Brightman v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
DANIELLE BRIGHTMAN, §
§
Plaintiff, §
§
v. § No. 3:24-cv-02886-L-BT
§
STATE FARM MUTUAL §
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE §
COMPANY, §
§
Defendant. §
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION
OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Defendant State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company moves to
dismiss this pro se civil action brought by Plaintiff Danielle Brightman to recover
damages sustained in an automobile accident allegedly caused by State Farm’s
insured. Because Texas law generally bars an injured third-party from suing a
liability insurer directly, the District Judge should GRANT State Farm’s Motion
(ECF No. 21) and DISMISS this action without prejudice.
Background
This lawsuit arises out of an automobile accident that occurred on August
22, 2023. Am. Compl. (ECF No. 25); see also Compl. (ECF No. 1). Plaintiff contends
that the other driver—insured by State Farm—was at fault and that State Farm
failed to fully compensate Plaintiff for her losses. Id. Plaintiff asserts claims against
State Farm for violating the Texas Insurance Code, breach of contract, and bad
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faith. See Am. Compl. (ECF No. 25); Compl. (ECF No. 1). She seeks $975,000 in
compensatory damages for herself and her child, as well as punitive damages.
Compl. at 10 (ECF No. 1); Civil Cover Sheet (ECF No. 13).
State Farm moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b) arguing that Plaintiff’s
lawsuit should be dismissed because she lacks standing, fails to plead facts
supporting the essential elements of her claims, and fails to plead a claim upon
which relief may be granted. See generally Mot. Dismiss (ECF No. 21). Plaintiff
filed a response (ECF No. 26) and an amended complaint (ECF No. 25). Even
liberally construing these filings, Plaintiff fails to show that she has standing to sue
State Farm.
Legal Standards and Analysis
Because Plaintiff proceeds pro se, the Court construes her pleadings
liberally. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Even so, a complaint must
allege facts that state a plausible claim for relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8; Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
Texas is not a direct-action state.1 That is, in Texas, an injured party—like
Plaintiff—cannot sue the at-fault party’s insurance company directly except in
1 The Fifth Circuit regards the availability of a direct action against an insurer as a
question of substantive law that requires a court sitting in diversity jurisdiction to
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some cases. See also Petty v. Great W. Cas. Co., 783 F. App'x 414, 415 (5th Cir.
2019) (“Texas law generally does not authorize an injured third-party to sue a
liability insurer directly in lieu of suing the tortfeasor.”). Texas law authorizes a
tort suit directly against the tortfeasor’s insurance company only if:
(1) the insurance company is by statute or contract directly
liable to the person injured or damaged; or
(2) the tortfeasor’s liability has been finally determined by
agreement or judgment.
See Tex. R. Civ. P. 38(c), 51(b); Angus Chem. Co. v. IMC Fertilizer, Inc., 939 S.W.2d
138, 138 (Tex. 1997) (per curiam). A third-party tort claimant in Texas also has no
direct cause of action for extra-contractual liability against a liability insurer (i) at
common law, (ii) under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices–Consumer Protection
Act, or (iii) under the Texas Insurance Code. Jones v. CGU Ins. Co., 78 S.W.3d 626,
629 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, no pet.) (citing Allstate Ins. Co. v. Watson, 876
S.W.2d 145, 149 (Tex. 1994)). Further, “Texas law ‘has never recognized a cause of
action for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing where the insurer fails
to settle third-party claims against its insured.’” Jones, 78 S.W.3d at 629 (quoting
Texas Farmers Ins. Co. v. Soriano, 881 S.W.2d 312, 317 (Tex. 1994)).
Plaintiff pleads that State Farm’s insured caused the accident and her
damages. See Pl. Compl. (ECF No. 3); see also Am. Compl. (ECF No. 25). But she
has not alleged that State Farm is directly liable to her by statute or contract. See
apply state law. Nelms v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 F.2d 1190, 1191 (5th
Cir. 1972) (per curiam).
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id. Nor does she plead that the other driver’s liability has been determined by a
final judgment or otherwise. See id. As a result, Plaintiff has not shown standing to
bring a direct action against State Farm. See Ho Yoo v. Amica Mut. Ins. Co., 2020
WL 4677684 (E.D. Tex. June 23, 2020) (“As Plaintiff is a third-party to the
insurance agreement between [the tortfeasor] and [the insurance carrier]
he lacks standing to assert” his claims). Thus, the claims against State Farm should
be dismissed without prejudice. See Williams v. Morris, 614 F. App’x 773, 774 (5th
Cir. 2015) (a dismissal for lack of standing “should be without prejudice.”)
Leave to Amend
Generally, “a pro se litigant should be offered an opportunity to amend [her]
complaint before it is dismissed.” Brewster v. Dretke, 587 F.3d 764, 767–68 (5th
Cir. 2009). But the Court need not grant leave to amend “if the plaintiff has already
pleaded [her] ‘best case.’” Id. Here, Plaintiff has already filed an amended
complaint, and her claims are still fatally infirm. See Am. Compl. (ECF No. 25).
Under these circumstances, granting leave to amend would be futile and cause
needless delay.
Recommendation
The District Judge should GRANT Defendant State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Company’s Rule 12(b) Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 21) and
DISMISS without prejudice Plaintiff Danielle Brightman’s complaint.
SO RECOMMENDED.
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January 21, 2026.
____________________________
REBECCA RUTHERFORD
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL/OBJECT
A copy of this report and recommendation will be served on all parties in the
manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of this report and
recommendation must file specific written objections within 14 days after being
served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). To be specific,
an objection must identify the specific finding or recommendation to which
objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and specify the place in the
magistrate judge's report and recommendation where the disputed determination
is found. An objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the
briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file specific written
objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal
conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district
court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto.
Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996).
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