Riding Nigbur v. United States of America et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
LISA IRENE RIDING NIGBUR,
Plaintiff,
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v. §
§ No. 3:25-cv-00725-D-BT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et
al.,
Defendants.
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§
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION
OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Special Order 3, this pro se civil action
was referred to the United States magistrate judge for case management, including
the entry of findings and a recommended disposition where appropriate. Upon
review of the relevant pleadings and applicable law, Plaintiff’s claims should be
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
I. BACKGROUND
Lisa Irene Riding Nigbur, proceeding in forma pauperis, initiated this
action by filing a lengthy document styled as a “Criminal Complaint with
Commercial Affidavit.” ECF No. 3. Liberally construed, Nigbur alleges that various
courts, clerks, and governmental entities violated her constitutional rights in
connection with a civil proceeding arising from a state-court judgment entered
against her in Texas.
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Nigbur’s allegations stem mainly from a monetary judgment entered in a
breach-of-guarantee action, Delta Victor, LLC v. Lisa Irene Riding Nigbur, No.
DC-23-3286 (95th Jud. Dist. Ct., Dallas Cnty).1 She references an August 17, 2023,
order granting summary judgment and a subsequent order addressing
disbursement of funds. See ECF No. 3 at 14-15. According to Nigbur, those
proceedings resulted in the creation of negotiable instruments, securities, or other
financial assets allegedly associated with the judgment or with funds deposited
into court registries. Id. She also alleges that court personnel and related entities
failed to disclose internal accounting records, improperly processed tendered
payments, and failed to disburse funds to which she claims entitlement. Id. at 16-
18.
Nigbur also references proceedings in Oregon and Arizona, which she
characterizes as efforts to register or enforce the Texas judgment. She alleges that
those proceedings likewise generated financial instruments or credits and that she
was denied due process during hearings conducted in those matters. Id. at 15.
Throughout her complaint, Nigbur describes herself as a “senior creditor”
and characterizes courts, clerks, and depository institutions as debtors or
intermediaries obligated to account for and disburse funds. Id. at 6-7. Her
allegations rely heavily on citations to the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC),
federal statutes governing deposits of court funds, and various criminal provisions.
1 The Court takes judicial notice of the state court docket sheet at Dallas County |
Online Record Search (last accessed January 28, 2026).
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She also challenges the public availability of hearing recordings and asserts that
failures to seal records or restrict access caused her harm. Id. at 7-10.
Nigbur has recently filed other federal actions challenging aspects of the
same underlying state-court proceedings. In one such case, the court dismissed her
claims as frivolous and warned her about the filing of frivolous or jurisdictionally
defective actions. See Riding Nigbur v. Oregon, No. 3:25-CV-709-S-BN, 2025 WL
1260652, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 27, 2025), rec. accepted Nigbur v. Oregon, No.
3:25-CV-0709-S-BN, 2025 WL 1260653 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 30, 2025). Nigbur has
filed additional actions in this district that likewise resulted in dismissal for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction and warnings that if she “persists in filing frivolous or
baseless lawsuits” she would be subject to sanctions. See Riding Nigbur v. State of
Oregon, et al., No. 3:25-CV-0710-S-BK (N.D. Tex. Apr. 30, 2025); see also Riding
Nigbur v. State of Arizona, et al., No. 3:25-CV-0711-X-BK (N.D. Tex. Sept. 25,
2025).
The present complaint seeks judicial intervention based on Nigbur’s belief
that courts and governmental entities unlawfully retained, concealed, or failed to
disburse funds allegedly generated by state-court judgments or tendered
instruments. The pleading does not identify a cognizable federal cause of action or
specify relief that this Court can grant.
II. LEGAL STANDARD AND ANALYSIS
A. Screening Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)
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Because Nigbur proceeds in forma pauperis, the complaint is subject to
screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Under this statute, a court must dismiss
an in forma pauperis complaint if it “(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state
a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a
defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). A complaint
is frivolous when it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A court may dismiss a complaint as frivolous
when it is based on an indisputable meritless legal theory or when the factual
contentions are “clearly ‘baseless.’” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32 (1992).
A complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does
not plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility
when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citations omitted).
Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, a plaintiff must still allege
sufficient facts to state a plausible claim for relief. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S.
89, 94 (2007) (pro se pleadings are “to be liberally construed,” and “a pro se
complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards
than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”); Cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e) (“Pleadings
must be construed so as to do justice”). But conclusory allegations, unwarranted
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deductions of fact, and legal conclusions masquerading as facts are insufficient.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
B. Plaintiff’s Allegations Are Frivolous and Fail to State Any
Cognizable Federal Claim.
Nigbur’s complaint consists largely of unintelligible assertions, pseudo-legal
terminology, and sovereign-citizen-style theories asserting that state-court civil
judgments generated negotiable instruments, securities, bonds, or other financial
assets to which Nigbur claims entitlement as a self-described “senior creditor.”
ECF No. 3 at 14-22. Liberally construed, Nigbur appears to contend that court
registry deposits function as commercial transactions that create monetized
instruments or credits, and that courts and related institutions act as financial
intermediaries required to account for and disburse those funds. She also alleges
that the court and governmental entities improperly created or used financial
accounts tied to her identity, failed to disclose internal accounting, and mishandled
or failed to recognize her purported “tender of payment” through self-created
negotiable instruments to discharge any obligations she had. Id.
Federal courts, including this Court, have uniformly rejected such theories.
Claims asserting that debts are extinguished, judgments converted, funds are
created through UCC filings, or similar redemptive concepts are consistently held
as “indisputably meritless” and lacking any basis in law. See Hughes v. Shannon,
No. 3:20-CV-0637-B (BT), 2021 WL 1093110, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 2, 2021), rec.
accepted No. 3:20-CV-0637-B (BT), 2021 WL 1088440 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 22, 2021)
(citations omitted); see also Brown v. Exeter Fin. LLC, No. 3:21-CV-00169-M-BT,
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2021 WL 4342336, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 27, 2021), rec. accepted sub nom. Brown
v. Exeter Fin. LLC, No. 3:21-CV-00169-M-BT, 2021 WL 4319666 (N.D. Tex. Sept.
23, 2021) (dismissing a pro se complaint asserting sovereign-citizen theories based
on UCC provisions, demands for “accounting,” securitization claims, and
allegations that court proceedings discharged obligations or created enforceable
securities); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327-28 (1989) (claims based on
“fantastic or delusional” legal theories are frivolous under § 1915); Gravatt v. U.S.,
100 Fed. Cl. 279, 282 (2011) (summarizing history of
“sovereign citizen” legal theories).
Nigbur’s complaint spans dozens of pages, yet its allegations are internally
inconsistent, legally incoherent, and premised on conclusory assertions
untethered to any recognized legal framework. Courts are not required to sift
through rambling pleadings or parse disjointed allegations in search of a viable
claim where, as here, the complaint is grounded in legally invalid premises. See
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327-28.
Even when Nigbur’s allegations are construed liberally, she identifies no
statute creating a private right of action, no constitutional violation supported by
factual allegations, and no plausible entitlement to relief. The UCC, criminal
statutes, and federal laws governing the deposit of court funds do not create private
rights of action, and do not override state-court judgments or convert judicial
proceedings into commercial transactions. See Brown, 2021 WL 4342336, at *3-
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4; Gravatt, 100 Fed. Cl. at 283. Thus, her extensive reliance on those authorities
does not transform her allegations into viable claims.
Because Nigbur’s claims depend on legally invalid premises that have been
repeatedly rejected by this Court and others, the complaint fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted and is frivolous under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii).
C. The Court Lacks Subject Matter Jurisdiction, and Plaintiff Lacks
Standing.
To the extent Nigbur seeks to challenge, invalidate, or obtain financial relief
arising from final state-court judgments entered in Texas, Oregon, or Arizona, this
Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction.
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and must have statutory or
constitutional authority to adjudicate a claim. See Home Builders Ass’n of Miss.,
Inc. v. City of Madison, 143 F.3d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir. 1998). These courts must
therefore “presume that a suit lies outside this limited jurisdiction, and the burden
of establishing federal jurisdiction rests on the party seeking the federal forum.”
Howery v. Allstate Ins. Co., 243 F.3d 912, 916 (5th Cir. 2001). As a result, all
federal courts have an independent duty to examine their own subject matter
jurisdiction. See Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583-84 (1999)
(“Subject-matter limitations . . . keep the federal courts within the bounds the
Constitution and Congress have prescribed. Accordingly, subject-matter
delineations must be policed by the courts on their own initiative even at the
highest level.” (citations omitted)).
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Insofar as Nigbur seeks review, nullification, or financial consequences
arising from final state-court judgments, such claims are barred by the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine. That doctrine precludes federal district courts from exercising
appellate review over state-court decisions. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic
Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005) (determining that federal district courts
lack authority to review or modify state-court judgments or to adjudicate claims
that are “inextricably intertwined” with those judgments).
Here, Nigbur’s alleged injuries stem directly from state-court judgments and
related disbursement orders. Her attempt to recharacterize closed state-court civil
proceedings as “foreign judgments,” commercial transactions, or negotiable
instruments does not alter the jurisdictional analysis. Any determination that she
is entitled to funds allegedly associated with those judgments would necessarily
require this Court to review and reject state-court rulings, which it lacks the
authority to do.
Moreover, Nigbur repeatedly styles this action as a “criminal complaint,”
and cites criminal statutes or enforcement provisions. ECF No. 3 at 24-34. Private
litigants lack standing to initiate or compel criminal prosecutions, and decisions
about criminal enforcement rest exclusively with prosecutorial authorities. See
United States v. Davis, 285 F.3d 378, 383 (5th Cir. 2002). To the extent Nigbur
seeks criminal investigation or enforcement, she lacks standing to pursue such
relief, and those requests must be dismissed as a matter of law.
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III. SANCTIONS
Sanctions may be appropriate when a pro se litigant has a history of
submitting multiple frivolous claims. Mendoza v. Lynaugh, 989 F.2d 191, 195-97
(5th Cir. 1993); see also Whitehead v. Food Max of Miss., Inc., 332 F.3d 796, 802-
03 (5th Cir. 2003) (a violation of any provision of Rule 11(b) justifies sanctions).
Pro se litigants have “no license to harass others, clog the judicial machinery with
meritless litigation, and abuse already overloaded court dockets.” Farguson v.
MBank Houston, N.A., 808 F.2d 358, 359 (5th Cir. 1986). Moreover, litigants who
abuse the judicial process are “not entitled to sue and appeal without paying the
normal filing fees -- indeed, are not entitled to sue and appeal, period.” Free v.
United States, 879 F.2d 1535, 1536 (7th Cir. 1989).
Nigbur has previously filed multiple federal actions challenging the same
underlying state-court civil judgment. The court expressly warned Nigbur that
continued filing of frivolous or jurisdictionally defective actions could result in
sanctions, including restrictions on future filings. See Riding Nigbur, No. 3:25-cv-
709-S-BN; 3:25-CV-0710-S-BK; 3:25-CV-0711-X-BK. Despite those warnings,
Nigbur has again filed another pleading asserting substantially similar theories
that are unsupported by law or fact. The Court should find that Nigbur is
a vexatious litigant and direct the clerk of the court not to accept any further
actions from her unless she first obtains leave from a district or magistrate
judge. See Mendoza v. Lynaugh, 989 F.2d 191, 195-97 (5th Cir. 1993); Fed. R. Civ.
P. 11(b)(2) & (c)(1) (authorizing sanctions against pro se litigants).
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IV. LEAVE TO AMEND
“Rule 15 is a liberal standard that favors leave, but that preference has no
purchase when amendment cannot cure the defect.” Ellsworth v. Dallas Texas
Dep't of Veteran Affs., --- F.4th ---, 2025 WL 3239806, at *5 (5th Cir. Nov. 20,
2025) (O'Connor); see also Sanders v. Deluxe, 2025 WL 3491013, at *3 (N.D. Tex.
Nov. 14, 2025) (Rutherford, J.), rec. accepted, 2025 WL 3488340 (N.D. Tex. Dec.
4, 2025) (“Ordinarily, a pro se plaintiff should be granted the opportunity to
amend her complaint prior to a dismissal.”) But leave to amend is not required
when the plaintiff has already pleaded her “best case.” Brewster v. Dretke, 587
F.3d 764, 767-68 (5th Cir. 2009).
Where, as here, a plaintiff continues to advance the same frivolous legal
theories after prior dismissal and warning, amendment would be futile and cause
needless delay. Nigbur’s complaint should be dismissed with prejudice.
V. RECOMMENDATION
For the foregoing reasons, the District Judge should DISMISS this case
WITH PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
In addition, the Court should find that Nigbur is a vexatious litigant and
direct the clerk of the court not to accept any further actions from her unless
Nigbur first obtains leave from a district or magistrate judge.
SO RECOMMENDED on February 2, 2026.
______________________________________
REBECCA RUTHERFORD
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL/OBJECT
A copy of this report and recommendation will be served on all parties in the
manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of this report and
recommendation must file specific written objections within 14 days after being
served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). To be specific,
an objection must identify the specific finding or recommendation to which
objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and specify the place in the
magistrate judge’s report and recommendation where the disputed determination
is found. An objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the
briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file specific written
objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal
conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district
court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Services Auto.
Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996).
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