Stuart v. United States of America

- 1 -
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
MICHAEL STUART,
Plaintiff,
V.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant.
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
No. 3:25-cv-198-X-BN
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This case has been referred to the undersigned United States magistrate judge
for pretrial management under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and a standing order of reference
from United States District Judge Brantley Starr. See Dkt. No. 1.
Plaintiff 	Michael 	Stuart, 	proceeding 	pro 	se, 	filed 	this 	lawsuit 	against
Defendant United States of America under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”),
bringing claims of medical negligence against employees of the Department of
Veterans Affairs (“VA”). See Dkt. No. 3 at 1.
Stuart has filed the following three pending non-dispositive motions:
• 	Plaintiff’s 	Motion 	for 	Judicial 	Recognition 	of 	Independent 	VA
Negligence under FTCA [Dkt. No. 10];
• 	Plaintiff’s 	Motion 	for 	Equitable 	Tolling 	of 	the 	FTCA 	Six-Month
Limitations Period [Dkt. No. 32]; and
• 	Plaintiff’s Motion for Judicial Determination that Dr. Ankit Patel and
UTSW were Employees/Agents of the United States [Dkt. No. 33].
The Court ordered the United States to respond to the pending motions and
ordered Stuart to reply. See Dkt. No. 37. The deadlines for briefing the motions have
Case 3:25-cv-00198-X-BN Document 44 Filed 02/19/26 Page 1 of 12 PageID <pageID>

- 2 -
now passed.
For the reasons and to the extent explained below, the Court should deny the
motions [Dkt. Nos. 10, 32, & 33] without prejudice.
Legal Standards and Analysis
I. 	Motion for Judicial Recognition of Independent VA Negligence
Stuart moves the Court to recognize that his FTCA claims against the United
States “include independent acts of negligence committed by [VA] employees acting
within the scope of their federal employment, and not solely acts attributable to
community 	care 	contractors.” 	Dkt. 	No. 	10 	at 	1. 	The 	motion 	“addresses 	the
Government’s anticipated defense – already stated in its administrative denial letters
– that the VA bears no liability because the initial surgery was performed by a non-
employee contractor.” Id.
And, in his reply, Stuart adds that he “does not seek an early determination of
liability or damages.” Dkt. No. 40 at 1. Rather, Stuart filed his motion “solely to clarify
that Plaintiff’s FTCA claim encompasses independent acts of negligence by [VA]
employees in post-operative care following the 2021 surgery – not merely the actions
of any community-care contractor.” Id.
Assuming first that Stuart seeks judgment on an anticipated defense, the
undersigned agrees with the United States in construing the motion as one for partial
summary judgment. See Dkt. No. 38 at 4 (citing F ED. R. CIV. P. 56(a) (“A party may
move for summary judgment, identifying each claim or defense – or the part of each
claim or defense – on which summary judgment is sought.”).
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, summary judgment is proper “if the
Case 3:25-cv-00198-X-BN Document 44 Filed 02/19/26 Page 2 of 12 PageID <pageID>

- 3 -
movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” F ED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). A factual “issue is
material if its resolution could affect the outcome of the action.” Weeks Marine, Inc.
v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 340 F.3d 233, 235 (5th Cir. 2003). And “[a] factual dispute
is ‘genuine,’ if the evidence is such that a reasonable [trier of fact] could return a
verdict for the nonmoving party.” Crowe v. Henry, 115 F.3d 294, 296 (5th Cir. 1997).
The United States argues that Stuart’s motion is premature, in part because
“basic discovery is ongoing, including discovery into the facts and circumstances
surrounding the actions of VA employees who provided Mr. Stuart with medical care
following his 2021 surgery.” Id. at 7.
The 	undersigned 	treats 	the 	United 	States’s 	argument 	as 	a 	motion
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d) for a continuance to obtain further
discovery. See McDougall v. Binswanger Mgmt. Corp., No. 3-12-cv-2563-D, 2012 WL
1109551, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 3, 2012) (treating argument that summary judgment
nonmovant has not had full opportunity to conduct discovery as request for relief
under Rule 56(d)); see also Dresser-Rand Co. v. Schutte & Koerting Acquisition Co.,
No. H-12-184, 2012 WL 3150342, at *6 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 1, 2012) (finding that assertion
that motion for summary judgment is premature absent further discovery is, in
effect, a motion under Rule 56(d)).
Under Rule 	56(d), 	the 	Court 	may 	“(1) 	defer 	considering 	the
[summary judgment] 	motion 	or deny it; (2) 	allow time to obtain affidavits 	or
declarations or to take discovery; or (3) issue any other appropriate order.” F ED. R.
Case 3:25-cv-00198-X-BN Document 44 Filed 02/19/26 Page 3 of 12 PageID <pageID>

- 4 -
CIV. P. 56(d). Motions under Rule 56(d) are generally favored and should be liberally
granted. Culwell v. City of Fort Worth, 468 F.3d 868, 871 (5th Cir. 2006) (referring to
former Rule 56(f)); Int’l Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally’s Inc., 939 F.2d 1257, 1267 (5th Cir.
1991). To warrant relief under Rule 56(d), “a party must indicate to the court by some
statement ... why [it] needs additional discovery and how the additional discovery will
create a genuine issue of material fact.” Stults v. Conoco, Inc., 76 F.3d 651, 657-58
(5th Cir. 1996) (quoting Krim v. BancTexas Grp., Inc., 989 F.2d 1435, 1442 (5th Cir.
1993)).
Here, the United States argues that, “[o]nce basic discovery has concluded,
there will be a more fully developed factual record of whether the VA employees met
the applicable standard of care.” Dkt. No. 38 at 7.
Stuart clarified that he does not seek determination of the VA’s liability at this
time. See Dkt. No. 40 at 1. Nonetheless, the undersigned finds that asking the Court
to make factual findings or reach legal conclusions about the employment status of
the relevant actors is premature at this stage. The deadline for the parties to complete
discovery is March 31, 2026, and the dispositive motions deadline is May 15, 2026.
See Dkt. No. 28. And the United States has argued, and Stuart does not dispute, that
the parties have not had an opportunity to conduct comprehensive discovery. See Dkt.
No. 28 at 7-8; see also Bailey v. KS Mgmt. Servs., L.L.C., 35 F.4th 397, 401 (5th Cir.
2022) (“Summary judgment is appropriate only where ‘the plaintiff has had a full
opportunity to conduct discovery.’” (citations omitted)).
Assuming, in the alternative, that Stuart does not move for judgment but
Case 3:25-cv-00198-X-BN Document 44 Filed 02/19/26 Page 4 of 12 PageID <pageID>

- 5 -
merely seeks to clarify his complaint, his motion is still improper. Stuart may amend
his complaint with the parties’ consent or the Court’s leave, as explained in the Initial
Scheduling Order. See Dkt. No. 10. But the Court should not rewrite or refine his
complaint for him. See Brown v. Matauszak, 415 F. App’x 608, 613 (6th Cir. 2011)
(“[A] court cannot create a claim which [a plaintiff] has not spelled out in his
pleading”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). To do so would “transform
the district court from its legitimate advisory role to the improper role of an advocate
seeking out the strongest arguments and most successful strategies for a party.’”
Jones v. Mangrum, No. 3:16-cv-3137, 2017 WL 712755, at *1 (M.D. Tenn. Feb. 23,
2017) (quoting Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985)).
And, so, the Court should deny Stuart’s motion for judicial recognition [Dkt.
No. 10] without prejudice.
II. 	Motion for Equitable Tolling
Stuart moves for equitable tolling of the FTCA limitation period. See Dkt. No.
32.
Under the FTCA’s statute of limitations, “a tort claim against the United
States ‘shall be forever barred’ unless it is presented to the ‘appropriate Federal
agency within two years after such claim accrues’ and then brought to federal court
‘within six months’ after the agency acts on the claim,” United States v. Wong, 575
U.S. 402, 410 (2015) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b)).
The statute of limitations, however, is “nonjurisdictional and subject to
equitable tolling.” Id. at 420. Even so, “a litigant is entitled to equitable tolling of a
Case 3:25-cv-00198-X-BN Document 44 Filed 02/19/26 Page 5 of 12 PageID <pageID>

- 6 -
statute of limitations only if the litigant establishes two elements: ‘(1) that he has
been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance
stood in his way and prevented timely filing.’” Menominee Indian Tribe of Wis. v.
United States, 577 U.S. 250, 255 (2016) (quoting Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631,
649 (2010)); see also Stamper v. Duval Cty. Sch. Bd., 863 F.3d 1336, 1342 (11th Cir.
2017) (“Equitable tolling is appropriate when a movant untimely files because of
extraordinary circumstances that are both beyond [his] control and unavoidable even
with diligence.” (citation omitted)).
Importantly, “the second prong of the equitable tolling test is met only where
the circumstances that caused a litigant’s delay are both extraordinary and beyond
its control.” Menominee Indian Tribe, 577 U.S. at 257 (emphasis in original); see,
e.g., Farmer v. D&O Contractors, 640 F. App’x 302, 307 (5th Cir. 2016) (per curiam)
(holding that a party’s mistaken belief is not an extraordinary circumstance” (citing
Menominee Indian Tribe, 577 U.S. at 256-58)).
Stuart filed this lawsuit on January 27, 2025. See Dkt. No. 3. His complaint
alleges that, “[o]n March 12, 2024, the VA issued a denial of Plaintiff’s administrative
claim. However, Plaintiff was hospitalized from January to June 2024 and unable to
receive the letter. The VA later re-mailed the denial letter in December 2024, at which
time 	Plaintiff 	received 	it. 	This 	delay, 	coupled 	with 	Plaintiff’s 	incapacitation,
constitutes extraordinary circumstances warranting equitable tolling.” Id. at 5.
And, so, Stuart raised equitable tolling in his complaint and “allege[d] specific
facts” to support both prongs of “a plausible equitable tolling claim.” Taggart v.
Case 3:25-cv-00198-X-BN Document 44 Filed 02/19/26 Page 6 of 12 PageID <pageID>

- 7 -
Norwest Mortg., Inc., No. 09-1281, 2010 WL 114946, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 11, 2011);
cf. Chandra v. Bowhead Sci. & Tech., LLC, No. 3:16-cv-375-B, 2018 WL 1252097, at
*4 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 12, 2018) (“[C]ourts ‘still require pro se parties to fundamentally
“abide by the rules that govern the federal courts.’” So pro se ‘litigants must properly
plead sufficient facts that, when liberally construed, state a plausible claim to relief,
... and brief arguments on appeal.’ Chandra’s pleadings fall short of that goal by
failing to allege any plausible facts entitling him to equitable tolling.” (quoting EEOC
v. Simbaki, Ltd., 767 F.3d 475, 484 (5th Cir. 2014))); Peterson v. United States, No.
8:18-cv-217-T-17TGW, 2018 WL 1832417, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 16, 2018) (“The
FTCA’s limitation period, however, is subject to equitable tolling. The plaintiff does
not even mention that it applies. In light of the length of time between the death and
the filing of this lawsuit, a claim of equitable tolling would seemingly be implausible
and thus frivolous.” (citation omitted)), rec. adopted, 2018 WL 1832419 (M.D. Fla.
Mar. 14, 2018).
And the Court should not dismiss Stuart’s claim sua sponte as time-barred. See
Wilson v. U.S. Penitentiary Leavenworth, 450 F. App’x 397, 399 (5th Cir. 2011) (per
curiam) (If “‘it is clear from the face of a complaint ... that the claims asserted are
barred by the applicable statute of limitations, those claims are properly dismissed’
as frivolous.” (quoting Gartrell v. Gaylor, 981 F.2d 254, 256 (5th Cir. 1993))); cf.
Snowton v. United States, No. 3:18-cv-2900-S-BN, 2018 WL 6202129, at *2-*3 (N.D.
Tex. Nov. 2, 2018) (recommending dismissal without prejudice of pro se plaintiff’s
FTCA claims as time-barred because complaint did not allege any facts supporting
Case 3:25-cv-00198-X-BN Document 44 Filed 02/19/26 Page 7 of 12 PageID <pageID>

- 8 -
equitable tolling), rec. adopted, 2018 WL 6201423 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 27, 2018).
But the Court should not go further and rule on Stuart’s motion for equitable
tolling at this time.
“[T]he FTCA’s statute of limitations is an affirmative defense for which the
Government has the burden of proof.” Trinity Marine Prods., Inc. v. United States,
812 F.3d 481, 486 (5th Cir. 2016) (citing Sec. Indus. Ins. Co. v. United States, 702 F.2d
1234, 1251 (5th Cir. 1983); citation omitted). Here, although the United States
pleaded a statute-of-limitations defense in its answer, see Dkt. No. 21 at 9, it has not
invoked the defense in a motion and, in fact, requests more time and discovery to
ascertain whether Stuart’s claim is barred or is subject to equitable tolling, see Dkt.
No. 34 at 4. And it suggests that, “after developing the factual record, the parties
[may be] able to reach an agreement about equitable tolling, without the necessity of
seeking a judicial determination.” Id.
And, so, determining whether equitable tolling applies in this case, before the
United States has decided to contest Stuart’s claims as time-barred, would be
premature. See Rule v. S. Indus. Mech. Maint. Co., L.L.C., No. 16-1408, 2017 WL
4276936, at *1 (W.D. La. Aug. 22, 2017) (finding plaintiff’s motion for equitable tolling
was premature because, “although [defendant] pleaded a limitations defense in its
answer, it [had] yet to invoke the defense to preclude the claim of any prospective
plaintiff”); U.S. v. Harrison, No. 10-40131-01-RDR, 2012 WL 1476073, at *1 (D. Kan.
Apr. 27, 2012) (“[T]he question of tolling is ripe for adjudication only when a § 2255
motion has actually been filed and the statute of limitations has been raised by the
Case 3:25-cv-00198-X-BN Document 44 Filed 02/19/26 Page 8 of 12 PageID <pageID>

- 9 -
respondent or the court sua sponte.”).
Equitable tolling also “turns on the facts and circumstances of a particular
case.” Fisher v. Johnson, 174 F.3d 710, 713 (5th Cir. 1999); see, e.g., Jones v. Cockrell,
No. 3:01-cv-279-M, 2003 WL 2141420, at *3 (N.D. Tex. May 22, 2003) (declining to
apply equitable tolling where petitioner’s impairment “caused him to be in pain” but
did not “prevent[ ] him from writing in longhand or typing,” as those activities “would
[not] have exacerbated his condition”). The United States contends that it will not
have all information relevant to the issues of limitations and equitable tolling until
the close of discovery, once it has deposed Stuart. See Dkt. No. 34 at 5. And, where “it
is unclear if equitable tolling is warranted,” “it is premature for [the Court] to
address” the issue. In re Campbell, 750 F.3d 523, 534 (5th Cir. 2014).
And, insofar as Stuart attempts to preclude an affirmative defense at this
stage, the undersigned interprets his motion as a partial summary judgment motion.
Because the United States has argued that more discovery is required to determine
the issue of equitable tolling, the undersigned finds that the motion is premature
under Rule 56(d). See Maldonado v. McHugh, No. EP-11-cv-388-KC, 2012 WL
3292419, at *6 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 10, 2012) (denying motion for summary judgment as
premature where motion was filed well before court’s deadline for discovery and
before nonmovant had opportunity to conduct discovery).
And, so, the Court should deny Stuart’s motion for equitable tolling [Dkt. No.
32] without prejudice.
III. 	Motion for Judicial Determination of Agency Relationship
Case 3:25-cv-00198-X-BN Document 44 Filed 02/19/26 Page 9 of 12 PageID <pageID>

- 10 -
Stuart moves the Court to determine that Dr. Ankit Patel and the University
of Texas Southwestern Medical Center (“UTSW”) were employees or agents of the
United States based on a ruling in a prior state-court lawsuit. See Dkt. No. 33. He
argues that
[t]he United States cannot simultaneously argue that Dr. Patel was an
independent contractor (to deny FTCA/§ 1151 liability) while also
claiming sovereign immunity on his behalf (shielding him from personal
liability). … Principles of judicial consistency and collateral estoppel bar
relitigation of Patel’s employment status: the Dallas County District
Court has already decided he was entitled to sovereign immunity.
Id. at 2.
Because Stuart invokes collateral estoppel to determine a legal question and
preclude a defense, the undersigned agrees with the United States that his motion
should be treated as one for partial summary judgment. See Dkt. No. 35. But the
United 	States 	does 	not 	contend 	that 	the 	motion 	is 	premature. 	And, 	so, 	the
undersigned will assess the merits of the motion.
Collateral estoppel “precludes a party from litigating an issue already raised
in an earlier action between the same parties only if (1) the issue at stake is identical
to the one involved in the earlier action; (2) the issue was actually litigated in the
prior action; and (3) the determination of the issue in the prior action was a necessary
part of the judgment in that action.” Petro-Hunt, L.L.C. v. United States, 365 F.3d
385, 397 (5th Cir. 2004) (footnotes omitted); see also Hacienda Records, L.P. v.
Ramos, 718 F. App’x 223, 228 (5th Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (“Issue preclusion or
collateral estoppel prevents a party from litigating an issue it previously litigated and
lost in another action and thus prevent[s] repetitious litigation of what is essentially
Case 3:25-cv-00198-X-BN Document 44 Filed 02/19/26 Page 10 of 12 PageID <pageID>

- 11 -
the 	same 	dispute, 	in 	addition 	to 	conserving 	judicial 	resources, 	maintaining
consistency, and avoiding oppression or harassment of the adverse party.” (cleaned
up)). 	And “[c]omplete 	identity of 	parties in 	the two suits 	is 	not 	required” 	to
establish collateral estoppel under federal law. Wehling v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 721
F.2d 506, 508 (5th Cir. 1983).
In the state-court lawsuit, Stuart sued Dr. Patel and UTSW under the Texas
Medical Liability Act for “negligen[ce] in providing medical treatment for Plaintiff’s
spine.” Dkt. No. 33 at 4-5. The defendants moved to dismiss the claims against Dr.
Patel because, “at all relevant times, Dr. Patel was a paid employee of UTSW acting
within the course and scope of his employment with UTSW” and, so, was immune
from suit under the Texas Tort Claims Act as a state government employee. Id. at 5.
The state court dismissed all claims against Dr. Patel with prejudice. See id. at 9.
But here, Stuart asks the Court to find that Dr. Patel and UTSW “acted as
employees or agents of [the VA] during their provision of care to Plaintiff under the
VA Community Care Program.” Id. at 1.
And, 	so, 	the issue presented here 	(whether Dr. 	Patel and UTSW were
employees or agents of the VA) is not identical to the issue presented in the state-
court proceedings (whether Dr. Patel was an employee or agent of UTSW and
therefore immune from suit). And Stuart’s collateral estoppel argument fails.
Stuart based his motion solely on collateral estoppel and did not provide any
other evidence or arguments that Dr. Patel and UTSW were employees or agents of
the VA or the United States. See generally id.
Case 3:25-cv-00198-X-BN Document 44 Filed 02/19/26 Page 11 of 12 PageID <pageID>

- 12 -
And, so, the Court should deny Stuart’s motion for judicial determination [Dkt.
No. 33] without prejudice.
Recommendation
For the reasons explained above, the Court should deny Plaintiff Michael
Stuart’s pending motions [Dkt. Nos. 10, 32, & 33] without prejudice.
A copy of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation shall be served on
all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these
findings, conclusions, and recommendation must file specific written objections
within 14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV.
P. 72(b). In order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or
recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and
specify the place in the magistrate judge’s findings, conclusions, and recommendation
where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by
reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure
to file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the
factual findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or
adopted by the district court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v.
United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996)
DATED: February 19, 2026
__________________________________________
DAVID L. HORAN
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Case 3:25-cv-00198-X-BN Document 44 Filed 02/19/26 Page 12 of 12 PageID <pageID>