Srinivasan v. NCH Corporation

3:24-cv-02292Txnd2 mar 2026

Testo completo

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
N A MAHALAKSHMI SRINIVASAN, 	§
Plaintiff, 	§
§
v. 	§ 	No. 3:24-CV-2292-B-BW
§
NCH CORPORATION, 	§
Defendant. 	§
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff N A Mahalakshmi Srinivasan, appearing pro se in this action, has filed several post-
judgment motions, which the Court construes as motions to alter or amend a judgment under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). (See Docs. 81, 82, 84, 86, and 88) (collectively “post-judgment
Motions”).)1 Plaintiff has also filed a Motion for Continuance. (See Doc. 90.) Having considered the
Motions, record, and applicable law, the Court determines and hereby DENIES all of Plaintiff ’s
currently outstanding Motions. (Docs. 81, 84, 86, 88, and 90).
I. BACKGROUND
The facts of this alleged patent infringement case have been summarized elsewhere in the
record (see Doc. 67), so the Court will recount only the facts and procedural history that are
pertinent. 	United States Magistrate Judge Brian McKay entered Findings, Conclusions, and
Recommendation (“FCR”) on November 21, 2025 (Doc. 67), and Plaintiff filed objections (Doc.
No. 71). The Court reviewed de novo those portions of the FCR to which objection was made and
reviewed the remaining portions for plain error. Finding no error, the Court accepted the FCR on
1 The Motions contain nearly identical language and seek essentially the same relief. (See Docs. 81,
82, 84, 86, and 88.)
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January 26, 2026 (Doc. 77), and judgment was entered the same day in favor of Defendant NCH
Corporation, dismissing Plaintiff’s claims with prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim (Doc. 78).
Plaintiff filed her post-judgment Motions under either Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b) requesting
to “reopen the case” due to “excusable neglect including recent supplemental filings which did not
prejudice the defendant.” 	(Doc. 84 at ECF p. 1.) 	Plaintiff also appears to suggest that she has
additional information to “fortify the original complaint claims.” (Id. at ECF p. 2.)
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Plaintiff’s post-judgment motions were filed within 28 days of the entry of judgment and
therefore, are appropriately treated as arising under Rule 59(e). See Washington v. UTMB, No. 20-
20434, 2022 WL 2527665, at *1 (5th Cir. July 7, 2022) (“Regardless of how it is labeled or classified,
a motion seeking reconsideration is treated as a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) motion if it is
filed within the applicable 28-day time limit.”).) 	Although Plaintiff’s Motions also refer to Rule
60(b) (see, e.g., Doc. 84), that rule involves a more “onerous” standard than Rule 59(e). 	Davila v.
Walmart Stores, Inc., No. 3:15-CV-2874-D, 2017 WL 1509303, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 27, 2017). Thus,
because Plaintiff is not entitled to relief under Rule 59(e) as discussed below, she also is not entitled
to relief under Rule 60(b).
Rule 59(e) motions serve the narrow purpose of permitting “a court to alter or amend a
judgment to (1) accommodate an intervening change in controlling law, (2) account for newly
discovered evidence, or (3) correct a manifest error of law or fact.” Trevino v. City of Fort Worth, 944
F.3d 567, 570 (5th Cir. 2019) (footnote omitted); see also Arrieta v. Yellow Transp., Inc., No. 3:05-CV-
2271-D, 2009 WL 129731, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 20, 2009). 	“Such motions are not the proper
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vehicle for rehashing old arguments or advancing theories of the case that could have been presented
earlier.” 	Arrieta, 2009 WL 129731, at *1 (quoting AMS Staff Leasing, NA, Ltd. v. Associated Cont.
Truckmen, Inc., No. 3:04-CV-1344-D, 2005 WL 3148284, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 21, 2005). 	The
movant must demonstrate valid reasons to justify the court’s reconsideration of a prior ruling. See
Hearn v. Quarterman, No. 3:04-CV-450-D, 2008 WL 679030, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 13, 2008).
While “[t]he district court has considerable discretion in deciding whether to reopen a case
under Rule 59(e),” Edward H. Bohlin Co. v. Banning Co., 6 F.3d 350, 355 (5th Cir. 1993),
“[r]econsideration of a judgment after its entry is an extraordinary remedy that should be used
sparingly,” Templet v. HydroChem Inc., 367 F.3d 473, 479 (5th Cir. 2004) (citing Clancy v. Employers
Health Insurance Co., 101 F. Supp. 2d 463, 465 (E.D. La. 2000)). Rule 59(e) generally “favor[s] the
denial of motions to alter or amend a judgment[.]” S. Constructors Grp., Inc. v. Dynalectric Co., 2 F.3d
606, 611 (5th Cir. 1993) (footnote omitted).
III. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff's post-judgment Motions fail to meet the first two narrow purposes for altering,
amending, or otherwise reconsidering the Court's order in accordance with Rule 59(e). 	First,
Plaintiff does not argue any intervening change in controlling law. Indeed, Plaintiff's Motions lack
citation to any case law or other legal authority. (See Doc. 81, 82, 84, 86, and 88.)
Second, although Plaintiff appears to suggest that she has additional information to “fortify
the original complaint claims” (Doc. 84 at ECF p. 2), she fails to identify any such information. She
also avers that her objections to the FCR filed on December 4, 2025 (Doc. 71 (“Objections”))
support the merits of her claim, but that document merely rehashes the allegations in her amended
complaint (compare Doc. 58 with Doc 71), which the Court has already dismissed for failure to state
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a claim. (See Doc. 67 and 72.) Furthermore, although Plaintiff attaches exhibits to her Objections
(see Doc. 71 at ECF p. 25-42), she does not explain why any of this material qualifies as “new
evidence,” or why she did not include such materials in any of the prior versions of her complaint.2
Plaintiff also fails to offer a reasonable explanation regarding why she was unable to present this
purported newly discovered evidence before the Court's final judgment.
Third, Plaintiff's Motion fails to show why or how the Court committed a manifest error of
law or fact. Simon v. United States, 891 F.2d 1154, 1159 (5th Cir. 1990) (“Motions for a new trial or
to alter or amend a judgment must clearly establish either a manifest error of law or fact or must
present newly discovered evidence.”) (internal quotation omitted). “‘Manifest error’ is one that is
plain and indisputable, and that amounts to a complete disregard of the controlling law.” Guy v.
Crown Equip. Corp., 394 F.3d 320, 325 (5th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation omitted).
As the magistrate judge explained, Plaintiff’s amended complaint (Doc. 58) “does not
comport with Fed. R. Civ. P. 8” because “the pleading does not contain a plain and simple statement
of facts alleging a cause of action.” (Doc. 67 at 7.) 	“Rather, [the amended complaint’s] 50 pages
largely contain disjointed thoughts, unexplained technical statements, and publicly available
information about NCH’s revenues.” (Id. at 7-8.) “Very little can be discerned from the amended
complaint beyond the general nature of Plaintiff’s assertion that NCH is profiting from a technology
or method that she or her father had a part in developing.” (Id. at 8.) The same can be said for the
Objections that Plaintiff now purports provide additional information to support her claims—it
merely advances a plethora of allegations from which little can be discerned beyond the general
2 As the magistrate judge noted, Plaintiff has been afforded multiple opportunities to replead her
claims. (See Doc. 67 at 9-10.)
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nature of Plaintiff’s bare assertions that Defendant NCH owns a U.S. patent that is derived from an
Indian patent for which Plaintiff has the ownership rights, and as a result, NCH is receiving profits
that should be hers. (See generally Doc. 71.) Accordingly, the Court denies Plaintiff’s pending post-
judgment Motions.
Finally, Plaintiff’s Motion for Continuance seeks six months “before this case proceeds
further.” (Doc. 90 at 1.) This case is currently closed. There are no live proceedings to warrant a stay.
Accordingly, the Court denies Plaintiff’s Motion for Continuance.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, Plaintiff’s post-judgment Motions (Doc. 81, 84, 86 and 88), which
the Court construes as motions to alter or amend a judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
59(e), are DENIED. Plaintiff’s Motion for Continuance is also DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
DATE: March 2, 2026
__________________________
JANE J. BOYLE
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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