Cruz Martinez v. Mullin et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
JOSE CARLOS CRUZ 	§
MARTINEZ, 	§
Petitioner, 	§
§
v. 	§ 	No. 3:26-CV-794-K-BW
§
MARKWAYNE MULLIN, 	§
Acting Secretary, et al., 	§
Respondents. 	§ 	Referred to U.S. Magistrate Judge1
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION
OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Before the Court is Petitioner Jose Carlos Cruz Martinez’s Emergency Motion
for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction. (See Dkt. No. 3
(“TRO App.”).) The undersigned magistrate judge recommends that the Court deny
the motion.
Petitioner, who is detained by immigration authorities, alleges that his
detention is unlawful under 8 U.S.C. § 1226, the Fourth Amendment, and the Fifth
Amendment Due Process Clause. (See Dkt. No. 1.) Petitioner is seeking through his
emergency motion precisely the same relief sought by the habeas petition, but he is
requesting that the Court grant that relief immediately. (See TRO App. at 29
(“Petitioner respectfully requests that the Court immediately grant his petition and
1 The habeas action has been automatically referred to the undersigned magistrate
judge for case management pursuant to Special Order 3-251. (See Dkt. No. 3.)
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this motion and issue a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction
ordering his immediate release from ICE custody”).)
“The purpose of a preliminary injunction [or temporary restraining order] is
not to give the plaintiff the ultimate relief it seeks.” Singh v. Acting Field Officer
Director, No. 3:26-CV-388-LS, 2026 WL 478934, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 11, 2026)
(quoting WarnerVision Ent. Inc. v. Empire of Carolina, Inc., 101 F.3d 259, 261 (2d Cir.
1996) (brackets in original)); accord Perez v. Noem, No. 3:25-CV-2920-K-BN, 2025 WL
3532430, at *6 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 14, 2025) (“[A] TRO or preliminary injunction is
not a device ‘to give a plaintiff the ultimate relief he seeks’ through his claims”
(quoting Peters v. Davis, No. 6:17-CV-595, 2018 WL 11463602, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Mar.
28, 2018))), accepted 2025 WL 3530951 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 9, 2025). “Preliminary relief
should ‘not conclusively resolve legal disputes,’ and thus a TRO is an inappropriate
vehicle for granting ultimate relief.” Saechao v. Noem, No. 3:26-CV-624-X, 2026 WL
602783, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 4, 2026) (quoting Lackey v. Stinnie, 604 U.S. 192, 200
(2025)). “Specifically, a court cannot render ultimate relief sought in a habeas
petition—releasing a detainee—in the form of a preliminary injunction or TRO.” Id.
(citing Ramirez v. Noem, 6:25-CV-035-H, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 5, 2026)); see also Cano
Alvarez v. S. Louisiana Processing Ctr., No. 26-696, 2026 WL 660752, at *1 (W.D. La.
Mar. 9, 2026) (“The Petitioner’s request for immediate release is improper because
one cannot skip the line by dressing a habeas petition in TRO clothes.”).
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The instant emergency motion is one of numerous similar motions brought by
Cruz Martinez’s attorney that merely asks the Court to accelerate the grant of relief
sought by the habeas petition. See id. at *1 n.1 (collecting cases). As in each of the
other cases, the emergency motion for a TRO or preliminary injunction should be
denied. See id. at *2.
SO RECOMMENDED on March 12, 2026.
BRIAN McKAY
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL/OBJECT
A copy of this report and recommendation will be served on all parties in the
manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of this report and
recommendation must file specific written objections within 14 days after being
served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). To be specific,
an objection must identify the finding or recommendation to which objection is
made, state the basis for the objection, and indicate the place in the magistrate
judge’s report and recommendation where the disputed determination is found. An
objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before the
magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file specific written objections will bar the
aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal conclusions of the
magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district court, except upon
grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Services Automobile Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415,
1417 (5th Cir. 1996), modified by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)
(extending the time to file objections to 14 days).
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