Sotelo De Avila v. Gutierrez

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
HUGO SOTELO DE ÁVILA, 	§
§
Petitioner, 	§
§
V. 	§ 	No. 3:25-cv-3163-BN
§
MONSERRAT ARRIAGA GUTIÉRREZ, 	§
§
Respondent. 	§
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Petitioner Hugo Sotelo De Ávila (“Petitioner” or “Sotelo”), through counsel,
filed this action against Respondent Monserrat Arriaga Gutiérrez (“Respondent” or
“Gutiérrez”) under the United Nations Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of
International Child Abduction (the “Hague Convention” or “Convention”), Mar. 26,
1986, T.I.A.S. No. 11670, S. Treaty Doc. No. 99-11, implemented by the International
Child Abduction Remedies Act (“ICARA”), 102 Stat. 437, as amended, 22 U.S.C. §
9001 et seq., regarding their minor daughter, A.X., in which Sotelo asserts that
Gutiérrez has wrongfully retained A.X. in the United States and seeks to secure A.X.’s
return to Mexico. See Dkt. No. 1.
United States District Judge Ada Brown, granting Sotelo’s emergency ex parte
application, 	entered 	a 	temporary 	restraining 	order 	prohibiting 	Gutiérrez 	from
removing A.X. from the jurisdiction of the Court pending a hearing on the merits of
Sotelo’s complaint, which Judge Brown then extended to February 26, 2026 [Dkt.
Nos. 9 & 22] (the “TRO”).
Gutiérrez, through counsel, answered the complaint, and, the same day, the
Case 3:25-cv-03163-BN Document 77 Filed 03/24/26 Page 1 of 29 PageID <pageID>

- 2 -
parties filed a joint status report under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(f). See Dkt.
Nos. 24 & 25.
Through their Rule 26(f) report, the parties consented to this action being
referred to a United States magistrate judge to conduct all further proceedings,
including entry of judgment, under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). See Dkt. No. 25 at 2. And Judge
Brown entered an order on January 20, 2026 transferring the case to the undersigned
under Section 636(c). See Dkt. No. 27.
Also through the Rule 26(f) report, Gutiérrez “consent[ed] to the current TRO
[Dkt. No. 9] being extended until such time as the Court issues a final decision on the
merits.” Dkt. No. 25 at 2.
Considering her consent, the Court found good cause to extend the TRO until
judgment is entered in this case through an order entered on January 20 that also
set this matter for a consolidated hearing on the motion for preliminary injunction
and trial on the merits on February 23, 2026. See Dkt. No. 28; FED . R. CIV. P. 65(b)(2);
FED . R. CIV. P. 65(a)(2).
The parties through counsel appeared at the final pretrial conference on
February 19, 2026. See Dkt. No. 50. And the Court entered the Final Pretrial Order
[Dkt. No. 51] later the same day.
Although the consolidated hearing on the motion for preliminary injunction
and trial on the merits was continued for two days to accommodate an unforeseen
illness, see Dkt. Nos. 55-61, proceedings began on February 25, 2026 and closed on
February 26, 2026, see Dkt. Nos. 63 & 64.
Case 3:25-cv-03163-BN Document 77 Filed 03/24/26 Page 2 of 29 PageID <pageID>

- 3 -
Considering the record, see Dkt. Nos. 65-70, the parties’ trial briefs, see Dkt.
Nos. 39, 40, & 43-45, and their proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, see
Dkt. 	Nos. 	73-76, 	the 	Court 	generally 	adopts 	Sotelo’s 	proposed 	findings 	and
conclusions [Dkt. Nos. 74 & 76] as supported by the evidence and the applicable legal
standards, see Sanchez v. Iduarte, No. 4:21-cv-984-P, 2022 WL 463386 (N.D. Tex. Feb.
15, 2022), and, so, for the reasons set out therein and as explained below, the Court
GRANTS Sotelo’s petition and ORDERS that A.X. be returned to Mexico forthwith.
Applicable Background
The Court draws this background from the parties’ stipulated facts as set out
in the Final Pretrial Order:
A.X. was born on January 29, 2019, in San Luis Potosi, Mexico.
A.X. turned 7 years old on January 29, 2026.
A.X. is a Mexican citizen.
A.X. does not currently have Lawful Permanent Residence status
(also commonly referred to as a “Green Card”) in the United States.
Respondent is A.X.’s biological mother.
Respondent is a Mexican citizen.
Respondent is not a United States citizen.
Respondent does not currently have Lawful Permanent Residence
status (also commonly referred to as a “Green Card”) in the United
States.
A.X. is not a United States citizen.
Petitioner is A.X.’s biological father.
Petitioner is a citizen of Mexico.
Petitioner 	is 	employed 	at 	Valeo, 	a 	motor 	vehicle 	parts
manufacturing company, as a Mechanical Design Engineer.
Petitioner has worked at Valeo since March 2013.
Petitioner and Respondent are identified as A.X.’s mother and
father on her birth certificate. See A.X.’s Birth Certificate attached on
the docket at Dkt. No. 46-6.
After A.X. was born and until Respondent relocated her to the
United States, she lived in Mexico.
Case 3:25-cv-03163-BN Document 77 Filed 03/24/26 Page 3 of 29 PageID <pageID>

- 4 -
From 	birth 	[until] 	she 	was 	two 	years 	old, 	A.X. 	lived 	with
Petitioner and Respondent in Petitioner’s home in San Luis Potosi,
Mexico.
In early 2021, Petitioner and Respondent separated.
After Petitioner and Respondent separated, A.X. continued to live
with Respondent in Petitioner’s home located in San Luis Potosi,
Mexico, and Petitioner moved in with his parents.
At all times since A.X.’s birth, Petitioner has paid for the home at
San Luis Potosi, Mexico.
At all times since A.X.’s birth, Petitioner has contributed to A.X.’s
education fund.
From the time the divorce decree was entered, through the
present, Petitioner has made regular child support payments.
As part of the divorce, Petitioner and Respondent agreed to
various custody terms.
The custody agreement granted physical custody to Respondent,
patria potestas (parental rights) to both parties, and weekend visitation
rights to Petitioner.
Petitioner has never signed any legal document, in either Mexico
or the United States, terminating or otherwise giving up his legal rights.
In May 2022, Respondent requested to temporarily relocate to the
United States with A.X. for a period of three years.
Respondent represented that such period was to coincide with her
husband’s temporary secondment to the United States.
Petitioner agreed to this temporary relocation based on (1) the
representations by Respondent that it would only last three years and
that A.X. would permanently return to Mexico in May 2025; (2) that he
be allowed regular video calls with A.X., facilitated by Respondent; and
(3) that Respondent would return home to Mexico with A.X. once every
three months (the “Temporary Relocation Agreement”).
On May 18, 2022, based on the Temporary Relocation Agreement
between Petitioner and Respondent, Petitioner signed an authorization
for A.X. to temporarily relocate to the U.S. with Respondent for a period
of three years (May 2022 to May 2025).
In May 2022, Respondent and A.X. left Mexico for their temporary
relocation to the United States.
Prior to May 2022, A.X. had lived only in Mexico.
Between May 2022 and the present, A.X returned to visit Mexico
five times.
In February 2024, Petitioner visited A.X. in the United States and
spent three days with her.
In or about March 2025, Respondent informed Petitioner for the
first time that A.X. would not be returning to Mexico in May 2025 as
previously agreed.
Case 3:25-cv-03163-BN Document 77 Filed 03/24/26 Page 4 of 29 PageID <pageID>

- 5 -
In March 2025, Respondent requested that Petitioner renew the
Travel Authorization for A.X. from May 2022 to May 2025.
Petitioner refused to sign a renewal of the Travel Authorization
for A.X. from May 2022 to May 2025.
Petitioner told Respondent that he would not agree to amend the
terms of the Temporary Relocation Agreement and that he expected
Respondent to return A.X. in May 2025, as planned.
In May 2025, Respondent did not return A.X. to Mexico.
In June 2025, Petitioner filed with the Mexican Authority for the
Discharge of the Hague Convention on Civil Aspects of the International
Child Abduction of 25 October 1980 the Application Form (the “Hague
Application”) regarding A.X.
Since May 2025, both Petitioner and Respondent have engaged in
legal proceedings in Mexican Family Courts related to A.X.’s custody.
At no point, including since May 2025, has Petitioner signed any
documentation 	or 	testified 	in 	any 	legal 	proceeding 	renouncing 	or
terminating his custody rights of A.X.
At no point, including since May 2025, has Petitioner signed any
documentation or testified in any legal proceeding that he gives his
permission for A.X. to remain in the United States indefinitely.
Dkt. No. 51 at 13-17 (cleaned up).
Legal Standards
“The Hague Convention’s overall goal is to address the problem of international
child abductions during domestic disputes.” Smith v. Smith, 976 F.3d 558, 561 (5th
Cir. 2020) (cleaned up).
And, so, it “was designed to restore the pre-abduction status quo,” Sealed
Appellant v. Sealed Appellee, 394 F.3d 338, 344 (5th Cir. 2004) (cleaned up), by
“mandat[ing] the return of a child wrongfully removed from her country of habitual
residence upon petition,” Guevara v. Castro, 155 F.4th 353, 360 (5th Cir. 2025)
(cleaned up).
In doing so, “[t]he Convention is based on the principle that the best interests
of the child are well served when decisions regarding custody rights are made in the
Case 3:25-cv-03163-BN Document 77 Filed 03/24/26 Page 5 of 29 PageID <pageID>

- 6 -
country of habitual residence.” Galaviz v. Reyes, 95 F.4th 246, 251 (5th Cir. 2024)
(cleaned up).
The Convention is therefore “not concerned with establishing the person to
whom custody of the child will belong at some point in the future.” Sealed, 394 F.3d
at 344 (cleaned up).
Instead, “[i]t seeks, more simply, to prevent a later decision on the matter being
influenced by a change of circumstances brought about through unilateral action by
one of the parties.” Id. (cleaned up).
“A parent wrongfully removes a child when he or she removes or retains the
child outside the child’s country of habitual residence, and this removal: breaches the
rights of custody accorded to the other parent under the laws of that country; and, at
the time of removal, the non-removing parent was exercising those custody rights.”
Id. at 343 (cleaned up).
And, so, the “habitual residence” determination is made “at the time of removal
or retention.” Monasky v. Taglieri, 589 U.S. 68, 77 (2020) (“The place where a child is
at home, at the time of removal or retention, ranks as the child’s habitual residence.”
(citation omitted)).
But “‘[h]abitual residence’ is not the same as residence or domicile.” Harm v.
Lake-Harm, 16 F.4th 450, 451 n.1 (5th Cir. 2021). It is instead “a term of art defined
by and uniquely applicable to Hague Convention cases.” Id. And, as a panel of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recently put it, “habitual
residence” is
Case 3:25-cv-03163-BN Document 77 Filed 03/24/26 Page 6 of 29 PageID <pageID>

- 7 -
the place where a child is at home, and the determination is highly fact
specific. To assess habitual residence, a court may consider the child’s
physical location, the passage of time, the child or parent’s immigration
status, family ties, and the location of personal belongings, among other
factors. For young children, a caregiving parent’s ties to the country at
issue [are] highly relevant. [C]ourts must [remain] sensitive to the
unique circumstances of the case and informed by common sense, and
in doing so, recognize situations where an infant lived in a country only
because a caregiving parent had been coerced into remaining there.
Sarzosa v. Vergara, No. 25-40052, 2025 WL 2694843, at *1 (5th Cir. Sept. 22, 2025)
(per curiam) (cleaned up; quoting Monasky, 589 U.S. at 77, 78 n.3, 80 n.4, 78).
“The Convention inquiry, then, consists of three elements, which
the petitioner must establish by a preponderance of the evidence. See 42
U.S.C. § 11603(e)(1). First, the petitioner must show that the respondent
removed or retained the child somewhere other than the child’s habitual
residence. If so, the question becomes whether the removal or retention
violated the petitioner’s rights of custody under the habitual-residence
nation’s laws. These rights need not be enshrined in a formal custody
order issued before the removal or retention; the Convention also
recognizes rights of custody that arise “ex lege.” Assuming that the
petitioner has rights of custody, she then need only make the final, and
relatively easy showing that at the time of removal or retention those
rights were actually exercised, either jointly or alone, or would have
been so exercised but for the removal or retention. Generally, courts
liberally find that rights of custody have been exercised unless evidence
demonstrates acts that constitute clear and unequivocal abandonment
of the child.
Larbie v. Larbie, 690 F.3d 295, 307 (5th Cir. 2012) (cleaned up), abrogated on other
grounds by Monasky; see Smith, 976 F.3d at 561 n.1 (“In light of the [United States]
Supreme Court’s holding in Monasky that a child’s habitual residence should be
determined by looking to the totality of the circumstances, to the extent that our
circuit’s prior caselaw in Larbie and other cases has prioritized the parents’ shared
intent over other factors, we overrule that emphasis.” (citations omitted)).
And, while “the Convention’s default rule is that the child must be returned to
Case 3:25-cv-03163-BN Document 77 Filed 03/24/26 Page 7 of 29 PageID <pageID>

- 8 -
her country of habitual residence,” it “does not pursue that goal at any cost” by
“recogniz[ing] that, in certain cases, the interests of the child may be better served by
the child remaining in her new environment, and,” so, “it provides several narrow
affirmative defenses to wrongful removal.” Guevara, 155 F.4th at 360 (cleaned up).
Under ICARA, the party petitioning for the child’s return bears
the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the
child was wrongfully removed or retained. [22 U.S.C.] § 9003(e)(1). If the
court 	finds 	the 	child 	was 	wrongfully 	removed 	or 	retained, 	the
respondent opposing return of the child has the burden of establishing
that an exception to the return requirement applies. § 9003(e)(2). ….
Absent a finding that an exception applies, a child determined to be
wrongfully removed or retained must be “promptly returned” to the
child’s country of habitual residence. § 9001(a)(4).
Golan v. Saada, 596 U.S. 666, 671-72 (2022) (cleaned up).
The 	affirmative 	defenses 	or 	“exceptions” 	– 	“the 	term 	employed 	by 	the
implementing legislation,” Hernandez v. Garcia Pena, 820 F.3d 782, 786 n.4 (5th Cir.
2016) (citing 22 U.S.C. § 9003(e)(2)) – provided by the Convention are, to reiterate,
“narrow,” Sealed, 394 F.3d at 393 (citing Convention, arts. 12, 13, 20):
A child may not be returned to his country of habitual residence if the
removing party can show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that: the
non-removing party was not exercising custody rights at the time of the
child’s removal; or, the child is of proper age and maturity and has
decided he does not want to return. Convention, arts. 12, 13(a); 42 U.S.C.
§ 11603(e)(2)(B). A removing party also may prevent the child’s return
if she can show, by clear and convincing evidence, that: principles
relating to the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms do
not permit the return of the child; or, the return would cause grave risk
to the child’s mental or physical well-being. Convention, arts. 20, 13(b);
42 U.S.C. § 11603(e)(2)(A).
Id. (cleaned up).
And, so, the Court’s sole task under the Convention and ICARA is to order the
return of a child wrongfully removed unless an exception applies. See, e.g., Guevara,
Case 3:25-cv-03163-BN Document 77 Filed 03/24/26 Page 8 of 29 PageID <pageID>

- 9 -
155 F.4th at 367 (“This decision is not easy, nor is it without sorrow. But it accords
with the Convention’s core objective: ‘to restore the pre-abduction status quo and to
deter parents from crossing borders in search of a more sympathetic court.’ Because
[petitioner] established a prima facie case for return – and because [an] exception
does not apply – the district court erred in denying his petition.” (cleaned up; quoting
England v. England, 234 F.3d 268, 271 (5th Cir. 2000))).
Analysis
I. 	Sotelo has established a prima facie case for return.
Sotelo has established by a preponderance of the evidence that, since May
2025, Gutiérrez has wrongfully retained A.X. in the United States where Mexico (not
the United States) is A.X.’s habitual residence, in violation of Sotelo’s rights of
custody under the Convention (and Mexican law), which he was exercising at the time
of the wrongful retention, and, so, Sotelo has established a prima facie case for A.X.’s
return to Mexico. See Larbie, 690 F.3d at 307.
A. 	In May 2025, A.X.’s habitual residence was Mexico.
Because of its importance, the Court repeats that “[t]he Convention uses the
phrases ‘wrongful removal or retention’ and ‘right of custody’ as terms of art”:
A removal or retention is “wrongful” under the Convention when (1) it
is in breach of rights of custody attributed to a person ... under the law
of the State in which the child was habitually resident immediately
before the removal or retention; and (2) at the time of removal or
retention those rights were actually exercised, either jointly or alone, or
would have been so exercised but for the removal or retention. The
Convention considers rights of custody [to] include rights relating to the
care of the person of the child and, in particular, the right to determine
the child’s place of residence. These rights differ from rights of access,
which include the right to take a child for a limited period of time to a
place other than the child’s habitual residence.
Case 3:25-cv-03163-BN Document 77 Filed 03/24/26 Page 9 of 29 PageID <pageID>

- 10 -
Larbie, 690 F.3d at 307 (cleaned up).
And, so, Gutiérrez’s retaining A.X. in the United States since May 2025 cannot
be “wrongful” if the United States somehow became A.X.’s habitual residence prior to
May 2025. Indeed, Gutiérrez urges the Court to accept that the United States is A.X.’s
habitual residence because that is where she has resided with Gutiérrez and her
husband since May 2022, when the family temporarily relocated here for his job. But
this position is supported by neither the facts nor the law.
Consider first the applicable facts on which the parties agree:
In May 2022, Respondent requested to temporarily relocate to the
United States with A.X. for a period of three years.
Respondent represented that such period was to coincide with her
husband’s temporary secondment to the United States.
Petitioner agreed to this temporary relocation based on (1) the
representations by Respondent that it would only last three years and
that A.X. would permanently return to Mexico in May 2025; (2) that he
be allowed regular video calls with A.X., facilitated by Respondent; and
(3) that Respondent would return home to Mexico with A.X. once every
three months (the “Temporary Relocation Agreement”).
On May 18, 2022, based on the Temporary Relocation Agreement
between Petitioner and Respondent, Petitioner signed an authorization
for A.X. to temporarily relocate to the U.S. with Respondent for a period
of three years (May 2022 to May 2025).
In May 2022, Respondent and A.X. left Mexico for their temporary
relocation to the United States.
Prior to May 2022, A.X. had lived only in Mexico.
Between May 2022 and the present, A.X returned to visit Mexico
five times.
In February 2024, Petitioner visited A.X. in the United States and
spent three days with her.
In or about March 2025, Respondent informed Petitioner for the
first time that A.X. would not be returning to Mexico in May 2025 as
previously agreed.
In March 2025, Respondent requested that Petitioner renew the
Travel Authorization for A.X. from May 2022 to May 2025.
Petitioner refused to sign a renewal of the Travel Authorization
for A.X. from May 2022 to May 2025.
Case 3:25-cv-03163-BN Document 77 Filed 03/24/26 Page 10 of 29 PageID <pageID>

- 11 -
Petitioner told Respondent that he would not agree to amend the
terms of the Temporary Relocation Agreement and that he expected
Respondent to return A.X. in May 2025, as planned.
In May 2025, Respondent did not return A.X. to Mexico.
Dkt. No. 51 (Stipulations of Fact Nos. 25-37).
As these agreed-upon facts reflect, when Sotelo allowed A.X. to relocate with
Gutiérrez to the United States, this arrangement – which Sotelo never agreed to
extend – was expressly limited to three years. Sotelo therefore never agreed to allow
A.X. to reside in the United States permanently.
In this respect, “[t]he Supreme Court held in Monasky that,” although “a child’s
habitual residence depends on the totality of the circumstances specific to the case,”
“a child’s residence in a particular country can be deemed ‘habitual’ ... only when her
residence there is more than transitory.” Smith, 976 F.3d at 562 (cleaned up).
And, “when a child moves to a new country but whose presence there is deemed
‘transitory,’” “the country in which the child habitually resided prior to such move
remains the child’s habitual residence.” Harm, 16 F.4th at 451-52 (cleaned up).
Consequently, “[t]hat country is the jurisdiction of any Hague Convention
custody dispute between such child’s parents.” Id. at 452.
And that is consistent with what happened here: As soon as Sotelo did not
agree to extend A.X.’s time in the United States, Gutiérrez turned to the courts of
Mexico, not the courts of Texas. See, e.g., Dkt. No. 51, Stipulation of Facts No. 39
(“Since May 2025, both Petitioner and Respondent have engaged in legal proceedings
in Mexican Family Courts related to A.X.’s custody.”).
And that Mexico was still A.X.’s habitual residence in May 2025, when Sotelo’s
Case 3:25-cv-03163-BN Document 77 Filed 03/24/26 Page 11 of 29 PageID <pageID>

- 12 -
permission for her to remain in the United States expired, is further supported by the
totality of the unique circumstances here, considering the factors as laid out by the
Supreme Court and the Fifth Circuit.
While A.X. was physically located in the United States at that time, her (and
her mother’s and stepfather’s) immigration status in the United States reflected the
transitory nature of the family’s presence here. See, e.g., Dkt. No. 74 (Sotelo’s
proposed findings and conclusions) at 11 (“Respondent came to the United States in
connection with her husband’s work visa which allowed Respondent and A.X. to
remain in the United States for a period of three years, from May 2022 to May 2025.
Tr. Vol. 2 [Dkt. No. 68], at 105:9-17. She admitted that if they lost their visas, they
would have had no legal authority to remain in the United States. Tr. Vol. 2, at 106:7-
12. If that had happened, Respondent freely stated that she and A.X. would have
returned to Mexico. Id. She did not say that she would have tried to stay in the United
States or move somewhere else. Id. Respondent and A.X. did not file for permanent
residency in the United States until after the time for Respondent to return A.X. to
Mexico had already passed and Respondent had decided that she would rather stay
in the United States than return home. Tr. Vol. 2, at 110:18–20.” (cleaned up)).
And A.X. has established family ties to Mexico that have been maintained
during the time that she temporarily relocated to the United States with her mother
and stepfather. See id. at 16 (“As part of [his agreeing to allow A.X. to relocate to the
United States with her mother], Mr. Sotelo insisted on certain conditions meant to
protect Mr. Sotelo’s custody rights and preserve his relationship with A.X. Tr. Vol. 2,
Case 3:25-cv-03163-BN Document 77 Filed 03/24/26 Page 12 of 29 PageID <pageID>

- 13 -
at 22:4-10. Those conditions included regular communication via phone or video calls
and regular trips home Mexico every three months. Tr. Vol. 2, at 22:4-10; 52:2-11. At
first, A.X. made regular trips home to Mexico – about five in total. Tr. Vol. 2, at 23:24-
25. During two of those regular trips home, Mr. Sotelo took A.X. on family trips with
her aunts, uncles, cousins, and grandparents to ensure that she maintained strong
ties to her paternal family. Tr. Vol. 2, at 22:13-17. During the other three trips home
to Mexico, A.X. stayed at her paternal grandparents’ home with Mr. Sotelo as the sole
caretaker. Tr. Vol. 2, at 24:4-6; 120:12-19. Eventually, Respondent failed to bring A.X.
home to Mexico to visit Mr. Sotelo due to scheduling issues. Tr. Vol. 2, at 98:3-5. To
co-parent effectively and accommodate A.X.’s schedule, Mr. Sotelo traveled to the
United States to visit A.X. Tr. Vol. 2, at 53:14-18.”).
And that Gutiérrez and her family have applied for Lawful Permanent
Residence (“LPR”) status does not alter the habitual-residence analysis where the
unilateral filing of an LPR application well after May 2025 (especially one that has
yet to be approved) does not retroactively justify a retention that is otherwise
wrongful under the Convention and ICARA or impede the Court’s making required
rulings as to wrongful retention. See Monasky, 589 U.S. at 77; cf. Sanchez v. R.G.L.,
761 F.3d 495, 510 (5th Cir. 2014) (“No authority has been offered to support the
argument that the discretionary grant of asylum confers a right to remain in the
country despite judicial orders under this Convention. The asylum grant does not
supersede the enforceability of a district court’s order that the children should be
returned to their mother, as that order does not affect the responsibilities of either
Case 3:25-cv-03163-BN Document 77 Filed 03/24/26 Page 13 of 29 PageID <pageID>

- 14 -
the Attorney General or Secretary of Homeland Security under the [Immigration and
Nationality Act].” (cleaned up)).
Nor does it matter for purposes of the Convention and ICARA that a Mexican
court may have found “that A.X.’s current habitual residence was the United States
of America on February 12, 2026.” Dkt. No. 73 (Respondent’s proposed findings of fact
and conclusions of law) at 2.
As to this, Gutiérrez more generally argues that, as a matter of international
comity, the Court must defer to determinations made in the “ongoing custody
proceedings involving A.X. in Mexico.” Id. at 3.
Such arguments are wrong for multiple reasons.
First, no evidence reflects that a Mexican court is considering – or has
considered – the same discrete issues confronted by the Court in this proceeding
under the Convention and ICARA. And, so, the Court owes no deference to the
Mexican legal proceedings.
As another federal district court recently put it, “under ICARA, ‘courts must
give full faith and credit to the Hague Convention determinations of other American
courts, state or federal, but only when those determinations are rendered pursuant
to the Convention, in an action brought under ICARA and the Convention.’” Goderth
v. Yandall-Goderth, No. 24-cv-8211, 2025 WL 1866307, at *9 n.5 (N.D. Ill. July 7,
2025) (cleaned up; quoting Redmond v. Redmond, 724 F.3d 729, 741 n.7 (7th Cir.
2013) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 11603(g))).
“This special preclusion rule does not, on its face, affirmatively authorize
Case 3:25-cv-03163-BN Document 77 Filed 03/24/26 Page 14 of 29 PageID <pageID>

- 15 -
American 	courts 	to 	apply 	res 	judicata 	principles 	to 	the 	Hague 	Convention
determinations 	of 	foreign 	courts; 	it’s 	an 	open 	question 	whether 	it 	precludes
application of res judicata principles to foreign Hague Convention determinations.”
Redmond, 724 F.3d at 741 n.7 (cleaned up).
And, while “the decision to extend comity to a foreign nation’s judgment is
within a court’s discretion, the answer is not always that straightforward in Hague
Convention cases” – “and most Hague Convention cases that have raised questions of
comity involve situations where a foreign court had already adjudicated a related
Hague petition.” Goderth, 2025 WL 1866307, at *9 n.5 (cleaned up; quoting Pedersen
v. Shriver, No. 23-cv-13836, 2024 WL 3718189, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 8, 2024)); accord
Van Driessche v. Ohio-Esezeoboh, 466 F. Supp. 2d 828, 843 (S.D. Tex. 2006) (“In the
instant action, Van Driessche does not allege there is another Hague petition
adjudication in the United States or in Belgium. Accordingly, there is no other Hague
Petition adjudication to which this Court considers deferring as a matter of comity.
The full faith and credit provision of ICARA does not require this Court, as a matter
of comity and res judicata, to accord full faith and credit to the underlying Belgian
court interim orders or its custody determination.”); see also Guimaraes v. Brann, 562
S.W.3d 521, 538, 530, 543 (Tex. App. – Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, pet denied).
More broadly, and as already explained, the purpose of this proceeding is not
to make custody or visitation determinations as to X.A. but to restore the pre-
wrongful-retention status quo under a framework – established by an international
convention entered into by the United States and Mexico and implemented by a
Case 3:25-cv-03163-BN Document 77 Filed 03/24/26 Page 15 of 29 PageID <pageID>

- 16 -
federal statute – that defines a remedy for a historical wrong that, if proven and if no
exception applies, mandates return. Cf. Sealed, 394 F.3d at 343 (“For purposes of the
Convention, it is irrelevant whether there is a custody dispute concerning that child
pending at the time of removal.”).
After that – and once there is “no international legal void that requires the
Convention’s intervention” – “[t]he courts in Mexico … are able to grant appropriate
relief to address [custody or visitation] concerns.” Madrigal v. Tellez, 848 F.3d 669,
675 (5th Cir. 2017) (footnote omitted).
And to the extent that Gutiérrez has argued that there is no role for the
Convention under the circumstances here because custody proceedings are ongoing
in Mexico, the country where both sides agree such determinations should be made,
she misapprehends the role of the Convention and ICARA.
That is at least because Gutiérrez’s failure to maintain the status quo by not
returning with A.X. to Mexico in May 2025, after the travel authorization to which
Sotelo consented expired, necessitates the remedy of return under the Convention
and ICARA, particularly where the record reflects that custody and visitation
decisions by the Mexican courts since then have been influenced by Gutiérrez’s
retaining A.X. in the United States, a consequence that the Convention is designed
to 	prevent. 	See, 	e.g., 	Dkt. 	No. 	69 	at 	10:6-13:7 	(testimony 	from 	an 	attorney
representing Gutiérrez in the Mexican proceedings explaining that Sotelo’s rights
were modified by the courts there to allow visitation with X.A. only over Zoom “so
that she would not be forced to return to Mexico to spend time with her father”);
Case 3:25-cv-03163-BN Document 77 Filed 03/24/26 Page 16 of 29 PageID <pageID>

- 17 -
Sealed, 394 F.3d at 344 (While the Convention is “not concerned with establishing
the person to whom custody of the child will belong at some point in the future,” it
does seek “to prevent a later decision on the matter being influenced by a change of
circumstances brought about through unilateral action by one of the parties.”
(cleaned up)).
B. 	A.X.’s being retained in the United States violated Sotelo’s
rights of custody, rights that Sotelo was exercising at the
time that A.X. was retained.
The parties agree that their “custody agreement granted physical custody to
[Gutiérrez], patria potestas (parental rights) to both parties, and weekend visitation
rights to [Sotelo]” and that Sotelo “has never signed any legal document, in either
Mexico or the United States, terminating or otherwise giving up his legal rights.”
Dkt. No. 51 at 15.
Today, patria potestas rights regulate relations between parents and
children until the latter reach the age at which they must fend for
themselves. It represents the most comprehensive right that a parent
can exercise over the person and property of his or her minor children,
including custody of the minors, the authority to raise them, discipline
them, represent them in legal acts, administer their property, feed and
care for them, etc.
Garcia v. Posada, 728 F. Supp. 3d 430, 438 (N.D. Tex. 2024) (cleaned up).
“As it comes to federal courts interpreting the cross over between patria
potestas rights and ‘rights of custody,’ a significant number of courts have held that
patria potestas rights are ‘rights of custody’ under the Convention.” Id. (collecting
cases).
And, even though Gutiérrez was granted sole physical custody of A.X., Sotelo’s
unextinguished patria potestas rights still “confer[] Hague Convention standing.” Id.
Case 3:25-cv-03163-BN Document 77 Filed 03/24/26 Page 17 of 29 PageID <pageID>

- 18 -
at 442-43 (“The first sentence in this divorce decree expressly grants patria potestas
rights to both Garcia and Posada. And while the second sentence in the divorce decree
grants sole physical custody to Posada, this Court follows Lalo in holding that a grant
of patria potestas rights ‘specifically incorporated in a custody agreement must
amount to a divisible custody right.’ That confers Hague Convention standing.”
(cleaned up; quoting Lalo v. Malca, 318 F. Supp. 2d 1152, 1156 (S.D. Fla. 2004))); see
also id. at 443 (rejecting the argument “that a grant of custody to one parent
extinguishes the left-behind parent’s patria potestas rights” (citing Garcia v. Pinelo,
808 F.3d 1158, 1164-67 (7th Cir. 2015))).
And Sotelo was exercising his rights of custody at the time that A.X. was
retained in the United States, as the record reflects that he has done the opposite of
abandon his daughter. See Sealed, 394 F.3d at 345 (“[I]n the absence of a ruling from
a court in the child’s country of habitual residence, when a parent has custody rights
under the laws of that country, even occasional contact with the child constitutes
‘exercise’ of those rights. To show failure to exercise custody rights, the removing
parent must show the other parent has abandoned the child.”); see also id. (“[I]f a
person has valid custody rights to a child under the law of the country of the child's
habitual residence, that person cannot fail to exercise those custody rights under the
Hague Convention short of acts that constitute clear and unequivocal abandonment
of the child. Once it determines that the parent exercised custody rights in any
manner, the court should stop – completely avoiding the question whether the parent
exercised the custody rights well or badly. These matters go to the merits of the
Case 3:25-cv-03163-BN Document 77 Filed 03/24/26 Page 18 of 29 PageID <pageID>

- 19 -
custody dispute and are, therefore, beyond the subject matter jurisdiction of federal
courts.” (cleaned up; quoting Friedrich v. Friedrich, 78 F.3d 1060, 1066 (6th Cir.
1996))).
For example, Gutiérrez “agreed that prior to (and after) the wrongful retention,
Mr. Sotelo maintained contact with A.X. through videocalls and in-person visits.”
Dkt. No. 74 at 21 (citing Stip. Fact Nos. 31, 32; Tr. Vol. 2, at 25:25-26:1; 27:14-20;
121:19-20); see also Dkt. No. 51 at 15 (Stip. Fact Nos. 19-21) (“At all times since A.X.’s
birth, Petitioner has paid for the home at San Luis Potosi, Mexico. At all times since
A.X.’s birth, Petitioner has contributed to A.X.’s education fund. From the time the
divorce decree was entered, through the present, Petitioner has made regular child
support payments.”).
And Gutiérrez’s mere initiation in April 2025 of proceedings in Mexico to alter
the parties’ custody rights (prior to the expiration of the travel authorization) didn’t
alter the status quo of the established custody rights as of May 2025 as there was no
final decision affecting those rights prior to the wrongful retention that occurred
when Gutiérrez kept A.X. in the United States after expiration of the travel
authorization. Cf. Sealed, 394 F.3d at 346 (“[T]he Convention does not require a
pending custody suit for removal to be wrongful.”).
II. 	Gutiérrez has not established that an exception to the return
requirement applies.
In addition to her arguments concerning the controlling weight that she
believes the Court must provide the Mexican legal proceedings – which the Court
rejects for the reasons set out above – Gutiérrez raises three exceptions to the
Case 3:25-cv-03163-BN Document 77 Filed 03/24/26 Page 19 of 29 PageID <pageID>

- 20 -
Convention’s return requirement, on which she bears the burden. But she has
established none of them.
Gutiérrez first asserts that Sotelo consented or acquiesced to A.X.’s remaining
in the United States by permitting her to travel here in May 2022 and by consenting
to a six-year extension of A.X.’s Mexican passport. See Dkt. No. 73 at 2.
The consent defense involves the petitioner’s conduct prior to the
contested removal or retention. The focus of inquiry is the petitioner’s
subjective intent, as evinced by the petitioner’s statements or conduct,
which can be rather informal. If a person has valid custody rights to a
child under the law of the country of the child’s habitual residence, that
person cannot fail to exercise those custody rights under the Hague
Convention 	short 	of 	acts 	that 	constitute 	clear 	and 	unequivocal
abandonment of the child. Accordingly, a court liberally finds exercise
whenever a parent with de jure custody rights keeps, or seeks to keep,
any sort of regular contact with his or her child. The consent defense
must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence. 22 U.S.C. §
9003(e)(2)(B).
Hernandez v. Erazo, No. 23-50281, 2023 WL 3175471, at *3 (5th Cir. May 1, 2023)
(per curiam) (cleaned up).
Gutiérrez has not proven this exception by a preponderance of the evidence
where (1) it’s not disputed that Sotelo expressly did not consent to A.X. remaining
beyond May 2025 and (2) agreeing to a renewed passport (but not an extended travel
authorization) cannot amount to acquiescing to Gutiérrez’s wrongfully keeping A.X.
in the United States.
And, in any event, there is no record that Sotelo failed to keep in regular
contact with A.X. or otherwise exercised his custody rights in any manner that could
“constitute clear and unequivocal abandonment of” A.X.
Gutiérrez also asserts that requiring that A.X. return to Mexico would expose
Case 3:25-cv-03163-BN Document 77 Filed 03/24/26 Page 20 of 29 PageID <pageID>

- 21 -
A.X. to a grave risk of harm. See Dkt. No. 73 at 2.
“Article 13(b) of the Hague Convention provides that a court is not bound to
return a child if one opposing the return establishes that there is a grave risk that
his or her return would expose the child to physical or psychological harm or
otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation.” Galaviz, 95 F.4th at 254
(cleaned up).
A movant “must show that the risk to the child is grave, not merely serious”;
that “[t]he grave risk involves not only the magnitude of the potential harm but also
the probability that the harm will materialize”; and that “[t]he alleged harm [is] a
great deal more than minimal and greater than would normally be expected on taking
a child away from one parent and passing him to another.” Id. at 256-57 (cleaned up);
see also, e.g., Madrigal, 848 F.3d at 677 (“Vergara is correct that the possible
separation of a child from a parent is not sufficient to trigger the grave risk of harm
exception.” (citations omitted)); England, 234 F.3d at 271-72 (“The District Court’s
finding that return to Australia would expose Karina to a grave risk of psychological
harm, then, was clearly erroneous.”).
And ICARA requires that “[a] respondent arguing that return would expose
the child to a grave risk of harm must establish that this exception applies by ‘clear
and convincing evidence.’ § 9003(e)(2)(A).” Golan, 596 U.S. at 672.
Clear and convincing evidence is a weight of proof which produces in the
mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the
allegations sought to be established. It is evidence so clear, direct and
weighty and convincing as to enable the fact finder to come to a clear
conviction, without hesitancy, of the truth of the precise facts. Mere
speculation does not meet the clear and convincing burden.
Case 3:25-cv-03163-BN Document 77 Filed 03/24/26 Page 21 of 29 PageID <pageID>

- 22 -
Galaviz, 95 F.4th at 256 (cleaned up).
“Article 13(b) focuses on the risk of harm posed by the child’s repatriation. It
is not an invitation to determine whether custody with one parent would be in the
best interest of the child. The question is whether there is clear and convincing
evidence that return would expose the child to a grave risk of harm, not whether a
parent is a worthy custodian.” Id. at 257 (footnotes omitted).
And, so, “findings of grave risk are rare.” Soto v. Contreras, 880 F.3d 706, 710
(5th Cir. 2018) (cleaned up).
And Gutiérrez has not proven this exception by clear and convincing evidence
here where all she does is speculate – without citation to any record evidence – that
Sotelo’s medical condition affects “his ability to properly care for A.X.” and “to work
and take care of himself”; “causes violent outbursts”; and “could lead to physical or
psychological harm to” A.X. Dkt. No. 73 at 2; see also, e.g., Dkt. No. 76 at 11-12
(“Because Respondent presented no competent evidence tying Mr. Sotelo’s medical
condition to any physical or psychological harm, she has failed to meet her burden to
establish 	this 	defense 	by 	clear 	and 	convincing 	evidence. 	The 	record 	evidence
established that Mr. Sotelo has a medical condition, he has received treatment, and
is not suffering any lasting symptoms. Tr. Vol. 2, 56:18-22; 57:5-12. Respondent
identifies no factual evidence in the record supporting any other conclusion. Mr.
Sotelo’s medical condition is simply not a factor in his ability to care for A.X. And even
if the Court accepted Respondent’s unsupported factual findings, that falls well short
of what is required to establish a grave risk.” (citations omitted)).
Case 3:25-cv-03163-BN Document 77 Filed 03/24/26 Page 22 of 29 PageID <pageID>

- 23 -
Related to Gutiérrez’s unfounded assertions in support of this exception, it’s
worth noting that she testified that, should the Court order that A.X. be returned to
Mexico, she would accompany her daughter and continue in her role as the parent
with sole physical custody of A.X. Cf. Sealed, 394 F.3d at 346 (“As Father stipulated
at oral argument here, he does not request the children be returned in his care or
physical custody; nor does he object to the children being returned to Australia in
Mother’s care and custody. Thus, Mother is to have primary physical custody of the
children at all times during the return to, and while in, Australia, pending any
custody determination by Australian courts.”).
Gutiérrez finally raises the age and maturity (or mature child) defense.
“The Convention establishes that a court ‘may refuse to order the return of the
child if it finds that the child objects to being returned and has attained an age and
degree of maturity at which it is appropriate to take account of its views.’” Rodriguez
v. Yanez, 817 F.3d 466, 473 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting England, 234 F.3d at 272 (quoting
Convention art. 13(b))).
Under 	this 	exception, 	the 	respondent’s 	burden 	is 	to 	establish 	“by 	a
preponderance of the evidence,” De La Rosa v. Alonso, No. 4:24-CV-00059-AGD, 2024
WL 4646975, at *6 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 30, 2024) (citing 22 U.S.C. § 9003), “two distinct
facts: (a) [the child] has attained an age and degree of maturity at which it is
appropriate to take account of her views; and (b) [the child] objects to being returned,”
Rodriguez, 817 F.3d at 474 (cleaned up).
Beginning with age, “[t]he Convention does not set an age at which a child is
Case 3:25-cv-03163-BN Document 77 Filed 03/24/26 Page 23 of 29 PageID <pageID>

- 24 -
automatically considered to be sufficiently mature, rather the determination is to be
made 	on 	a 	case-by-case 	basis.” 	Smith 	v. 	Smith, 	No. 	4:19-cv-784-O, 	2019 	WL
13201172, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 20, 2019) (quoting Vasconcelos v. Batista, 512 F.
App’x 403, 405 (5th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (quoting Tsai-Yi Yang v. Fu-Chiang Tsui,
499 F.3d 259, 279 (3d Cir. 2007))), aff’d, 976 F.3d 558 (5th Cir. 2020).
And, while the Fifth Circuit “has ‘declined to hold, as a matter of law, that any
particular age is sufficient or insufficient to meet the defense,’” Rodriguez, 817 F.3d
at 474 (quoting Dietz v. Dietz, 349 F. App’x 930, 934 (5th Cir. 2009)), it has also noted
that the age of 13 “is consonant with that of other children whom courts have found
to be of sufficient age and maturity for the purposes of this exception,” Vasconcelos,
512 F. App’x at 405 (collecting cases).
As to the second fact that must be established by a preponderance of the
evidence, “[t]he Convention requires an objection, ‘not a mere preference.’” Smith,
2019 WL 13201172, at *3 (quoting Rodriguez, 817 F.3d at 476).
The text of the Convention restricts the age and maturity exception to
cases in which the child “objects” to being returned. A preference is not
an objection. This is not a matter of magic words or talismanic language.
There is a substantive difference between preferring to live in one of two
countries – when living in either country would be acceptable – and
affirmatively objecting to returning to one country – when living in that
country would be unacceptable. Only an objection is sufficient to trump
the Convention’s strong presumption in favor of return.
Rodriguez, 817 F.3d at 476-77; see also id. at 476 (“[A]n objection by the child to being
returned, if found to be a considered and mature decision, will be honored whether or
not it rests in part on her objection to living with the abducting parent.”).
And, so, “[c]ourts have distinguished between the ‘wishes’ of a child and a
Case 3:25-cv-03163-BN Document 77 Filed 03/24/26 Page 24 of 29 PageID <pageID>

- 25 -
child’s objection, holding that wishes are associated with custody proceedings, and
are thus not appropriate to consider in a Hague case” – that is, “‘a child’s objections
as defined by the Hague Convention’” must be “‘stronger and more restrictive’” than
“‘the child’s wishes as in a typical child custody case.’” Neumann v. Neumann, 310 F.
Supp. 3d 823, 835 (E.D. Mich. 2018) (quoting Hirst v. Tiberghien, 947 F. Supp. 2d
578, 597 (D.S.C. 2013)).
“In a similar vein, courts have required that children subject to the Convention
set forth particularized reasons why they object to return, as opposed to a generalized
opposition.” Id. (citing Tsai-Yi Yang, 499 F.3d at 479.
Courts should also consider whether a child’s objection to being returned is
rooted in the wrongful detention itself. See Tsai-Yi Yang, 499 F.3d at 280.
And, “[e]ven if the Court [finds that] the child displayed sufficient age and
maturity” – and expressed particularized objections, as opposed to generalized wishes
– the Court may still reject “any objection by the minor child to returning” if that
objection “is the result of undue influence.” Preston v. Preston, No. 4:22-CV-00990-
CAN, 2023 WL 300130, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 17, 2023) (citing Vazquez v. Vasquez,
No. 3:13-cv-1445-B, 2013 WL 7045041, at *29 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 27, 2013)).
And “[t]he Fifth Circuit has explained that an in-camera interview with the
child provides a proper basis for the court’s consideration of the age and maturity
defense.” De La Rosa, 2024 WL 4646975, at *6 (citing Vasconcelos, 512 F. App’x at
406 & n.6 (citing TEX. FAM. CODE § 153.009)).
Here, the Court, following the Fifth Circuit’s approved approach, appointed
Case 3:25-cv-03163-BN Document 77 Filed 03/24/26 Page 25 of 29 PageID <pageID>

- 26 -
an ad litem to meet with A.X. prior to and then accompany A.X. to an in-camera
interview with the Court. See Dkt. Nos. 61, 62, & 70. During that interview, A.X.
registered no objection at all to returning to and living in Mexico. See generally Dkt.
No. 70. So, even if A.X. is of sufficient age and maturity, Gutiérrez has not proven
this exception by a preponderance of the evidence.
But, before moving on, the Court must pause to document that Gutiérrez
includes in her proposed findings of fact the statement “A.X. wishes to remain in the
United States and A.X. objects to returning to Mexico.” Dkt. No. 73 at 2. Gutiérrez
points to no evidence in support. And that’s not surprising since this proposed finding
is belied by the transcript of the Court’s in-camera interview. See generally Dkt. No.
70; see also FED . R. CIV. P. 11(b) (“By presenting to the court a pleading, written
motion, or other paper – whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating it
– an attorney … certifies that to the best of the person’s knowledge, information, and
belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances ... the factual
contentions have evidentiary support.”).
III. 	The Court declines to exclude objected-to evidence offered by
Gutiérrez (or otherwise impose related sanctions) because this
evidence is either irrelevant or insufficient as a matter of law.
Prior to trial and during the proceedings, Sotelo raised numerous evidentiary
objections and moved for discovery sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
37(c). See, e.g., Dkt. No. 51 at 12-13; Dkt. No. 54.
And the Final Pretrial Order sets out, “[a]s the Court explained at the final
pretrial conference, it is inclined to permit the parties’ proffered testimony and
exhibits subject to ruling on these objections and requests for exclusion under Rule
Case 3:25-cv-03163-BN Document 77 Filed 03/24/26 Page 26 of 29 PageID <pageID>

- 27 -
37(c) post-trial when issuing its findings of fact and conclusions of law.” Dkt. No. 51
at 13.
The Court now finds that these discovery sanctions requests and evidentiary
objections are mooted by its considering Gutiérrez’s objected-to evidence and its
finding – for all the reasons set out above – that this evidence is either irrelevant or
insufficient as a matter of law.
IV. 	The Court is inclined not to stay this return order pending any
appeal.
While Gutiérrez has neither indicated that she would appeal a decision adverse
to her nor requested that the Court stay any order requiring return, the Supreme
Court “has warned that issuance of routine stays in Hague Convention cases ‘would
conflict with the Convention’s mandate of prompt return to a child’s country of
habitual residence.’’ Garcia v. Ramsis, No. 4:21-CV-650-SDJ, 2022 WL 1271129, at
*1 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 28, 2022) (quoting Chafin v. Chafin, 568 U.S. 165, 178 (2013)).
Still, to “ensure[] that each case will receive the individualized treatment
necessary for appropriate consideration of the child’s best interests,” “courts should
apply the four traditional stay factors in considering whether to stay a return order:
(1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is likely to succeed
on the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be irreparably injured absent a stay; (3)
whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure the other parties interested in
the proceeding; and (4) where the public interest lies.” Chafin, 568 U.S. at 179.
And, while the Court cannot know the exact grounds that Gutiérrez may raise
if she does move to stay this order, the Court observes that the Supreme Court “has
Case 3:25-cv-03163-BN Document 77 Filed 03/24/26 Page 27 of 29 PageID <pageID>

- 28 -
explained that ‘[i]f losing parents were effectively guaranteed a stay, it seems likely
that more would appeal, a scenario that would undermine the goal of prompt return
and the best interests of children who should in fact be returned.’” Hernandez, 2023
WL 3175471, at *4 (quoting Chafin, 568 U.S. at 179).
And, in Hernandez, the Fifth Circuit rejected as a basis to stay grounds that
the Court could see Gutiérrez raising here:
Erazo argues that both she and M.S.O. will suffer irreparable
harm if he is returned to Mexico. She emphasizes the “physical and
emotional disruption to M.S.O.’s life” and the further risk to his stability
if she is successful in her appeal and M.S.O. must then return to the
United States. Relatedly, she asserts that there is a strong public
interest “in protecting children from the risk of being unnecessarily
shuttled back and forth between two countries as a result of ongoing
litigation.” But these are the risks facing many of the children and
parents 	litigating 	under 	the 	Hague 	Convention; 	granting 	stay
applications such as these would become routine if Erazo’s arguments,
without more, were sufficient. Furthermore, we cannot ignore the
“precious months” that M.S.O. might lose “readjusting to life in [his]
country of habitual residence” given the dubious merits of Erazo’s
appeal, along with the harm that Ortiz suffers the longer that he is
separated from M.S.O.
Id. (citations omitted).
Conclusion
For the reasons set out above, the Court ORDERS A.X. to be returned to
Mexico.
To help ensure that happens in an efficient manner, the Court ORDERS
counsel for both sides to meet and confer in person, by telephone, or over an online
platform such as Zoom no later than 10:00 a.m. on March 25, 2026 to facilitate
A.X.’s return and then file a joint status report no later than 4:00 p.m. on March 25,
2026 setting out their proposal.
Case 3:25-cv-03163-BN Document 77 Filed 03/24/26 Page 28 of 29 PageID <pageID>

- 29 -
Counsel for Sotelo must initiate the conference and file the joint status report.
After the Court receives and reviews this report, it will enter a further order
and a final judgment.
Until that occurs, the Court ORDERS Gutiérrez to not remove A.X. from the
Northern District of Texas.
And, if Sotelo maintains his request for fees and costs related to this litigation,
he must submit a motion and attach itemized evidence of all fees and costs requested
by April 23, 2026.
SO ORDERED.
DATE: March 24, 2026
_________________________________________
DAVID L. HORAN
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Case 3:25-cv-03163-BN Document 77 Filed 03/24/26 Page 29 of 29 PageID <pageID>