Arms of Hope v. City of Mansfield, Texas

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH DIVISION
ARMS OF HOPE 	§
§
Plaintiff, 	§
§
v. 	§ 	Civil Action No. 4:23-CV-00131-O
§
CITY OF MANSFIELD, TEXAS 	§
§
Defendant. 	§
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER
Before the Court are Plaintiff Arms of Hope’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Brief in
Support, and Appendix in Support (ECF Nos. 71, 72, 73), filed on April 25, 2025; Defendant City
of Mansfield’s Response (ECF No. 79), filed May 30, 2025; and Plaintiff’s Reply (ECF No. 84),
filed June 20, 2026; Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment
and Brief in Support, and Appendix in Support (ECF Nos. 69, 70), filed on April 25, 2025;
Plaintiff’s Response (ECF No. 76), filed on May 30, 2025; and Defendant’s Reply (ECF No. 83),
filed on June 20, 2025; Defendant’s Objections to Plaintiff’s Summary Judgment Evidence and
Motion to Strike (ECF No. 78), filed on May 30, 2025; Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant’s Motion
to Strike (ECF No. 85), filed on June 20, 2025; and Defendant’s Reply (ECF No. 92), filed on July
21, 2025. For the reasons stated herein, Defendant’s Motion (ECF No. 69) is DENIED. Plaintiff’s
Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 71) is hereby GRANTED. Because the Court does not
rely on any of the challenged evidence in reaching its decision, Defendant’s Motion to Strike (ECF
No. 78) is DENIED as moot.
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I. 	BACKGROUND1
In 2022, the City of Mansfield (“Defendant” or the “City”) enacted regulations about
Unattended Donation Boxes (“UDBs”). The City added Chapter 116 to the Mansfield Code of
Donation Box Law to create a permitting process for donation boxes and amended Chapter 155 of
the 	Mansfield 	Code 	to 	regulate 	the 	location, 	placement, 	size, 	signage, 	appearance, 	and
maintenance of donation boxes (together, the “Donation Box Law” or the “Law”). In 2023, after
noticing an uptick in UDBs that “contributed to visual clutter,” “blight due to graffiti and poor
maintenance, and the accumulation of debris and excess items outside of the collection boxes,” the
City enacted two additional Donation Box Laws regulating such boxes—OR-2287-23 and OR-
2288-23. Together, the Donation Box Law created a complicated permitting scheme for every
UDB, regulating their location, placement, size, signage, appearance, and maintenance.
Plaintiff Arms of Hope (“Plaintiff” or “AOH”) is a Christian tax-exempt nonprofit
organization that cares for children, youth, and single mother families in their greatest time of
need. “AOH has been speaking and evangelizing its Christian message to the people of Mansfield
and associating with supporters through its UDBs since 2019.”2 Each of Plaintiff’s UDBs shows
AOH’s name and phone number.
The City threatened enforcement against Plaintiff for its failure to bring three of its UDBs
into compliance with the permitting scheme. AOH responded by bringing a facial challenge
against the Donation Box Law, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
and moved for both a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. This Court granted
the preliminary injunction holding that the Donation Box Law failed intermediate scrutiny as
applied to AOH’s right to speak. Defendant filed an interlocutory appeal, and Plaintiff cross-
1 Unless otherwise stated, the undisputed facts are taken from the parties’ summary judgment briefing.
2 Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J. Br. 2, ECF No. 72.
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appealed this Court’s reasoning. In early 2024, while the appeal was pending, the City enacted
OR-2342-24 and OR-2346-24. Those ordinances updated the zoning requirements, reduced which
streets the setback restrictions covered, eliminated the building-setback requirement, eased the
permitting restrictions, broadened 	the consent requirement, 	and imposed new advertising
restrictions.
The Fifth Circuit, held that the enactment of OR-2342-24 and OR-2346-24 “addressed the
supermajority of the [this Court’s] narrow-tailoring issues” and that “both ordinances expressly
repealed and replaced ‘all ordinances of the City in conflict with’ them.” Arms of Hope v. City of
Mansfield, Tex., 114 F.4th 374, 379 (5th Cir. 2024) (quoting OR-2342-24 § 3; OR-2346-24 § 4).
Based on this finding, the Fifth Circuit dismissed Defendant’s appeal and Plaintiff’s cross-appeal
as moot but held that the mootness of the appeal “‘does not prevent the district court from ruling
on any of Plaintiffs’ claims that remain justiciable.’” Arms of Hope, 114 F.4th at 381 (quoting U.S.
Navy SEALs 1-26 v. Biden, 72 F.4th 666, 675 (5th Cir. 2023)).
As a result of the 2024 ordinance amendments, Plaintiff does not challenge the Donation
Box Law’s requirements for permitting, appearance, and maintenance.3 But Plaintiff maintains
that the City’s location and color restrictions on UDBs are unconstitutional by unreasonably
restricting where UDBs can be placed, banning them through its zoning restrictions from churches
and schools throughout the City, and effectively hiding them from public view in the few areas in
which they are allowed.4
The Law’s zoning restrictions prohibit donation boxes from being placed in 11 of 20 zones
identified in the Donation Box Law. UDBs “are only permitted in the 2F, MF-1, MF-2, O-P, C-1,
3 Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J. Br. 4, ECF No. 72 (citing OR-2342-24, OR-2346-24, OR-2396-24).
4 Id.
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C-2, C-3, I-1, and I-2 Zoning Districts.”5 The setback restrictions ban UDBs from within 300 feet
of Mansfield’s three major roads (U.S. Hwy. 287, U.S. Business Hwy. 287, and State Hwy. 360),
within 250 feet of “any public parks and recreational facilities,” or within 75 feet of land zoned for
single-family use (A or SF).6 The location-on-lot restrictions limit donation boxes to (1) “the rear
yard or side yards only” such that “no donation box shall be located between any building and a
street”; (2) only on “a paved surface, separate and independent of all required parking spaces,
aisles, and loading dock and service areas”; and (3) “a minimum distance of 25 feet away from the
intersection of two or more fire lanes and/or drive aisles,” including parking lot drive aisles.7
Defendant moved to dismiss under 12(b)(1) or in the alternative, for summary judgment,
challenging Plaintiff’s standing to bring any of its claims.8 On the same day, Plaintiff moved for
summary judgment asking the Court to declare the challenged portions of the Donation Box Law
unconstitutional and to permanently enjoin Defendant from enforcing the Donation Box Law.9
The motions are now ripe for the Court’s review.
II. 	LEGAL STANARD
A. Rule 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and must have “statutory or constitutional
power to adjudicate the case.” Home Builders Ass’n of Miss. v. City of Madison, 143 F.3d 1006,
1010 (5th Cir. 1998). “Under the Constitution’s Article III cases and controversies requirement, a
plaintiff must establish standing to sue. Standing requires: (1) an injury in fact, (2) a sufficient
‘causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of’ and (3) a likelihood that the
5 OR-2436-24, § 3 (amending § 40(a)).
6 OR-2396-24 § 1; OR-2346-24 § 3.
7 OR-2436-24 § 3; Pl.’s App. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. (hereinafter “Pl.’s App.”) (Wheaton-Rodriguez Tr.)
68:25–69:2, APP145, ECF No 73.
8 Def. Mot. Dismiss. ECF No 69.
9 Pl. Mot. Summ. J. 2, ECF No. 71.
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injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.” Morgan v. Huntington Ingalls, Inc., 879 F.3d
602, 606 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992); U.S.
CONST. art. III, § 2. The injury cannot be merely “conjectural or hypothetical.” Summers v. Earth
Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 493 (2009). Causation requires that the injury “fairly can be traced to
the challenged action of the defendant” rather than to “the independent action of some third party
not before the court.” Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rts. Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41–42 (1976). “‘[W]hen
standing is challenged on the basis of the pleadings,’ [courts] must ‘accept as true all material
allegations of the complaint and . . . construe the complaint in favor of the complaining party.’”
Ass’n of Am. Physicians & Surgeons, Inc. v. Tex. Med. Bd., 627 F.3d 547, 550 (5th Cir. 2010)
(quoting Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 7 (1988)) (first alteration and omission in
original).
A Rule 12(b)(1) motion is proper when the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, including
for lack of standing. FED. R. C IV. P. 12(b)(1). To survive at the pleadings stage, a plaintiff must
“allege a plausible set of facts establishing jurisdiction.” Burnett Specialists v. Cowen, 140 F.4th
686, 693 (5th Cir. 2025) (citation omitted).
B. Rule 56(a) Motion for Summary Judgment
The Court may grant summary judgment when the pleadings and evidence show “that there
is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” F ED. R. C IV. P. 56(a). Summary judgment is not “a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather
. . . an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed to secure the just, speedy
and inexpensive determination of every action.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
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“[T]he substantive law will identify which facts are material.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A genuine dispute as to any material fact exists “if the evidence is
such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. The movant must
inform the court of the basis for its motion and demonstrate from the record that no genuine dispute
as to any material fact exists. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. The Court must view the evidence in the
light most favorable to the nonmovant. Ion v. Chevron USA, Inc., 731 F.3d 379, 389 (5th Cir.
2013). And if there appears to be some support for disputed allegations, such that “reasonable
minds could differ as to the import of the evidence,” the Court must deny the motion for summary
judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250.
“The party opposing summary judgment is required to identify specific evidence in the
record and to articulate the precise manner in which that evidence supports his or her claim.” Ragas
v. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 136 F.3d 455, 458 (5th Cir. 1998). “The opposing parties’ failure to
produce proof as to any essential element of a claim renders all other facts immaterial.” 2223
Lombardy Warehouse, LLC v. Mount Vernon Fire Ins. Co., No. 3:17-CV-2795-D, 2019 WL
1583558, at *6 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 12, 2019) (Fitzwater, J.). Summary judgment is mandatory if the
parties fail to meet this burden. Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994).
III. 	ANALYSIS
A. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Summary Judgment
Defendant moves to dismiss all of Plaintiff’s claims under Rule 12(b)(1), or in the
alternative, for summary judgment. Defendant offers three paragraphs of argument relating to
Plaintiff’s First Amendment standing and two paragraphs relating to Plaintiff’s RLUIPA standing.
Defendant challenges Plaintiff’s Article III standing, arguing that the Donation Box Law only
applies to “operators” of UDBs and that a third party (UTM), not Plaintiff, is the operator of the
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UDBs in question.10 Plaintiff responds that it meets all of the elements of standing and that the
“challenged law continues to prohibit the Christian charity’s protected religious exercise, speech,
and association through donation boxes, chilling its First Amendment rights and violating the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA).”11 The Court finds that Plaintiff
has standing to challenge the Donation Box Law under the First Amendment but not RLUIPA.
This Court must first satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction before turning to the merits.
See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 93–102 (1988). The Supreme Court has
crystallized three “irreducible” constitutional requirements for a party to have standing to pursue
a “case or controversy” within the meaning of Article III: injury-in-fact, traceability, and
redressability. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61. Plaintiff bears the burden to demonstrate standing for
each claim it seeks to press. See DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 352 (2006). The
implication of the City’s argument against Plaintiff’s First Amendment standing is that because
the Donation Box Law applies only to operators, UDB operators are the only ones who could be
harmed by the Donation Box Law. But this is not the law.
1. 	Plaintiff’s First Amendment Claims
In the First Amendment context, merely “chilling a plaintiff’s speech is a constitutional
harm adequate to satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement.” Speech First, Inc. v. Fenves, 979 F.3d
319, 330–31 (5th Cir. 2020), as revised (Oct. 30, 2020). To establish such injury, a plaintiff must
show (1) “an intention to engage in a course of conduct arguably affected with a constitutional
interest, (2) his intended future conduct is arguably proscribed by the policy in question and (3)
the threat of future enforcement of the challenged policies is substantial.” Id. at 330 (quoting Susan
B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 161–64 (2014)).
10 Def.’s Mot. Dismiss 6–9, ECF No. 69.
11 Pl.’s Resp. Def.’s Mot. Dismiss 1, ECF No. 76.
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Here, Plaintiff intends to continue soliciting charitable donations through its UDBs. As
noted above, the message on the UDBs is Plaintiff’s. The beneficiary of the donations is Plaintiff.
Such solicitation of charitable contributions is protected speech. See Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the
Blind of N. Carolina, Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 790 (1988). Furthermore, it is undisputed that the
Donation Box Law regulates, and consequently limits, the placement of UDPs in Mansfield. These
facts taken together, demonstrate that AOH’s charitable solicitation is a “course of conduct
arguably affected with a constitutional interest” and that its constitutional interest is proscribed by
the Donation Box Law. Speech First, 979 F.3d at 330; see also Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of Texas,
Inc. v. City of Arlington, Texas, 109 F.4th 728, 733 (5th Cir. 2024) (holding that an ordinance
regulating donation boxes that contain charitable solicitations “implicates protected expression and
triggers First Amendment analysis”).
The third element of injury-in-fact is whether the “threat of future enforcement of the
challenged policies is substantial.” Speech First, 979 F.3d at 330. There is ample evidence in the
record that the Donation Box Law would be enforced against Plaintiff. Defendant has already
enforced the previous versions of the Donation Box Law against AOH’s boxes in 2022 and 2023.12
According to the City, despite amendment, at least three of AOH’s UDPs do not comply with the
Donation Box Law.13 Such an acknowledgment renders it a virtual certainty that the Donation Box
Law will be enforced against Plaintiff. Therefore, Plaintiff has met its burden to demonstrate
injury-in-fact because Plaintiff’s charitable solicitations are proscribed by the Donation Box Law,
and the threat of future enforcement is substantial.
Finally, Plaintiff also satisfies the remaining two elements of standing: traceability and
redressability. The injury Plaintiff claims is clearly traceable to the City’s Donation Box Law
12 Pl.’s App. APP021–26, ECF No. 73.
13 Pl.’s App. (Nicolette Ricciuti Tr.) 91:1–6, 108:17–23, APP121, 125, ECF No. 73.
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because the Donation Box Law is the direct cause of the proscription on Plaintiff’s speech. Such
prescription would be redressed were the Court to grant Plaintiff’s requested relief. Accordingly,
Plaintiff has met its burden to establish standing for its First Amendment claims.
Even assuming arguendo that Plaintiff must be an operator to have standing, Plaintiff likely
is an operator by the Donation Box Law’s own terms. Neither the Donation Box Law nor the City
Code define the term “operator.” Section 155.012 defines “Donation Box” as “[a]ny drop-off box,
bin, container, receptacle . . . that accepts donated textiles, clothing, shoes, books, toys, household
items . . . to be used by the operator for distribution, resale or recycling.”14 The Donation Box Law
likewise states that “[e]ach donation box shall bear the name and a contact telephone number of
the operator of the donation box who benefits from the collected materials on a sign.”15 Defendant
does not dispute that Plaintiff is the entity that uses the donated items placed in Plaintiff’s UDBs
for distribution, resale or recycling. Nor does Defendant challenge the evidence that Plaintiff is the
one who benefits from the collected materials.16 Therefore, the Donation Box Law assumes
Plaintiff’s status as the operator and Plaintiff would have standing to challenge the Donation Box
Law.
2. Plaintiff’s RLUIPA Claims
Defendant offers two paragraphs of argument to challenge Plaintiff’s standing under
RLUIPA. Defendant asserts that Plaintiff “has no standing to challenge the zoning ordinance under
RLUIPA because AOH neither owns nor leases real property in the City.”17 Plaintiff responds that
it “has had written agreements [(“Placement Agreements”)] with the owners of five different
14 Mansfield, Tex., Code of Ordinances ch. 155, § 155.012 (emphasis added).
15 Pl.’s App. APP056, ECF No. 73.
16 Pl.’s App. (Robertson Tr.) 35:19–36:14 APP090; 48:13–17, APP093; Tr. 24:11–12, APP087, ECF No.
73.
17 Def.’s Mot. Dismiss 8, ECF No. 69.
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properties in Mansfield to use a particular part of their property for a donation box in return for a
monthly payment of $100” which gives Plaintiff the requisite property interest.18 The Court agrees
with Defendant.19
RLUIPA defines a “land use regulation” as a “zoning or landmarking law, or the
application of such a law, that limits or restricts a claimant’s use or development of land (including
a structure affixed to land), if the claimant has an ownership, leasehold, easement, servitude, or
other property interest in the regulated land or a contract or option to acquire such an interest.” 42
U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(5). The Court agrees with Plaintiff that permission to utilize property certainly
could suffice as a property interest, but only if permission is conferred in a way that is recognized
by the law. See Taylor v. City of Gary, 233 F. App’x 561, 562 (7th Cir. 2007) (requiring RLUIPA
land use claimant to have a “legally recognized property interest” in the land at issue). Because
the property at issue is located in Texas, Texas law will determine whether Plaintiff’s interest in
the property is “legally recognized.”
Plaintiff’s Placement Agreements are most akin to licenses, which do not convey
possession or an interest in the property itself. Under Texas law, “[g]enerally, an easement
constitutes an interest in the land itself, while a license merely confers a privilege to do some act
or acts upon the land without conveying any interest in or title to the land itself.” Thompson v.
Clayton, 346 S.W.3d 650, 654 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2009, no pet.). A “real property license” is “a
privilege to go on premises for a certain purpose, but does not operate to confer on, or vest in,
licensee any title, interest or estate in such property.” H.E.Y. Tr. v. Popcorn Express Co., 35
18 Pl.’s Response Mot. Dismiss 24, ECF No. 76.
19 Plaintiff correctly points out in its response that statutory standing is addressed “under a 12(b)(6)
standard” rather than 12(b)(1). However, statutory standing can be raised at the motion for summary
judgment stage and Defendant’s moved for summary judgment in the alternative. Regardless of any
procedural deficiencies, Defendant raised the same arguments in its response to Plaintiff’s Motion for
Summary Judgment and are therefore properly before the Court.
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S.W.3d 55, 58 (Tex. App. —Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied) (quoting license, B LACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY 920 (6th ed. 1990)). “Licenses are generally revocable at the will of the
licensor.” Joseph v. Sheriffs’ Asso. of Tex., 430 S.W.2d 700, 704 (Tex. Civ. App.—Austin 1968,
no writ).
Here, Plaintiff’s Placement Agreements provide Plaintiff with the privilege of placing its
UDBs on a premises and authorize Plaintiff to be the property owner’s “Exclusive Textile
collection agent.”20 The Placement Agreements are explicitly revocable at any time by the property
owner.21 As a license, the Placement Agreements are analogous to those Texas cases relating to
the contractual rights of owners of coin-operated vending machines. See B. & B. Vending Co. v.
Ducharme, 349 S.W.2d 630 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1961, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (holding that the
agreement was not a lease because the intention of one party “to dispossess himself of the premises
and of the other party to occupy them” was lacking); see also Hancock v. Bradshaw, 350 S.W.2d
955 (Tex. Civ. App.—Amarillo 1961, no writ).
Though the Placement Agreements give Plaintiff, in a very limited sense, a stake in the
property, they do not convey a legally cognizable interest in the regulated property. See E. End
Eruv Ass’n, 	Inc. 	v. 	Vill. of Westhampton Beach, 828 F.Supp.2d 	526, 540–41 (E.D.N.Y.
2011) (concluding that plaintiffs, who were granted a revocable license to use the subject land,
held an insufficient property interest under RLUIPA’s definition of “land use regulation”); see
also Muslim Cmty. Ass’n of Ann Arbor v. Pittsfield Charter Twp., No. 12-CV-10803, 2015 WL
1286813, at *9 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 20, 2015).
20 See e.g. Pl.’s App. APP164, ECF No. 73.
21 Under the “OUR PLEDGE TO YOU” section of the Placement Agreements, Plaintiff commits “To
remove the donation box at any time requested.” Id.
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Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to
Plaintiff’s RLUIPA claims. The Court DENIES Defendant’s Motion as to Plaintiff’s First
Amendment claims.
B. Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment
Plaintiff moves for summary judgment, arguing that the Donation Box Law facially and as
applied, violates three clauses of RLUIPA and Plaintiff’s freedoms of religion, speech, and
association under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.22 Having dismissed Plaintiff’s RLUIPA
claims for the reasons given supra, the Court addresses each of Plaintiff’s remaining First
Amendment claims in turn.
1. 	Plaintiff’s Free Exercise Claims
Generally, in a Free Exercise case, if the law is neutral and generally applicable, the
government prevails. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 886 (1990). However, if the
plaintiff can demonstrate that there is animus against religion in the enactment of the ordinance,
see Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533 (1993), animus against religion
in the enforcement process, see Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civ. Rights Comm’n, 584
U.S. 617, 631 (2018), or that the law is not on its face neutral and generally applicable or not
applied in a neutral and generally applicable manner, strict scrutiny applies. Tandon v. Newsom,
593 U.S. 61, 64 (2021).
Plaintiff first argues that Defendant has acted with animus toward Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s
religious expression as evidenced by Defendant threatening to “hammer” Plaintiff and to “stack
the municipal court in its favor to ‘remove these damn things.’”23 Plaintiff contends that
Defendant’s “disparate enforcement of other donation boxes that similarly do not comply with the
22 Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J. Br. 13–14, ECF No. 72.
23 Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J. Br. 29, ECF No. 72.
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City’s 	overly 	burdensome 	regulation” 	further 	shows 	that 	Plaintiff 	is 	“target[ed]” 	for
enforcement.24 Defendant responds that Plaintiff’s evidence of animus is “inapposite” because it
does not show the legislative intent of the entire city council nor that such intent “is reflected in
the plain text of the ordinance, purpose statements contained in the preamble, and the city’s
legislative record.”25 	The City’s actions, though concerning, do not appear to target Plaintiff
because of Plaintiff’s religious motivations.26
The Supreme Court has held that “[a]lthough a law targeting religious beliefs as such is
never permissible . . . if the object of a law is to infringe upon or restrict practices because of their
religious motivation, the law is not neutral.” Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, at 533 (1993)
(emphasis added); see also Bethel World Outreach Ministries v. Montgomery Cnty. Council, 706
F.3d 	548 	(4th 	Cir. 	2013) 	(affirming 	grant 	of 	summary 	judgment 	for 	defendants 	on 	a
nondiscrimination claim where plaintiff failed to put forth any evidence that the government’s
actions against plaintiff were because plaintiff was a religious organization). As the record stands,
Plaintiff has not produced any evidence to suggest that its religious character was the reason for
the City’s animus. Accordingly, strict scrutiny does not apply.
Plaintiff next argues that the Donation Box Law is not neutral and generally applicable
because the City Code allows for trash cans where donation boxes are prohibited and that such
24 Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J. Br. 29, ECF No. 72.
25 Def.’s Resp. Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J. 20, ECF No. 79.
26 The Court notes that the City’s desire to “hammer” Plaintiff and the fact that the only UDB permit so far
approved would render one of Plaintiff’s UDBs illicit, are highly concerning actions that may evidence the
City’s targeted animus toward Plaintiff. The Court also notes the City’s argument that evidence of AOH’s
sincerely held religious beliefs should be disregarded as anthropomorphic. Such arguments are squarely
foreclosed. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 706–07 (2014). It is the beliefs of the
people associated with a corporation or association that are protected. Id. Consequently, the Court reminds
Defendant that “the sincerity of a plaintiff’s engagement in a particular religious practice is rarely
challenged” and that “examin[ing] religious convictions any more deeply would stray into the realm of
religious inquiry, an area into which we are forbidden to tread.” Moussazadeh v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Justice,
703 F.3d 781, 790–92 (5th Cir. 2012).
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allowance triggers strict scrutiny.27 Assuming arguendo that Plaintiff’s operation of the UDBs
constitutes an exercise of religion, the Supreme Court has held that “government regulations are
not neutral and generally applicable, and therefore trigger strict scrutiny under the Free Exercise
Clause, whenever they treat any comparable secular activity more favorably than religious
exercise.” Tandon, 593 U.S. at 62. To determine “whether two activities are comparable for
purposes of the Free Exercise Clause,” they “must be judged against the asserted government
interest that justifies the regulation at issue.” Id. The Supreme Court has explained that
“[c]omparability is concerned with the risks various activities pose, not the reasons why people
gather.” Id.
Plaintiff asserts that trash receptacles are sufficiently similar to UDBs to be a valid secular
comparator. The Court disagrees. According to Plaintiff, “[t]he City’s asserted interests in
regulating donation boxes and trash receptacles are the same . . . . Both laws state a broad general
welfare interest that boils down to aesthetics.”28 But even if the stated purpose in regulating UDBs
and trash receptacles are the same, the risks associated with each are sufficiently distinct so as to
warrant them incomparable.
As Plaintiff points out, Defendant’s asserted interest in passing the zoning ordinance is, at
least in part, “blight” and “health and sanitation.”29 However, the ordinance itself states that the
inability to “accurately identify the owners of such donation boxes” is also part of the reason for
the ordinance.30 In general, the City is the one responsible for trash receptacles. Thus, the party
responsible for any violation or maintenance of a trash receptacle is more easily identifiable than
the party similarly responsible for a privately owned and placed UDB. Because the City can better
27 Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J. Br. 29, ECF No. 72.
28 Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J. Br. 29–30, ECF No. 72 (internal citation omitted).
29 Pl.’s App. APP005 (OR-2346-24), ECF No. 73.
30 Pl.’s App. APP006 (OR-2346-24), ECF No. 73.
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regulate the risks of blight, health, and sanitation posed by public utilities like trash receptacles,
the risks posed by the latter and UDBs are distinct. Moreover, Plaintiff’s asserted activity is the
solicitation of donations for charitable purposes.31 Plaintiff maintains that this solicitation is
constitutionally protected speech and religious exercise. But there is no evidence before the Court
that trash receptacles engage in speech, let alone religious exercise. The mismatch of the activity
of trash receptacles and UDBs renders the comparison untenable. The more accurate comparator
is non-religious UDBs.
Non-religious UDBs also engage in solicitation and donative speech, like Plaintiff’s UDBs.
They are also privately owned and operated, like Plaintiff’s UDBs. They pose the same risks as
identified by the City. But unlike trash receptacles, non-religious UDBs are typically not part of
the public utility infrastructure. When compared to non-religious UDBs, Plaintiff’s UDBs are
treated identically. The Donation Box Law does not differentiate between those UDBs run by a
religious organization and those run by a secular one. Accordingly, the Donation Box Law is a
neutral law of general applicability and is facially constitutional under the Free Exercise Clause.
See Smith, 494 U.S. at 886.
2. 	Plaintiff’s Free of Speech Claims
i. 	Strict Scrutiny Does Not Apply
The First Amendment, applicable to municipalities vested with state authority through the
Fourteenth Amendment, provides that governments “shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom
of speech.” U.S. Const. amend. I; see, e.g., Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 163 (2015).
Charitable solicitations are fully protected speech. See Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better
Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 632–33 (1980). For a First Amendment challenge, the appropriate level of
31 Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J. Br. 31, ECF No. 72.
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scrutiny depends on whether the Donation Box Law is content-based or content-neutral. City of
Arlington, 109 F.4th at 734. If content-based, the Donation Box Law is “presumptively
unconstitutional” and must survive strict scrutiny and if content-neutral, intermediate scrutiny
applies. Id.
“A regulation of speech is facially content based under the First Amendment if it ‘target[s]
speech based on its communicative content’—that is, if it ‘applies to particular speech because of
the topic discussed or the idea or message expressed.’” City of Austin v. Reagan Nat’l Advert. of
Austin, LLC, 596 U.S. 61, 69 (2022). The Fifth Circuit has recently ruled that where an ordinance
“regulates all donation boxes, encompassing both charitable and non-charitable solicitations” and
“‘is agnostic as to content’ . . . [the ordinance is] facially content-neutral to the extent it regulates
expressive activity.” City of Arlington, 109 F.4th at 735.
Plaintiff first argues that “strict scrutiny applies here because the Donation Box Law targets
and prohibits a type of charitable solicitation and is thus content based.”32 Plaintiff next argues
that “the City’s less favorable treatment of donation boxes compared to trash reflects a content
preference.”33 Plaintiff urges this Court to adopt the reasoning of the Sixth Circuit in Planet Aid v.
City of St. Johns, 782 F.3d 318 (6th Cir. 2015), that found a similar city ordinance to be content-
based.34 Finally, Plaintiff argues that the City has demonstrated animus towards it as a speaker,
which triggers strict scrutiny.35
In City of Arlington, the Fifth Circuit addressed two of Plaintiff’s arguments regarding a
materially similar donation box regulation and explicitly departed from Planet Aid. First, the court
held that the ordinance in that case “specifically regulate[d] only the manner and place of donation
32 Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J. Br. 33, ECF No. 72.
33 Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J. Br. 33, ECF No. 72.
34 Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J. Br. 33–34, ECF No. 72.
35 Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J. Br. 34, ECF No. 72.
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solicitation—e.g., solicitation in the manner of a donation box, located in prohibited places.” City
of Arlington, 109 F.4th at 734 (emphasis in original). Therefore, the ordinance discriminated “‘on
the basis of non-expressive, non-communicative conduct’—solicitation manner and place—but
[did] ‘not discriminate based on topic, subject matter, or viewpoint.’” Id. (quoting Recycle for
Change v. City of Oakland, 856 F.3d 666, 672 (9th Cir. 2017)). 	Second, the court found that
donated items do not have an exclusively charitable connotation and therefore the regulation “is
agnostic as to content.” See City of Arlington, 109 F.4th 735 (analyzing the definition of “donate”
and “charity”).
The Court finds no reason to distinguish this case from that of City of Arlington as to the
applicable level of scrutiny. Because the Donation Box Law “regulates all donation boxes,
encompassing both charitable and non-charitable solicitations[] [i]t ‘is agnostic as to content’, and,
therefore, facially content-neutral to the extent it regulates expressive activity.” Id. Critical to the
Court’s finding is that “although the [Donation Box Law] curtails solicitation by the manner of
donation 	boxes, 	entities 	may 	continue 	to 	solicit 	donations 	by all 	other 	means in all
locations within the city.” City of Arlington, 109 F.4th at 734 (emphasis in original).
Plaintiff’s final argument as to why strict scrutiny should apply is because there is evidence
that the City has shown animus toward it as a speaker.36 Under Plaintiff’s own cited authority, a
law “favoring some speakers over others demand[s] strict scrutiny when the legislature’s speaker
preference reflects a content preference.” Reed, 576 U.S. at 170 (quoting Turner Broadcasting
System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 658 (1994)) (emphasis added). The Fifth Circuit has held “‘the
principal inquiry in determining content-neutrality, in speech cases generally and in time, place,
or manner cases in particular, is whether the government has adopted a regulation of speech
36 Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J. Br. 34, ECF No. 72.
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because of disagreement with the message it conveys.’” Palmer ex rel. Palmer v. Waxahachie
Independent School District, 579 F.3d 502, 510 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Ward v. Rock Against
Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)). There is no evidence in the record before the Court that
Defendant’s 	negative 	treatment 	of 	Plaintiff 	reflects 	a 	content 	preference 	nor 	the 	City’s
disagreement with Plaintiff’s message. As discussed above, though the City’s actions are
concerning, and may demonstrate animus toward Plaintiff, they do not trigger strict scrutiny.37
Accordingly, the Court analyzes the Donation Box law under intermediate scrutiny.
ii. 	Intermediate Scrutiny Applies
To survive intermediate scrutiny, a content-neutral restriction on speech or expression must
be “narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest” and “leave open ample
alternative channels for communication of the information.” Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491
U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The City asserts the significant government interests of protecting the public’s health,
safety, and welfare, “the promotion of consistent land uses and development, the protection of
property rights and the protection of landowners and residents of the” City.38 Plaintiff asserts, and
the City does not dispute, that the City’s interest in regulating UDBs boils down to aesthetics.39
The Supreme Court has concluded such interests are significant. See Members of City Council v.
Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 805–07 (1984) (“[M]unicipalities have a weighty, essentially
[a]esthetic interest in proscribing intrusive and unpleasant formats for expression”); Metromedia,
Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 510 (1981) (plurality opinion) (upholding city’s aesthetic
37 See supra at n. 26.
38 Pl.’s App. APP055 (OR-2396-24 at 1), ECF No. 73.
39 Pl. Mot. Summ. J. Br. 6, ECF No. 72.
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interest in removing billboards in part because “[s]uch [a]esthetic judgments are necessarily
subjective, 	defying 	objective 	evaluation”); McCullen 	v. 	Coakley, 	573 	U.S. 	464, 	486–87
(2014) (recognizing legitimacy of government’s interests in “ensuring public safety and order,
promoting the free flow of traffic on streets and sidewalks, protecting property rights” (citation
omitted)). As a result, the only remaining question is whether the zoning provision and setback
requirement are (1) “narrowly tailored” and (2) “leave open ample alternative channels of
communication.” Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
“[N]arrow tailoring is satisfied so long as the . . . regulation promotes a substantial
government interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation.” Ward, 491 U.S.
at 799 (second alteration in original) (citation omitted). And the City is required to “demonstrate
that alternative measures that burden substantially less speech . . . fail to achieve [its]
interests.” McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, 495 (2014).
In City of Arlington, the Fifth Circuit held a similar zoning ordinance to be narrowly
tailored stating that “[b]ecause one of the substantive evils Arlington seeks to eliminate—‘visual
blight’—is created in part by the donation boxes themselves, the zoning provision ‘curtails no
more speech than is necessary to accomplish its purpose.’” City of Arlington, 109 F.4th at 738
(quoting Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 810). Plaintiff argues that City of Arlington is
distinguishable because Defendant does not consider a well-maintained donation box to be
“unsightly.”40 Defendant offers no discernable response. The Court agrees with Plaintiff.
Critical to the Fifth Circuits ruling in City of Arlington was an analysis of the zoning
ordinance under Taxpayers for Vincent because the city maintained that even a well-kept donation
box was a visual blight. Id. In Taxpayers for Vincent, the Supreme Court concluded that the “visual
40 Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J. Br. 34, ECF No. 72.
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assault . . . presented by [the] accumulation of signs” on public property was “a significant
substantive evil within the [c]ity’s power to prohibit.” 466 U.S. at 807. The city’s prohibition on
such signs was a proper means to address that “evil.” Id. at 808. In City of Arlington, the court
found that the zoning provision was similarly justified because the city’s concern about visual
blight “is created in part by the donation boxes themselves.” 109 F.4th at 738. Because the city’s
aesthetic interest was only achieved by a total ban on all UDBs, the ordinance was sufficiently
narrow to achieve that interest.
Here, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the City, the summary judgment
evidence shows that Defendant does not regard a clean, well-maintained UDB to be visual blight.
As Plaintiff points out, when asked “[i]s it that the City does not like the look of donation bins?,”
the City’s representative responded, “No. We don’t like the accumulation of trash and debris or
unmaintained areas.”41 The City reiterated that a clean, well-maintained donation box is “not an
aesthetic harm,” does not present any “aesthetic issues,” is not “itself blight,” and is not
“unsightly.”42 Because the City does not regard the medium of expression itself—UDBs—as the
cause of visual blight, an outright ban on UDBs is not narrowly tailored to achieve the City’s
interests and Taxpayers for Vincent does not apply for the same reasons.
The City’s zoning provisions ban even clean and well maintained UDBs from most of the
City. Such a total ban cannot be construed as narrowly tailored because the Law’s permitting and
maintenance requirements would address the City’s stated interests in aesthetics, safety, and land
development. As the dissent noted in City of Arlington, the Supreme Court “differentiated between
narrowly tailored rules that ‘respond[] precisely’ to a city’s problems and broad rules that end up
‘gratuitously infring[ing] upon’ protected speech. City of Arlington, 109 F.4th at 742 (Graves, J.,
41 Pl.’s App. (Ricciuti Tr.) 50:1–4, APP111, ECF No. 73.
42 Pl.’s App. (Ricciuti Tr.) 45:3–6, 49:23–25, 54:15–17, APP109–12, ECF No. 73.
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concurring in part and dissenting in part). The zoning provision is an example of the latter.” Id. at
743.43
Similarly, the Law’s setback restrictions and location-on-lot restrictions do not further
Defendant’s stated interests. By Defendant’s own admission, the City’s asserted interests of
“health, safety and welfare of the general public,” “promotion of consistent land uses and
development,” and “the protection of property rights and . . . landowners and residents of
Mansfield” are not imperiled by clean, well maintained UDBs with identifiable operators.44 The
Law’s permitting and maintenance requirements already address the City’s specific interest in
safety, property rights, and aesthetics by prohibiting graffiti, trash, debris, and maintenance
problems in and around the boxes, and they provide accountability through the permitting, the
identification of persons responsible for the boxes, and steep civil and criminal penalties for any
violation.45
The City’s response to Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment contains one paragraph
addressing Plaintiff’s “Constitutional claims.”46 As the record stands, 	Defendant fails to
demonstrate how the Law’s permitting and maintenance requirements, which burden substantially
less speech than the challenged provisions, would fail to achieve the government’s interests.
McCullen, 573 U.S at 495. The record does demonstrate that UDBs create “specific problems; the
[C]ity created specific provisions to address those specific problems; and that it also created []
zoning provision[s,] [setback restrictions, and location-on-lot restrictions] attacking the [UDBs]
43 The Court does not reach whether UDBs are an “important and distinct medium of expression” because
it finds that Taxpayers for Vincent does not apply on other grounds.
44 See Pl.’s App. (Ricciuti Tr.) 45:3–6, 49:23–25, 54:15–17, APP109–12, ECF No. 73.
45 See id. at APP003–04 (§ 116.03(A)(1)–(5), (B)).
46 Def.’s Resp. Pl. Mot. Summ. J. 8, ECF No. 79.
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much more indiscriminately.” City of Arlington, 109 F.4th at 742 (Graves, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
Accordingly, the Court finds that the zoning provisions, setback restrictions, and location-
on-lot restrictions’ substantial speech limitations are not necessary to serve the City’s goals,
particularly, in light of provisions of the Law that more properly “focus[] on the source of the evils
the [C]ity seeks to eliminate.” See Ward, 491 U.S. at 799 & n.7. Therefore, the zoning provision,47
setback restrictions,48 and location-on-lot restrictions49 fail intermediate scrutiny by burdening
substantially 	more 	speech 	than 	is 	necessary 	to 	achieve 	the 	City’s 	stated 	interests 	and
unconstitutionally violate Plaintiff’s First Amendment right to speak.50
3. 	Whether the Color Restriction Constitutes an Impermissible Prior Restraint
Plaintiff contends that the Law’s “vague and undefined color requirements grant too much
discretion to the licensor and enable arbitrary and capricious application of the licensing
scheme.”51 The Donation Box Law requires “neutral or earth-tone color[ing]” and prohibits
“[h]igh-intensity colors.”52 Those terms are not defined in the Donation Box Law or elsewhere in
the Code.
“[T]he [Supreme] Court has long held that ‘law[s] subjecting the exercise of First
Amendment freedoms to the prior restraint of a license, without narrow, objective, and definite
standards to guide the licensing authority, [are] unconstitutional.’” Freedom From Religion
47 OR-2436-24, § 3 (amending § 40(a)).
48 OR-2396-24 § 1; OR-2346-24 § 3.
49 OR-2436-24 § 3.
50 Because the Court finds that the Law’s zoning provisions, setback restrictions, and location-on-lot
restrictions unconstitutional for the reasons stated supra, the Court does not reach Plaintiff’s claim that the
Law violates its right to associate. Similarly, the Court need not address Plaintiff’s overbreath claim.
51 Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J. Br. 43, ECF No. 72.
52 OR-2346-24 § 3(c)11.
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Found. v. Abbott, 955 F.3d 417, 427 (5th Cir. 2020) (third and fourth alterations in original)
(quoting Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 150–51 (1969)). This is often referred
to as the “unbridled discretion doctrine.” Id. “A government regulation that allows arbitrary
application is inherently inconsistent with a valid time, place, and manner regulation because such
discretion has the potential for becoming a means of suppressing 	a particular point of
view.” Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 130 (1992) (citation omitted). “[A]
time, place, and manner regulation [must] contain adequate standards to guide the official’s
decision and render it subject to effective judicial review.” Thomas v. Chi. Park Dist., 534 U.S.
316, 323 (2002).
Typically, even if the Court were to “assume vagueness in the words identified by
[Plaintiff]” the Law’s standards need only be “reasonably specific and objective, and [cannot]
leave the decision to the whim of the administrator.” City of Arlington, 109 F.4th at 741 (quoting
Thomas, 534 U.S. at 324) (emphasis in original). However, the evidence before the Court shows
that the City has discretion to decide what constitutes “high intensity” ad hoc.53 Further evidence
shows that the City was unable to articulate the basis for denying a permit for a green donation
box as high-intensity, other than to cite the Law.54 The City could not identify or provide any
guidelines, measurements, or criteria for determining permissible intensity.55 The City offers no
explanation as to how “high-intensity colors” may be differentiated from similarly prohibited
“neon colors.” Given the City’s admission that it makes the “determination” as to color without
providing a definite standard, the Court finds that the prohibition on “high-intensity colors” to be
an unconstitutional prior restraint. Freedom From Religion Found., 955 F.3d at 427.
53 See Pl.’s App. (Wheaton-Rodriguez Tr.) 71:17–19, 74:13–75:3, APP146–47, ECF No. 73.
54 Pl.’s App. at APP194–95 (CITY 0666–67); Pl.’s App. (Ricciuti Tr.) 81:3–91:6, APP118, ECF No. 73.
55 Pl.’s App. (Wheaton-Rodriguez Tr.) 71:15–75:3, APP146-47, ECF No. 73.
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C. Permanent Injunctive Relief
Plaintiff is entitled to permanent injunctive relief. A permanent injunction is proper when
a plaintiff (1) prevails on the merits, (2) there is no adequate remedy at law for the plaintiff’s
otherwise irreparable injury, (3) the balance of the harms favors the plaintiff, and (4) an injunction
would serve the public interest. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).
Plaintiff satisfies each of these elements.
Plaintiff satisfies the first requirement because it succeeds on the merits by establishing a
violation of its First Amendment rights, as explained supra. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373
(1976) (“The loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably
constitutes irreparable injury.”). Second, monetary damages cannot compensate Plaintiff for the
loss of its constitutionally protected rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The
deprivation of constitutional rights is immeasurable. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,
343 U.S. 579, 585 (1952). Third, given the Court’s finding that Plaintiff’s harm is irreparable, the
City “would need to present powerful evidence of harm to its interests” to prevent Plaintiff from
meeting this requirement. See Opulent Life Church, 697 F.3d at 297. Here, the Court finds that the
City’s interests are outweighed by the threat of injury to Plaintiff should an injunction not be
granted. Finally, an injunction will not disserve the public interest because “injunctions
protecting First Amendment freedoms are always in the public interest.” Texans for Free Enter. v.
Tex. Ethics Comm’n, 732 F.3d 535, 539 (5th Cir. 2013) (internal citations omitted).
Because Plaintiff carries its burden as to each of the permanent injunction factors, the Court
next addresses the scope of the injunction. When ordering equitable relief, the Court is obligated
to state “specifically” and “in reasonable detail . . . the act or acts restrained or required” under the
injunction. FED. R. C IV. P. 65(d)(1)(b)–(c). The scope of injunctive relief is “dictated by the extent
of the violation established.” Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 702 (1979). An injunction
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“should be crafted to provide ‘complete relief to the plaintiffs.’” Mock v. Garland, 75 F.4th 563,
587 (5th Cir. 2023) (quoting Yamasaki, 442 U.S. at 702). At the same time, the injunction “should
be no more burdensome to the defendant than necessary to provide complete relief to the
plaintiffs.” Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 765 (1994) (citation omitted). And
it must be tailored to “redress the plaintiff’s particular injury.” Gill v. Whitford, 585 U.S. 48, 73
(2018).
Accordingly, the Court hereby ENJOINS the City of Mansfield from enforcing Mansfield
Ordinance Nos. OR-2396-24 and OR-2346-24 §§ 2, 3(a), 3(c)(1)–(6), (9)–(11), and any other
provisions that are inconsistent with this Order, against Plaintiff Arms of Hope.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 71) is hereby
GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Mansfield Ordinance Nos. OR-2396-24 and OR-
2346-24 §§ 2, 3(a), 3(c)(1)–(6), (9)–(11), and any other provisions that are inconsistent with this
Order, are hereby declared unconstitutional and that the City of Mansfield is enjoined from
enforcing such provisions against Plaintiff Arms of Hope.
SO ORDERED on this 19th day of February, 2026.
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