Reynolds et al v. Austin Street Center et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
LADEREK REYNOLDS, et al., §
§
Plaintiffs, §
§
v. § No. 3:25-cv-3487-K-BT
§
AUSTIN STREET CENTER, et al., §
§
Defendants. §
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION
OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Pro se Plaintiffs LaDerek Reynolds and Alicia J. Lyons have filed a civil
action in which they appear to accuse Defendants of intentionally serving them
contaminated food and making them sick. See generally Compl. (ECF No. 3).
Having reviewed the pleadings and the relevant law, the undersigned recommends
that this action be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Background
Plaintiffs LaDerek Reynolds and Alicia J. Lyons filed a formal grievance with
Austin Street Center—a local homeless shelter—complaining that volunteers
closed lunch early and were rude when Plaintiffs complained. Id. at 4. Nearly two
months later, Reynolds was diagnosed with a bacterial disease. Id. at 5. And Lyons
suffered a miscarriage after that, with doctors attributing the cause to “bacterial
vaginosia.” Id.
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Plaintiffs blame Austin Street Center for their conditions. See id. at 5–6.
They claim that volunteers intentionally gave them contaminated food in
retaliation for Plaintiffs’ complaints and formal grievance. Id. at 5. Plaintiffs
therefore raise several claims on behalf of themselves and the child they lost:
assault, battery, reckless endangerment, attempted murder, manslaughter,
negligence, breach of duty, and breach of Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA) standards. Id. at 5–6.
Plaintiffs request relief amounting to $750 million. Id. at 6.
Legal Standard
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction; “[t]hey possess only that
power authorized by Constitution and statute, which is not to be expanded by
judicial decree.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377
(1994) (citations omitted). Unless otherwise provided by statute, federal subject
matter jurisdiction requires: 1) an action “arising under the Constitution, laws, or
treaties of the United States,” see 28 U.S.C. § 1331; or 2) complete diversity of
citizenship between adverse parties combined with an amount in controversy
exceeding $75,000, see 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
Regarding federal question jurisdiction, the most common cases “arising
under” federal law “are those in which federal law creates the cause of
action.” Merrell Dow Pharms. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 808 (1986). In rare
situations, a case may arise under federal law “where the vindication of a right
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under state law necessarily turn[s] on some construction of federal law.” Franchise
Tax Bd. of State of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Tr. for S. California, 463 U.S.
1, 9 (1983).
In cases invoking diversity jurisdiction, each plaintiff’s citizenship must be
diverse from each defendant’s citizenship, and the amount in controversy must
exceed $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), (b). “The basis for diversity jurisdiction
must be ‘distinctly and affirmatively alleged.’ ” Dos Santos v. Belmere Ltd. P’ship,
516 F. App’x 401, 403 (5th Cir. 2013) (per curiam). “ ‘The failure to adequately
allege the basis for diversity jurisdiction mandates dismissal.’
” Id. (quoting Stafford v. Mobil Oil Corp., 945 F.2d 803, 805 (5th Cir. 1991)).
While pleadings by pro se plaintiffs are construed liberally, see, e.g., Perez
v. United States, 312 F.3d 191, 194–95 (5th Cir. 2002); Mass v. McDonald’s Corp.,
2004 WL 2624255, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 12, 2004), the court “must presume that
a suit lies outside [its] limited jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing federal
jurisdiction rests on the party seeking the federal forum.” Howery v. Allstate Ins.,
243 F.3d 912, 916 (5th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). And “even though a
particular statute or rule need not necessarily be cited by name[,]” the party
asserting jurisdiction must allege the jurisdictional basis “affirmatively and
distinctly”; jurisdiction cannot be “established argumentatively or by mere
inference.” Ill. Cent. Gulf R.R. Co. v. Pargas, Inc., 706 F.2d 633, 636 (5th Cir.
1983) (citations omitted). “[C]ourts are not obligated to search out the identity of
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a party’s vaguely-pleaded claims.” Mass, 2004 WL 2624255, at *2. Ultimately,
“[t]he plaintiff is the master of his own pleadings, and even a pro se litigant has the
right to plead himself out of court, just as an attorney may do.” Estrada v.
Dominguez, 2001 WL 506982, at *2 (N.D. Tex. May 14, 2001).
Federal courts do not have to—and in fact, should not—wait for a Rule
12(b)(1) motion to determine whether subject matter jurisdiction exists. On the
contrary, “[i]f the court determines at any time that it lacks subject matter
jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). The court
“is duty-bound to examine its subject-matter jurisdiction sua sponte.” Burciaga,
871 F.3d at 384 n.4; see also Ins. of Ir., Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee,
456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982) (explaining that while under Rule 12(h) defenses for lack
of personal jurisdiction are waived if untimely, even an appellate court may review
subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte).
Analysis
In the present action, there is no diversity of citizenship. Rather, Plaintiffs
and Defendants are all citizens of Texas. Accordingly, this Court only has subject
matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims if they arise under the Constitution, laws,
or treaties of the United States. But Plaintiffs cannot make such a showing.
Plaintiffs bring two categories of claims: (1) intentional torts and negligence;
and (2) violations of OSHA standards. Neither bestows jurisdiction upon this
Court.
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First, Federal courts lack jurisdiction over state tort causes of action. See
Burgess v. Feghhi, 2007 WL 9710178, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 30, 2007), rec.
adopted, 2007 WL 9710219 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 26, 2007). Second, “[t]he Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals has recognized that there is no private right of action arising out
[of an] alleged violation of OSHA regulation[s].” Parker v. ASRC Omega Natchiq,
2008 WL 4974584, at *7 (W.D. La. Nov. 20, 2008), aff’d, 332 F. App’x 219 (5th
Cir. 2009) (citing Valdez v. Joy Technologies, 29 F.3d 623 (5th Cir.1994); George
v. Aztec Rental Center, Inc., 763 F.2d 184, 186–187 (5th Cir.1985); Dixon v. Boise
Cascade Corp. 163 F.3d 1355 (5th Cir.1998)).
For these reasons, the Court should dismiss this action for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction.
Leave to Amend
“Rule 15 is a liberal standard that favors leave, but that preference has no
purchase when amendment cannot cure the defect.” Ellsworth v. Dallas Texas
Dep’t of Veteran Affs., 160 F.4th 161, 169 (5th Cir. Nov. 20, 2025) (O’Connor); see
also Sanders v. Deluxe, 2025 WL 3491013, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 14,
2025) (Rutherford, J.), rec. adopted, 2025 WL 3488340 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 4,
2025) (“Ordinarily, a pro se plaintiff should be granted the opportunity to amend
her complaint prior to a dismissal.”). But leave to amend is not required when the
plaintiff has already pleaded his “best case.” Brewster v. Dretke, 587 F.3d 764, 767-
68 (5th Cir. 2009).
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Here, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims.
They cannot cure this defect in an amended pleading.
Therefore, granting leave to amend would be futile and cause needless delay.
Plaintiffs’ complaint should be dismissed without prejudice.
Recommendation
The District Judge should dismiss this action without prejudice for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.
February 18, 2026.
REBECCA RUTHERFORD
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL/OBJECT
A copy of this report and recommendation will be served on all parties in the
manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of this report and
recommendation must file specific written objections within 14 days after being
served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b). To be specific,
an objection must identify the specific finding or recommendation to which
objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and specify the place in the
magistrate judge’s report and recommendation where the disputed determination
is found. An objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the
briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file specific written
objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal
conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district
court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Services Auto.
Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996).
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