Morrad v. Warden et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
NAJMUDIN MORRAD,
Petitioner,
v.
PRAIRIELAND DETENTION
FACILITY WARDEN et al.,
Respondents.
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Civil Action No. 3:26-CV-0845-X
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is Petitioner Najmudin Morrad’s (Morrad) Motion for
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and Preliminary Injunction (PI). (Doc. 2). For
the reasons stated below the Court DENIES the TRO/PI.
A TRO serves to preserve the status quo at the timing the lawsuit was filed
and prevent irreparable harm to the movant so a court can “render a meaningful
decision after a trial on the merits.”1 To warrant the extraordinary relief of a TRO,
the movant must demonstrate:
(1) a likelihood of success on the merits; (2) a substantial threat of
irreparable injury; (3) that the threatened injury if the injunction is
denied outweighs any harm that will result if the injunction is granted;
and (4) that the grant of an injunction will not disserve the public
interest.2
1 Apex Grp. Cap. Advisors LLC v. Related Fund Mgmt. LLC, No. 3:25-CV-1627-X, 2025 WL
1869436, at *2 (N.D. Tex. July 7, 2025) (Starr, J.) (citing Canal Auth. of Fla. v. Callaway, 489 F.2d
567, 572 (5th Cir. 1974)).
2 Ladd v. Livingston, 777 F.3d 286, 288 (5th Cir. 2015).
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Preliminary relief should “not conclusively resolve legal disputes[,]” and thus
a TRO is an inappropriate vehicle for granting ultimate relief.3 Specifically, a court
cannot render ultimate relief sought in a habeas petition—releasing a detainee—in
the form of a preliminary injunction or TRO.4
Morrad’s TRO seeks to upend these bedrock principles. First, it seeks to
change the status quo at the time of the lawsuit. Morrad is in ICE custody and wants
out.5 But granting a TRO would just preserve the status quo of Morrad being in
custody—something he obviously does not want. What’s more, Morrad’s TRO seeks
to conclusively resolve the ultimate legal dispute in this case—whether ICE can
detain Morrad. Conclusively deciding legal issues and granting ultimate relief is
something courts do not do in TROs.
The Court DENIES Morrad’s TRO/PI request. Morrad’s habeas petition
remains pending.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 17th day of March, 2026.
___________________________________
BRANTLEY STARR
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
3 Lackey v. Stinnie, 604 U.S. 192, 200 (2025).
4 Ramirez v. Noem, 6:25-CV-035-H, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 5, 2026) (Hendrix, J.) (citing Ramirez
Rios v. Noem, 3:25-CV-522, 2025 WL 3220095, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 7, 2025)).
5 Doc. 3 at 29.
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