Hurt v. Hunt County, Texas et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
JOHN HURT, 	§
§
Plaintiff, 	§
§
V. 	§ 	No. 3:25-cv-3154-D
§
HUNT COUNTY, TEXAS, ET AL., 	§
§
Defendants. 	§
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Based on his January 2020 arrest and resulting 14-day detention in Hunt
County, Texas, Plaintiff John Hurt filed this pro se lawsuit in September 2025 in the
Eastern District of Texas, which transferred Hurt’s lawsuit to the Dallas Division of
this federal judicial district, in which Hunt County lies. See Dkt. Nos. 22 & 23; 28
U.S.C. §§ 1391(b)(2), 1406(a), & 124(a)(1).
Prior to this transfer, Defendants Hunt County, Texas and Hunt County
Sheriff Terry Jones (the “Hunt County Defendants”) moved to dismiss Hurt’s
operative (amended) complaint [Dkt. No. 12] under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6), see Dkt. No. 25; see also Dkt. No. 44 (purported supplement to the amended
complaint).
Hurt responded to the motion to dismiss. See Dkt. No. 34. The Hunt County
Defendants replied. See Dkt. No. 46. Hurt then moved for leave to file a surreply. See
Dkt. No. 47.
The same day, Senior Judge Sidney A. Fitzwater referred the motion to dismiss
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and Hurt’s related motion for leave to the undersigned United States magistrate
judge for recommendation under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). See Dkt. No. 48.
Hurt then moved for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) and preliminary
injunction against Defendants Bernalillo County, Bernalillo County Clerk, and New
Mexico Administrative Office of the Courts “because Defendants have, after ten
years, resumed prosecutorial activity on a case that is legally void, dismissed, and
jurisdictionally extinguished under New Mexico law, placing Plaintiff at immediate
risk of renewed arrest, unlawful detention, and catastrophic harm.” Dkt. No. 50; see
also Dkt. Nos. 51 & 52.
Judge Fitzwater also referred this motion and any related procedural motions
to the undersigned for recommendation under Section 636(b)(1)(B). See Dkt. No. 53.
And, for the following reasons, the Court should deny the motion for leave to
file a surreply, grant the motion to dismiss, and deny the motion for a TRO and
preliminary injunction.
Discussion
I. 	The Court should deny Hurt’s motion for leave to file a surreply and
grant dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) because Hurt’s claims against the
Hunt County Defendants are facially time-barred.
Starting with Hurt’s request for leave to file a surreply, “[b]ecause the rules do
not provide for surreplies as a matter of right, the district court only accepts such
filings ‘in exceptional or extraordinary circumstances.’” Gezu v. Charter Commc’ns,
17 F.4th 547, 556 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting Lacher v. West, 147 F. Supp. 2d 538, 539
(N.D. Tex. 2001)).
And, while, “[o]rdinarily, sur-replies are ‘heavily disfavored,’ and the decision
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to allow a sur-reply lies within the district court’s discretion,” “when a party raises
new arguments or evidence for the first time in a reply, the district court must either
give the other party an opportunity to respond or decline to rely on the new
arguments and evidence.” Ga. Firefighters’ Pension Fund v. Anadarko Petroleum
Corp., 99 F.4th 770, 774 (5th Cir. 2024) (quoting Butler v. S. Porter, 999 F.3d 287, 297
(5th Cir. 2021)).
While it is not apparent to the undersigned that the Hunt County Defendants
raise new arguments for the first time on reply, the undersigned need not rely on
anything in their reply brief to find that Hurt’s claims should be dismissed as time-
barred. And, so, the Court should deny leave to file a surreply.
Turning to the motion to dismiss, considering dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6),
the Court “accepts all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff.” In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205-06
(5th Cir. 2007).
Even so, a plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face” and must plead those facts with enough specificity “to raise a
right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
570, 555 (2007).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); cf. Bryant v. Ditech
Fin., L.L.C., No. 23-10416, 2024 WL 890122, at *3 (5th Cir. Mar. 1, 2024) (“[J]ust as
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plaintiffs cannot state a claim using speculation, defendants cannot defeat plausible
inferences using speculation.”).
“The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks
for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 678.
So, “[w]here a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a
defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of
entitlement to relief.” Id. (cleaned up; quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557); see, e.g.,
Parker v. Landry, 935 F.3d 9, 17 (1st Cir. 2019) (Where “a complaint reveals random
puffs of smoke but nothing resembling real signs of fire, the plausibility standard is
not satisfied.”).
And, while Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) does not mandate detailed
factual allegations, it does require that a plaintiff allege more than labels and
conclusions, and, so, while a court must accept a plaintiff’s factual allegations as true,
it is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
Consequently, a threadbare or formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause
of 	action, 	supported 	by 	mere 	conclusory 	statements, 	will 	not 	suffice. 	See 	id.;
Armstrong v. Ashley, 60 F.4th 262, 269 (5th Cir. 2023) (“[T]he court does not ‘presume
true a number of categories of statements, including legal conclusions; mere labels;
threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action; conclusory statements; and
naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.’” (quoting Harmon v. City of
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Arlington, Tex., 16 F.4th 1159, 1162-63 (5th Cir. 2021))).
And, so, “to survive a motion to dismiss” under Twombly and Iqbal, plaintiffs
must “plead facts sufficient to show” that the claims asserted have “substantive
plausibility” by stating “simply, concisely, and directly events” that they contend
entitle them to relief. Johnson v. City of Shelby, Miss., 574 U.S. 10, 12 (2014) (per
curiam) (citing FED . R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)-(3), (d)(1), (e)); cf. Brown v. Tarrant Cnty., Tex.,
985 F.3d 489, 494 (5th Cir. 2021) (While “[p]ro se complaints receive a ‘liberal
construction,’” “mere conclusory allegations on a critical issue are insufficient.”
(cleaned up)).
The Hunt County Defendants move for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) for
multiple reasons, the first being that Hurt’s claims are barred by the applicable
statute of limitations. See Dkt. No. 25 at 10-12.
The undersigned agrees and finds that the motion should be granted for this
reason alone.
“A complaint is ‘subject to dismissal if its allegations affirmatively demonstrate
that the plaintiff’s claims are barred by the statute of limitations and fail to raise
some basis for tolling.’” Jenkins v. Tahmahkera, 151 F.4th 739, 747 (5th Cir. 2025)
(quoting Frame v. City of Arlington, 657 F.3d 215, 240 (5th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (citing
Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215 (2007))); accord Doe 1 v. City View Indep. Sch. Dist.,
150 F.4th 668, 674 (5th Cir. 2025) (“A statute of limitations may support dismissal
under Rule 12(b)(6) where it is evident from the plaintiff’s pleadings that the action
is barred and the pleadings fail to raise some basis for tolling or the like.” (citations
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omitted)).
Against the Hunt County Defendants, Hurt brings claims that they violated
(1) the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the Rehabilitation Act (“RA”); (2)
his 	right 	to 	substantive 	and 	procedural 	due 	process 	under 	the 	Fourteenth
Amendment and to be protected from unlawful seizure under the Fourth Amendment
(claims that are actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); and Texas tort law (false
imprisonment, 	negligence 	and 	gross 	negligence, 	and 	intentional 	infliction 	of
emotional distress).
All these claims are subject to Texas’s two-year statute of limitations for
personal-injury claims. See Jenkins, 151 F.4th at 747 (“‘The statute of limitations for
a suit brought under § 1983 is determined by the general statute of limitations
governing personal injuries in the forum state.’ In Texas, a two-year statute of
limitations governs personal injury claims.” (quoting Winfrey v. Rogers, 901 F.3d 483,
492 (5th Cir. 2018), then citing TEX. C IV. PRAC. & R EM. CODE ANN . § 16.003(b))); Lee
v. Dall. Cnty., No. 3:19-cv-2690-L-BN, 2022 WL 721536, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 18,
2022) (“Consistent with Congress’s mandate, ‘[t]he ADA and the [RA] generally are
interpreted in pari materia.’ And, while neither statute ‘provides a limitations period,’
as to both, the Court should ‘apply Texas’s two-year personal-injury limitations
period to this case.’” (quoting Frame, 657 F.3d at 223, 236, 237, then citing T EX. CIV.
PRAC. & R EM. CODE § 16.003)), rec. accepted, 2022 WL 717261 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 10,
2022); Bennett v. State, No. 05-99-01788-CV, 2001 WL 569749, at *3 (Tex. App. –
Dallas 	May 	29, 	2001, 	pet. 	denied) 	(“Negligence, 	gross 	negligence, 	intentional
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infliction of emotional distress, false arrest or false imprisonment are subject to the
two-year limitations period.” (citing TEX. CIV. P RAC. & REM. CODE ANN . § 16.003(a))).
While Texas’s limitations statute is borrowed as to the federal causes of action,
federal courts “determine the accrual date of [federal claims] by reference to federal
law.” Walker v. Epps, 550 F.3d 407, 414 (5th Cir. 2008) (Section 1983) (citing Wallace
v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007)).
And “accrual occurs when a plaintiff has ‘a complete and present cause of
action, that is, when the plaintiff can file suit and obtain relief.’” Frame, 657 F.3d at
238 (ADA and RA) (quoting Wallace, 549 U.S. at 388; citing Bay Area Laundry & Dry
Cleaning Pension Tr. Fund v. Ferbar Corp. of Cal., 522 U.S. 192, 201 (1997)).
Put another way, the two-year clock “starts running … ‘the moment the
plaintiff becomes aware that he has suffered an injury or has sufficient information
to know that he has been injured.’” Johnson v. Harris Cnty., 83 F.4th 941, 945 (5th
Cir. 2023) (quoting Edmonds v. Oktibbeha Cnty., 675 F.3d 911, 916 (5th Cir. 2012)
(quoting Helton v. Clements, 832 F.2d 332, 335 (5th Cir. 1987))).
Similarly, “[t]he statute of limitations for a personal injury cause of action
under Texas law begins to run from the date a wrongful act causes an injury.”
Williams v. Kroger Tex., L.P., No. 3:16-cv-1631-L, 2016 WL 5870976, at *3 n.1 (N.D.
Tex. Oct. 16, 2016) (citing Childs v. Haussecker, 974 S.W.2d 31, 36 (Tex. 1998)).
The Hunt County Defendants assert that all of Hurt’s claims accrued when he
was arrested and detained in January 2020, as that is when “the last tortious act
complained of occurred.” Dkt. No. 25 at 12; accord Johnson, 83 F.4th at 945-46 (“‘[T]he
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statute of limitations upon a § 1983 claim seeking damages for a false arrest in
violation of the Fourth Amendment, where the arrest is followed by criminal
proceedings, begins to run at the time the claimant becomes detained pursuant to
legal process.’ Thus, a false arrest claim accrues when charges are filed. Similarly,
because a § 1983 claim for false imprisonment is ‘based upon detention without legal
process, limitations run once legal process is initiated.’” (cleaned up; quoting Wallace,
549 U.S. at 397, 389-90)).
And, so, they argue that
Plaintiff’s allegation that he later suffered loss of a confirmed job offer
in August of 2025 does not alter or otherwise extend limitations, as
Defendants’ alleged wrongful conduct ended in January of 2020 and
Plaintiff alleges he suffered a distinct injury at that time. Plaintiff’s
additional alleged injuries in 2023 and 2025 are merely “later additional
injuries” that do not prevent the limitations period from running.
Dkt. No. 25 at 12 (citation omitted).
The Hunt County Defendants therefore assert that, when Hurt filed this
lawsuit in 2025, it was years too late. See id.
Hurt responds that his “detention-based claims accrued upon release, while his
publication-based injuries accrued separately upon each rescinded job offer caused by
ongoing republication in 2020, 2023, and August 2025.” Dkt. No. 34 at 17. That is, he
argues that he has pleaded “discrete, newly accruing injuries in 2023 and August
2025, rescinded job offers caused by Hunt County’s continued publication of false
warrant data, bringing those claims well within the limitations period.” Id.; see also
id. at 18 (asserting that the alleged injuries that occurred within the limitations
period “new and independent harms, not mere lingering effects of the 2020 detention
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and therefore constitute separately accruing injuries” that should also warrant
“apply[ing] the continuing-violation doctrine”).
The undersigned is not persuaded by Hurt’s arguments.
Hurt’s claims accrued in 2020, which, accepting his allegations as true, was
when 	he 	became 	“aware 	that 	he 	ha[d] 	suffered 	an 	injury 	or 	ha[d] 	sufficient
information to know that he ha[d] been injured.” Johnson, 83 F.4th at 945 (cleaned
up). That is because, for accrual, “the proper focus is on the time of the [allegedly
wrongful] act, not the point at which the consequences of the act become painful.”
Chardon v. Fernandez, 454 U.S. 6, 8 (1981) (per curiam) (cleaned up).
Put in the context of Texas’s accrual principles, because Hurt allegedly suffered
a legal injury in 2020 that was not “inherently undiscoverable,” that is when his
claims accrued, “regardless of … if all resulting damages have yet to occur,” Suter v.
Univ. of Tex. at San Antonio, 495 F. App’x 506, 509 (5th Cir. 2012) (per curiam)
(quoting Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 918 S.W.2d 453, 456 (Tex. 1996),
then Childs, 974 S.W.2d at 36-37; citing Murphy v. Campbell, 964 S.W.2d 265, 270
(Tex. 1997)).
In the alternative, Hurt alleges that he is entitled to equitable tolling:
Plaintiff invokes the doctrine of equitable tolling based on Defendants
continuing misconduct and his own due diligence. Additionally, because
Plaintiff was judicially declared incompetent to stand trial in 2017 and
remained under significant medical and cognitive impairment during
subsequent years of cancer treatment, equitable tolling applies under
[Texas and federal law] until he regained capacity to pursue his claims.
The 	wrongful 	publication 	of 	false 	criminal 	records 	and 	resulting
employment 	losses 	persisted 	through 	August 	2025, 	and 	Plaintiff’s
serious medical condition further prevented earlier full pursuit of these
claims. Accordingly, each violation constitutes a newly accruing injury,
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and any applicable limitations period is equitably tolled.
Dkt. No. 12 at 14.
“[A] litigant is entitled to equitable tolling of a statute of limitations only if the
litigant establishes two elements: ‘(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently,
and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely
filing.’” Menominee Indian Tribe of Wis. v. United States, 577 U.S. 250, 255 (2016)
(quoting Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010)).
“‘The diligence required for equitable tolling purposes is reasonable diligence,
not maximum feasible diligence.’ What a [litigant] did both before and after the
extraordinary circumstances that prevented him from timely filing may indicate
whether he was diligent overall.” Jackson v. Davis, 933 F.3d 408, 411 (5th Cir. 2019)
(cleaned up; quoting Holland, 560 U.S. at 653).
Hurt’s equitable-tolling assertions are conclusory. For example, an allegation
that he was declared incompetent to stand trial in 2017 without further factual
development does not allow the Court to reasonably infer that this incompetency
persisted some three years later when these civil claims accrued and then continued
for another five years. So Hurt’s allegations neither allow the Court to find that an
extraordinary circumstance prevented his filing this lawsuit sooner nor demonstrate
a degree of reasonable diligence.
II. 	The Court should deny Hurt’s motion for a TRO and preliminary
injunction.
More recently, Hurt moved for a TRO and preliminary injunction in this civil
action to prevent New Mexico officials from prosecuting him, alleging that, “[f]or
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nearly 	a 	decade, 	New 	Mexico 	state 	actors 	have 	maintained, 	resurrected, 	and
continued to enforce a legally nonexistent criminal case against [him].” Dkt. No. 50
at 2.
As “[a] TRO is simply a highly accelerated and temporary form of preliminary
injunctive relief,” “[t]o obtain a temporary restraining order, an applicant must show
entitlement to a preliminary injunction.” Horner v. Am. Airlines, Inc., No. 3:17-cv-
665-D, 2017 WL 978100, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 13, 2017) (cleaned up).
But granting a preliminary injunction “is an extraordinary remedy which
requires the movant to unequivocally show the need for its issuance.” Valley v.
Rapides Par. Sch. Bd., 118 F.3d 1047, 1050 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing Allied Mktg. Grp.,
Inc. v. C.D.L. Mktg., Inc., 878 F.2d 806, 809 (5th Cir. 1989)).
So, to obtain preliminary injunctive relief, a movant must unequivocally “show
(1) a substantial likelihood that he will prevail on the merits, (2) a substantial threat
that he will suffer irreparable injury if the injunction is not granted, (3) his
threatened injury outweighs the threatened harm to the party whom he seeks to
enjoin, and (4) granting the preliminary injunction will not disserve the public
interest.” Bluefield Water Ass’n, Inc. v. City of Starkville, Miss., 577 F.3d 250, 252-53
(5th Cir. 2009) (cleaned up); accord Canal Auth. of State of Fla. v. Callaway, 489 F.2d
567, 572 (5th Cir. 1974).
And the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit “has repeatedly
cautioned that [such relief] should not be granted unless the party seeking it has
clearly carried the burden of persuasion on all four requirements.” Voting for Am.,
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Inc. v. Steen, 732 F.3d 382, 386 (5th Cir. 2013) (cleaned up).
“Under the rule set out by the United States Supreme Court in Younger v.
Harris,” 401 U.S. 37 (1971), “federal courts must refrain from considering requests
for 	injunctive 	relief 	based 	upon 	constitutional 	challenges 	to 	state 	criminal
proceedings pending at the time the federal action is instituted,” Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v.
Earle, 388 F.3d 515, 518 (5th Cir. 2004).
“Younger abstention is one of a handful of federalism-flavored carveouts to a
federal court’s ‘virtually unflagging obligation’ to exercise congressionally conferred
jurisdiction.” Netflix, Inc. v. Babin, 88 F.4th 1080, 1084-85 (5th Cir. 2023) (footnote
omitted).
So, “[o]ut of respect for the legitimate interest of the state, and to avoid
needless friction, federal courts may not interfere with an ongoing state criminal
proceeding, so long as the defendant being prosecuted has an adequate opportunity
to raise constitutional challenges in the underlying state forum.” Id. at 1085.
But there is no legitimate state interest
in a prosecution brought in bad faith or to harass. Nor, for that matter,
does a defendant have an adequate opportunity to assert constitutional
violations in the state proceeding when the prosecution itself is the
constitutional violation. Thus, in exceptional cases in which a state
prosecutor is credibly accused of bad faith and has no reasonable hope
of obtaining a valid conviction against the defendant, comity-infused
deference gives way, and a federal court may exercise its equitable
power to enjoin the prosecution.
Id.
Here, Hurt may feel that New Mexico state officials are prosecuting him in bad
faith or to harass him. But he has not alleged factual content from which the Court
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may reasonably infer that that could be the case. And, so, he has not carried his
burden to show that his is an exceptional case that requires the Court to disregard
Younger and intervene in an ongoing state criminal proceeding.
For this reason, Hurt has not unequivocally shown that he is entitled to a TRO
or preliminary injunction.
Recommendation
The Court should deny Plaintiff John Hurt’s motion for leave to file a surreply
[Dkt. No. 47]; grant Defendants Hunt County, Texas and Hunt County Sheriff Terry
Jones’s Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss [Dkt. No. 25]
because Hurt’s claims are time-barred; and deny Hurt’s motion for a temporary
restraining order and preliminary injunction against Defendants Bernalillo County,
Bernalillo County Clerk, and New Mexico Administrative Office of the Courts [Dkt.
No. 50].
A copy of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation shall be served on
all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these
findings, conclusions, and recommendation must file specific written objections
within 14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED . R. CIV.
P. 72(b). In order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or
recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and
specify the place in the magistrate judge’s findings, conclusions, and recommendation
where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by
reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure
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to file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the
factual findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or
adopted by the district court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v.
United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996).
DATED: December 4, 2025
_________________________________________
DAVID L. HORAN
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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