Lewis v. Ellis County et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
LINDA LEWIS, 	§
§
Plaintiff, 	§
§
V. 	§ 	No. 3:25-cv-1221-E
§
ELLIS COUNTY, ET AL., 	§
§
Defendants. 	§
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Linda Lewis filed a pro se complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Ellis County,
the Waxahachie Police Department, and unidentified individuals. See Dkt. No. 3. Lewis paid the
filing fee and filed documents purporting to be proofs of service for Ellis County and the
Waxahachie Police Department, but the documents were both served on the same person at the
Ellis County Courthouse despite the fact that the Waxahachie Police Department is not part of
Ellis County. See Dkt. Nos. 5, 9, 10.
Ellis County moved to dismiss the complaint, see Dkt. Nos. 11, 12, and the motion was
fully briefed, see Dkt. Nos. 14, 15. The magistrate judge entered findings of fact, conclusions of
law, and a recommendation that the Court grant the motion to dismiss the complaint against Ellis
County and that the Court dismiss the claims against the Waxahachie Police Department without
prejudice under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 4(m) and 41(b) and dismiss the claims against
the unnamed individual defendants as frivolous [Dkt. No. 25] (the “FCR”).
Lewis filed objections, see Dkt. Nos. 26, 27, but the Court accepted the FCR and entered
judgment on January 30, 2026, see Dkt. Nos. 28, 29.
On February 6, 2026, Lewis filed a motion to vacate the judgment under Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure 60(b)(3) and 60(d)(3). See Dkt. No. 30. Because the motion was filed within 28
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days of the judgment, the Court will treat it as though it was filed under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 59(e). See Demahy v. Schwarz Pharma, Inc., 702 F.3d 177, 182 n.2 (5th Cir. 2012) (per
curiam) (A motion requesting that a district court reexamine a prior ruling that adjudicates all the
claims among all the parties filed “within twenty-eight days after the entry of the judgment … is
treated as though it was filed under [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 59.” (citation omitted)); see
also Washington v. UTMB, No. 20-20434, 2022 WL 2527665, at *1 (5th Cir. July 7, 2022) (per
curiam) (“Regardless of how it is labeled or classified, a motion seeking reconsideration is treated
as a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) motion if it is filed within the applicable 28-day time
limit.” (citing FED . R. CIV . P. 59(e); Mangieri v. Clifton, 29 F.3d 1012, 1015 n.5 (5th Cir. 1994))).
A Rule 59(e) motion timely filed, within 28 days of judgment, “‘suspends the finality of
the original judgment’ for purposes of an appeal.” Banister v. Davis, 590 U.S. 504, 508 (2020)
(quoting FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 373, n.10 (1984)). Upon the
timely filing of an initial Rule 59(e) motion, “there is no longer a final judgment to appeal from,”
and a district court must rule on such a motion to “restore the finality of the original judgment”
and “start the 30-day appeal clock,” id. (cleaned up), even where a litigant files that motion after
noticing an appeal, see FED . R. APP . P. 4(a)(4)(B)(i); FED . R. APP . P. 4(a)(4)(A). The Court’s
“ruling on the Rule 59(e) motion” will therefore merge “with the prior determination, so that the
reviewing court takes up only one judgment.” Banister, 590 U.S. at 509 (citation omitted).
Rule 59(e) “is ‘an extraordinary remedy that should be used sparingly.’” Rollins v. Home
Depot USA, 8 F.4th 393, 396 (5th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted). And, while its text “does not
specify the available grounds for obtaining such relief,” the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit
has explained that Rule 59(e) motions “are for the narrow purpose of correcting
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manifest errors of law or fact or presenting newly discovered evidence” – not for
raising arguments “which could, and should, have been made before the judgment
issued.” [The Fifth Circuit has] further noted that Rule 59(e) allows a party to alter
or amend a judgment when there has been an intervening change in the controlling
law.
Id. (citations omitted); accord Demahy, 702 F.3d at 182.
Under these standards, Lewis fails to show a basis for this remedy. Controlling law has not
changed since the Court entered judgment; she presents no newly discovered evidence that could
question the correctness of the judgment; nor does she show that the Court need correct a manifest
error of law or fact.
In sum, Lewis offers no compelling reasons to reconsider the Court’s decision to dismiss
her claims. Therefore, the Court DENIES her post-judgment motion construed as a motion under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) [Dkt. No. 30].
SO ORDERED this 4th day of March, 2026.
____________________________________________
ADA BROWN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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