Anderson-Taylor v. FEDS

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
CHAREE L. ANDERSON-TAYLOR, 	§
Plaintiff, 	§
§
v. 	§ 	No. 3:25-CV-2576-X-BW
§
FEDS, 	§
Defendant. 	§ 	Referred to U.S. Magistrate Judge1
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION
OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Before the Court is Plaintiff Charee L. Anderson-Taylor’s Complaint, received
on September 23, 2025. (Dkt. No. 3.) Based on the relevant filings and applicable
law, the Court should DISMISS the complaint with prejudice as frivolous.
I. BACKGROUND
On September 23, 2025, Anderson-Taylor filed a pro se Complaint for a Civil
Case that names “FEDS” as the defendant, which she later identifies as “Federal
Government.” (See id. at 1, 3.) Her complaint is unintelligible, as her statement of a
claim merely states, “Harassment; Blackballing; Entrapment.” (Id. at 4.) As for
relief, she seeks $10,000 “for bills accumulating while they are hindering me from
finding gainful employment.” (Id.) Anderson-Taylor filed a previous pro se action
against “Federal Government—FEDS” in 2023, which was dismissed as frivolous.
1 By Special Order No. 3-251, this pro se case has been automatically referred for full
case management. (See Dkt. No. 1.)
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See Dkt. Nos. 1, 10, 11, 12, Charee L. Anderson-Taylor v. Federal Government, No. 3:23-
CV-136-X-BT.
II. LEGAL STANDARDS AND ANALYSIS
Because Anderson-Taylor has not paid the applicable filing fee and is seeking
to proceed in forma pauperis in this action (see Dkt. No. 4.), her complaint is subject
to screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).2 That statute authorizes the sua sponte
dismissal of a complaint if the Court finds that it is frivolous or malicious. A
complaint is frivolous when it is “based on an indisputably meritless legal theory” or
when its factual contentions are “clearly ‘baseless.’” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S.
25, 32 (1992); see also Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). The latter
category encompasses allegations that describe “fanciful, fantastic, and delusional”
scenarios or that “rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible.” Denton,
504 U.S. at 33 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
The Court must always liberally construe pleadings filed by pro se litigants.
See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (noting pro se pleadings “must be held
to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers”); Fed. R. Civ. P.
8(e) (“Pleadings must be construed so as to do justice.”). Even under the most liberal
construction, however, Anderson-Taylor’s three words fail to state a viable claim or
2 Although Anderson-Taylor moves to proceed in forma pauperis in this case, the
responses in her application show that her monthly income exceeds her monthly expenses
such that the application should be denied. (See Dkt. No. 4.) The undersigned makes no
recommendation on the motion at this time, however, in light of the recommended
dismissal of this case on a different basis.
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anything that can be construed as such. Further, her allegations here—to the extent
they are coherent—are fanciful and incredible, and thus, inadequate to support any
cognizable claim. See Denton, 504 U.S. at 33. Finally, even if Anderson-Taylor
stated a coherent set of facts from which the Court could infer a cause of action,
nothing suggests that the federal government’s sovereign immunity would have been
waived as to such claims. See Lynch v. U.S. Government, No. 7:09-CV-130-O, 2009
WL 2949770, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 14, 2009). Dismissal is also appropriate for that
reason. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii).
Consequently, Anderson-Taylor’s complaint should be dismissed with
prejudice as frivolous.
III. CONCLUSION
The Court should DISMISS the Complaint, received on September 23, 2025
(Dkt. No. 3), with prejudice as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
SO RECOMMENDED on December 16, 2025.
____________________________________
BRIAN McKAY
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL/OBJECT
A copy of this report and recommendation will be served on all parties in the
manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of this report and
recommendation must file specific written objections within 14 days after being
served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). To be specific,
an objection must identify the finding or recommendation to which objection is
made, state the basis for the objection, and indicate the place in the magistrate
judge’s report and recommendation where the disputed determination is found. An
objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before the
magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file specific written objections will bar the
aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal conclusions of the
magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district court, except upon
grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Services Automobile Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415,
1417 (5th Cir. 1996), modified by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)
(extending the time to file objections to 14 days).
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