JTH Tax LLC v. Brown et al

OCR transcription for search; preserved printed pages are authoritative

Case 3:24-cv-02083-K-BT
Document 48 Filed 12/12/25 Page 1 of 17 PageID
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS DALLAS DIVISION
JTH TAX LLC d/b/a LIBERTY TAX § §
SERVICE,
§
Plaintiff,
§
v.
§ § Civil Action No. 3:24-cv-2083-K-BT
EBONY BROWN; TIFFANY
§ §
ALPHONSE; LIBERTY TAXES, LLC;
§ §
and LIBERTY CONSULTANATS, LLC
§ §
§
Defendants.
§
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff has filed a motion seeking attorney's fees and costs (ECF No. 45). For the following reasons, the District Judge should GRANT Plaintiff's Motion in part and award Plaintiff $53,545.75 in attorney's fees; $1,877.30 in costs; $2,121.82 in prejudgment interest; and post-judgment interest.
Background
Plaintiff was represented in this trademark infringement action by the law firm Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani LLP (GRSM). On May 20, 2025, Plaintiff filed its Motion for Default Judgment (ECF No. 40), to which Defendants did not respond. On September 2, 2025, the Court granted in part Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment and awarded attorney's fees and costs to be determined by subsequent motion. See Mem. Op. and Order at 31 (ECF No. 42); Final J. at 2 (ECF No. 43). On September 16, 2025, Plaintiff filed its motion for attorney's fees and
AUTHENTICATED U.S. GOVERNMENT INFORMATION GPO
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costs seeking $93,446.58 in attorney’s fees; $1,977.30 in costs and expenses; and
$3,905.06 in pre-judgment interest—$99,328.94 in total. Mot. at 1 (ECF No. 45).
Defendants did not respond to the Motion, and the time to do so has passed. The
Motion is now ripe for adjudication.
Legal Standard and Analysis
I. Entitlement to Fees
Plaintiff moves for attorney’s fees under 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a), as well as costs
and pre- and post-judgment interest. The Lanham Act permits an award of
reasonable attorney’s fees to a prevailing party in exceptional cases. 15 U.S.C.
§ 1117(a); Nat’l Business Forms & Printing, Inc. v. Ford, 671 F.3d 526, 537 (5th Cir.
2012). The Fifth Circuit has acknowledged that “the exceptional case is one in
which the defendant’s trademark infringement can be characterized as ‘malicious,’
‘fraudulent,’ deliberate,’ or willful.’” Tex. Pig Stands, Inc. v. Hard Rock Cafe Int’l,
951 F.2d 684, 697 (5th Cir. 1992) (cleaned up).
Here, the District Judge has already characterized this case as “exceptional.”
Mem. Op. and Order at 31 (ECF No. 42) (“Defendants engaged in willful conduct
and they have failed to appear. Therefore, this is an ‘exceptional case’ for the
purpose of attorney’s fees under the Lanham Act, and award of such fees is
warranted.”). Therefore, Plaintiff is entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees under the
Lanham Act.
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II. Lodestar Calculation
The Court uses the “lodestar” method to calculate reasonable attorney’s fees.
Smith & Fuller, P.A. v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 685 F.3d 486, 490 (5th Cir.
2012). The lodestar is calculated by multiplying the number of hours that an
attorney reasonably spent on the case by an appropriate hourly rate, which is the
market rate in the community for the work. Id. The party seeking attorney’s fees
bears the burden of establishing the number of hours expended through the
presentation of adequately recorded time records as evidence. See Watkins v.
Fordice, 7 F.3d 453, 457 (5th Cir. 1993). The Court uses this time as a benchmark
and 	excludes 	any 	time 	it 	deems 	excessive, 	duplicative, 	unnecessary, 	or
inadequately documented. Id. There is a strong presumption that the lodestar
figure is reasonable. Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel., 559 U.S. 542, 552 (2010). Because
the lodestar is presumed reasonable, it should be modified only in exceptional
circumstances. Watkins, 7 F.3d at 457. The Court calculates the lodestar to be
$53,545.75 in this case.
A. Reasonableness of Rate
In support of the Motion, Plaintiff submitted the declaration of attorney
Cristina Guerrero, a GRSM attorney, who declares that the rates charged by the
attorneys and paralegals in the matter “are reasonable, standard, and customary
for individuals with their experience.” Mot., Ex. C at 3, ¶ 9 (ECF No. 45-3)
(declaration of Cristina Guerrero). GSRM’s attorneys billed $325 per hour for
associate attorneys and $450 per hour for partners. See Mot., Ex. A at 3, 8, 10, 13,
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16, 20, 22, 26, 28–29, 31, 34, 40–41, 43, 47, 54, 56, 58 (ECF No. 45-1). And GRSM’s
paralegals billed $125 per hour. Id.
The fee applicant has the burden of showing that its attorneys’ hourly rates
are reasonable. La. Power & Light Co. v. Kellstrom, 50 F.3d 319, 325 (5th Cir.
1995) (per curiam). “A reasonable hourly rate is the prevailing market rate in the
relevant legal community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable
skills, experience, and reputation.” Hill v. Schilling, 2022 WL 1321548, at *2 (N.D.
Tex. May 3, 2022) (Lindsay, J.) (citing Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895–96 n.11
(1984)). “The relevant legal community is the community in which the district
court sits.” Id. (citing Tollett v. City of Kemah, 285 F.3d 357, 368 (5th Cir. 2002)).
“Typically, the Court receives copies of resumes or summaries of the
qualifications of attorneys involved in the litigation, as well as information
regarding the individuals’ litigation skills generally.” Mauricio v. Phillip Galyen,
P.C., 174 F. Supp. 3d 944, 948 (N.D. Tex. 2016) (citation omitted). “Generally, the
reasonable hourly rate for a particular community is established through affidavits
of other attorneys practicing there.” Tollett, 285 F. 3d at 368 (citation omitted). A
court, however, may also use its own expertise and judgment to independently
assess the reasonableness of an attorney’s hourly rates. See Primrose Operating
Co. v. Nat’l Am. Ins. Co., 382 F.3d 546, 562 (5th Cir. 2004) (“[T]rial courts are
considered experts as to the reasonableness of attorney’s fees[.]”); Merge Off.
Interiors, Inc. v. Alfa Adhesives, Inc., 2020 WL 2115645, at *2 (N.D. Tex. May 3,
2020) (Lynn, J.) (“It is well-established that the Court may use its own expertise
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and judgment to independently assess the hourly rates charged for attorney’s
fees.”).
Besides the declaration of GRSM attorney Cristina Guerrero, Plaintiff does
not submit any evidence regarding the prevailing market rate for this type of case
or for lawyers of similar skills, experience, and reputation in the Dallas community.
However, the Court is familiar with the prevailing market rates in the Dallas legal
market for attorneys with the skill, experience, and reputation of GRSM’s counsel.
Based on the Court’s knowledge of rates charged for legal services by attorneys with
the level of skill, experience, and reputation of GRSM’s counsel in the Dallas legal
community, and its experience in setting attorney’s fees in numerous other cases,
the Court finds that GRSM’s rates are reasonable and comport with Dallas area
market rates. See, e.g., Reilly v. Online Land Market, LLC, 2025 WL 463317, at
*10 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 25, 2025) (Horan, J.) (finding that attorney rates between $350
and $375 per hour and paralegal rates of $150 per hour for copyright litigation is
reasonable), adopted by 2025 WL 462085 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 11, 2025) (Kinkeade,
J.); Verch v. White Rock Sec. Grp., 2020 WL 4550419, at *5 (N.D. Tex. June 30,
2020) (Rutherford, J.) (finding that attorney rate of $425 per hour in copyright
case is reasonable), adopted by 2020 WL 4530716 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 6, 2020)
(Scholer, J.).
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B. Reasonableness of Hours
From the billing invoices, it appears that the following professionals worked on the case:
Name
Title
Hours Expended
Rate Per Hour1
Hannah Brown Goehring
Partner
2.8
$450
Haylee M. Culver
Partner
27.3
$450
JoAnna M. Doherty
Partner
10
$450
Cristina Guerrero
Partner
22.7
$450
Susan B. Meyer
Partner
42.2
$450
Peter G. Siachos
Partner
1.2
$450
Dean Y. Drew
Associate Attorney
41.1
$325
Donald Hageman III
Associate Attorney
135.4
$325
Taylor L. Jordan
Paralegal
2.1
$125
Christina R. Smith
Paralegal
.2
$125
See Mot., Ex. A at 3, 8, 10, 13, 16, 20, 22, 26, 28-29, 31, 34, 40-41, 43, 47, 54, 56, 58 (ECF No. 45-1). Thus, GRSM expended 106.2 partner hours at $450 per hour, 176.5 associate attorney hours at $325 per hour, and 2.3 paralegal hours at $125 per hour. Mot. at 3-4 (ECF No. 45). Based on these sums, Plaintiff asks for
1 This hourly rate reflects the professionals' standard hourly rate before any discounts.
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$89,379.63 in attorney’s fees and $244.38 in paralegal fees—$89,624.01 in total.2
Id.
The burden to show reasonableness of the hours billed necessarily includes
the burden of proving the attorneys seeking the fees exercised billing judgment.
Saizan v. Delta Concrete Prods. Co., 448 F.3d 795, 799 (5th Cir. 2006) (per
curiam). “Billing judgment requires documentation of the hours charged and of
the hours written off as unproductive, excessive, or redundant.” Id. (citing Walker
v. City of Mesquite, 313 F.3d 246, 251 (5th Cir.2002)). A court may reduce an
award by a percentage to substitute for the exercise of billing judgment where it
appears from the records supporting a motion for attorney’s fees that the attorneys
did not exercise billing judgment. Id.
Here, the billing invoices reflect that GRSM voluntarily reduced their hourly
rates by approximately 15%, which is consistent with the exercise of billing
judgment. See Mauricio v. Phillip Gaylen, P.C., 174 F. Supp. 3d 944, 950 (N.D.
Tex. 2016) (finding that voluntary reduction of fees by approximately 20%
demonstrated billing judgment); S.E.C. v. Saleh, 2011 WL 816822, at *2 (N.D. Tex.
Jan. 19, 2011) (Toliver, J.) (holding that requested fees were reached after the
exercise of appropriate billing judgment when attorney voluntarily reduced hourly
rate), adopted by 2011 WL 817161 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 9, 2011) (Lynn, J.); Hancock v.
Chi. Title Ins. Co., 2013 WL 2391500, at *9 (N.D. Tex. June 3, 2013) (Fitzwater, J.)
2 Plaintiff calculates the total attorney and paralegal fees as $89,624.08. Mot. at 4
(ECF No. 45). However, the Court calculates the total as $89,624.01.
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(refusing to further reduce fees because the party’s voluntary reduction was
comparable to the reduction imposed by courts in cases where evidence of billing
judgment was absent); Jim S. Adler, P.C. v. McNeil Consultants, LLC, 2024 WL
1348401, at *15 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 28, 2024) (Horan, J.) (declining to impose
additional reduction when attorney applied 10% discount to charged fees).
However, the Court finds that staffing the matter with six partners, two
associates, and two paralegals resulted in duplicative and redundant work. See
BMO Harris Bank, N.A. v. Balmor Transp., Inc., 2020 WL 4490431, at *5 (N.D.
Tex. July 1, 2020) (Rutherford, J.), adopted by 2020 WL 4464662 (N.D. Tex. Aug.
3, 2020) (Scholer, J.). “If more than one attorney is involved, the possibility of
duplication of effort along with proper utilization of time should be scrutinized.”
Walker v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 99 F.3d 761, 768 (5th Cir. 1996)
(quoting Johnson v. Ga. Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717 (5th Cir. 1974)).
Ten professionals worked on this matter that required, by the Court’s estimation,
no more than six substantive filings on GRSM’s part. Further, the billing entries
show that some of the attorney’s fees were duplicative and redundant. For
example, the billing invoices reflect that at least seven professionals charged for
reviewing and editing Plaintiff’s original complaint, see Mot., Ex. A at 2–3, 6–7, 12,
15–16, & 19 (ECF No. 45-1), and at least five professionals charged for work
performed on Plaintiff’s motions for preliminary injunction, see id. at 12, 15, 19,
25, & 37. And four GRSM attorneys billed nearly 30 hours for researching the social
media pages for various individuals. Id. at 2, 6, 31, 34, 37, 38, 39, 40, 43, 56, & 58.
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But there is no evidence that GRSM’s counsel wrote off hours that were duplicative,
redundant, or excessive.
Accordingly, the Court finds that the appropriate lodestar is $53,545.75,
approximately 40% less than GRSM’s request and the sum billed to the client for
Mr. Hageman and Ms. Meyer’s work in this matter. See Mot. at 4 (listing total fees
sought for Mr. Hageman and Ms. Meyer’s work). By the Court’s calculation, Mr.
Hageman and Ms. Meyer are the attorneys in this case whose bills are the highest
based on the respective rates and hours billed. In its discretion, the Court finds that
this 	lodestar 	accurately 	accounts 	for 	the 	overstaffing 	while 	reflecting 	the
reasonable amount of time necessary to pursue this lawsuit. See Leroy v. City of
Houston, 906 F.2d 1068, 1079 (5th Cir. 1990) (“Hours which, though actually
expended, . . . result from the case being ‘overstaffed,’ are not hours ‘reasonably
expended’ and are to be excluded from this calculation.”) (emphasis in original);
EsNtion Records, Inc. v. TritonTM, Inc., 2010 WL 3446910, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Aug.
31, 2010) (Lindsay, J.) (reducing requested fees in copyright action by 40% because
matter was overstaffed with four different attorneys and one paralegal); BMO
Harris Bank, 2020 WL 4490431, at *5 (reducing requested fees by 31% because
matter was overstaffed with six legal professionals).
Finally, Plaintiff provides that a “reasonable estimate for fees and costs
incurred to file [the instant Motion] and for any post-judgment proceedings is
$3,822.50. Mot. at 4 (ECF No. 45) (emphasis added). However, Plaintiff does not
provide any billing statements or other evidence supporting this estimate. Notably,
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Plaintiff does not attach billing statements recording the number of hours spent
drafting and filing the instant motion, which precludes the Court from examining
the propriety of Plaintiff’s estimated fee. See La. Power & Light Co., 50 F.3d at 324
(“In determining the amount of an attorney fee award, courts customarily require
the applicant to produce contemporaneous billing records or other sufficient
documentation so that the district court can fulfill its duty to examine the
application for noncompensable hours. Thus a district court may reduce the
number of hours awarded if the documentation is vague or incomplete.”) (internal
citations omitted) (emphasis in original). Further, the Court declines to award fees
for any post-judgment proceedings because the Court cannot “reliably assess
whether these fees are reasonable, as the events upon which such fees are based
have not yet occurred.” Ass’n of Pro. Ball Players of Am. v. Madison, 2025 WL
736802, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 10, 2025) (O’Connor, J.) (collecting cases).
C. Adjustment to the Lodestar
Although 	there 	is 	a 	strong 	presumption 	that 	the 	lodestar 	figure 	is
reasonable, the Court must consider whether the lodestar should be adjusted
upward or downward based on the factors set forth in Johnson v. Ga. Highway
Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717–19 (5th Cir. 1974), abrogated on other grounds
by Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87 (1989).3 The district court, however, is not
3 The Johnson factors are: (1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and
difficulty of the legal issues; (3) the skill required to perform the legal service
properly; (4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney as a result of
taking the case; (5) the customary fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent;
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required to “recite or even mention the Johnson factors, so long as ‘the record
clearly indicates that the district court has utilized the Johnson framework as the
basis for its analysis.’” Moench v. Marquette Transp. Co. Gulf-Inland, L.L.C., 838
F.3d 586, 596 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting Union Asset Mgmt. Holding A.G. v. Dell,
Inc., 669 F.3d 632, 642 (5th Cir. 2012)).
Upon 	consideration 	of 	the 	Johnson 	factors, 	the 	Court 	finds 	that 	no
adjustment to the lodestar figure is necessary. This civil action was a fairly
straightforward trademark infringement case. The litigation did not require any
unique skill or expertise on the part of the GRSM attorneys; nor did it require more
than the usual investment of time or labor. Indeed, the default posture of this case
indicates that it involved less than the usual time and labor for a trademark
infringement action. No trial was required. GRSM billed Plaintiff on an hourly
basis, and there is no evidence before the Court that Plaintiff imposed any time
limitation on GRSM or that other circumstances made representing Plaintiff
undesirable. GRSM charged a customary fee, which resulted in an award that is
typical for this type of case. Accordingly, the Court should GRANT Plaintiff’s
Motion in part and award Plaintiff $53,545.75 in attorney’s fees.
(7) time limitations imposed by the client or other circumstances; (8) the monetary
amount involved and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and
ability of the attorneys; (10) whether the case is undesirable; (11) the nature and
duration of the professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards in similar
cases. Johnson, 488 F.2d at 717–19.
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III. Costs
Plaintiff next requests to recover $1,977.30 in costs for “filing fees, service of
process, domain name search expenses, and transcript/research costs[.]” Mot. at
4 (ECF No. 45). A prevailing party in a civil action is entitled to recover its costs
unless a federal statute, the federal rules, or the court provides otherwise. See Fed.
R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1). Taxable costs include: (1) fees paid to the clerk and marshal; (2)
fees for printed or electronically recorded transcripts necessarily obtained for use
in the case; (3) fees and disbursements for printing and witnesses; (4) fees for
copies of papers necessarily obtained for use in the case, (5) docket fees, and (6)
compensation of court appointed experts and interpreters. 28 U.S.C. § 1920.
The invoices provided reflect that GRSM incurred $1,877.30 in recoverable
expenses for filing fees and process servers. See Mot., Ex. A at 29, 35, & 41.
However, GRSM has not met its burden to recover the remaining $100.00
requested. “Courts may award computer-assisted research costs as part of its
attorneys’ fees awards ‘if [counsel] normally bills its paying clients for the costs of
online 	research 	services[.]” 	Wyndham 	Properties 	II, 	Ltd. 	v. 	Buca 	Tex.
Restaurants, LP, 2023 WL 2392090, at *6 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 7, 2023) (Ray, J.)
(alterations in original) (quoting Fluor Corp. v. Citadel Equity Fund Ltd., 2011 WL
3820704, at *6 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 26, 2011) (Boyle, J.)). GRSM has not produced any
evidence to show that it normally bills its clients for this type of online research.
Indeed, none of the billing statements attached to the Motion reflect that GRSM
billed Plaintiff for online research costs.
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Accordingly, the Court should GRANT Plaintiff’s Motion in part and award
$1,877.30 in recoverable expenses under 28 U.S.C. § 1920.
IV. Interest
A. Prejudgment Interest
“Prejudgment interest is compensation for the lost use of money owed as
damages.” Agredano v. State Farm Lloyds, 2021 WL 4228340, at *13 (W.D. Tex.
Sept. 16, 2021) (citing Phillips v. Bramlett, 407 S.W.3d 229, 238 (Tex. 2013)). The
Lanham 	Act 	does 	not 	explicitly 	state 	that 	a 	prevailing 	party 	can 	recover
prejudgment interest, see 15 U.S.C. § 1117, but courts have discretion to award
prejudgment interest in appropriate cases. See Clearline Techs. Ltd. v. Cooper B-
Line, Inc., 948 F. Supp. 2d 691, 712–13 (S.D. Tex. 2013) (collecting cases).
“[C]ircuit courts are split as to when pre-judgment interest is appropriate,” and
“[t]he Fifth Circuit has not addressed when a court should award pre-judgment
interest for Lanham Act violations.” Whirlpool Corp. v. Shenzhen Sanlida Elec.
Tech. Co., 2025 WL 904378, at *8 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 25, 2025) (emphasis in original).
“But district courts in this Circuit generally award prejudgment interest based on
the rationale that without it, the plaintiff’s compensation is incomplete and the
defendant has an incentive to delay.” Uchi Rests. Grp., Inc. v. Hoang, 2025 WL
1693355, at *7 (W.D. Tex. June 13, 2025).
As the District Judge found that this case is exceptional, and Defendants
delayed the suit by failing to enter an appearance, the Court finds that an award of
prejudgment interest in appropriate. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Exxonmobil for
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Export, Import & Trade Ltd., 2013 WL 12124589, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 23, 2013)
(Solis, J.) (awarding prejudgment interest at federal rate when the defendant
“delayed the suit, to the [p]laintiff’s detriment, by failing to file an answer,” and
alternatively, because the case was exceptional); Uchi Rests. Grp., 2025 WL
1693355, at *8 (awarding prejudgment interest when defendant defaulted); ReSea
Project APS v. Restoring Integrity to the Oceans, Inc., 2024 WL 4279524, at *14
(W.D. Tex. Sept. 24, 2024) (same).
Plaintiff asks the Court to calculate prejudgment interest using the weekly
average 1-year Treasury constant-maturity yield set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1961, or
alternatively, a Texas benchmark set forth in Texas Finance Code Chapter 304.
Mot. at 6 (ECF No. 45). “Although some courts have utilized ‘the prime rate of
Treasury bill rate,” others use ‘the average monthly prime rate from the date’
claims accrued until the date of judgment.” ReSea Project APS, 2024 WL 4279524,
at 	*14. 	Further, 	the 	Fifth 	Circuit 	“has 	stated 	that 	§ 1961 	fixes 	the 	rate 	of
prejudgment interest only when it is a federal question that must be governed by
federal law.” Id. (quoting Travelers Ins. Co. v. Liljeberg Enters., Inc., 7 F.3d 1203,
1209 (5th Cir. 1993)).
In light of Plaintiff’s request to utilize the federal rate, and the fact that this
is an action arising under federal law, the District Judge should award Plaintiff
prejudgment interest at 3.65% in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1961. See Post
Judgment Interest Rates, United States District Court for the Northern District of
Texas (last visited Dec. 1, 2025), https://www.txnd.uscourts.gov/post-judgment-
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rates (reporting that the post-judgment interest rate from September 15, 2025 to
September 21, 2025 is 3.65%); ReSea Project APS, 2024 WL 4279524, at *14
(applying the rate equal to the weekly average 1-year constant maturity Treasury
yield set by 28 U.S.C. § 1961); Exxon Mobil Corp., 2013 WL 12124589, at *5 (same).
Accordingly, the Court should GRANT Plaintiff’s Motion in part and award
Plaintiff $2,121.82 in prejudgment interest.4
B. Post-judgment Interest
Lastly, Plaintiff requests post-judgment interest pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1961. Mot. at 6 (ECF No. 45). This statute grants interest “from the date of the
entry of the judgment” at a rate “equal to the weekly average 1-year constant
maturity Treasury yield . . . for the calendar week preceding . . . the date of the
judgment.” 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a). Post-judgment interest compounds annually and
is “computed daily to the date of payment.” Id. § 1961(b). The principal for
calculating post-judgment interest is “the entire amount of the final judgment,”
4 When calculating the amount of prejudgment interest on percentage per year, the
proper calculation is the amount of prejudgment damages (which consists of
$53,545.75 in attorney’s fees and $1,877.30 in costs) multiplied by the annual
interest rate (3.65%) divided by 365 to obtain the amount of interest per day (here,
approximately $5.54). That daily amount is then multiplied by the number of days
from the day damages accrue (August 15, 2024 when Plaintiff filed suit) until the
day before judgment (September 2, 2025), which is 383 days in this case. See
ReSea Project APS, 2024 WL 4279524, at *15; Mot. at 6 (ECF No. 45).
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including attorney’s fees, costs, and prejudgment interest. Fuchs v. Lifetime Doors,
Inc., 939 F.2d 1275, 1280 (5th Cir. 1991).
Because “district courts do not have the discretion to deny post-judgment
interest on monetary judgments,” Plaintiff’s request for post-judgment interest
should be granted. Paisano Capital SA de CV v. 23 Tex. Produce, Inc., 2019 WL
3239152, at *5 (N.D. Tex. July 18, 2019) (Boyle, J.). Therefore, the Court should
GRANT Plaintiff’s request for post-judgment interest for all damages awarded
herein,5 at the statutory rate of 3.65%,6 from the date of final judgment until it is
paid in full. Id.
Recommendation
For the forgoing reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion for attorney’s fees and costs
(ECF No. 45) should be GRANTED in part. The Court should award Plaintiff
$53,545.75 in attorney’s fees; $1,877.30 in costs; and $2,121.82 in prejudgment
interest—$57,544.87 in total. The Court should also award Plaintiff post-judgment
interest.
SO RECOMMENDED.
December 12, 2025.
REBECCA RUTHERFORD
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
5 The District Judge previously awarded Plaintiff $200,000 in damages. See Final
J. at 2 (ECF No. 43).
6 	The 	post-judgment 	interest 	rate 	can 	be 	found 	at:
https://www.txnd.uscourts.gov/post-judgment-rates.
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INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL/OBJECT
A copy of this report and recommendation shall be served on all parties in
the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of this report and
recommendation must file specific written objections within 14 days after being
served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). To be specific,
an objection must identify the specific finding or recommendation to which
objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and specify the place in the
magistrate judge’s report and recommendation where the disputed determination
is found. An objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the
briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file specific written
objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal
conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district
judge, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto.
Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996).
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