Johnson v. Gregg County Sheriff Department

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
SADRICK BEVARD JOHNSON, 	§
Plaintiff, 	§
§
v. 	§ 	No. 3:26-CV-1044-N-BW
§
GREGG COUNTY SHERIFF 	§
DEPARTMENT, 	§
Defendant. 	§ 	Referred to U.S. Magistrate Judge1
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION
OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Before the Court is the Complaint for a Civil Case, filed on April 1, 2026.
(Dkt. No. 3.) Based on the relevant filings and applicable law, the Court should
DISMISS the complaint without prejudice as frivolous and malicious and for failure
to state a claim.
I. BACKGROUND
On April 1, 2026, Sadrick Bevard Johnson filed this pro se civil action against
the Gregg County Sheriff’s Department. (See id.) Johnson’s statement of his claim,
in its entirety, reads as follows: “Mental cruelty witchcraft applications uniform
organized crime attempted aggravated kidnapping organized crime invasion of
privacy mental exhaustion PTSD discrimination stalking harassment terrorizing
terroristic threats.” (Id. at 4 (capitalization altered).) He appears to seek a total of
$20 billion “and more.” (Id.)
1 By Special Order No. 3-251, this pro se case has been automatically referred for full
case management.
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Since January 13, 2026, Johnson has filed 14 civil actions—including this
one—in this Court against various state agencies, state courts, state and federal law
enforcement entities and officials, and individuals, and in which he presents fantastic
and delusional allegations. He has not filed an application to proceed in forma
pauperis or paid the applicable filing fee in any of his cases. One of his other actions
was filed against the same Defendant and asserted similar fanciful allegations in its
statement of the claim as in this case: “Organized crime 3 counts of aggravated
kidnapping false arrest fraud harassment mental cruelty witchcraft applications
criminal trespassing invasion of privacy negligence of liable defamation of character
slandering.” Johnson v. Gregg Cnty. Sheriff Dep’t., No. 3:26-CV-92-S-BT, Dkt. No. 3 at
4 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 13, 2026) (capitalization altered). His cases thus far have been
dismissed for lack of prosecution or transferred to another district, or they are
pending initial screening. In all or almost all of these cases, mail sent by the Clerk of
Court to the address provided by Johnson is returned undelivered. See, e.g., Johnson,
No. 3:26-CV-92-S-BT, Dkt. No. 5.
II. ANALYSIS
Johnson’s complaint is subject to screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
That statute authorizes the sua sponte dismissal of a complaint if the Court finds that
it is frivolous or malicious. A complaint is frivolous when it is “based on an
indisputably meritless legal theory” or when its factual contentions are “clearly
‘baseless.’” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32 (1992); see also Neitzke v. Williams,
490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). The latter category encompasses allegations that describe
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“fanciful, fantastic, and delusional” scenarios or that “rise to the level of the
irrational or the wholly incredible.” Denton, 504 U.S. at 33 (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted). “A complaint is malicious if it duplicates claims
involving the same series of events and allegations of many of the same facts asserted
by the same plaintiff in prior or pending litigation[.]” Amrhein v. United States, 740 F.
App’x 65, 66 (5th Cir. 2018) (citing, among others, Pittman v. Moore, 980 F.2d 994,
994-95 (5th Cir. 1993)); see also Shakouri v. Davis, 923 F.3d 407, 410 (5th Cir. 2019)
(“We have repeatedly stated that a claim qualifies as malicious if it is virtually
identical to and based on the same series of events as a claim previously brought by
the plaintiff.”).
The Court must always liberally construe pleadings filed by pro se litigants.
See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (noting pro se pleadings “must be held
to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers”); Fed. R. Civ. P.
8(e) (“Pleadings must be construed so as to do justice.”). Even under the most liberal
construction, Johnson fails to state a viable legal claim or anything that can be
construed as such.2
Johnson’s factual allegations present, at best, no more than “legal
conclusions[,] mere labels[,] threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action[,]
conclusory statements[,] and naked assertions devoid of further factual
2 Additionally, there is no indication—and Johnson does not allege—that venue lies
in this District for this case or for any of his other cases filed in this Court, as is reflected by
the transfer of most of his cases to either the Eastern District of Texas or the Western
District of Texas. Indeed, according to his complaint, Johnson himself does not even reside
within the Northern District of Texas. (See, e.g., Dkt. No. 3 at 1); 28 U.S.C. § 124(c)(1).
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enhancement” in support of his purported entitlement to federal relief. Armstrong v.
Ashley, 60 F.4th 262, 269 (5th Cir. 2023) (citation omitted). None of these categories
of statements is sufficient to state a plausible claim to relief on the face of the
complaint. See Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 570; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009). Further, the substance of Johnson’s allegations—to the extent they are
coherent—is fanciful and incredible, and thus, inadequate to support any cognizable
claim. See Denton, 504 U.S. at 33. The complaint is also malicious for purposes of
§ 1915(e)(2)(B) to the extent Johnson’s allegations are duplicative of, virtually
identical to, or pertain to the same series of events as those in his prior action against
the same Defendant. See Shakouri, 923 F.3d at 410.
Accordingly, the Court should dismiss the complaint without prejudice as
factually and legally frivolous and malicious, and for failure to state a claim.
III. LEAVE TO AMEND
Although a pro se plaintiff ordinarily should be granted leave to amend the
complaint before dismissal, leave is not required when he has already pled his “best
case.” Brewster v. Dretke, 587 F.3d 764, 767-68 (5th Cir. 2009). As the Court has
explained, Johnson has failed to state or suggest a cognizable claim or any facts from
which a cognizable claim can be inferred, and his allegations are frivolous and
malicious. Based on the most deferential review of his complaint, it is highly
unlikely that, given the opportunity, Johnson could allege cogent and viable legal
claims. The Court therefore concludes that granting leave to amend under these
circumstances would be futile and cause needless delay.
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IV. SANCTION WARNING
As noted, Johnson has filed 14 actions in this Court since January 2026. Most
have been dismissed for lack of prosecution or transferred to a proper venue. Pro se
litigants do not have “license to harass others, clog the judicial machinery with
meritless litigation, and abuse already overloaded court dockets.” Farguson v. MBank
Houston, N.A., 808 F.2d 358, 359 (5th Cir. 1986). Sanctions may therefore be
warranted when a pro se litigant has a history of filing multiple frivolous or
malicious lawsuits. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2), (c)(1); Mendoza v. Lynaugh, 989 F.2d
191, 195-97 (5th Cir. 1993).
Here, in light of Johnson’s filing history and his pattern of filing actions in this
improper venue that raise fantastic, delusional, and duplicative allegations, the Court
should warn him that if he persists in filing frivolous or baseless lawsuits, the Court
may impose monetary sanctions, bar him from filing any new action, or subject him
to other sanctions the Court deems appropriate.
V. RECOMMENDATION
The Court should DISMISS the Complaint for a Civil Case, filed on April 1,
2026 (Dkt. No. 3), without prejudice as frivolous and malicious and for failure to
state a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The Court also should WARN
Johnson that if he persists in filing frivolous or baseless lawsuits, he may be assessed
monetary sanctions, barred from bringing any new action, or subjected to any other
sanctions the Court deems appropriate.
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SO RECOMMENDED on April 3, 2026.
____________________________________
BRIAN McKAY
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL/OBJECT
A copy of this report and recommendation will be served on all parties in the
manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of this report and
recommendation must file specific written objections within 14 days after being
served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); F ED . R. C IV. P. 72(b). To be specific,
an objection must identify the finding or recommendation to which objection is
made, state the basis for the objection, and indicate the place in the magistrate
judge’s report and recommendation where the disputed determination is found. An
objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before the
magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file specific written objections will bar the
aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal conclusions of the
magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district court, except upon
grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Services Automobile Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415,
1417 (5th Cir. 1996), modified by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)
(extending the time to file objections to 14 days).
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