Cantu v. Justice of the Peace Precinct 4

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
ROGELIO CANTU, §
§
Plaintiff, §
§
V. § No. 3:25-cv-3152-B-BN
§
JUSTICE OF THE PEACE PRECINCT §
4, §
§
Defendant. §
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Without paying the filing fee, Plaintiff Rogelio Cantu filed a pro se complaint
related to a criminal charge filed against him in the justice of the peace court in
Johnson County, Texas. See Dkt. No. 3. Senior United States District Judge Jane J.
Boyle referred Cantu’s lawsuit to the undersigned United States magistrate judge for
screening under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and a standing order of reference.
Cantu did not pay the filing fee or file a motion for leave to proceed in forma
pauperis (“IFP”). So the Court ordered Cantu to file an IFP motion or pay the filing
fee by December 22, 2025. See Dkt. No. 4. The Court also ordered Cantu to file an
amended complaint “because the complaint on its face does not appear to allege any
claim, much less a plausible claim.” Id. at 2. On January 8, 2026, Cantu filed a
document titled “Acceptance of Filing Fees & Court Costs For Trust Authorized
Payment.” See Dkt. No. 7. He has not filed an amended complaint or filed an IFP
motion on the form provided by the Court.
And the undersigned enters these findings of fact, conclusions of law, and
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recommendation that the Court should dismiss the complaint with prejudice.
Discussion
A district court is required to screen a civil complaint filed IFP (that is, without
payment of the filing fee) and may summarily dismiss that complaint (or any portion
of it) if the complaint fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted. See 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
“The language of § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) tracks the language of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6).” Black v. Warren, 134 F.3d 732, 733-34 (5th Cir. 1998) (per
curiam).
And “[i]t is well-established that a district court may dismiss a complaint on
its own motion under [Rule] 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may
granted.” Starrett v. U.S. Dep’t of Defense, No. 3:18-cv-2851-M-BH, 2018 WL 6069969,
at *1 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 30, 2018) (citing Carroll v. Fort James Corp., 470 F.3d 1171 (5th
Cir. 2006)), rec. accepted, 2018 WL 6068991 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 20, 2018), aff’d, 763 F.
App’x 383 (5th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 142 (2019).
A district court may exercise its “inherent authority ... to dismiss a complaint
on its own motion ... ‘as long as the procedure employed is fair.’” Gaffney v. State Farm
Fire & Cas. Co., 294 F. App’x 975, 977 (5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (quoting Carroll,
470 F.3d at 1177; citation omitted).
“[F]airness in this context requires both notice of the court’s intention to
dismiss sua sponte and an opportunity to respond.” Id. (cleaned up; quoting Lozano
v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, FSB, 489 F.3d 636, 643 (5th Cir. 2007)); see also Carver v.
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Atwood, 18 F.4th 494, 498 (5th Cir. 2021) (“The broad rule is that ‘a district court
may dismiss a claim on its own motion as long as the procedure employed is fair.’
More specifically, ‘fairness in this context requires both notice of the court’s intention
and an opportunity to respond’ before dismissing sua sponte with prejudice.”
(citations omitted)).
And these findings, conclusions, and recommendations provide notice, while
the period for filing objections affords an opportunity to respond. See, e.g., Starrett,
2018 WL 6069969, at *2 (citations omitted).
A district court has authority to dismiss an action as “factually frivolous”
related to claims where “the facts alleged are clearly baseless, a category
encompassing allegations that are fanciful, fantastic, and delusional.” Denton v.
Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1992) (cleaned up; quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490
U.S. 319, 325, 327-28 (1989)); see also id. at 33 (Dismissal “is appropriate when the
facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible, whether or not
there are judicially noticeable facts available to contradict them.”)).
A review of Cantu’s complaint reveals that his claims rely on sovereign citizen
theories. See United States v. Weast, 811 F.3d 743, 746 n.5 (5th Cir. 2016) (“The
sovereign citizen movement is a loose grouping of litigants, commentators, and tax
protesters who often take the position that they are not subject to state or federal
statutes and proceedings.”). Those claims are frivolous and without merit. See, e.g.,
Watson v. Texas State Univ., 829 F. App’x 686 (5th Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (affirming
dismissal of claims based on legal theories associated with the sovereign citizen
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movement as “frivolous” and “entirely without merit”); Hughes v. Shannon, No. 3:20-
CV-0637-B-BT, 2021 WL 1093110, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 2, 2021), rec. accepted, No.
3:20-CV-0637-B (BT), 2021 WL 1088440 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 22, 2021) (finding that
“factual allegations are irrational and nonsensical” and “sovereign citizen claims are
also legally frivolous”); Westfall v. Davis, 2018 WL 2422058, at *2 (N.D. Tex. May 4,
2018), rec. accepted, 2018 WL 2414794 (N.D. Tex. May 29, 2018) (noting that
“[s]overeign-citizen legal arguments ... are indisputably meritless.”). So the complaint
should be dismissed with prejudice as frivolous.
Recommendation
The Court should dismiss the complaint with prejudice as frivolous.
A copy of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation shall be served on
all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these
findings, conclusions, and recommendation must file specific written objections
within 14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV.
P. 72(b). In order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or
recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and
specify the place in the magistrate judge’s findings, conclusions, and recommendation
where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by
reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure
to file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the
factual findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or
adopted by the district court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v.
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United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996).
DATED: January 14, 2026
_________________________________________
DAVID L. HORAN
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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