Cajo Enterprises, Inc.v. The Hartford Insurance Group Inc.

6:25-cv-00191Txed19 dic 2025

Testo completo

1
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
TYLER DIVISION
CAJO ENTERPRISES, INC.,
Plaintiff,
v.
MAXUM INDEMNITY COMPANY
(INCORRECTLY NAMED AS THE
HARTFORD INSURANCE GROUP),
Defendant.
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
Case No. 6:25-cv-191-JDK-JDL
ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff Cajo Enterprises, Inc. filed this insurance coverage dispute against
Defendant Maxum Indemnity Company (incorrectly named as “the Hartford
Insurance Group”) on May 23, 2025. Docket No. 1. The case was referred to United
States Magistrate Judge John D. Love pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b). Docket No. 4.
On October 30, 2025, Judge Love issued a Report recommending that
Defendant’s motion to dismiss the amended complaint be granted as to any claim
asserted under § 542.003(b) of the Texas Insurance Code but denied as to all other
claims. Docket No. 20. Plaintiff did not object. Defendant timely objected on
November 13, 2025. Docket No. 22.
The Court reviews objected-to portions of the Magistrate Judge’s Report and
Recommendation de novo. See FED. R. CIV. P. 72; 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (“A judge of
the court shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or
Case 6:25-cv-00191-JDK-JDL Document 23 Filed 12/19/25 Page 1 of 8 PageID #:
<pageID>
2
specified proposed findings and recommendations to which objection is made.”). The
Court conducting a de novo review examines the entire record and makes an
independent assessment under the law. Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79
F.3d 1415, 1430 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc), superseded on other grounds by statute,
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
Defendant first objects that the Report applied the wrong legal standard to its
motion to dismiss by citing Gun Barrell Jacksonville LLC v. Depositors Ins. Co., No.
6:20-cv-469-JDK, 2021 WL 5154218, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 9, 2021), which was a
summary judgment case. Docket No. 22 at 2. However, this brief citation in a
footnote merely refers to the proposition that disputed facts are viewed in the light
most favorable to non-moving party. This appears to be nothing more than a
reference to what the standard for factual review would be at summary judgment.
There is nothing in the Report’s recitation of the legal standard or analysis that
suggests the Magistrate Judge applied a summary judgment standard in evaluating
the motion to dismiss. In fact, the Report plainly relies on the Twombly/Iqbal
standard throughout its analysis. Docket No. 20 at 3–4. Accordingly, this objection
is overruled.
Defendant next objects to the Magistrate Judge’s analysis of the asserted
claims arising under § 542.056 and § 542.058. Defendant argues the Report
incorrectly found that Defendant made a late claim decision under Chapter 542,
which requires claim decisions be issued within fifteen business days. See TEX. INS.
CODE § 542.056(a). Defendant points out that the claim decision was issued on April
Case 6:25-cv-00191-JDK-JDL Document 23 Filed 12/19/25 Page 2 of 8 PageID #:
<pageID>
3
22, 2024, which is exactly fifteen business days after April 1, 2024 (the date of the
last engineering report). Docket No. 22 at 2. Defendant is correct that under
§ 542.056(a) the claim decision was made on exactly the 15th business day and was
therefore timely.
However, as to Plaintiff’s claim under § 542.058(a), Plaintiff has alleged that
all information was provided as of April 1, 2024, but Defendant has yet to pay the full
alleged amount on the claim. Therefore, the objection is sustained as to Plaintiff’s
§ 542.056(a) claim but overruled as to Plaintiff’s § 542.058(a) claim. See Groba v.
State Farm Lloyds, No. 1:25-cv-991-ADA-ML, 2025 WL 3011894, at *3 (W.D. Tex.
Sept. 11, 2025), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:25-cv-00991-ADA-ML,
2025 WL 2977529 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 17, 2025) (holding that an allegation of insurer’s
failure to pay the disputed portion of a claim was “sufficient to support a plausible
claim for delayed payment under Texas Insurance Code § 542.058”).
Defendant next objects that the Report failed to apply the heightened Rule 9(b)
standard to Plaintiff’s Chapter 541 claims. Docket No. 22 at 3. However, Chapter
541 claims based on claim-handling conduct, as alleged in the instant action, are not
fraud-based, and the Fifth Circuit has limited the application of the Rule 9(b)
pleading standard to claims grounded in fraud. See Hand v. Trumbull Ins. Co., No.
2:21-cv-135-BR, 2022 WL 22887537, at *7 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 12, 2022) (“Rule 9(b)
applies to claims brought under Chapter 541 of the Texas Insurance Code to the
extent the claims involve averments of fraud, ‘whether they are part of a claim of
Case 6:25-cv-00191-JDK-JDL Document 23 Filed 12/19/25 Page 3 of 8 PageID #:
<pageID>
4
fraud or not.’” (quoting Lone Star Ladies Inv. Club v. Schlotzsky’s Inc., 238 F.3d 363,
368 (5th Cir. 2001))). Accordingly, this objection is overruled.
Defendant next objects that the Report improperly used a subjective standard
for determining reasonableness despite Texas law requiring an objective test for
§ 541.060(a)(3) claims. Docket No. 22 at 4. However, the Report cites and applies the
correct legal standard. See Mid-Continent Cas. Co. v. Eland Energy, Inc., 795 F.
Supp. 2d 493, 529 (N.D. Tex. 2011), aff’d, 709 F.3d 515 (5th Cir. 2013) (“[T]o establish
a violation of § 541.060(a)(3), a plaintiff must prove that the insurer’s explanation of
the factual and/or legal basis in the policy for an offer of compromise settlement was
not provided promptly or was not reasonable.”). As Judge Love explained, Plaintiff
alleged specific delays, unexplained partial payment, and failure to respond, which is
sufficient to survive dismissal at the pleading stage. Docket No. 20 at 6–7. This
objection is overruled.
Defendant next objects that the Report ignored facts in the pleadings which
demonstrated that Defendant issued a timely denial letter summarizing its basis and
providing partial payment; Defendant also objects that the cases relied upon by Judge
Love on this point are inapposite. Docket No. 22 at 5. But whether Defendant’s
explanation for the partial payment was reasonable is a question that cannot be
resolved at the pleading stage where Plaintiff has alleged facts to suggest it was
unreasonable. Lormand v. US Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 232 (5th Cir. 2009)
(“[C]ourts must, as with any motion to dismiss for failure to plead a claim on which
relief can be granted, accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true.”). And
Case 6:25-cv-00191-JDK-JDL Document 23 Filed 12/19/25 Page 4 of 8 PageID #:
<pageID>
5
the Court finds no issue with Judge Love’s cited cases. Accordingly, these objections
are overruled.
Finally, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s DTPA allegations fail to meet the
heightened pleading standard under Rule 9(b), that the Report erroneously finds
otherwise (Docket No. 22 at 6–8), and that the Report also improperly reads a failure-
to-disclose claim into the complaint even though Plaintiff did not plead the necessary
elements thereof. Id. at 6.
The following allegations form the basis of the DTPA claim:
Quick Copy has been an insured of Maxum for many years. During that
time Quick Copy maintained and continually renewed the same policy
with Maxum. Upon making their claim decision, Maxum informed
Quick Copy for the first time their insurance policy terms had changed
from the prior policy, without Quick Copy’s knowledge. Maxum
informed Quick Copy that as a result, two of the Properties, 211 South
Main Street and 107 East Elk Street, were underinsured. Quick Copy
was never made aware their policy required them to have an eighty (80)
percent coinsurance on the Properties. Maxum then applied
“underinsured penalties” in sum greater than twenty thousand dollars
($20,000.00) on each underinsured property, further reducing the
coverage payments to Quick Copy. Quick Copy was not made aware at
the time the Policy purchased or renewed that Quick Copy was
underinsuring two of the Properties. Quick Copy purchased the Policy
based on the representations made by Maxum and their agents that the
Properties would be fully covered against hail and wind damage.
Docket No. 14 at ¶ 23. Judge Love’s first Report and Recommendation in this case
(Docket No. 10) dismissed Plaintiff’s DTPA claim because it did not allege an
independent injury. Docket No. 10 at 7. To address this problem, the amended
complaint adds only the following sentence to the original DTPA allegation:
Case 6:25-cv-00191-JDK-JDL Document 23 Filed 12/19/25 Page 5 of 8 PageID #:
<pageID>
6
Maxum violated the DTPA by using or employing acts and practices that
are deceptive or unconscionable in their promises, statements, or
otherwise indications made to Quick Copy at the time the Policy was
sold and purchased. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 17.50(A)(1).
Id. at ¶ 55. The Report concludes that the above-alleged facts and new allegation
combined to allege a fraud by non-disclosure theory that survives the Rule 9(b)
pleading standard. Docket No. 20 at 11.
“State law fraud claims are subject to the heightened pleading requirements of
Rule 9(b).” Musket Corp. v. Suncor Energy (U.S.A.) Mktg., Inc., 759 F. App’x 280, 289
(5th Cir. 2019) (quoting Sullivan v. Leor Energy, LLC, 600 F.3d 542, 550–51 (5th Cir.
2010)). “At a minimum, Rule 9(b) requires allegations of the particulars of time,
place, and contents of the false representations, as well as the identity of the person
making the misrepresentation and what he obtained thereby.” Wallace v. Tesoro
Corp., 796 F.3d 468, 480 (5th Cir. 2015) (citations omitted); United States ex rel.
Grubbs v. Kanneganti, 565 F.3d 180, 186 (5th Cir. 2009) (“The frequently stated,
judicially-created standard for a sufficient fraud complaint . . . instructs a plaintiff to
plead the time, place and contents of the false representation, as well as the identity
of the person making the misrepresentation and what that person obtained thereby.”
(citation modified)). In other words, a plaintiff must plead the “who, what, when,
where, and how” of the fraud. U.S. ex rel Williams v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc.,
417 F.3d 450, 453 (5th Cir. 2005).
Plaintiff’s DTPA allegations fail to satisfy the Rule 9(b) pleading standard. To
begin, Plaintiff fails to identify who made the alleged misrepresentations or
omissions. While Plaintiff identifies “Maxum” and its “agents” (Doc. 14 ¶¶ 23, 55),
Case 6:25-cv-00191-JDK-JDL Document 23 Filed 12/19/25 Page 6 of 8 PageID #:
<pageID>
7
Rule 9(b) requires “the identity of the person making the misrepresentation and what
that person obtained thereby.” Musket Corp., 759 F. App’x at 286 (emphasis added);
see Williams, 417 F.3d at 454 (holding that pleadings naming only “Bell Helicopter
agent or employee”—but not specific individuals—did not satisfy Rule 9(b)). The
following reasoning from the Fifth Circuit in Williams applies with equal force to the
complaint here: “[The] complaint fails to plead any particular facts showing that
[Defendant] was aware of the actions of its employees, that it intentionally [made]
false claims . . ., [or] that it had purposefully withheld information . . . .” Id.
Further, the amended complaint does not allege what representations were
fraudulent or when they were made. Plaintiff admits that representations the
property would be fully covered were true when made at the time of initial coverage.
Docket No. 14 ¶ 23; see also Docket No. 18 ¶¶ 47, 48. Under Plaintiff’s theory, those
representations did not become fraudulent until Plaintiff relied on them years later
at the time of renewal. But Plaintiff does not allege any representations made at the
time of renewal that induced Plaintiff to renew the contract. Vague references to
“deceptive . . . statements” (Docket No. 14 ¶ 55) do not particularly plead “the place
and contents of the false representation,” Kanneganti, 565 F.3d at 186.
Defendant’s objection is therefore sustained as to Plaintiff’s DTPA claim.
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that the Magistrate Judge’s Report
(Docket No. 20) is ADOPTED-IN-PART. Defendant’s motion (Docket No. 17) is
GRANTED as to any claim asserted under § 542.056(a) and § 542.003(b) of the Texas
Insurance Code (Count B in-part and Count C in-part, respectively) and § 17.50(A) of
Case 6:25-cv-00191-JDK-JDL Document 23 Filed 12/19/25 Page 7 of 8 PageID #:
<pageID>
8
the Texas Business and Commerce Code (Count D). Those claims are dismissed with
prejudice. Defendant’s motion (Docket No. 17) is DENIED as to the remainder of
Plaintiff’s claims.
So ORDERED and SIGNED this day of
___________________________________
JEREMY D. KERNODLE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
19th	December, 2025.
Case 6:25-cv-00191-JDK-JDL Document 23 Filed 12/19/25 Page 8 of 8 PageID #:
<pageID>

Continua la tua ricerca in ChatGPT o Claude

Collega Omnilex per cercare nel corpus legale dal tuo assistente IA.