Pryor v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
ABILENE DIVISION
RHONDA P., 	§
Plaintiff, 	§
§
v. 	§ 	No. 1:24-CV-173-BW
§
COMMISSIONER OF THE SOCIAL 	§
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, 	§
Defendant. 	§
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Rhonda P. brings this action pursuant to the Social Security Act (the
“Act”), seeking review of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security
(the “Commissioner”) denying her application for Disability Insurance Benefits
(“DIB”) under Title II of the Act, and her application for Supplemental Security
Income (“SSI”) under Title XVI of the Act. (See Dkt. No. 1.) The Court has
jurisdiction over this action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c), and the parties
consented to proceed before the undersigned in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)
and Special Order No. 3-350.
Plaintiff filed a brief on appeal (Dkt. No. 12) (“P. Br.”), to which the
Commissioner filed a brief in response (Dkt. No. 17 (“D. Br.”)), and Plaintiff filed a
reply brief (Dkt. No. 18) (“Reply”). After considering the pleadings, briefs, and
administrative record, the Court finds that the Commissioner's decision is
REVERSED and REMANDED.
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I. BACKGROUND
On September 17, 2021, Plaintiff protectively filed applications for DIB and
SSI, alleging disability beginning August 12, 2021. (See Transcript (“Tr.”) 18, 214-
21.) In her application documents, Plaintiff alleged that she was disabled because of
a heart condition. (Tr. 215.) Plaintiff’s claims were denied initially on May 1, 2023,
and again on reconsideration on May 24, 2023, after which Plaintiff timely requested
an administrative hearing. (Tr. 18, 50-77.)
On December 12, 2023, Administrative Law Judge Christopher Van Dyck
(“the ALJ”) held a telephonic hearing, at which all participants appeared by
telephone. (Tr. 18.) Plaintiff was represented at the hearing by Nicholas Andrew
Huntsman, an attorney. (Id.) Barbara A. Dunlap, an impartial vocational expert
(“VE”), also appeared and testified. (Id.) The ALJ issued an unfavorable decision
on March 4, 2024, finding Plaintiff not disabled. (Tr. 18-29.)
On August 13, 2024, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for further
review. (Tr. 1-6.) The ALJ’s March 4, 2024 decision thus became the “final
decision” of the Commissioner subject to judicial review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. 	District Court Review
Judicial review of the Commissioner's denial of benefits is limited to whether
the Commissioner’s position is supported by substantial evidence and whether the
Commissioner applied the proper legal standards in evaluating the evidence. See 42
U.S.C. § 405(g); Copeland v. Colvin, 771 F.3d 920, 923 (5th Cir. 2014); Ripley v. Chater,
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67 F.3d 552, 555 (5th Cir. 1995). Substantial evidence is “more than a mere scintilla.
It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); accord
Copeland, 771 F.3d at 923. To determine whether substantial evidence of disability
exists, four elements of proof must be weighted: (1) objective medical facts;
(2) diagnoses and opinions of treating and examining physicians; (3) claimant’s
subjective evidence of pain and disability; and (4) claimant’s age, education, and
work history. See Wren v. Sullivan, 925 F.2d 123, 126 (5th Cir. 1991) (citing DePaepe
v. Richardson, 464 F.2d 92, 94 (5th Cir.1972)).
The Commissioner, rather than the courts, must resolve conflicts in the
evidence, including weighing conflicting testimony and determining witnesses’
credibility, and the Court does not try the issues de novo. See Martinez v. Chater, 64
F.3d 172, 174 (5th Cir. 1995); Greenspan v. Shalala, 38 F.3d 232, 237 (5th Cir. 1994).
Thus, the court may not reweigh the evidence or substitute its judgment for the
Commissioner’s but must scrutinize the entire record to ascertain whether substantial
evidence supports the hearing decision. See Copeland, 771 F.3d at 923; Hollis v.
Bowen, 837 F.2d 1378, 1383 (5th Cir. 1988). The Court “may affirm only on the
grounds that the Commissioner stated for [the] decision.” Copeland, 771 F.3d at 923.
“Absent an error that affects the substantial rights of a party, administrative
proceedings do not require ‘procedural perfection.’” Wilder v. Colvin, No. 13-CV-
3014-P, 2014 WL 2931884, at *5 (N.D. Tex. June 30, 2014) (quoting Taylor v. Astrue,
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706 F.3d 600, 603 (5th Cir. 2012)). “The ALJ is not required to discuss every piece
of evidence in the record nor must the ALJ follow formalistic rules of articulation.”
Hunt v. Astrue, No. 4:12-CV-244-Y, 2013 WL 2392880, at *7 (N.D. Tex. June 3,
2013) (citing Castillo v. Barnhart, 151 F. App'x 334, 335 (5th Cir. 2005)). “Procedural
errors affect the substantial rights of a claimant only when they ‘cast into doubt the
existence of substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s decision.’” Wilder, 2014 WL
2931884, at *5 (quoting Morris v. Bowen, 864 F.2d 333, 335 (5th Cir. 1988)).
“Remand is required only when there is a realistic possibility that the ALJ would
have reached a different conclusion absent the procedural error.” Id. (citing January
v. Astrue, 400 F. App’x 929, 933 (5th Cir. 2010)).
B. 	The Sequential Evaluation Process
“In order to qualify for disability insurance benefits or [supplemental security
income], a claimant must suffer from a disability.” Copeland. 771 F.3d at 923 (citing
42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A)). The Act defines “disability” as the inability to engage in
substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or
mental impairment that can be expected to result in death or last for a continued
period of 12 months. See id. § 423(d)(1)(A); see also Copeland, 771 F.3d at 923; Cook v.
Heckler, 750 F.2d 391, 393 (5th Cir. 1985).
An ALJ must follow a five-step sequential evaluation to determine whether a
claimant is disabled within the meaning of the Act. See Wren, 925 F.2d at 125
(summarizing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b)-(f)). On the first four steps of the analysis, the
claimant has the initial burden of proving that he is disabled. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482
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U.S. 137, 146 n.5 (1987). The burden shifts to the Commissioner on the fifth step to
show that the claimant is capable of performing work in the national economy and is
therefore not disabled. Id. “A finding that a claimant is disabled or is not disabled at
any point in the five-step review is conclusive and terminates the analysis.” Lovelace
v. Bowen, 813 F.2d 55, 58 (5th Cir.1987).
At step one, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant is engaged in
substantial gainful work activity. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b). If so, the claimant is
not disabled. If the claimant is not engaged in substantial gainful work activity, the
ALJ proceeds to step two and determines whether the claimant has an impairment,
or combination of impairments, that is “severe” within the meaning of the Act,
meaning that it imposes significant restrictions on the claimant’s ability to perform
basic work activities. Id. § 404.1520(c). If the claimant does not have a severe
impairment or combination of impairments, the analysis concludes with a finding of
“not disabled.” If the claimant does, the ALJ continues to step three.
At step three, the ALJ examines whether a claimant’s impairment meets or
medically equals the criteria of a listed impairment in Appendix 1 of Subpart P of
Regulation No. 4 (the “Listings”). Id. § 404.1520(d). If the impairment meets or
medically equals the criteria of a Listing and meets the durational requirement, the
claimant is disabled. Id. § 404.1509. If not, the ALJ determines the claimant’s
residual functional capacity (“RFC”), which is the ability to perform physical or
mental work activities on a sustained basis notwithstanding limitations for the
collective impairments. See id. § 404.1520(e)-(f).
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The ALJ then proceeds to step four and determines whether the claimant’s
RFC permits him or her to perform the requirements of her past relevant work. 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520(f). If the claimant can perform such requirements, then she is not
disabled. Id. If an individual’s impairment precludes her from performing past
work, the analysis proceeds to the fifth and final step, wherein the burden shifts to
the Commissioner to show that there is other gainful employment available in the
national economy that the claimant is capable of performing. Greenspan, 38 F.3d at
236. This burden may be satisfied either by reference to the Medical-Vocational
Guidelines of the regulations or by expert vocational testimony or other similar
evidence. Fraga v. Bowen, 810 F.2d 1296, 1304 (5th Cir. 1987).
III. ALJ’s FINDINGS
The ALJ analyzed Plaintiff's claim for benefits under the process described
above and made the following findings in his March 4, 2024 decision:
1. 	The claimant meets the insured status requirements of the Social Security
Act through September 30, 2022.
2. 	The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since August
12, 2021, the alleged onset date (20 CFR 404.1571 et seq., and 416.971 et
seq.).
3. 	The claimant has the following severe impairments: aortic valve
insufficiency with mechanical aortic valve replacement, aortic
regurgitation, mitral regurgitation, non-rheumatic aortic valve stenosis,
atrial fibrillation, hypertension, scoliosis of the thoracic spine, spondylosis,
and chronic back pain (20 CFR 404.1520(c) and 416.920(c)).
4. 	The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of impairments
that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments
in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 404.1520(d),
404.1525, 404.1526, 416.920(d), 416.925 and 416.926).
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5. 	The claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform the full range
of light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b).1
6. 	The claimant is capable of performing past relevant work as a fast food
worker. This work does not require the performance of work-related
activities precluded by the claimant’s residual functional capacity (20 CFR
404.1565 and 416.965).
7. 	The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social
Security Act, from August 12, 2021, through the date of this decision (20
CFR 404.1520(f) and 416.920(f)).
(Tr. 20-29.)
Accordingly, the ALJ determined that, based on the application for a period of
disability and disability insurance benefits, protectively filed on September 17, 2021,
the claimant is not disabled under sections 216(i) and 223(d) of the Act. (Tr. 29.)
The ALJ also determined that based on the application for supplemental security
income protectively filed on September 17, 2021, the claimant is not disabled under
section 1614(a)(3)(A) of the Social Security Act. (Id.)
IV. ANALYSIS
On appeal, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in evaluating her mental RFC
because he failed to explain how he accounted for Plaintiff’s non-severe mental
impairments in formulating her RFC. 	(P. Br. at 2, 4-8.) As Plaintiff notes, the ALJ
1 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b): Light work involves lifting no more than 20 pounds at a
time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 10 pounds. Even though the
weight lifted may be very little, a job is in this category when it requires a good deal of
walking or standing, or when it involves sitting most of the time with some pushing and
pulling of arm or leg controls. To be considered capable of performing a full or wide range
of light work, [the claimant] must have the ability to do substantially all of these activities.
If someone can do light work, [the SSA] determine[s] that he or she can also do sedentary
work, unless there are additional limiting factors such as loss of fine dexterity or inability to
sit for long periods of time.
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found at steps 2 and 3 of the sequential analysis that Plaintiff had mild limitations in
all four categories of mental functioning but failed to include any discussion of these
limitations at the later steps as the regulations require. (Id., Tr. 22, 23–27.) Instead,
the ALJ’s RFC assessment focused solely on Plaintiff’s physical impairments. (Id.,
Tr. 23–27.) Plaintiff does not contest the ALJ’s physical RFC finding. (See generally
P. Br.)
The Commissioner argues in response that the ALJ properly considered the
mental limitations identified in the paragraph B criteria and did not err by declining
to include mental limitations in his RFC determination. (See D. Br. at 4.) For the
reasons discussed below, the Court agrees with Plaintiff.
A. 	The ALJ erred in determining Plaintiff’s RFC.
An individual’s RFC “is an assessment of an individual’s ability to do
sustained work-related physical and mental activities in a work setting on a regular
and continuing basis.” Social Security Regulation (“SSR”) 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184,
at *1, 3–5 (S.S.A. July 1, 1996). “The RFC assessment must first identify the
individual's functional limitations or restrictions and assess his or her work-related
abilities on a function-by-function basis, including functions in paragraphs (b), (c),
and (d) of 20 C.F.R. [§§] 404.1545 and 416.945.” Id. at *1. Paragraphs (b), (c), and
(d) relate to physical, mental, and other abilities.
When an ALJ assesses mental impairments, the ALJ considers evidence of the
claimant’s abilities to understand, remember, and carry out instructions, as well as
respond appropriately to supervision, co-workers, and other work-setting pressures.
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20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(c); Martha L. v. Saul, No. 1:20-CV-00003-H-BU, 2021 WL
3610316, at *3 (N.D. Tex. July 27, 2021), adopted, 2021 WL 3604082 (N.D. Tex.
Aug. 13, 2021). Here, the ALJ conducted a mental functioning review using the
psychiatric review technique (“PRT”) and found that Plaintiff had mild limitation in
all four functional areas—understanding, remembering, or applying information;
interacting with others; concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace; and adapting
or managing oneself. (Tr. 22.)
Ultimately, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff’s mental limitations were non-
severe. (Id.) The ALJ’s evaluation of mental limitations at this step, however, is
“not an RFC assessment but [is] used to rate the severity of mental impairment(s) at
steps 2 and 3 of the sequential evaluation process.” SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at
*4. “The subsequent mental RFC assessment requires a more detailed analysis in
which the ALJ must consider a claimant’s mental disorders and express them in
terms of work-related functions[.]” Joy C.-L. v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 3:23-
CV-896-B-BK, 2024 WL 3527855, at *4 (N.D. Tex. July 8, 2024) (citing SSR 96-8p,
1996 WL 374184, at *4, 6), adopted, 2024 WL 3529009 (N.D. Tex. July 24, 2024).
“[C]ourts within this district have found no legal error where an ALJ does not
include mental limitations in a claimant’s RFC so long as the ALJ considered the
limiting effects and restrictions of all impairments in the RFC analysis, even those
impairments that are non-severe.” Tamara G. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 3:22-
CV-631-D-BK, 2023 WL 2504912, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 13, 2023), adopted, 2023
WL 2518840 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 14, 2023). But when an ALJ finds mental limitations
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are credible at steps 2 and 3 but does not include any discussion of them at later
steps, an ALJ must explain “why he omitted any mental limitations from the
residual-functional-capacity formulation.” See Castillo v. Kijakazi, 599 F. Supp. 3d
483, 489 (W.D. Tex. 2022).
Here, the ALJ did not adequately discuss Plaintiff’s mental limitations in his
RFC determination. In fact, the RFC determination is completely silent regarding
Plaintiff’s mental impairments, despite finding Plaintiff to be mildly limited in all
four functional areas. (See Tr. 22, 23-27.) The Commissioner argues that “the ALJ
expressly found that the residual functional capacity assessment reflects the degree of
limitation that the ALJ found in the [paragraph B] mental function analysis” (D. Br.
at 4), but the Court disagrees. The RFC determination contains no such “express”
finding, as the Commissioner argues. As previously stated, there is no mention of
mental limitations in the RFC determination whatsoever. In any event, the
Commissioner’s argument misstates the issue at hand. The error here is not that the
ALJ failed to include mental limitations in the RFC, instead, the error is the failure to
consider whether including the functional limitations was warranted. Castillo, 599 F.
Supp. 3d at 489. Here, the ALJ failed to explain his reasoning for failing to include
any of the mental impairments. (See Tr. 23-27.) The ALJ’s failure to consider
Plaintiff’s mental impairments in her RFC assessment constitutes legal error. See
Martha L., 2021 WL 3610316, at *5; see also Joy C., 2024 WL 3527855, at *4; Castillo,
599 F. Supp. 3d at 489; Melissa B. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 4:24-CV-00856-BT, 2025
WL 2550582, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 4, 2025).
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B. 	The ALJ’s error was not harmless.
Notwithstanding legal error, remand is not warranted if the ALJ’s error is
harmless. Mays v. Bowen, 837 F.2d 1362, 1364 (5th Cir. 1988). For the reasons
discussed below, the Court finds the error is not shown to be harmless.
“The ALJ has a responsibility to adequately explain his reasoning in making
the findings on which his ultimate decision rests, and in doing so must address all
pertinent evidence. The Court’s inability to clearly determine whether the ALJ
adequately considered certain limitations or not constitutes reversible error.” Joy C.,
2024 WL 3527855, at *5 (quoting Gonzales v. Berryhill, No. 3:16-CV-1830-BN, 2017
WL 3492215, at *6 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 15, 2017)). Here, the ALJ only asked the VE
about a hypothetical individual who could perform the full range of both light and
sedentary work, to which the VE responded that an individual limited to light work
could still perform Plaintiff’s past relevant work as a fast-food worker as actually and
generally performed and as a door-to-door salesperson as generally performed. (Tr
48.) The ALJ did not ask the VE about how Plaintiff’s mild mental limitations
would affect her ability to work (see Tr. 48–49), and as Plaintiff points out, both the
fast-food worker door-to-door salesperson jobs require frequent talking. (See P. Br. at
8; see also Dkt. 12-1 at 1; Dkt. No. 12-2 at 1.)
This omission makes it impossible to know “whether the ALJ adequately
considered certain limitations or not.” Castillo, 599 F. Supp. At 490 ((citing Gonzales,
2017 WL 3492215, at *6). Even slight mental limitations may have affected the
ability to perform the other jobs identified. Id.; see also Serena G. v. O'Malley, No.
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4:23-CV-3517, 2024 WL 4846214, at *5 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 18, 2024) (finding that the
ALJ’s errors prejudiced the plaintiff because the ALJ “may have assessed a more
limited RFC precluding Plaintiff from performing” the occupations identified by the
VE); see also Joy C.-L., 2024 WL 3527855, at *4; Melissa B., 2025 WL 2550582, at *3.
In other words, “the impact of the ALJ’s error here may be de minimis, or
only require minor modifications of [Plaintiff’s] residual functional capacity[,]”
resulting in the same conclusion that Plaintiff can still perform her past relevant
work; but due to the ALJ’s silence on the matter, the Court cannot say if that would
truly be the result. Castillo, 599 F. Supp. at 490 (citing Curry v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
No. 1:15-CV-07515-NLH, 2017 WL 825196, at *5 (D.N.J. Mar. 2, 2017)) (cleaned
up) (ALJ reversibly erred in failing to evaluate whether plaintiff's mild and moderate
mental impairments impacted her overall residual functional capacity). Accordingly,
the Court finds that remand is warranted.
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, the Commissioner’s decision be REVERSED
and this case REMANDED pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
SO ORDERED on January 8, 2026.
____________________________________
BRIAN McKAY
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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