Camacho v. Sajeda Inc et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
YENNI CAMACHO, 	§
Plaintiff, 	§
§
v. 	§ 	No. 3:23-CV-2770-S
§
SAJEDA INC. d/b/a MARIA’S 	§
GROCERY and ABDEL HUSSEIN, 	§
Defendants. 	§
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION
OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
On June 10, 2024, Plaintiff Yenni Camacho filed a Motion for Default
Judgment against Defendants Sajeda Inc. d/b/a Maria’s Grocery and Abdel Hussein
(collectively “Defendants”). (Dkt. No. 17 (“Mot.”).) Defendants have not appeared
in this action and did not file a response. The court denied the motion without
prejudice on March 6, 2025, granting Camacho leave to file an amended complaint
within 30 days. (See Dkt. No. 23 (“OA”).) Camacho did so on March 27, 2025.
(Dkt. No. 24 (“Am. Compl.”).) On April 24, 2025, Camacho filed a Second Motion
for Default Judgment against Defendants. (Dkt. No. 26 (“2nd Mot.”).) On April 25,
2025, United States District Judge Karen Gren Scholer referred the motion to the
undersigned magistrate judge for a hearing, if necessary, and for recommendation.
(See Dkt. No. 27.) Having considered the motion, the undersigned recommends that
the motion be GRANTED and that the District Judge enter default judgment
requiring Defendants to pay Camacho (1) unpaid overtime compensation in the
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amount of $11,714.00; (2) liquidated damages in the amount of $11,714.00;
(3) reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees in the amount of $3,780.00; and (4) costs
in the amount of $402.00.
I. BACKGROUND
Maria’s Grocery (“Maria’s”) is a grocery store in Dallas County that is owned
and operated by Abdel Hussein. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 3, 4.) This suit arises out of
Camacho’s prior employment as a cashier at Maria’s. Camacho worked at Maria’s
from January 8, 2022, until July 2023. (Id. ¶ 13.) According to Camacho,
Defendants paid her on a weekly basis, and her wages were based on an hourly rate.1
(See id. ¶¶ 16–18.) At the beginning of the employment, Camacho’s rate was $13 per
hour, (id. ¶ 18), but starting in mid-March 2023, it increased to $14 per hour, (id.).
Camacho alleges Defendants regularly required her to work over 40 hours per week.
(Am. Compl. ¶¶ 15, 19.) From her start date in January 2022 until mid-March 2023,
Camacho’s schedule required her to work an average of 63 hours a week. (Id. ¶ 15.)
1 Camacho’s initial filings manifested inconsistencies with respect to Camacho’s
gender, referring to Camacho at some points as male and at others as female. In the original
complaint and motion for default judgment, Camacho is referred to using male pronouns.
(Dkt. No. 1 (“Compl.”) ¶ 12; Mot. ¶ 5.) But in other documents, such as the attorney
declarations, Camacho is referred to using female pronouns. (Dkt. No. 15 at 3; Mot. at 9
¶ 1.) The undersigned followed the example of the Complaint and used male pronouns to
refer to Camacho in the initial findings, conclusions, and recommendation. (See Dkt. No.
21 (“FCR”) at 2 n.1.) In Camacho’s objections to the findings, conclusions, and
recommendation, Camacho is referred to using male pronouns, (See Dkt. No. 22), but in the
later filed amended complaint and second motion for default judgment, Camacho is once
again referred to using female pronouns, (Am. Compl. ¶ 2; 2nd Mot. ¶ 7). Since the
amended complaint uses female pronouns, the undersigned does the same in these findings
and conclusions.
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She worked an average of 60 hours per week from mid-March 2023 until May 2023,
(id.), and an average of 54 hours per week from June 2023 until her end date in July
2023, (id.).
According to Camacho, Defendants never paid her the proper overtime rate—
not less than one and a half times her regular rate—for the hours she worked in
excess of 40 hours per week. (See Am. Compl. ¶ 20.) Instead, Defendants paid
Camacho the entirety of her work hours at her standard rate. (See id.) Camacho
alleges this deficit totals $11,714.00 in unpaid wages in violation of the Fair Labor
Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (“FLSA”). (Id. ¶ 23.)
Camacho accused Defendants of violating the FLSA, filing her initial
complaint on December 15, 2023. (See generally Compl.) Defendants failed to file an
answer or respond in any way. On May 27, 2024, Camacho requested the Clerk to
issue an entry of default, (Dkt. No. 15), and on the following day, the Clerk entered
default as to the Defendants, (Dkt. No. 16). On June 10, 2024, Camacho filed a
motion for default judgment against Defendants. (See generally Mot.) On August 26,
2024, Judge Scholer referred the motion to the undersigned for recommendation.
(See Dkt. No. 20.) On January 24, 2025, the undersigned issued his findings,
conclusions, and recommendation on the motion. (See FCR.)
The undersigned recommended that Camacho’s motion for default judgment
be denied without prejudice, finding that, though default judgment was procedurally
proper in this case, (id. at 8–10), Camacho had not pled sufficient facts to establish
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that Defendants engaged in interstate commerce as required under the FLSA, (id. at
13–15). On March 6, 2025, the court accepted the recommendation of the
undersigned, denying the motion without prejudice but granting Camacho leave to
file an amended complaint within 30 days to address pleading deficiencies. (See
OA.) Camacho filed an amended complaint on March 27, 2025, (Am. Compl.), and
a second motion for default judgment on April 24, 2025, (2nd Mot.).
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
Rule 55 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs the entry of a default
judgment. A default judgment is available to a plaintiff who demonstrates the
following: (1) the defendant was served with a summons and the complaint, and a
default was entered because the defendant failed to appear; (2) the defendant is not a
minor or an incompetent person; (3) the defendant is not in the military or subject to
the Soldiers and Sailors Relief Act of 1940, 50 U.S.C. § 3931; and (4) if the defendant
appeared in the case, the defendant was provided with notice of the default judgment
application at least three days before the hearing. Arch Ins. Co. v. WM Masters &
Assocs., Inc., 3:12-CV-2092-M, 2013 WL 145502, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 14, 2013)
(citing Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Streeter, 438 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1070 (D.
Ariz. 2006)). In addition, the plaintiff “must make a prima facie showing of
jurisdiction.” TFHSP, LLC Series 10147 v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 3:14-CV-2589-M-BN,
2016 WL 2856006, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 18, 2016) (citing Sys. Pipe & Supply, Inc. v.
M/V Viktor Kurnatovskiy, 242 F.3d 322, 325 (5th Cir. 2001)).
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The Fifth Circuit has set out a three-step process for a plaintiff seeking default
judgment: (1) default by the defendant; (2) entry of default by the Clerk; and (3) entry
of a default judgment by the district court. See New York Life Ins. Co. v. Brown, 84
F.3d 137, 141 (5th Cir. 1996). A default occurs when a defendant has failed to plead
or otherwise respond to the complaint within the time required by the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a); PharMerica Corp. v. Paragon Healthcare
Grp., LLC, No. 2:19-CV-00196, 2021 WL 9274561, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 20, 2021).
“‘Default judgments are a drastic remedy, not favored by the Federal Rules
and resorted to by courts only in extreme situations.’” Lewis v. Lynn, 236 F.3d 766,
767 (5th Cir. 2001) (quoting Sun Bank of Ocala v. Pelican Homestead & Sav. Ass’n, 874
F.2d 274, 276 (5th Cir. 1989)); see also Arch Ins. Co., 2013 WL 145502, at *2 (citing
Rogers v. Hartford Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 167 F.3d 933, 936 (5th Cir. 1999) (observing the
Fifth Circuit’s general disfavor of default judgments and preference to resolve cases
on their merits)). But this policy is “counterbalanced by considerations of social
goals, justice, and expediency, a weighing process [that] lies largely within the
domain of the trial judge’s discretion.” Rogers, 167 F.3d at 936 (quoting Pelican Prod.
Corp. v. Marino, 893 F.2d 1143, 1146 (10th Cir. 1990) (internal quotations omitted));
see also Merrill Lynch Mortg. Corp. v. Narayan, 908 F.2d 246, 253 (7th Cir. 1990)
(noting that default judgments allow courts to manage their dockets “efficiently and
effectively”).
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“A party is not entitled to a default judgment as a matter of right, even where
the defendant is technically in default.” Ganther v. Ingle, 75 F.3d 207, 212 (5th Cir.
1996) (citing Mason v. Lister, 562 F.2d 343, 345 (5th Cir. 1977)). “There must be a
sufficient basis in the pleadings for the judgment entered.” Nishimatsu Const. Co. v.
Hous. Nat. Bank, 515 F.2d 1200, 1206 (5th Cir. 1975). Only well-pleaded facts, not
conclusions of law, are presumed to be true. Id. Default judgments are not typically
“granted on the claim, without more, that the defendant had failed to meet a
procedural time requirement.” Mason & Hanger-Silas Mason Co. v. Metal Trades Council
of Amarillo, Tex. & Vicinity, 726 F.2d 166, 168 (5th Cir. 1984). A defaulting defendant
is deemed to admit all well-pleaded facts in the plaintiff’s complaint, but not facts
that are not well-pleaded or conclusions of law. Nishimatsu Const. Co., 515 F.2d at
1206.
Courts have developed a three-part analysis to determine whether to enter a
default judgment against a defendant. United States v. 1998 Freightliner Vin #:
1FUYCZYB3WP886986, 548 F. Supp. 2d 381, 384 (W.D. Tex. 2008). First, in
assessing whether the entry of a default judgment is procedurally warranted, courts
consider several factors, including: (1) whether material issues of fact are at issue;
(2) whether there has been substantial prejudice; (3) whether the grounds for default
are clearly established (4) whether the default was caused by a good faith mistake or
excusable neglect; (5) the harshness of a default judgment; and (6) whether the court
would think itself obliged to set aside the default on the defendant’s motion. Lindsey
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v. Prive Corp., 161 F.3d 886, 893 (5th Cir. 1998). Second, courts assess the
substantive merit of the plaintiff’s pleadings to determine whether there is a sufficient
factual basis for default judgment. See Nishimatsu Const. Co., 515 F.2d at 1206
(finding that a plaintiff must plead sufficient facts to show it is entitled to relief).
Third, courts determine what form of relief, if any, the plaintiff should receive. See
1998 Freightliner, 548 F. Supp. 2d at 384.
III. ANALYSIS
Judge Scholer previously adopted the conclusions that the Court has
jurisdiction over this matter (FCR at 10), Camacho effectively served Defendants (id.
at 7), the Clerk’s entry of default was appropriate (id. at 8), and entry of default
judgment is procedurally proper in this case (id. at 8–10). (See OA.) The
undersigned has no reason to reconsider these conclusions here and thus moves to
the second step of the three-part default judgment analysis: assessing whether the
plaintiff’s pleadings “sufficiently set[ ] forth facts establishing that it is entitled to
relief,” making an entry of default judgment substantively proper. 1998 Freightliner,
548 F. Supp. 2d at 384.
A. 	Default judgment is substantively proper.
Camacho alleges that Defendants, in violation of the FLSA, refused to pay her
overtime wages for the hours worked in excess of 40 hours per week. (Am. Compl.
¶ 21.) “The FLSA requires that employers pay covered employees at a rate of at least
one and one-half times their regular rate for the hours an employee works in excess
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of a forty-hour workweek.” Montoya Garcia v. Overnight Cleanse, LLC, No. 3:18-CV-
3386-S-BH, 2021 WL 902494, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 22, 2021) (citing 29 U.S.C.
§ 207(a)(1)), adopted, 2021 WL 1012146 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 9, 2021); see also Hewitt v.
Helix Energy Sols. Grp., Inc., 15 F.4th 289, 290 (5th Cir. 2021) (“The Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA) establishes a standard 40-hour workweek by requiring
employers to pay ‘time and a half’ for any additional time worked.”), aff'd, 598 U.S.
39 (2023).
To state a claim for unpaid overtime wages under the FLSA, a plaintiff must
allege facts sufficient to show: “(1) that there existed an employer-employee
relationship during the unpaid overtime periods claimed; (2) that the employee
engaged in activities within the coverage of the FLSA; (3) that the employer violated
the FLSA’s overtime wage requirements; and (4) the amount of overtime
compensation due.” Johnson v. Heckmann Water Res. (CVR), Inc., 758 F.3d 627, 630
(5th Cir. 2014) (citations omitted). Judge Scholer has adopted the finding that
Camacho sufficiently alleged an employer-employee relationship with both Maria’s
as a corporation and Abdel Hussein as a corporate officer with managerial
responsibilities. (FCR at 12; OA.) Defendants are thus jointly and severally liable
for whatever damages are owed Camacho under the FLSA. See Ho v. Xpress Pho,
LLC, No. 3:14-CV-0533-B, 2015 WL 1810339, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 20, 2015). The
court also adopted the findings that Camacho is not an exempted employee under
the FLSA, (FCR at 13), and Camacho is entitled to overtime pay in accordance with
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the statute, (id.). (See OA.) The undersigned has no reason to reconsider these
findings here.
Next, Camacho must sufficiently allege that she was “engaged in activities
within the coverage of the FLSA.” Heckmann Water Res., 758 F.3d at 630. “The
FLSA covers employees who are ‘engaged in commerce or in the production of
goods for commerce.’” Williams v. Henagan, 595 F.3d 610, 619 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing
29 U.S.C. §§ 206(a), 207(a)(1)). The FLSA defines an “enterprise engaged in
commerce or in the production of goods for commerce” as one that:
(A)(i) has employees engaged in commerce or in the production
of goods for commerce, or that has employees handling, selling, or
otherwise working on goods or materials that have been moved in or
produced for commerce by any person; and
(ii) is an enterprise whose annual gross volume of sales made or
business done is not less than $500,000 (exclusive of excise taxes at the
retail level that are separately stated)[.]
29 U.S.C. § 203(s)(1). The FLSA defines “Commerce” as “trade, commerce,
transportation, transmission, or communication among the several States or between
any State and any place outside thereof.” Id. § 203(b). To determine whether an
employee engages in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, courts
in the Fifth Circuit look at “whether the work is so directly and vitally related to the
functioning or an instrumentality or facility of interstate commerce as to be, in
practical effect, a part of it rather than an isolated activity.” Henagan, 595 F.3d at
621 (quoting Sobrinio v. Med. Ctr. Visitor's Lodge, Inc., 474 F.3d 828, 829 (5th Cir.
2007)). “Work that is purely local in nature does not meet the FLSA’s requirements,
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but any regular contact with commerce, no matter how small, will result in
coverage.” Id. (cleaned up).
Camacho alleges that Defendants have an “annual gross volume of sales made
or business done of at least $500,000.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 5.) Such a statement is
sufficient to allege that Defendants are an enterprise whose annual gross volume of
sales made or business done is not less than $500,000. (See FCR at 14.) But to
establish that Defendants are an enterprise within the scope of the FLSA, there must
also be sufficient factual basis in the pleadings to demonstrate that “regular contact
with commerce” that places Defendants, “in practical effect,” within the flow of
interstate commerce. Henagan, 595 F.3d at 621 (quoting Sobrinio, 474 F.3d at 829).
It is not enough to “merely echo[ ] the language of the FLSA’s definition of
‘enterprise engaged in commerce’ and allege[ ] in conclusory fashion that
[Defendants] engage[ ] in interstate commerce.” Ventura v. Pro. Frame & Home, No.
3:18-CV-2659-B, 2019 WL 2436263, at *4 (N.D. Tex. June 11, 2019) (citations
omitted). Rather, a plaintiff must allege with some degree of specificity “the types of
activities” she performed or the “types of material and goods” she handled as an
employee that interacted with commerce. Id. (citing Ho, 2015 WL 1810339, at *4).
Here, Camacho alleges that Defendants, in operating a business “dedicated to
the retail sale of products,” regularly “purchased, imported, and used supplies” that
arrived in-store from other states via the stream of interstate commerce. (Am.
Compl. ¶ 6.) Defendants would then have employees like Camacho regularly handle
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“goods and materials that travelled in interstate commerce on a near daily basis,”
such as “meats, produce, cheeses, flour, ovens, firewood, soft drinks such as Coca
Cola, Pepsi, Sprite, alcoholic beverages such as tequila, vodka, beer, and whiskey,
cigarettes, soaps, hair care products and kitchen appliances and utensils.” (Id.)
Camacho has alleged sufficient facts to establish enterprise coverage under the
FLSA. See, e.g., Montoya Garcia, 2021 WL 902494, at *5 (finding plaintiff engaged in
commerce when plaintiff alleged the business “regularly handled goods and materials
such as meats, produce, cheeses, flour, ovens, firewood, soft drink, [and] alcoholic
beverages . . . that . . . travelled through interstate commerce prior to their use by
such employees”); see 29 U.S.C. § 203(s)(1)(A).
Camacho also alleges that when she worked for Defendants between January
2022 and July 2023, her hourly rate started at $13.00 and was raised to $14.00 in
mid-March 2023, (Am. Compl. ¶ 18), and the average number of hours she worked
per week was between 54 and 63 hours for the length of her employment, (id. ¶ 15),
but she was never paid the extra half-time rate for all hours worked above 40 hours in
a week, (id. ¶ 20). Camacho contends that Defendants’ failure to “keep proper time
records,” “provide paystubs,” or “require timesheets or work logs,” their repeated
scheduling of her to work more than 40 hours in a week, and their refusal to pay her
overtime wages constituted a “willful violation of the FLSA.” (Id. ¶¶ 19–22.) These
allegations are sufficiently well-pleaded to show that Defendants willfully violated
the FLSA’s overtime wage requirements.
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Camacho also includes in her amended complaint a calculation of the
overtime wages she was owed but never paid. (See Am. Compl. at 8–9.) She
calculates this amount by taking the average number of overtime hours she worked
per week for each period of her employment (23 from January 2022 to mid-March
2023, 20 from mid-March 2023 to May 2023, and 14 from June 2023 until the end of
July 2023), multiplying each week’s average overtime hours by the half-time pay of
her normal hourly rate ($6.50 from January 2022 to mid-March 2023 and $7.00 from
mid-March 2023 until the end of July 2023), and adding together the unpaid
overtime wages for every week of her employment (from January 2022 to July 2023).
(See id.) The sum amount of unpaid overtime wages she arrives at is $11,714.00. (Id.
¶ 23.) These allegations are sufficiently well-pleaded to show the amount of overtime
compensation Camacho is due. Accordingly, the undersigned finds a sufficient
factual basis to hold Defendants liable under the FLSA for violating overtime wage
requirements. Default judgment in favor of Camacho is substantively proper.
B. 	Camacho is entitled to recover unpaid overtime wages and liquidated
damages.
Camacho’s second motion for default judgment seeks to recover unpaid
overtime and liquidated damages of $23,428.00, as well as reasonable attorney’s fees
and costs, from Defendants. (2nd Mot. ¶ 7.) Under the FLSA, an employer that
fails to pay required overtime is liable for the amount of “unpaid overtime
compensation” in addition to an “equal amount as liquidated damages.” 29 U.S.C.
§ 216(b). “[T]he FLSA is subject to a strict two-year statute of limitations, unless the
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cause of action arises out of a willful violation of the FLSA, in which case the
limitations period is three years.” Bell v. Able Sec. & Investigations Inc., No. 3:10-CV-
1945-L, 2011 WL 2550846, at *2 (N.D. Tex. June 28, 2011) (citing 29 U.S.C.
§ 255(a)). The employment period for which Camacho is seeking to recover unpaid
overtime compensation—January 2022 to July 2023—occurred entirely within the
two years prior to Camacho’s filing this lawsuit on December 15, 2023. (See Compl.)
Camacho is therefore entitled to recover on unpaid overtime wages earned for her
entire time employed by Defendants.
As discussed above, Camacho includes in her amended complaint a table
tracking her hourly rate of pay and her average number of hours worked per week for
the length of her employment. (See Am. Compl. at 8–9.) Camacho calculates the
amount of unpaid overtime wages she earned during this time by taking the average
number of overtime hours worked each week, multiplying that by half her hourly
rate for the given week, and adding together that amount for each week of her
employment, arriving at a sum of $11,714.00. (See id.) Camacho also provides,
attached as exhibits to her affidavit for prove-up (Dkt. No. 26-1) included in her
second motion for default judgment, three payroll reports she received from
Defendants and a bank statement. The payroll reports show three separate weeks in
June and July of 2023 in which Camacho worked more than 40 hours. (See id. at 7–
9.) Camacho’s bank statement shows that she was paid a total of $3,507.00 between
May 23, 2023, and June 22, 2023, (id. at 11–12), a period during which Camacho
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alleges she was working an average of 60 hours a week for $14 an hour, (id. ¶ 8).
That amount is not enough to cover the overtime wages Camacho would have
earned under the FLSA for working an average of 60 hours a week at a normal
hourly rate of $14 for four weeks.
“Where, as here, Defendants have failed to participate in the case and are
likely in possession of the payroll and personnel records necessary to calculate an
employee’s damages with certainty,” courts have found similar evidence provided by
FLSA plaintiffs “sufficient proof to establish their damages for uncompensated
overtime.” Montoya Garcia, 2021 WL 902494, at *6 (listing examples). And where,
as here, Defendants have failed to plead and prove good faith despite violating the
FLSA, “[a]n award of liquidated damages is mandatory.” Sanchez v. Maddies
Mayhem, LLC, No. 4:19-CV-00574-SDJ-CAN, 2020 WL 4808604, at *6 (E.D. Tex.
July 27, 2020) (citation omitted), adopted, 2020 WL 4785046 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 18,
2020).
As a general rule, damages on a default judgment “are not awarded without
an evidentiary hearing.” James v. Frame, 6 F.3d 307, 310 (5th Cir. 1993) (citing
United Artists Corp. v. Freeman, 605 F.2d 854, 857 (5th Cir. 1979)). That rule does not
apply, however, when “the amount claimed is a liquidated sum or one capable of
mathematical calculation.” Id. (citing United Artists Corp., 605 F.2d at 857; Flaks v.
Koegel, 504 F.2d 702, 707–09 (2d Cir. 1974)). Because Camacho’s total unpaid
overtime compensation earned is capable of mathematical calculation from her
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uncontested sworn declarations as to her hours worked, hourly rates, and wages
paid, and because Camacho is entitled to liquidated damages under the FLSA, the
undersigned finds a damages award of $23,428.00—$11,714.00 in unpaid overtime
wages and $11,714.00 in liquidated damages—to be appropriate. Accordingly,
Defendants, jointly and severally, should be ordered to pay the total amount of
$23,428.00 to Camacho.
C. 	Camacho is entitled to recover attorney’s fees and costs.
“Under the FLSA, an employer who violates the statute is also required to pay
attorney’s fees.” Black v. SettlePou, P.C., 732 F.3d 492, 502 (5th Cir. 2013) (citing 29
U.S.C. § 216(b) (“The court . . . shall, in addition to any judgment awarded to the
plaintiff or plaintiffs, allow a reasonable attorney’s fee to be paid by the
defendant.”)); Singer v. City of Waco, 324 F.3d 813, 829 n.10 (5th Cir. 2003)). To
determine the appropriate amount of attorney’s fees to be awarded, courts in this
Circuit apply the “lodestar” method by first “multiplying the number of hours
reasonably expended by an appropriate hourly rate in the community for such work”
before then considering whether any factors weigh in favor of an “increase or
decrease” to that amount. Singer, 324 F.3d at 829 (citations omitted). The party
seeking attorney’s fees “bears the burden of proving that the number of hours and the
hourly rate for which compensation is requested is reasonable.” Riley v. City of
Jackson, 99 F.3d 757, 760 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424,
437 (1983)).
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Camacho seeks $3,780.00 in attorney’s fees for 9.45 hours of work performed
by attorney James M. Dore. (Dkt. No. 26-2 ¶ 5.) To establish her request for fees,
Camacho submits a sworn statement from Dore. (See id.) Dore’s statement affirms
that his hourly billing rate is $400.00 and that he expended 9.45 hours performing
reasonable and necessary tasks in a competent and efficient manner. (Id. ¶¶ 3, 5, 7.)
Dore swears that he is licensed to practice in Texas, and he states that his hourly rate
of $400.00 is “reasonable and comparable to rates charged by attorneys and staff of a
comparative level, serving the same legal market.” (Id. ¶¶ 2, 4.) Texas district courts
have found an hourly rate of $400.00 to be reasonable in other FLSA cases. See, e.g.,
Henderson v. Fenwick Protective Inc., No. 3:14-CV-505-M-BN, 2015 WL 9582755, at *7
(N.D. Tex. Nov. 23, 2015), adopted, 2015 WL 9582147 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 28, 2015).
As the Court is an expert on the reasonableness of attorney’s fees, see generally
Vanliner Ins. Co. v. DerMargosian, No. 3:12-CV-5074-D, 2014 WL 1632181, at *2
(N.D. Tex. Apr. 24, 2014), the undersigned concludes, based on information and the
record, that the requested hourly rate of $400.00 is reasonable and within the market
rate of attorney’s handling this type of litigation in the Dallas area.
The undersigned finds that the appropriate lodestar is calculated using 9.45
hours at $400.00 per hour, for a total of $3,780.00. The lodestar is presumed to be
reasonable and should only be modified in exceptional cases. See Watkins v. Fordice,
7 F.3d 453, 457 (5th Cir. 1993). Camacho does not seek a modification of this
amount, Defendants do not contest this amount, and there are no other exceptional
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circumstances. Accordingly, Defendants should be ordered to pay $3,780.00 to
Camacho for reasonable attorney’s fees.
Camacho also seeks to recover costs incurred in connection to this matter as
specified in Dore’s sworn statement in the amount of $666.00; $402.00 for filing fees
and $264.00 for special process serving. (Dkt. No. 26-2 ¶ 5.) “The Supreme Court
has indicated that federal courts may only award those costs articulated in [28 U.S.C.
§ 1920] absent explicit statutory or contractual authorization to the contrary.”
Gagnon v. United Technisource, Inc., 607 F.3d 1036, 1045 (5th Cir. 2010) (cleaned up).
Section 1920 permits the recovery of costs for filing fees; it does not allow for the
recovery of costs for serving process. See Gomez v. Managing Innovation & Tech., Inc.,
No. 3:14-CV-0936-M, 2015 WL 6150905, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 15, 2015).
Accordingly, the undersigned finds that Camacho should be awarded only $402.00
in costs for filing fees.
IV. RECOMMENDATION
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that Camacho’s
second motion for default judgment, (Dkt. No. 26), be GRANTED and that the
Court enter default judgment requiring Defendants Sajeda Inc. d/b/a Maria’s
Grocery and Abdel Hussein to pay Camacho (1) unpaid overtime compensation in
the amount of $11,714.00; (2) liquidated damages in the amount of $11,714.00;
(3) reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees in the amount of $3,780.00; and (4) costs
in the amount of $402.00.
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SO RECOMMENDED on November 12, 2025.
BRIAN McKAY
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL/OBJECT
A copy of this report and recommendation will be served on all parties in the
manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of this report and
recommendation must file specific written objections within 14 days after being
served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). To be specific,
an objection must identify the finding or recommendation to which objection is
made, state the basis for the objection, and indicate the place in the magistrate
judge’s report and recommendation where the disputed determination is found. An
objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before the
magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file specific written objections will bar the
aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal conclusions of the
magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district court, except upon
grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Services Automobile Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415,
1417 (5th Cir. 1996), modified by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)
(extending the time to file objections to 14 days).
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