Bautista v. Gexa Energy LP et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
ROBERT ALLEN BAUTISTA,
Plaintiff,
v.
GEXA ENERGY, LP, et al.,
Defendants.
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Case No. 3:24-cv-2920-E-BT
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION
OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Before the Court is Defendants Gexa Energy, LP, and Nextera Energy, Inc.’s
Motion to Dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) and 12(b)(6) (ECF
No. 39). For the reasons stated, the undersigned RECOMMENDS the District
Judge grant the Motion and dismiss Plaintiff’s claims.
Background
Plaintiff Robert Allen Bautista sued Defendants in state court, and
Defendants timely removed to federal court. See Not. Removal (ECF No. 1). The
Court granted Plaintiff leave to file an Amended Complaint, which asserts various
claims arising under federal criminal statutes, the Uniform Commercial Code
(UCC), the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and Texas law. See Order (ECF No.
37); see generally Am. Compl. (ECF No. 38). Defendants move to dismiss the
Amended Complaint under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 9(b) and 12(b)(6). See
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Mot. Dismiss (ECF No. 39). The Motion to Dismiss has been fully briefed and is
ripe for determination.
Defendants also moved for summary judgment (ECF No. 43), but Plaintiff
failed to file a timely response. To the extent that Plaintiff has not abandoned his
claims,1 the District Judge should dismiss them without leave to amend.
Legal Standards
Rule 12(b)(6)
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a plaintiff's complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “To be plausible, the complaint's
‘[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative
level.’” In re Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. LLC, 624 F.3d 201, 210 (5th Cir. 2010)
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
1 It is well established in this Circuit that “[w]hen a plaintiff fails to defend a claim
in response to a . . . summary judgment motion, the claim is deemed abandoned.”
See Arias v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 3:18-CV-00418-L, 2019 WL 2770160, at
*2–3 (N.D. Tex. July 2, 2019) (citing Black v. N. Panola Sch. Dist., 461 F.3d 584,
588 n.1 (5th Cir. 2006)) (determining that the plaintiff abandoned his claim by
failing to respond to the defendant's Supplement to Motion for Summary
Judgment); see also Scales v. Slater, 181 F.3d 703, 708 n. 5 (5th Cir. 1999) (plaintiff
abandoned claim by failing to contest defendant's arguments for dismissal of that
claim); Gray v. Wal-Mart Stores Tex., LLC, 2020 WL 7327994, at *4 (N.D. Tex.
Nov. 6, 2020) (Rutherford, J.), rec. accepted, 2020 WL 7322737 (N.D. Tex. Dec.
11, 2020) (“Because Plaintiff has offered no evidence raising a material fact issue
as to any element of her . . . claim—indeed, she has not responded or offered any
evidence [at] all—the Court finds that Plaintiff has abandoned her claim . . . .”).
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This pleading standard does not require detailed factual allegations, but it
does demand more than an unadorned accusation devoid of factual support.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[A] formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at
555 (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). “While legal conclusions
can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual
allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Where the facts do not permit the Court to infer
more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has stopped short of
showing that the plaintiff is plausibly entitled to relief. Id. at 678 (citing Twombly,
550 U.S. at 557).
When applying the plausibility standard, the Court “accepts all well-pleaded
facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” In re
Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted). But a court may not look beyond the
pleadings “to determine whether relief should be granted based on the alleged
facts.” Spivey v. Robertson, 197 F.3d 772, 774 (5th Cir. 1999). Review is “limited to
the complaint, any documents attached to the complaint, and any documents
attached to the [motion to dismiss] that are central to the claim and referenced by
the complaint.” Smith v. Buffalo Wild Wings, No. 3:20-CV-2875-D, 2021 WL
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4265849, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 20, 2021) (Fitzwater, J.) (quoting Lone Star Fund
V (U.S.), L.P. v. Barclays Bank PLC, 594 F.3d 383, 387 (5th Cir. 2010)).
Courts considering Rule 12(b)(6) motions generally hold pro se complaints
to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Taylor v.
Books A Million, Inc., 296 F.3d 376, 378 (5th Cir. 2002) (internal quotations
omitted) (quoting Miller v. Stanmore, 636 F.2d 986, 988 (5th Cir. 1981)). But
“despite [the] general willingness to construe pro se filings liberally,” courts “still
require pro se parties to fundamentally abide by the rules that govern the federal
courts.” E.E.O.C. v. Simbaki, Ltd., 767 F.3d 475, 484 (5th Cir. 2014), as revised
(Sept. 18, 2014) (cleaned up). Thus, a pro se plaintiff is not excused from the
requirements to “properly plead sufficient facts that, when liberally construed,
state a plausible claim to relief[.]” Id. (citations omitted).
The undersigned liberally construes Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint with all
possible deference due a pro se litigant. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94
(2007). But such liberal treatment does not require a court to “create causes of
action where there are none.” Smith v. CVS Caremark Corp., No. 3:12–CV–2465–
B., 2013 WL 2291886, at *8 (N.D. Tex. May 23, 2013) (Boyle, J.). And pro se status
does not provide an “impenetrable shield, for one acting pro se has no license to
harass others, clog the judicial machinery with meritless litigation, and abuse
already overloaded court dockets.” Farguson v. MBank Houston, N.A., 808 F.2d
358, 359 (5th Cir. 1986).
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Even so, generally, a district court may not dismiss a pro se complaint for
failure to state a claim under 12(b)(6) without giving the plaintiff a chance to
amend. Bazrowx v. Scott, 136 F.3d 1053, 1054 (5th Cir. 1998).
Requirements for Pleading Fraud and Securities Fraud
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9 requires a heightened level of pleading for
fraud claims, and plaintiffs alleging fraud must plead with particularity. See Fed.
R. Civ. P. 9(b); Dorsey v. Portfolio Equities, Inc., 540 F.3d 333, 339 (5th Cir.
2008). This requires “the complaint to set forth ‘the who, what, when, where, and
how’ of the events at issue.” Dorsey, 540 F.3d at 339 (quoting ABC Arbitrage
Plaintiffs Grp v. Tchuruk, 291 F.3d 336, 350 (5th Cir. 2002)). The Fifth Circuit
“interprets Rule 9(b) strictly, requiring a plaintiff pleading fraud to specify the
statements contended to be fraudulent, identify the speaker, state when and where
the statements were made, and explain why the statements were fraudulent.” Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Hermann Holdings Ltd. v. Lucent
Techs. Inc., 302 F.3d 552, 564–65 (5th Cir. 2002)). Under Rule 9(b), “allegations
of fraud must meet a higher, or more strict, standard than the basic notice pleading
required by Rule 8.” Patel v. Holiday Hosp. Franchising, Inc., 172 F. Supp. 2d 821,
824 (N.D. Tex.2001) (quoting Shushany v. Allwaste, Inc., 992 F.2d 517, 521 (5th
Cir. 1993)). General allegations lumping all defendants together that fail to
segregate the alleged wrongdoing of one from those of another fail to meet the
requirements of Rule 9(b). Id. Additionally, state-law fraud claims are subject to
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the pleading requirements of 9(b). Williams v. WMX Tech., Inc., 112 F.3d 175, 177
(5th Cir.1997).
Because § 10(b) claims under the Securities and Exchange Act are fraud
claims, the pleading requirements of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
of 1995 (PSLRA) incorporates the standard for pleading fraud under Rule 9(b). See
15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). According to the PSLRA,
the complaint shall specify each statement alleged to have been
misleading, the reason or reasons why the statement is misleading,
and, if an allegation regarding the statement or omission is made on
information and belief, the complaint shall state with particularity all
facts on which the belief is formed.
15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1). The PSLRA goes further than Rule 9(b), though, and
“enhances the particularity requirements” for pleading federal securities fraud
claims. Dorsey, 540 F.3d at 339. A plaintiff alleging federal securities fraud must
therefore “specify each statement alleged to have been misleading, the reason or
reasons why the statement is misleading, and, if an allegation regarding the
statement or omission is made on information and belief, the complaint shall state
with particularity all facts on which that belief is formed.” Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. §
78u–4(b)(1)). Finally, to satisfy Rule 9(b) and the PSLRA, a plaintiff must plead
facts and avoid reliance on conclusory allegations. Tuchman v. DSC Commc’n
Corp., 14 F.3d 1061, 1067 (5th Cir. 1994).
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Analysis
A. Plaintiff fails to plausibly allege securities fraud against Defendants.
In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff asserts claims against both Defendants
for “Securities Fraud” and alleges that Defendants violated Texas Securities Act
§ 33.001 and the federal Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Section 10(b). See Am.
Compl. at 3 (ECF No. 38). Defendants move to dismiss these claims, arguing that
Plaintiff’s allegations do not meet the requirements of Rule 9(b) and the PSLRA.
See Mot. Dismiss at 6–7 (ECF No. 39).
After reviewing the Amended Complaint, the Court agrees that Plaintiff has
failed to meet the heightened pleading requirements for his state and federal
securities fraud claims. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants committed securities
fraud by:
• Making false and misleading statements regarding the
negotiability of the instrument, inducing Plaintiff to make
payments based on fraudulent representations; and
• Omitting material facts regarding the unauthorized alteration of
the instrument through an allonge, which violated UCC § 3-104
and UCC § 3-119.
Am. Compl. at 3. (ECF No. 38). These allegations are insufficient for several
reasons. First, Plaintiff fails to allege the date, location, speaker, or content of any
alleged false or misleading statements or omissions. See Williams, 112 F.3d at 177.
Second, the allegations do not explain why these statements or omissions were
false or misleading. See id. Third, Plaintiff fails to segregate conduct between
Defendants and instead asserts general allegations lumping both Defendants
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together. See Patel, 172 F. Supp. 2d at 824. And finally, the allegations are wholly
conclusory. Tuchman, 14 F.3d at 1067.
To be sure, Plaintiff’s “Factual Background” contains two additional
allegations apparently related to his securities fraud claims. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 1,
2 (ECF No. 38). But these allegations, too, are insufficient under either Rule 9(b)
or the PLSRA. First, Plaintiff’s allegation entitled “Fraudulent Alteration of
Negotiable Instruments” does not allege who made the “material
misrepresentation” or where that misrepresentation was made. See id. ¶ 1; see also
Williams, 112 F.3d at 177. Second, the allegation entitled “Deceptive
Misrepresentations” fails to allege who, where, and when the “significant
misrepresentation regarding the negotiable instrument’s validity” or why the
misrepresentation was false or misleading. See Am. Compl. ¶ 2 (ECF No. 38); see
also Williams, 112 F.3d at 177. Additionally, this allegation improperly lumps both
Defendants together. See Patel, 172 F. Supp. 2d at 824.
Finally, both allegations are conclusory and lack factual support. See
Tuchman, 14 F.3d at 1067. Thus, Plaintiff’s securities fraud claims fail to meet the
heightened pleading standards under 9(b) and the PSLRA and should be
dismissed.
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B. Plaintiff fails to state a claim for Deprivation of Rights under the UCC or
18 U.S.C. § 1581.
Plaintiff’s second cause of action, entitled “Deprivation of Rights,” should be
dismissed for failure to state a claim. Plaintiff alleges “Defendants’ conduct
resulted in the deprivation of Plaintiff’s rights by:
• Coercing Plaintiff into unlawful financial obligations based on a
fraudulently altered negotiable instrument.
• Depriving Plaintiff of the ability to challenge or renegotiate the
altered terms due to Defendants’ fraudulent actions.
See Am. Compl. at 3 (ECF No. 38). Plaintiff further asserts that “[t]hese actions
constitute violations of UCC § 3-305(a), UCC § 3-311, and 18 U.S.C. § 1581, which
prohibit trafficking in debt slavery and coercive financial practices.” See id.
Even liberally construed, these allegations fail to state a plausible claim for
relief. First, this claim, too, asserts fraud on the part of Defendants but fails to meet
the requirements of Rule 9(b). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 9; See also Dorsey, 540 F.3d at
339 (a plaintiff pleading fraud must “specify the statements contended to be
fraudulent, identify the speaker, state when and where the statements were made,
and explain why the statements were fraudulent”).
Second, these allegations are conclusory and devoid of factual support. Cf.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (“While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a
complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.”). Additionally, except
for the above clause, Plaintiff does not mention UCC § 3-311 anywhere else in the
body of his Amended Complaint. See Am. Compl. (ECF No. 38). And although
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Plaintiff mentions UCC § 3-305(a) in his “Factual Background,” he states only that
this section “protects an individual’s right to enforce a negotiable instrument under
its original terms unless properly discharged.” See id. ¶ 2. These allegations do not
permit the Court to infer more than a mere possibility of misconduct by
Defendants with respect to any alleged UCC violations. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Finally, although Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’ conduct amounted to
“debt slavery,” under 18 U.S.C. § 1581, section 1581 is a federal criminal statue that
does not provide a private right of action. See Am. Compl. ¶ 5 (ECF No. 38); See
Miller v. Capital One, Nat'l Ass'n, No. 3:25-CV-1371-L-BN, 2025 WL 1841326, at
*3 (N.D. Tex. June 4, 2025) (Horan, J.), rec. adopted, 2025 WL 1828467 (N.D.
Tex. July 2, 2025) (Lindsay, J.). Accordingly, the District Judge should dismiss this
claim under 12(b)(6).
C. Plaintiff’s remaining claims are subject to dismissal.
The “Factual Background” section of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint also
refers to UCC Sections 3-104, 3-119, 3-603(b), Texas Business and Commerce Code
§ 26.02, 18 U.S.C. § 8, and an alleged “Failure to Honor Bills of Exchange.” See Am.
Compl. ¶¶ 1–6 (ECF No. 38). Although Plaintiff does not expressly assert any
“causes of action,” related to these purported claims, 2 the Court liberally construes
2 Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint contains a separately labeled section entitled
“V. Causes of Action,” which is clearly delineated from the rest of the pleading. See
generally Am. Compl. (ECF No. 38). These allegations are not included under the
“Causes of Action,” and, generally, the Court will not “create causes of action where
there are none.” Smith v. CVS Caremark Corp., No. 3:12–CV–2465–B., 2013 WL
2291886, at *8 (N.D. Tex. May 23, 2013) (Boyle, J.). Nevertheless, in light of
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Plaintiff’s allegations as causes of action and addresses each in turn. See id. at 2–
3; Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94. Having reviewed these claims, however, the Court
concludes that none state any plausible basis for relief, and each should be
dismissed.
First, Plaintiff fails to state a claim under 18 U.S.C. § 8, which is a federal
criminal statute that defines the term “obligation or other security of the United
States.” See 18 U.S.C. § 8; Am. Compl. ¶¶ 3, 6 (ECF No. 38). But this section does
not create a private right of action, and therefore any claim brought under
18 U.S.C. § 8 should be dismissed on that basis. See 18 U.S.C. § 8.
Second, Plaintiff’s purported claim under Texas Business and Commerce
Code § 26.02 is based on conclusory statements that lack factual support. See Am.
Compl. ¶ 2 (ECF No. 38); See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Section 26.02 is a specific
statute of frauds that prevents oral evidence from being used to enforce a loan
agreement valued at more than $50,000. See Tex. Bus. Com. Code § 26.02.
Plaintiff asserts, incorrectly, that § 26.02 “protects an individual’s right to enforce
a negotiable instrument under its original terms unless properly discharged.” See
Am. Compl. ¶ 2 (ECF No. 38). Plaintiff does not sufficiently explain how or why
Section 26.02 applies, nor does he explain how Defendants have violated this
Plaintiff’s pro se status, and the fact that these allegations assert misconduct by
Defendants, the Court will address them. Additionally, in its motion, Defendants
argue that these claims should be dismissed. See Mot. Dismiss (ECF No. 39).
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statute. See id. Thus, Plaintiff has not asserted a plausible claim for relief under the
Texas Business and Commerce Code and this claim should be dismissed.
Third, any UCC §§ 3-104 and 3-119 claims also fail. Plaintiff asserts that
Defendants “fraudulently altered” a negotiable instrument which “violated [UCC]
§ 3-104 and § 3-119, which govern the proper endorsement and negotiability of
such instruments.” See Am. Compl. ¶ 1 (ECF No. 38). But to the extent that Plaintiff
is alleging a fraud claim, Rule 9(b) requires much more specificity. See Dorsey, 540
F.3d at 339 (The Fifth Circuit “interprets Rule 9(b) strictly, requiring a plaintiff
pleading fraud to specify the statements contended to be fraudulent, identify the
speaker, state when and where the statements were made, and explain why the
statements were fraudulent”). Additionally, Plaintiff’s allegations are conclusory
and lack the requisite factual support to survive a 12(b)(6) motion. See Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 679.
Fourth, Plaintiff’s allegations regarding UCC § 3-603 are not plausible.
Plaintiff alleges “[t]he failure to honor, properly discharge, or dispute the bills, in
addition to coercing Plaintiff into further payments, amounts to a violation of
Plaintiff’s rights under UCC §3-603(b).” See Am. Compl. ¶ 6 (ECF No. 38). This
allegation is conclusory and lacks any factual support—therefore, any purported
UCC § 3-603 claim fails and should be dismissed. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679
Finally, Plaintiff claims Defendants failed to honor “bills of exchange.” Am.
Compl. ¶ 4 (ECF No. 38). Plaintiff alleges that Defendants “neither formally
accept[ed] nor reject[ed]” bills of exchange “presented by Plaintiff” which
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“breached Plaintiff’s rights,” and “violated commercial practices governing
negotiability.” Id. Again, Plaintiff’s allegations are conclusory, and Plaintiff has
provided no factual basis entitling him to relief on this claim.3 These allegations
are no more than “unadorned” accusations devoid of factual support. See Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
D. The District Judge should not grant leave to amend.
Generally, a court must grant a pro se plaintiff leave to amend before
dismissing a complaint with prejudice under 12(b)(6), unless the plaintiff has
already had an opportunity to plead his best case, or where leave to amend would
be futile. See Martinez v. Nueces Cnty., Tex., 71 F.4th 385, 391 (5th Cir. 2023);
Brewster v. Dretke, 587 F.3d 764, 767–68 (5th Cir. 2009). Here, Plaintiff has
already been granted leave to amend his complaint, ECF No. 37, and the deadline
for filing amended pleadings was almost a year ago. Additionally, granting leave to
amend would be futile, as Plaintiff’s claims based on these facts would remain
subject to dismissal after amendment. See Martinez, F.4th at 391 (“If the
3 Plaintiff cites two U.S. Supreme Court cases—from 1880 and 1876—which
allegedly support his “Bills of Exchange” claim. See Am. Compl.¶ 4 (citing Shaw v.
Railroad Co., 101 U.S. 557 (1880), and First Natl. Bank of Washington v.
Whitman, 94 U.S. 343 (1876)). In Shaw, the Supreme Court assessed whether a
bill of lading—a legal document issued by a carrier to acknowledge receipt of cargo
for shipment—carried the same protections as a negotiable instrument. And in
First National Bank of Washington, the Court held that banks do not enjoy the
protections afforded to negotiable instruments when they pay on a fraudulent
endorsement. But neither case supports an inference that Defendants may be liable
for the misconduct alleged. Indeed, Plaintiff does not allege that either Defendant
is a carrier, a shipper of goods, or a bank.
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complaint, as amended, would be subject to dismissal, then amendment is futile
and the district court [is] within its discretion to deny leave to amend.”) (quoting
Ariyan, Inc. v. Sewage & Water Bd. of New Orleans, 29 F.4th 226, 229 (5th Cir.
2022)).
And “[a]lthough plaintiff does not explicitly identify himself as such,” the
Amended Complaint is “‘replete with the legal-sounding but meaningless verbiage
commonly used by adherents to the so-called sovereign-citizen
movement.’” Bonilla v. Cap. One, Nat'l Ass'n, No. 3:24-cv-00377-AN, 2024 WL
3567396, at *4 (D. Or. July 26, 2024) (quoting Sealey v. Branch Banking & Tr.
Co., No. 2:17CV785-MHT-SMD, 2019 WL 1434065, at *2 (M.D. Ala. Feb. 21,
2019)).
For example, in the caption of his pleading, Plaintiff listed his name with a
“tm” symbol behind it, and under “Parties” identifies himself as “a principal
account, receiving formal correspondence at” a PO box. See Am. Compl. at 1 (ECF
No. 38). Additionally, many of Plaintiff’s claims are the types of claims which have
been “rejected by countless federal courts” as frivolous. See Miller, 3:25-cv-1371-
L-BN, 2025 WL 1841326, at *4, rec. adopted, 2025 WL 1828467.
Further, as the undersigned has previously observed, Plaintiff is “a familiar
litigant in the Northern District of Texas” having filed several other lawsuits under
similar legal theories. See, e.g., Bautista v. Cap. One Fin. Corp, No. 3:24-CV5-
03010-N-BT, 2025 WL 2412932, at *7 (N.D. Tex. July 25, 2025) (Rutherford, J.),
rec. adopted, 2025 WL 2410350 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 19, 2025) (Boyle, J.); Bautista v.
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Santander Consumer USA et al., No. 3:24-cv-02935-K-BN; Bautista v. Gexa
Energy LP, No. 3:24-cv-02920-E-BT; Bautista v. Price Water House Coopers
LLP, No. 3:24-cv-02593-D. Plaintiff has yet to demonstrate that he can bring a
plausible claim against any defendant.
Recommendation
For the reasons stated, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the District
Judge GRANT Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 39) and DISMISS the
Complaint with prejudice.
SO RECOMMENDED.
February 11, 2026.
____________________________
REBECCA RUTHERFORD
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL/OBJECT
A copy of this report and recommendation will be served on all parties in the
manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of this report and
recommendation must file specific written objections within 14 days after being
served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). To be specific,
an objection must identify the specific finding or recommendation to which
objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and specify the place in the
magistrate judge’s report and recommendation where the disputed determination
is found. An objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the
briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file specific written
objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal
conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district
court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Services Auto.
Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996), modified by statute on other grounds, 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (extending the time to file objections to 14 days).
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