Pinson v. Dallas County Jail & Associates et al

3:22-cv-02317Txnd2 gen 2026

Testo completo

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
TAHJ PINSON, §
TDCJ No. 2463814, §
§
Plaintiff, §
§
V. § No. 3:22-cv-2317-G-BN
§
DALLAS COUNTY JAIL & ASSOCS., §
ET AL., §
§
Defendants. §
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff Tahj Pinson, now a Texas prisoner, filed a pro se civil rights complaint
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking injunctive relief against the Dallas County Jail and
numerous jail employees while he was an inmate at the jail. See Dkt. No. 3. Senior
United States District Judge A. Joe Fish referred Pinson’s lawsuit to the undersigned
United States magistrate judge for pretrial management under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)
and a standing order of reference.
The Court granted Pinson leave to proceed in forma pauperis under the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”). See Dkt. No. 7.
And, after screening his claims, as detailed below, the undersigned now enters
these findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendation that the Court should
dismiss this lawsuit without prejudice as moot.
Applicable Background
Pinson’s complaint alleges claims against Dallas County Jail and Associates in
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their official capacity as well as forty employees of the Dallas County Jail identified
by their last name, rank, and in some cases gender. See Dkt. No. 3 at 1, 2. Most of the
claims relate to purported assaults by jail employees, many of which involved Pinson
being taken to the ground, handcuffed, and/or placed in a restraint chair. See
generally id. Pinson also complains about issues with his arraignment, his placement
for periods of time in protective custody, and concerns about procedures for
segregating food trays used for inmates infected with Covid-19 and monkeypox. See
id.
Pinson’s complaint seeks “[a] preliminary and permanent injunction ordering
defendants named to stop hitting, re-housing with no reason, giving me the wrong
medication, wrap trays, and do th[ei]r job as if GOD is watching.” Id. at 6. The only
other relief sought is costs. See id.
Under the PLRA, where prisoners (whether incarcerated or detained pending
trial) seek relief from a governmental entity or employee, a district court must, on
initial screening, identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion
of the complaint, that “is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted” or “seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune
from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
Consistent with this obligation, the undersigned required the Dallas County
Sheriff to file a report under Martinez v. Aaron, 570 F.2d 317 (10th Cir. 1978). See
Dkt. No. 8. The sheriff filed the Martinez report on February 13, 2023 and an
amended brief on February 20, 2023. See Dkt. Nos. 16, 17, 19, 21. And the Court
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allowed Pinson to file a response, see Dkt. No. 20, which he did on May 16, 2023, see
Dkt. No. 31.
Pinson was convicted after trial on June 28, 2023. See State of Texas v. Pinson,
No. F-22-75315 (265th Jud. Dist. Ct, Dallas Cnty., Tex.). Shortly thereafter, he was
transferred to the custody of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (“TDCJ”). See,
e.g., Dkt. No. 41.
Legal Standards
As set out above, the PLRA authorizes the Court to dismiss a complaint where
it “fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).
Because this language tracks the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6), the Court should apply the pleading standards as set out in Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
Under these standards, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) does not require
that a complaint contain detailed factual allegations, but it does require “enough facts
to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
“The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks
for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 678.
So, “[w]here a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a
defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of
entitlement to relief.” Id. (cleaned up; quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
On the other hand, “[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
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factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.; cf. Bryant v. Ditech Fin., L.L.C.,
No. 23-10416, 2024 WL 890122, at *3 (5th Cir. Mar. 1, 2024) (“[J]ust as plaintiffs
cannot state a claim using speculation, defendants cannot defeat plausible inferences
using speculation.”).
“The burden is on the plaintiff to frame a ‘complaint with enough factual
matter (taken as true) to suggest’ that he or she is entitled to relief.” Robbins v.
Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1248 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
And, while a court must accept a plaintiff’s allegations as true, it is “not bound
to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
In fact, “the court does not ‘presume true a number of categories of statements,
including,’” in addition to legal conclusions, “‘mere labels; threadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action; conclusory statements; and naked assertions devoid of
further factual enhancement.’” Armstrong v. Ashley, 60 F.4th 262, 269 (5th Cir. 2023)
(quoting Harmon v. City of Arlington, Tex., 16 F.4th 1159, 1162-63 (5th Cir. 2021)).
So, to avoid dismissal for failing to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted under Section 1915A(b)(1), plaintiffs must “plead facts sufficient to show”
that the claims asserted have “substantive plausibility” by stating “simply, concisely,
and directly events” that they contend entitle them to relief. Johnson v. City of Shelby,
Miss., 574 U.S. 10, 12 (2014) (per curiam) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)-(3), (d)(1), (e));
see also Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. v. Lincoln Prop. Co., 920 F.3d 890, 899
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(5th Cir. 2019) (“‘Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief’
is ‘a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial
experience and common sense.’” (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679)).
A Martinez report is one “tool” a district court may use to screen claims under
Section 1915A. Hamer v. Jones, 364 F. App’x 119, 122 n.2 (5th Cir. 2010) (per curiam)
(“This court has adopted the procedures used in Martinez v. Aaron, 570 F.2d 317 (10th
Cir. 1978), as a tool by which an administrative record is constructed to assist in
assessing prisoner litigation under 28 U.S.C. § 1915.” (citing Norton v. Dimazana,
122 F.3d 286, 292-93 (5th Cir. 1997))).
And, as the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit more recently
explained,
[a] district court may obtain a Martinez report to frame its evaluation of
a prisoner’s in forma pauperis claim. “A Martinez report is produced as
a result of prison officials’ investigating the prisoner’s complaints and
compiling an administrative record that acts like an affidavit to aid the
district court in screening the complaint.” The report serves only to “sort
and clarify issues raised in a pro se complaint.”
Thompson v. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice, 67 F.4th 275, 280 (5th Cir. 2023)
(footnotes omitted).
And, so, information provided through “[a] Martinez report may not be used to
resolve material disputed fact findings when they are in conflict with the pleadings
or affidavits.” Newby v. Quarterman, 325 F. App’x 345, 354 (5th Cir. 2009) (per
curiam) (citing Shabazz v. Askins, 980 F.2d 1333, 1334-35 (10th Cir. 1992)); accord
Cardona v. Taylor, 828 F. App’x 198, 201 (5th Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (collecting
cases).
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Accordingly, “if the Martinez report conflicts with the pro se plaintiff’s
allegations, the district court must accept the plaintiff’s allegations as true, not the
records in the report.” Davis v. Lumpkin, 35 F.4th 958, 964 (5th Cir. 2022) (citation
omitted); see also Thompson, 67 F.4th at 280 (approving “[t]he district court[’s
reliance] on the ‘more complete record’ in the Martinez report to elucidate details
about [a plaintiff’s alleged] medical evaluations” where “nothing in the district court’s
opinion [ ] contradict[ed] the claims in [the plaintiff’s] initial pleadings”).
Analysis
Pinson’s complaint seeks only injunctive relief and court costs. See Dkt. No. 3
at 6. But Pinson has been transferred from Dallas County Jail to a TDCJ facility. See
Dkt. No. 41. And that transfer mooted his claims for injunctive relief. See, e.g.,
Mitchell v. Tex. Denton Cnty., No. 4:18-cv-490-ALM-CAN, 2021 WL 4497860, at *6
(E.D. Tex. Aug. 13, 2021) (collecting cases), rec. adopted, 2021 WL 4477694 (E.D. Tex.
Sept. 29, 2021); see also Herman v. Holiday, 238 F.3d 660, 665 (5th Cir. 2001)
(injunctive and declaratory relief claims re conditions of confinement mooted by
transfer to another prison); Cooper v. Sheriff, Lubbock Cnty., 929 F.2d 1078, 1084
(5th Cir. 1991) (injunctive relief claims based on treatment at jail mooted by transfer).
So the Court should dismiss this lawsuit without prejudice as moot.
Recommendation
The Court should dismiss the complaint without prejudice as moot.
A copy of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation shall be served on
all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these
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findings, conclusions, and recommendation must file specific written objections
within 14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV.
P. 72(b). In order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or
recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and
specify the place in the magistrate judge’s findings, conclusions, and recommendation
where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by
reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure
to file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the
factual findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or
adopted by the district court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v.
United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996).
DATED: January 2, 2026
_________________________________________
DAVID L. HORAN
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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