Dill v. Experian Information Solutions Inc

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
DOUGLAS WAYNE DILL, SR., 	§
Plaintiff, 	§
§
v. 	§ 	No. 3:23-CV-1399-G-BW
§ 	(consolidated with No. 3:23-CV-1660-G)
EXPERIAN INFORMATION 	§
SOLUTIONS INC., et al., 	§
Defendants. 	§
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION
OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Before the Court is pro se Plaintiff Douglas Wayne Dill, Sr.’s Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 132) and brief in support (Dkt. No. 133).
United States Senior District Judge A. Joe Fish referred the case to the undersigned
magistrate judge for a hearing, if necessary, and for recommendation pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 636(b). (Dkt. No. 87.) For the reasons discussed below, the undersigned
recommends that Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 132)
be DENIED as untimely.
This Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”) case has been pending since March
2023. Its procedural history has been extensively detailed elsewhere in the record
(see, e.g., Dkt. Nos. 79, 110) and need not be repeated here. On September 23, 2025,
the Court issued an amended scheduling order stating that all discovery must be
completed discovery by November 17, 2025, and dispositive motions must be filed
no later December 19, 2025. (See Dkt. No. 93.) Pursuant to the parties’ joint motion
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(Dkt. No. 94), on October 10, 2025, the Court extended the discovery deadline to
December 4, 2025, and the dispositive motions deadline to January 13, 2026. (See
Dkt. No. 97.) No other deadlines were modified, and the parties were advised that
“[they] should not expect extension of the briefing deadlines absent extraordinary
and compelling circumstances.” (Id.)
In accordance with the Court’s dispositive motion deadline, Defendants filed a
motion for summary judgment on January 13, 2026. (See Dkt. No. 113.) Then, on
January 23, 2026, Plaintiff filed an “emergency motion for continuance,” seeking a
stay of all deadlines due to “involuntary displacement” and a “temporary inability to
access critical evidence, work product, litigation materials, and records[.]” (Dkt. No.
117 at 1.) The precise details underlying the motion were not provided, but the
Court nevertheless granted Plaintiff a 14-day extension to file a response to
Defendants' motion for summary judgment, making his response due no later than
February 17, 2026. (See Dkt. No. 120.) Importantly, no other deadlines were
extended. Thereafter, on February 6, 2026, Plaintiff filed his response to Defendants'
motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 123), and on the same day also filed a
cross-motion for partial summary judgment (Dkt. No. 132).
Plaintiff must demonstrate good cause for filing an untimely motion. “To
assist in the speedy and efficient resolution of cases, Rule 16(b) requires the court to
enter a scheduling order that limits the time litigants may file motions. Once set, the
scheduling order may only be modified by leave of court upon a showing of good
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cause.” Argo v. Woods, 399 F. App'x 1, 2 (5th Cir. Sept. 10, 2010); see also Fed. R.
Civ. P. 16(b)(4) (“A schedule may be modified only for good cause and with the
judge's consent.”). The good cause standard requires a showing by the movant that
“the deadlines cannot reasonably be met despite the diligence of the party needing
the extension.” Olivarez v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 997 F.3d 595, 602 (5th Cir. 2021).
As noted above, the extended deadline for filing dispositive motions in this
case expired on January 13, 2026. Although Plaintiff’s January 23, 2026 motion for
continuance seeks to “continue all hearings, conferences, and submission dates
currently set,” the motion only provided vague references to “involuntary
displacement” and a “temporary inability to access critical evidence, work product,
litigation materials, and records.” (Dkt. No. 117.) As such, Plaintiff failed to give
any reason how he meets Rule 16’s fairly stringent “good cause” standard which
requires him to give a persuasive reason why the dates originally set by the
scheduling order for the filing of dispositive motions could not “reasonably be met
despite the diligence of the party seeking the extension.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)
advisory committee's note (1983).
Furthermore, the dispositive motions deadline had already expired ten days
before Plaintiff submitted his motion for a continuance, and therefore, that deadline
was not “currently set.” (Dkt. No. 117.) In addition, the motion for continuance
was granted only to the extent to allow Plaintiff a 14-day extension to file a response
to Defendants' motion for summary judgment. (See Dkt. No. 120.) The remainder
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of the motion was denied. (See id.) Finally, as the Court has previously explained,
this case has been pending for quite some time (see, e.g., Dkt. No. 120), and the
parties were previously warned to expect no further extensions of the scheduling
deadlines “absent extraordinary and compelling circumstances” (Dkt. No. 97). No
such circumstances are present here.
Based on the foregoing, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s
February 6, 2026 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 132) be
DENIED as untimely.
SO RECOMMENDED on February 9, 2026.
BRIAN McKAY
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO OBJECT
A copy of this report and recommendation will be served on all parties in the manner
provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of this report and recommendation
must file specific written objections within 14 days after being served with a copy. See
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). To be specific, an objection must identify
the finding or recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the
objection, and indicate the place in the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation
where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by
reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to
file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual
findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by
the district court, except upon grounds of plain error. 	See Douglass v. United Services
Automobile Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996), modified by statute on other grounds,
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (extending the time to file objections to 14 days).
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