Pate v. United States of America et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
FRANK EDWIN PATE,
#30430-408
Petitioner,
§
§
§
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v. 	§
§ 	No. 3:25-cv-01297-K-BT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et
al.,
Respondents.
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§
§
§
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION
OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Petitioner Frank Edwin Pate, a federal prisoner in a halfway house in
Hutchins, Texas, filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241. As explained herein, the District Judge should summarily dismiss the
petition for lack of jurisdiction.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Petitioner was convicted of mail fraud and wire fraud in the Eastern District
of Texas and sentenced to 168 months on each count to run concurrently. United
States v. Petitioner, No. 4:14-cr-125 (E.D. Tex. May 26, 2016) (Am. J., Crim. Doc.
184). Although Petitioner is physically located in this district, his petition does not
challenge the Bureau of Prisons’ execution of his sentence. Instead, Petitioner
mounts a broad collateral attack on his underlying conviction and sentence in the
Eastern District of Texas and seeks release or resentencing. See generally, Pet.
(ECF No. 3).
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The petition raises several grounds for relief, including: (1) failure to state
an offense; (2) alleged Brady/Giglio violations; (3) insufficient evidence; (4)
unlawful restitution and forfeiture; (5) failure to defer to Delaware corporate law;
(6) erroneous sentencing enhancements; (7) lack of appellate review; (8)
ineffective assistance of counsel; (9) an unconstitutional firearm ban; (10)
unlawful arrest; (11) jurisdictional defects; (12) judicial bias; (13) double jeopardy;
(14) Confrontation Clause violations; (15) due process violations relating to pretrial
detention; (16) sentencing errors based on time-barred conduct; and (17) “factual
innocence.” Id. at 1-13. It also invokes § 2255(e)’s savings clause.
This filing is not Petitioner’s first attempt to use § 2241 to challenge his
conviction. His first attempt was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and transferred
to the Eastern District of Texas, so he could pursue his claims under § 2255. See
Petitioner v. Volunteers of Am., No. 3:24-CV-2903-X-BW, 2025 WL 808465, at *1
(N.D. Tex. Mar. 13, 2025); see also Petitioner v. United States, No. 4:25-CV-262
(E.D. Tex. filed March 14, 2025).
After his initial case was transferred, Petitioner filed similar actions in this
district under § 2241. See Petitioner v. Dir., Volunteers of Am., No. 3:25-CV-2405-
N-BW, 2025 WL 2900259, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 23, 2025), rec. accepted, No.
3:25-CV-2405-N-BW, 2025 WL 2899904 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 10, 2025); Petitioner v.
Director Sales, RRM VOA of Texas, 3:25-CV-03018-L-BK, (N.D. Tex. filed Nov. 5,
2025) (rec. filed). In those cases, the Court determined the case should be
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dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because Petitioner continues to challenge his
conviction in the Eastern District of Texas. Id.
Now, again, Petitioner has filed a § 2241 petition in this Court which seeks
to invalidate his conviction and sentence rather than challenge how his sentence is
being executed.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A motion to vacate sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 provides the main
means of “collaterally attacking a federal sentence” and is the appropriate remedy
for “errors that occurred at or prior to the sentencing.” Padilla v. United States,
416 F.3d 424, 425-26 (5th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (internal quotations and
citations omitted). Such a collateral attack must be brought in the court that
imposed the sentence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a) (providing that a prisoner “may
move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the
sentence” (emphasis added)); Cox v. Warden, Fed. Det. Ctr., 911 F.2d 1111, 1113 n.2
(5th Cir. 1990) (“[A] collateral attack . . . under section 2255 must be brought
before the sentencing court.”).
Relief under § 2241, on the other hand, is the proper procedural vehicle in
which to raise an attack on “the manner in which a sentence is executed.” Padilla,
416 F.3d at 426 (internal quotations and citations omitted). A petition filed under
§ 2241 is not a substitute for a § 2255 motion. Jeffers v. Chandler, 253 F.3d 827,
830 (5th Cir. 2001) (per curiam). Moreover, a § 2241 petition that challenges the
validity of a federal sentence—by contesting errors that occurred at trial or
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sentencing—must either be dismissed or construed as a § 2255 motion. Pack v.
Yusuff, 218 F.3d 448, 452 (5th Cir. 2000).
Even so, a prisoner may file a § 2241 petition “to challenge the legality of his
conviction or sentence if he can satisfy the mandates of the ‘savings clause’ of
§ 2255.” Christopher v. Miles, 342 F.3d 378, 381 (5th Cir. 2003) (citations
omitted). But the Supreme Court recently held that the savings clause is limited to
“cases where unusual circumstances make it impossible or impracticable to seek
relief in the sentencing court[.]” Jones v. Hendrix, 599 U.S. 465, 478 (2023).
III. ANALYSIS
A. Petitioner Is Improperly Using § 2241 to Challenge His
Conviction and Sentence.
Although styled as a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, Petitioner seeks to
invalidate his federal conviction and sentence imposed in the Eastern District of
Texas. Across several grounds, he alleges defective indictment, Brady/Giglio
violations, insufficient evidence, prosecutorial misconduct, judicial bias, and
various alleged pretrial and appellate irregularities. ECF. No. 3 at 1-13.
Each of his claims attacks alleged errors that occurred at or before trial,
during trial, or at sentencing in the underlying criminal case. These are not
challenges to the execution of his sentence (e.g., credit calculations, BOP actions,
or conditions imposed by the Bureau of Prisons). Instead, Petitioner seeks to have
this Court declare his conviction void, vacate the judgement, and dismiss the
indictment. Id. at 2, 13.
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Under Fifth Circuit precedent, challenges to the validity of a conviction or
sentence—including defective indictment, evidentiary violations, prosecutorial
misconduct, and judicial bias—must be brought under § 2255, not re-litigated
through § 2241. See Pack, 218 F.3d at 452 ; see also Jeffers, 253 F.3d at 830. And
such collateral attacks on a federal conviction must be brought in the sentencing
court—which for Petitioner would be the Eastern District of Texas, not this Court.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a).
That Petitioner groups these allegations under different headings or
characterizes them as “jurisdictional,” “structural,” or “actual innocence” does not
change their nature. Repackaging trial-level claims does not transform a § 2255
challenge into a § 2241 petition.
Indeed, these same categories of claims—attacking the indictment, the
grand jury, the prosecution, the evidence, appellate review, and sentencing—have
been repeatedly raised in Petitioner’s prior § 2241 petitions in this Court and
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. See Case Nos. 3:24-CV-2903-X-BW, 3:25-CV-
2405-N-BW, 3:25-CV-03018-L-BK. The recurrence of materially similar
allegations across multiple filings underscores that this petition is another
iteration of the same collateral attack rather than a proper challenge to the
execution of his sentence.
Accordingly, Petitioner’s current petition—raising substantially the same
type of conviction-based challenges—should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
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B. Petitioner Does Not Satisfy the § 2255(e) Savings Clause.
Petitioner also invokes the § 2255(e) “savings clause,” asserting that § 2255
is inadequate or ineffective because of alleged “new evidence” and supposed
jurisdictional defects. ECF. No. 3 at 2-3. That contention fails under controlling
law, and for the same reasons it has failed in Petitioner’s prior attempts.
The Supreme Court has made clear that the savings clause is narrow and
does not permit a prisoner to use § 2241 as an alternative vehicle for claims that
could have been—or were—brought under § 2255. See Jones, 599 U.S. at 477-80.
Procedural barriers, prior adverse rulings, or restrictions imposed by the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) (such as limits on
successive motions) do not render § 2255 inadequate or ineffective. Id. at 477.
Rather, the clause applies only in truly “unusual circumstances” where it is
impossible or impracticable to seek relief in the sentencing court. Barrientes v.
Warden, USP Pollock, No. 23-30896, 2024 WL 2369376, at 1 (5th Cir. May 23,
2024) (quoting Jones, 599 U.S. at 478).
Here, none of Petitioner’s sixteen grounds fall within that narrow exception.
The Fifth Circuit has repeatedly rejected attempts to repackage trial-level errors as
§ 2241 petitions. See Cabello v. Hijar, No. 24-50407, 2024 WL 4614718, at 1 (5th
Cir. Oct. 30, 2024) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (petitioner
must show that “unusual circumstances make it impossible or impracticable to
seek relief in the sentencing court”).
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Nor has Petitioner shown that it is impossible to seek relief. To the contrary,
the record shows that he is pursuing relief in the Eastern District of Texas—the
sentencing court—through a pending § 2255 action. See Petitioner v. United
States, No. 4:25-CV-262 (E.D. Tex. filed March 14, 2025) at Doc. 16 (Motion to
Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255). The existence
of that proceeding confirms that seeking relief in the sentencing court is neither
impossible nor impracticable, and therefore, forecloses savings-clause relief.
Petitioner identifies no intervening or retroactive Supreme Court decision that
renders his underlying conduct (mail fraud and wire fraud) no longer criminal.
Without any showing, § 2241 is unavailable. Jones, 599 U.S. at 480-81.
Finally, Petitioner’s invocation of “factual innocence” is unavailing. His
allegations rest largely on recharacterizations of trial evidence and alleged
discovery or procedural errors—not on newly discovered, previously unavailable
evidence that would conclusively establish factual innocence. “Actual innocence”
requires the petitioner to show “factual innocence, not mere legal insufficiency.”
See U.S. v. Jones, 172 F.3d 381, 384 (5th Cir. 1999). Claims of defective indictment,
unauthorized prosecution, or evidentiary violations—even if framed as
innocence—do not satisfy this demanding standard.
Here, Petitioner’s complaints—such as claims of unauthorized prosecution,
defective indictment, and similar trial-based deficiencies—are legal challenges to
his conviction rather than evidence that he did not commit the offense. Such
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arguments do not satisfy the demanding standard for actual innocence and cannot
invoke the § 2255(e) savings clause.
Accordingly, this Court lacks jurisdiction under § 2241.
C. This Petition Is a Duplicative Collateral Attack.
Even if styled as a new filing, this petition is functionally another iteration
of the same collateral attack that has already been litigated and rejected multiple
times here in the Northern District.
Petitioner’s previous filings have tried to bring similar claims under § 2241
petitions. However, this Court has dismissed all for lack of jurisdiction and
determined Petitioner’s claims should be brought under § 2255. See Case Nos.
3:25-CV-2405-N-BW, 3:25-CV-2903, 3:25-CV-03018-L-BK. In fact, this Court
transferred Petitioner’s original § 2241 claims to the Eastern District finding the
claims should be heard under § 2255 in the sentencing court. See Petitioner, Case
No. 3:24-CV-2903-X-BW at *2. Once transferred, Petitioner repeatedly sought to
keep his § 2241 petition in the Northern District, but those requests were denied
by the Eastern District for the same reasons as discussed here. See Order Denying
Transfer, No. 4:25-CV-262 at 2-3.
Repackaging previously rejected arguments under new headings or new
filings does not create jurisdiction under § 2241. And permitting serial filings of
this nature would nullify § 2255’s gatekeeping provisions and undermine AEDPA’s
finality principles. In sum, the Court should dismiss the petition for lack of
jurisdiction.
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IV. SANCTION WARNING
The Fifth Circuit has warned Petitioner about his frequent filings for appeals
in the underlying criminal case. See U.S. v. Petitioner, No. 23-40353, 2023 WL
6213452, at *1 (5th Cir. Sept. 25, 2023)(“Petitioner is WARNED that the filing of
another notice of appeal of the 2016 judgment or the filing of any other frivolous,
repetitive, or otherwise abusive pleadings will invite the imposition of sanctions,
which may include dismissal, monetary sanctions, and restrictions on his ability to
file pleadings in this court and any court subject to this court’s jurisdiction.”)
Although this was not in the § 2241 context, this Court takes this repeated
behavior into consideration. Sanctions may be appropriate when a pro se litigant
has a history of submitting multiple frivolous claims. Mendoza v. Lynaugh, 989
F.2d 191, 195 (5th Cir. 1993); see also Whitehead v. Food Max of Miss., Inc., 332
F.3d 796, 802-03 (5th Cir. 2003) (a violation of any provision of Rule 11(b) justifies
sanctions). Pro se litigants have “no license to harass others, clog the judicial
machinery with meritless litigation, and abuse already overloaded court dockets.”
Farguson v. MBank Houston, N.A., 808 F.2d 358, 359 (5th Cir. 1986). Moreover,
litigants who abuse the judicial process are “not entitled to sue and appeal without
paying the normal filing fees—indeed, are not entitled to sue and appeal, period.”
Free v. United States, 879 F.2d 1535, 1536 (7th Cir. 1989).
Considering the nature of Petitioner’s repeated attempts at filing the same
claims, Petitioner should be warned that if he persists in filing § 2241 habeas
corpus petitions that are frivolous or baseless, or over which a federal court lacks
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subject matter jurisdiction, the Court may impose monetary sanctions, bar him
from bringing any new § 2241 habeas corpus action, or subject him to other
sanctions the Court deems appropriate. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2)&(c)(1)
(providing for sanctions against pro se litigants or attorneys).
V. 	RECOMMENDATION
Because Petitioner challenges the validity of his conviction and sentence—
not the execution of his sentence—and because he has failed to satisfy § 2255(e)’s
savings clause, this Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction under § 2241. The
petition should therefore be summarily DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE
for want of jurisdiction, leaving Petitioner to pursue whatever relief remains
available in the Eastern District of Texas under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
Petitioner should also be WARNED that he may face sanctions, including
monetary penalties, if he continues to abuse judicial resources by filing repetitive,
frivolous pleadings, including habeas petitions in the federal courts.
SO RECOMMENDED on February 6, 2026.
______________________________________
REBECCA RUTHERFORD
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL/OBJECT
A copy of this report and recommendation will be served on all parties in the
manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of this report and
recommendation must file specific written objections within 14 days after being
served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). To be specific,
an objection must identify the specific finding or recommendation to which
objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and specify the place in the
magistrate judge’s report and recommendation where the disputed determination
is found. An objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the
briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file specific written
objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal
conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district
court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Services Auto.
Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996).
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