Doan v. Starr et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
HAI TU DOAN, 	§
A# 073275957, 	§
Petitioner, 	§
§
v. 	§ 	No. 3:26-CV-286-X-BW
§
THOMAS BERGAMI, Warden, 	§
Respondent. 	§ 	Referred to U.S. Magistrate Judge1
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION
OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Before the Court is the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus Under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241, received on February 4, 2026. (Dkt. No. 3.) Based on the relevant filings
and applicable law, the Court should DISMISS the habeas petition without prejudice
for lack of jurisdiction.
I. BACKGROUND
Hai Tu Doan, a native and citizen of Vietnam detained by United States
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) at the Prairieland Detention Center
(“PDC”) in Alvarado, Texas, filed a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241
in connection with his deportation status. (See id.) The Respondent is the warden of
PDC. (See id. at 1; Dkt. No. 7.)2
1 By Special Order No. 3-251, this habeas case has been automatically referred for
full case management.
2 Citations to the record refer to the CM/ECF system page number at the top of each
page rather than the page numbers at the bottom of each filing.
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Doan indicates that he is subject to a final order of removal to Vietnam based
on a 2004 aggravated felony conviction in New Jersey, for which he served 2 years of
imprisonment. (See Dkt. No. 3 at 4, 12-13; Dkt. No. 4 at 3.) In December 2025,
Doan filed a motion for post-conviction relief in New Jersey state court collaterally
challenging the constitutionality of his 2004 conviction. (See Dkt. No. 3 at 17-31;
Dkt. No. 4 at 4.) On December 18, 2025, Doan reported to a scheduled meeting
with ICE in Dallas, Texas, where he was taken into ICE custody and detained at
PDC. (See Dkt. No. 4 at 5.)
In his § 2241 petition, Doan asserts one ground for relief: “Requesting a STAY
or POSTPONEMENT [of removal order] for the right to apply for collateral benefit
afforded non-citizens to remain in the U.S. pending the outcome of pending post
conviction relief motion in New Jersey, which if granted, will return status to Legal
Permanent Resident[.]” (Dkt. No. 3 at 6 (emphasis in original); see also id. at 7; Dkt.
No. 4 at 2.)
II. JURISDICTION
“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They possess only that
power authorized by Constitution and statute, which is not to be expanded by
judicial decree.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994)
(internal citations omitted). They “must presume that a suit lies outside this limited
jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction rests on the party
seeking the federal forum.” Howery v. Allstate Ins. Co., 243 F.3d 912, 916 (5th Cir.
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2001). They have “a continuing obligation to examine the basis for their
jurisdiction.” MCG, Inc. v. Great W. Energy Corp., 896 F.2d 170, 173 (5th Cir. 1990).
In 2005, Congress enacted the REAL ID Act of 2005 (“Real ID Act”), which
altered the way in which noncitizens can seek judicial review of administrative
review of removal orders. See Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231 (2005). Under the
REAL ID Act, the exclusive means for judicial review of a removal order is a
petition for review filed in the appropriate federal appellate court. See Nasrallah v.
Barr, 590 U.S. 573, 579-80 (2020) (“[F]inal orders of removal may not be reviewed in
district courts, even via habeas corpus, and may be reviewed only in the courts of
appeals.”); 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5). District courts also generally lack jurisdiction to
stay removal orders because they are “connected ‘directly and immediately’ with the
Attorney General’s decision to commence removal proceedings against” a petitioner.
Idokogi v. Ashcroft, 66 F. App’x 526 (5th Cir. 2003); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g).
Here, Doan is not challenging his ICE detention, and he alleges that he “is not
requesting this Court to address ICE’s removal order but only stay, or postpone
deportation, within the parameters of its jurisdiction and hear his right to apply for a
collateral benefit afforded noncitizens. Thus, this claim does not arise from ICE’s
decision to execute its removal order.” (Dkt. No. 4 at 2 (emphasis in original).)
Despite this characterization, however, Doan’s request to stay or postpone the
execution of his final removal order is sought only for the purpose of allowing him to
challenge the basis of that removal order, namely, his removability as a convicted
aggravated felon. As such, it necessarily involves a collateral attack on his final
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order of removal, and the Court accordingly lacks jurisdiction to grant the requested
relief. See, e.g., Imran v. Harper, No. 25-30370, 2026 WL 93131, at *1 (5th Cir. Jan.
13, 2026) (unpublished) (holding that “[a] request for stay of removal is a challenge
to a removal order” and that the district court therefore lacked jurisdiction to grant
such relief). This is so even to the extent Doan alternatively seeks a stay of his
removal order under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). See Hidalgo-Mejia
v. Pitts, 343 F. Supp. 3d 667, 673 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 27, 2018) (determining that, as the
REAL ID Act stripped the district court of jurisdiction to review the petitioner’s
expedited removal order, judicial review under the APA was unavailable) (citing 5
U.S.C. § 701(a); Sandoval-Lopez v. Tillerson, 713 F. App’x 255, 258-29 (5th Cir.
2017)).
The Court therefore should dismiss Doan’s § 2241 petition for lack of
jurisdiction.
III. RECOMMENDATION
The Court should DISMISS the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus Under
28 U.S.C. § 2241, received on February 4, 2026 (Dkt. No. 3), without prejudice for
lack of jurisdiction.
SO RECOMMENDED on February 11, 2026.
____________________________________
BRIAN McKAY
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL/OBJECT
A copy of this report and recommendation will be served on all parties in the
manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of this report and
recommendation must file specific written objections within 14 days after being
served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). To be specific,
an objection must identify the finding or recommendation to which objection is
made, state the basis for the objection, and indicate the place in the magistrate
judge’s report and recommendation where the disputed determination is found. An
objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before the
magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file specific written objections will bar the
aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal conclusions of the
magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district court, except upon
grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Services Automobile Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415,
1417 (5th Cir. 1996), modified by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)
(extending the time to file objections to 14 days).
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