Moreno v. Randall

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AMARILLO DIVISION
VICTOR MORENO, §
§
Plaintiff, §
§
v. § 2:25-CV-12-Z-BR
§
DONNIE RANDALL, et al., §
§
Defendants. §
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT
Before the Court is the Complaint (ECF 3) filed by Plaintiff Victor Moreno (“Moreno”),
alleging violations of his civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Moreno filed this lawsuit pro se
while a prisoner at the McConnell Unit of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, and
subsequently was granted permission to proceed in forma pauperis. As such, his lawsuit is subject
to preliminary screening as provided by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”). Pursuant to
such screening and for the reasons stated below, the Magistrate Judge recommends that Moreno’s
Complaint be DISMISSED as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 and 1915A.
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A court must dismiss a complaint filed in forma pauperis by a prisoner against a
government entity or employee if the court determines that the complaint is frivolous or malicious,
fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant
who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) (2017); see also Section 1915A(b)
(applying section to any suit by a prisoner against certain governmental entities, regardless of
whether the prisoner is proceeding in forma pauperis). A frivolous complaint lacks any arguable
basis, either in fact or in law, for the wrong alleged. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).
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A complaint has no arguable basis in fact if it rests upon clearly fanciful or baseless factual
contentions, and similarly lacks an arguable basis in law if it embraces indisputably meritless legal
theories. See id. at 327; Geiger v. Jowers, 404 F.3d 371, 373 (5th Cir. 2005). When analyzing a
prisoner’s complaint, the court may consider reliable evidence such as the plaintiff’s allegations,
responses to a questionnaire, and authenticated prison records. Wilson v. Barrientos, 926 F.2d 480,
483-84 (5th Cir. 1991); see also Berry v. Brady, 192 F.3d 504, 507 (5th Cir. 1999) (explaining that
responses to a questionnaire or testimony given during an evidentiary hearing are incorporated into
the plaintiff’s pleadings).
In evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint, the Court accepts well-pleaded factual
allegations as true, but does not credit conclusory allegations or assertions that merely restate the
legal elements of a claim. Chhim v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 836 F.3d 467, 469 (5th Cir. 2016).
While courts hold pro se plaintiffs to a more lenient standard when analyzing complaints, such
plaintiffs must nevertheless plead factual allegations that raise the right to relief above a
speculative level. Id. (citing Taylor v. Books A Million, Inc., 296 F.3d 376, 378 (5th Cir. 2002)).
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS
A. Factual Background.1
Moreno alleges that Defendant Donnie Kendall (“Kendall”), the manager of an El Camino
restaurant in Tulia, Texas, gave a false statement to police on or about January 20, 2016. (ECF 3
at 4). He complains that Kendall’s false statement led to a false probable cause affidavit filed by
1These background facts are taken from Moreno’s Complaint (ECF 3) and questionnaire responses (ECF
7) and are assumed to be true for the purpose of evaluating the merits of Moreno’s claims. Page citations
to Moreno’s questionnaire responses refer to the electronic page number assigned by the Court’s electronic
filing system.
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Defendant Steven Brush (“Brush”) and ultimately led to Moreno being wrongly convicted of
aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. (Id.).
Moreno sued Kendall for violating his civil rights by providing the false statement upon
which the charges against Moreno were based. (ECF 3 at 3-4). In his questionnaire responses,
Moreno also seeks to sue Brush for taking the statement and not determining that the statement
was false and contrary to video evidence. For the reasons stated below, Moreno’s claims should
be dismissed as frivolous.2
B. Claims Against Kendall.
Moreno’s claims against Kendall fail at the outset because he cannot show that Kendall
was a state actor who is subject to liability under Section 1983. A plaintiff seeking to recover
damages under Section 1983 must establish that a defendant acted under color of state law in
violating his rights. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986). A plaintiff can establish that a
defendant acted under color of state law only if he can show that a defendant’s actions are “fairly
attributable to the state.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49 (1988); Cornish v. Correctional Servs.
Corp., 402 F.3d 545, 549 (5th Cir. 2005) (“Mere[] private conduct, no matter how discriminatory
or wrongful, is excluded from § 1983’s reach.” (internal quotation omitted)).
When notified in the Court’s Briefing Order that he must show that Randall is a state actor
in order to state a viable claim against him, Moreno alleged only that Randall (1) pressed charges
against him; (2) gave police a false statement that provided probable cause for Moreno’s arrest;
and (3) testified against Moreno at his criminal trial. (ECF 7 at 1-2). None of these facts, assumed
to be true, show that Randall acted with the authority of state law. “The traditional definition of
2The Court notes that Moreno’s claims are likely barred by limitations, but out of an abundance of caution,
the Court has evaluated the merits of his claims.
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acting under color of state law requires that the defendant in a § 1983 action have exercised power
possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the
authority of state law.” West, 487 U.S. at 49 (internal quotation omitted). Accordingly, Moreno’s
claims against Randall should be dismissed as frivolous because Randall is not a state actor subject
to liability under Section 1983.
C. Claims Against Brush.
Moreno seeks to sue Brush for knowingly taking Kendall’s purportedly false statement and
failing to realize that Kendall’s statement did not match a video of the alleged incident. (ECF 7 at
2-3). The Court will construe Moreno’s claim against Brush as a claim of wrongful arrest and
imprisonment.
Such claims fail, however, because Moreno admits in his questionnaire responses that he
was convicted of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon against Kendall. (Id. at 7; see also
Moreno v. State, No. 07-18-123-CR; 2018 WL 1956136 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Apr. 25, 2018)).
Because this ensuing event broke the chain of causation for any false arrest, Moreno’s claim is
foreclosed and should be dismissed. The independent-intermediary doctrine is based on the
principle that “when a neutral intermediary … reviews the facts and allows a case to go forward,
such an act breaks the chain of causation” for claims of false arrest …, thereby insulating the
initiating party from liability. Murray v. Earle, 405 F.3d 278 (5th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation
and citation omitted); see also Trevino v. Iden, 79 F.4th 524, 531 (5th Cir. 2023) (the independent-
intermediary doctrine becomes relevant when a plaintiff’s claims depend on lack of probable
cause); Cuadra v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 626 F.3d 808, 813 (5th Cir. 2010) (finding that a
court appearance or grand jury indictment breaks the chain of causation for an allegedly false
arrest); Haggerty v. Tex. S. Univ., 391 F.3d 653, 655 (5th Cir. 2004) (false imprisonment claim
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requires showing of arrest absent probable cause). Moreno admits that he was charged and
convicted in Texas state court for aggravated assault against Randall, which breaks the chain of
causation for an allegedly false arrest by Brush. Although there are exceptions to this doctrine,
Moreno does not plead any facts indicating that he is attempting to assert such an exception.
Moreno has failed to state a claim for false arrest or false imprisonment.
D. Leave to Amend.
Ordinarily, “a pro se litigant should be offered an opportunity to amend his complaint
before it is dismissed.” Brewster v. Dretke, 587 F.3d 764, 767-68 (5th Cir. 2009). Even so, the
Court need not grant leave to amend “if the plaintiff has already pleaded his ‘best case.’” Id. at
768. As discussed here, Moreno fails to state a plausible claim. Based on the most deferential
review of his complaint, it is unlikely that, given the opportunity, he could allege viable legal
claims against either Defendant. Moreno has stated his best case in his complaint and detailed
questionnaire responses. Under these circumstances, the Court concludes that granting leave to
amend would be futile and cause needless delay.3
III. RECOMMENDATION
For the reasons stated above, the Magistrate Judge concludes that Moreno’s claims should
be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
IV. INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE
The United States District Clerk is directed to send a copy of this Findings, Conclusions
and Recommendation to each party by the most efficient means available.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
3That notwithstanding, the 14-day objection period will permit Moreno the opportunity to proffer factual
and/or legal bases, if any, to cure the deficiencies in his claims outlined herein.
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ENTERED December 19, 2025.
* NOTICE OF RIGHT TO OBJECT *
Any party may object to these proposed findings, conclusions and recommendation. In the
event parties wish to object, they are hereby NOTIFIED that the deadline for filing objections is
fourteen (14) days from the date of filing as indicated by the “entered” date directly above the
signature line. Service is complete upon mailing, Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2)(C), or transmission by
electronic means, Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2)(E). Any objections must be filed on or before the
fourteenth (14th) day after this recommendation is filed as indicated by the “entered” date. See 28
U.S.C. § 636(b); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(d).
Any such objections shall be made in a written pleading entitled “Objections to the
Findings, Conclusions and Recommendation.” Objecting parties shall file the written objections
with the United States District Clerk and serve a copy of such objections on all other parties. A
party’s failure to timely file written objections shall bar an aggrieved party, except upon grounds
of plain error, from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings, legal
conclusions, and recommendation set forth by the Magistrate Judge and accepted by the district
court. See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428–29 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc),
superseded by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), as recognized in ACS Recovery
Servs., Inc. v. Griffin, 676 F.3d 512, 521 n.5 (5th Cir. 2012); Rodriguez v. Bowen, 857 F.2d 275,
276-77 (5th Cir. 1988).
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