Frericks v. Rockwall County Texas et al

3:25-cv-03561Txnd12 gen 2026

Testo completo

1
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
MICHAEL JOSEPH FRERICKS, II, §
§
Plaintiff, §
§
v. § No. 3:25-cv-03561-L-BT
§
ROCKWALL COUNTY, TEXAS, et al., §
§
Defendants. §
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION
OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff Michael Joseph Frericks, II filed this pro se civil rights action on
December 31, 2025. See generally Compl. (ECF No. 3). He filed an amended
complaint on January 5, 2026. See generally First Am. Compl. (ECF No. 6). The
Court granted Frericks leave to proceed in forma pauperis and withheld issuance
of service pending judicial screening. See (ECF No. 6). For the following reasons,
the Court should dismiss Frericks’s claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
or, alternatively, as frivolous and for failure to state a claim, and warn Frericks
against filing frivolous, duplicative, and vexatious lawsuits.
Background
According to Frericks, “Rockwall County voters have twice approved major
road-bond programs totaling approximately $180 million.” First Am. Compl. ¶¶
27. But Frericks complains that the County has refused to improve highway
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infrastructure, instead, shifting available funds to the construction of new office
space, expansion of the county jail, and technology upgrades. Id. ¶¶ 28, 31, 39, 55–
56. This has purportedly allowed dangerous road conditions in Rockwall County
to persist. See id. ¶¶ 32–36. Specifically, Frericks alleges that five traffic fatalities
occurred on Rockwall County roads in 2025 alone. Id. ¶ 35.
Frericks also takes issue with Rockwall County’s budgeted allocation for
court-appointed attorneys. See id. ¶¶ 41–46. He states that the County apportions
$1.2 million to indigent defense each year “yet employs no court-appointed
attorneys and, in practice, does not provide counsel to indigent defendants as
required by law.” Id. ¶ 41. This grievance appears to stem from Frericks’s prior
criminal proceedings in Rockwall County, in which a state court judge “forced
counsel upon [Frericks] . . . despite waiving his rights to counsel multiple times.”
Id. ¶ 42. But Frericks also claims that “hundreds or even thousands of Rockwall
County defendants have gone through criminal proceedings with conflicted or
perfunctory representation.” Id. 45.
Frericks notes that his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims are “directed at policies and
customs attributable to Rockwall County itself.” Id. ¶ 51. He therefore brings suit
against Rockwall County, Rockwall County Commissioners Court (which
purportedly has final authority to decide issues related to the budget and road
improvement), Frank New (Rockwall County Judge and presiding officer of the
Commissioners Court), Rockwall County Commissioners, John Stacy, Bobby
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Gallana, Dana K. Mullins Macalik, and Lorne Liechty (in their official and
individual capacities), and Kenda Culpepper (Rockwall County District Attorney).
Id. ¶¶ 13–20.
Frericks seeks a declaration that Rockwall’s policies and practices are
unconstitutional and unlawful; permanent injunctive relief “prohibiting
Defendants from continuing or funding the challenged practices and requiring
constitutionally adequate safeguards, transparency, and compliance controls
going forward”; compensatory damages to be determined at trial; punitive
damages; and costs and attorneys’ fees. Id. ¶¶ 78–83.
Legal Standards
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), a district court may summarily dismiss a
complaint filed in forma pauperis if it concludes the action is: (1) frivolous or
malicious; (2) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (3) seeks
monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B). A complaint is “frivolous” when it “lacks an arguable basis either
in law or fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A court may dismiss
a complaint as frivolous when it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory
or when the factual contentions are “clearly baseless.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504
U.S. 25, 32 (1992). The latter category encompasses allegations that describe
“fanciful, fantastic, and delusional” scenarios, or that “rise to the level of the
irrational or the wholly incredible.” Id. at 33.
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Analysis
I. Frericks fails to establish subject matter jurisdiction.
A. Frericks fails to establish diversity of citizenship or the
existence of a federal question.
The Court is “duty-bound” to examine its subject-matter jurisdiction sua
sponte. Burciaga v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co., 871 F.3d 380, 384 n.4 (5th Cir.
2017). See also Giles v. NYLCare Health Plans, Inc., 172 F.3d 332, 336 (5th Cir.
1999) (a court must raise the issue sua sponte if it discovers that it lacks subject-
matter jurisdiction); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time
that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”).
Federal courts have limited subject-matter jurisdiction and cannot hear a
case unless authorized by the Constitution or a federal statute. Griffin v. Lee, 621
F.3d 380, 388 (5th Cir. 2010); see also Coury v. Prot, 85 F.3d 244, 248 (5th Cir.
1996). District courts have original jurisdiction over two types of cases: (1) those
that arise under federal law, see 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question jurisdiction),
and (2) those in which the amount in controversy exceeds $ 75,000 and there is
complete diversity of citizenship among the parties, see 28 U.S.C. §
1332(a) (diversity jurisdiction). Home Depot U. S. A., Inc. v. Jackson, 139 S. Ct.
1743, 1746 (2019).
While pleadings by pro se plaintiffs are construed liberally, see, e.g., Perez
v. United States, 312 F.3d 191, 194–95 (5th Cir. 2002), the Court “must presume
that a suit lies outside [its] limited jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing
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federal jurisdiction rests on the party seeking the federal forum.” Howery v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 243 F.3d 912, 916 (5th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). And “even
though a particular statute or rule need not necessarily by cited by name[,]” the
party asserting jurisdiction must allege the jurisdictional basis “affirmatively and
distinctly”; jurisdiction cannot be “established argumentatively or by mere
inference.” Ill. Cent. Gulf R.R. Co. v. Pargas, Inc., 706 F.2d 633, 636 (5th Cir.
1983) (citations omitted).
Here, it is clear that there is no diversity of citizenship, as all the parties are
citizens of Texas. See First Am. Compl. ¶¶ 12–20. And there is also no federal
question for this Court. Rather, courts in this Circuit have held that actions
challenging the misappropriation of municipal funds “do not state a claim for the
violation of any federal law and they should be dismissed to that extent.” See Eaker
v. City of Moss Point, Miss., 2021 WL 6618594, at *9 (S.D. Miss. Feb. 26, 2021);
see also Joseph v. City of Moss Point, Miss., 2021 WL 6752167, at *6 (S.D. Miss.
Feb. 26, 2021). Indeed, Frericks identifies no federal rights violated by Defendants’
conduct. To the extent he complains about his right to counsel, he pleads that he
was represented. First Am. Compl. Id. ¶ 42
Accordingly, the District Judge can dismiss this action for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. As explained further below, the Court’s dismissal should be
without leave to amend, as Frericks’s Complaint is frivolous.
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B. Frericks fails to establish he has standing to challenge
Rockwall County’s spending.
Article III of the Constitution limits the judicial power of federal courts to
“Cases” and “Controversies.” U.S. Const. art. III, § 2; Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S.
Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016). To establish “the ‘irreducible constitutional minimum’ of
standing,” a plaintiff must show that he has “(1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that
is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely
to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Lujan v. Def. of Wildlife, 504 U.S.
555, 560–61 (1992). The alleged injury in fact must be concrete, particularized, and
actual or imminent and must bear a “ ‘close relationship’ to a harm traditionally
recognized as providing a basis for a lawsuit in American courts.” Perez v.
McCreary, Veselka, Bragg & Allen, P.C., 45 F.4th 816, 821 (5th Cir. 2022). As the
party asserting federal jurisdiction, Frericks carries the burden of establishing his
standing. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1547.
Insofar as Frericks relies on his status as a taxpayer to confer standing, the
Supreme Court generally has denied federal and state taxpayers standing under
Article III to object to particular expenditures of federal or state funds simply
because they are taxpayers. Ehm v. San Antonio City Council, 269 Fed. Appx. 375,
377 (5th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). Municipal residents,
however, do have standing to enjoin the illegal use of taxpayer funds by a
municipal entity. See id.
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Municipal taxpayer standing arises from “the peculiar relation of the
corporate taxpayer to the corporation.” Christopher v. Lawson, 358 F. Supp. 3d
600, 609 (S.D. Tex. 2019) (citations omitted).
A plaintiff meets the injury requirement of municipal taxpayer standing if
he shows that “he pays taxes to the relevant entity” and “tax revenues are expended
on the disputed practice.” Id. (citing Doe v. Duncanville Independent School Dist.,
70 F.3d 402, 408 (5th Cir. 1995)) (internal quotations omitted). “Paying sales taxes
is not enough to establish standing—a party must pay property taxes, or other
similar taxes that evince a personal stake in how the funds at issue are expended,
to an entity to establish jurisdiction to sue that entity.” Nuttall v. Dallas Indep.
Sch. Dist., 2021 WL 4431115, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 1, 2021), rec. adopted as
modified on other grounds, 2021 WL 4399772 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 27, 2021).
Here, Frericks does not plead that he is a citizen of Rockwall County or that
he pays taxes to Rockwall County. Rather, it appears he is a citizen of Garland,
Texas, which sits within Dallas County. See First Am. Compl. at 16; Sec. Am.
Compl. at 2 (ECF No. 9)1. His only apparent connection to Rockwall County is a
prior criminal proceeding there. Id. ¶ 12. And even if Frericks did pay taxes to
Rockwall County, he is unable to show that he has suffered any direct injury as a
result of Defendants’ actions. Frericks, therefore, lacks standing to challenge
1 By separate order, the Court struck Frericks’s proposed second amended
complaint from the record.
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expenditures made by Rockwall County and its officials. See Nuttall, 2021 WL
4431115, at *2 (finding that plaintiff lacked standing to challenge funding decisions
made by Dallas Independent School District because he was not a Dallas County
taxpayer); Eaker, 2021 WL 6618594, at *9 (finding that a “general and conclusory
allegation of ‘harm’ was not sufficient to plead a direct injury” against a
municipality for its funding decisions).
Accordingly, the Court should dismiss Frericks’s claims for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. See Ehlmann v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, 20 F. Supp. 2d
1008, 1010 (N.D. Tex. 1998), aff’d sub nom. Ehlmann v. Kaiser Found. Health
Plan of Texas, 198 F.3d 552 (5th Cir. 2000) (“[I]f a plaintiff lacks standing the
court is without jurisdiction and the case must be dismissed.”).
II. Frericks is unable to state a claim related to the purported denial
of his right to self-representation.
To the extent Frericks complains that Rockwall County denied him the right
of self-representation, such a claim should fail. Frericks already complained of this
alleged unlawful misconduct in a prior action before this Court. See Frericks v.
Rockwall Cnty., 2025 WL 2858904, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 4, 2025), supplemented,
2025 WL 2856553 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 5, 2025), rec. adopted, 2025 WL 2856309
(N.D. Tex. Oct. 8, 2025), and rec. adopted, 2025 WL 2856309 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 8,
2025). The Court dismissed this claim with prejudice. Id. Frericks is not entitled
to raise the claim again.
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Accordingly, since Frericks again challenges the denial of his right to self-
representation, the Court should similarly dismiss this claim with prejudice.
Leave to Amend
“Rule 15 is a liberal standard that favors leave, but that preference has no
purchase when amendment cannot cure the defect.” Ellsworth v. Dallas Texas
Dep’t of Veteran Affs., --- F.4th ---, 2025 WL 3239806, at *5 (5th Cir. Nov. 20,
2025) (O’Connor); see also Sanders v. Deluxe, 2025 WL 3491013, at *3 (N.D. Tex.
Nov. 14, 2025) (Rutherford, J.), rec. adopted, 2025 WL 3488340 (N.D. Tex. Dec.
4, 2025) (“Ordinarily, a pro se plaintiff should be granted the opportunity to
amend her complaint prior to a dismissal.”) Indeed, leave to amend is not required
when plaintiffs have already pleaded their “best case.” Brewster v. Dretke, 587
F.3d 764, 767–68 (5th Cir. 2009).
Here, the Court lacks jurisdiction over Frericks’s claims. And to the extent
Frericks complains about the denial of his right to self-representation, such a claim
has already failed in a prior action. Frericks could not overcome these deficiencies
in an amended complaint. Accordingly, the Court should find that leave to amend
is not required here.
Sanctions Warning
The Court also warns Frericks that he could be subject to sanctions,
including monetary sanctions and an injunction preventing him from filing
additional lawsuits, if he persists in filing duplicative and vexatious lawsuits.
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Courts possess the inherent power “to protect the efficient and orderly
administration of justice and . . . to command respect for the court’s orders,
judgments, procedures, and authority.” In re Stone, 986 F.2d 898, 902 (5th Cir.
1993) (per curiam). Included in this inherent power is “the power to levy sanctions
in response to abusive litigation practices.” Id. Sanctions may be appropriate when
a pro se litigant has a history of submitting multiple frivolous claims. See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 11; Mendoza v. Lynaugh, 989 F.2d 191, 195–97 (5th Cir. 1993). Pro se
litigants have “no license to harass others, clog the judicial machinery with
meritless litigation, and abuse already overloaded court dockets.” Farguson v.
MBank Hous., N.A., 808 F.2d 358, 359 (5th Cir. 1986).
Including this one, Plaintiff has filed at least three lawsuits in this District
since August 2025 against Defendants from Rockwall County and Southlake,
Texas. See Frericks v. Rockwall Cnty., No. 3:25-cv-2148 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 11, 2025);
Frericks v. City of Southlake, No. 3:25-cv-3560 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 31, 2025); Frericks
v. Rockwall County, No. 3:25-cv-3561 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 31, 2025). The first of these
actions was already dismissed with prejudice under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). See
Frericks, 2025 WL 2858904, at *5–7. And in that action, Frericks filed numerous
frivolous motions that consumed much of the Court’s valuable time. See, e.g.,
Frericks v. Rockwall Cnty., No. 3:25-cv-2148, ECF Nos. 5, 10, 15–16, 18–19, 21,
,25, 28–31, 33–43, 44–45, 52.
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Accordingly, the Court warns Plaintiff that if he persists in filing frivolous,
duplicative, and vexatious lawsuits, he could be subject to sanctions, including
monetary sanctions and an injunction preventing him from filing additional
lawsuits.
Recommendation
The District Judge should dismiss this action for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction or, alternatively, as frivolous and for failure to state a claim pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
SO RECOMMENDED.
January 12, 2026.
____________________________
REBECCA RUTHERFORD
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL/OBJECT
A copy of this report and recommendation shall be served on all parties in
the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of this report and
recommendation must file specific written objections within 14 days after being
served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b). To be specific,
an objection must identify the specific finding or recommendation to which
objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and specify the place in the
magistrate judge’s report and recommendation where the disputed determination
is found. An objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the
briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file specific written
objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal
conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district
court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Services
Automobile Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996).
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