Wilkinson v. Smith County, Texas et al

6:24-cv-00243Txed17 apr 2026

Testo completo

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
TYLER DIVISION
GARY WILKINSON, by and through
his Guardian Ad Litem, Michael
Wilkinson,
Plaintiff,
v.
SMITH COUNTY, TEXAS, et al.,
Defendants.
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Case No. 6:24-cv-243-JDK-JDL
ORDER ADOPTING THE REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff Gary Wilkinson, by and through his appointed Guardian Ad Litem,
Michael Wilkinson, filed this civil rights lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and
state law. The complaint was referred to United States Magistrate Judge John D.
Love for findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendations for the disposition
of the case.
Smith County filed a motion to dismiss (Docket No. 56) arguing that it is the
wrong party to be sued. Specifically, the County argues that Plaintiff lacks standing
to raise this claim because the claim is not traceable to its actions. The County also
asserts that Plaintiff’s proper remedy is to join the class action lawsuit in Ward v.
Young, No. 1:16-cv-917-DAE, in the Western District of Texas, which seeks to hold
the Health and Human Services Commission (“HHSC”) liable for the length of time
inmates are in state jail facilities awaiting transfer to a mental health facility.
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On October 9, 2025, Judge Love notified the parties that the motion to dismiss
would be converted to a motion for summary judgment. Docket No. 61. Plaintiff was
directed to file any amended response and/or competent summary judgment evidence.
Id. Plaintiff filed his amended response in opposition on October 31, 2025. Docket
No. 63. Smith County filed its amended reply on November 7, 2025. Docket No. 64.
Both parties attached additional exhibits to their pleadings.
On December 30, 2025, Judge Love issued a Report (Docket No. 66)
recommending that the Court grant Smith County’s motion for summary judgment
and dismiss Plaintiff’s claims with prejudice. Specifically, Judge Love determined
that: (1) given the lack of a subsequent judgment of conviction, Plaintiff failed to
show with certainty that he was detained beyond his sentence date, assuming he had
one; (2) a sheriff cannot release an inmate from the jail without a proper court order;
and (3) any claim that Smith County should have petitioned the court or alerted
authorities to Plaintiff’s over-detention sounds in negligence—not a constitutional
violation. In sum, Judge Love concluded that Smith County was the wrong party to
be held liable for Plaintiff’s stay in the Smith County jail. Docket No. 66 at 18.
Judge Love also recommended that the Court decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claim against his attorney. Plaintiff filed timely
objections (Docket No. 67), and Smith County filed a response (Docket No. 68).
I.
The Court reviews the findings and conclusions of the Magistrate Judge de
novo if a party objects within fourteen days of the Report and Recommendation.
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28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). In conducting a de novo review, the Court examines the entire
record and makes an independent assessment under the law. Douglass v. United
Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1430 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc), superseded on other
grounds by statute, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (extending the time to file objections from
ten days to fourteen days).
As to conclusions in the Report for which no objections are filed, the Court
reviews those findings for clear error or abuse of discretion and reviews the legal
conclusions to determine whether they are contrary to law. See United States v.
Wilson, 864 F.2d 1219, 1221 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding that the standard of review is
“clearly erroneous, abuse of discretion and contrary to law” if no objections to a
Magistrate Judge’s Report are filed).
Plaintiff raises five objections to the Report: (1) Plaintiff’s maximum lawful
confinement is a question of law, (2) commitment orders are not indefinite,
(3) Jackson v. Indiana and other authorities would hold Smith County responsible
for continued detention after expiration of the maximum lawful detention period, (4)
the Report improperly resolves disputed issues of fact, and (5) Ward v. Young does
not bar Plaintiff’s claims. See generally Docket No. 67. In response, Smith County
maintains that it is not the correct party to sue—the duty to release Plaintiff was on
the mental health facility listed in the commitment order, not the County because the
County “only temporarily” houses inmates while they await a decision from the court
or mental health facility. Docket No. 68.
The Court will consider each objection in turn.
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A.
Plaintiff first maintains that the Report errs by “concluding that Plaintiff
failed to establish that he was held beyond his maximum lawful confinement period,”
as burglary of a building is a state jail felony that cannot result in more than two
years of imprisonment as a matter of Texas state law. Docket No. 67 at 3. He insists
that he was released from jail because the “maximum confinement period for the
burglary offense had expired,” citing Texas Code of Criminal Procedure
article 46B.0095. Id.
This objection, however, overlooks the Report’s conclusion and the summary
judgment evidence showing that Plaintiff was not held in the Smith County jail on a
conviction or sentence for burglary of a building. Rather, the summary judgment
evidence reveals that Plaintiff was held in the jail for a revocation of his probation
(Docket No. 56, Exs. D, E)—and there is no evidence in the record showing that
Plaintiff was sentenced for burglary of a building after violating his probation. See,
e.g., Docket No. 56, Ex. F.
Plaintiff has therefore not met his burden to show that he was held in the
Smith County jail beyond his maximum sentence for burglary.1
Plaintiff’s first objection is overruled.
B.
Plaintiff next asserts that the Report essentially adopts Smith County’s
position that “a criminal commitment order must be honored indefinitely unless and
1 Additionally, Plaintiff’s argument about the prosecutor’s reasons for dismissing Plaintiff’s charges
is not germane to the substance of the Report, which is that Smith County is not the proper party.
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until a court issues a release order.” Docket No. 67 at 3. He posits that, under this
theory, a sheriff could constitutionally detain an individual forever—which is
irreconcilable with due process.
For one, this objection is irrelevant to the Report’s conclusion that Smith
County is not the proper defendant. Plaintiff is also incorrect. A county sheriff’s legal
authority is “subject to an order of the proper court.” See Odonnell v. Harris County,
892 F.3d 147, 156 (5th Cir. 2018) (“. . . the Sheriff is legally obliged to execute all
lawful process and cannot release prisoners committed to jail by a magistrate’s
warrant—even if prisoners are committed for want of bail.” (citation modified)); see
also TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE § 351.041(a) (“The sheriff of each county is the keeper of
the county jail. The sheriff shall safely keep all prisoners committed to the jail by
a lawful authority, subject to an order of the proper court.” (emphasis added)).
Under Texas law, “[b]ail is set by judicial officers, not county sheriffs, and county
sheriffs are required to execute all process and precepts directed to them by legal
authority.” Brown v. Daniels, 2021 WL 1997060, *16 (Tex. App.—Dallas, May 19,
2021, no pet.).
Here, the evidence does not show or suggest that Plaintiff was held beyond the
maximum lawful authority for burglary. Plaintiff was arrested on revocation of
probation and placed in the Smith County jail. Docket No. 56, Exs. D, E. The trial
court held a hearing and ultimately denied Plaintiff bail, determined him
incompetent to stand trial, and ordered him committed to a state mental hospital for
competency restoration. Plaintiff was placed on a waitlist for a hospital bed—and, as
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a result, remained in the jail and was not taken to the hospital for the competency
restoration.
During that time, the evidence shows, the County had lawful custody of
Plaintiff through the trial court’s commitment order—and, through that order,
Plaintiff was to remain incarcerated until he could be sent to the hospital. He was
released pursuant to a court order. There is nothing in the record indicating—let
alone showing—that the sheriff or County could have unilaterally released Plaintiff
during this time while he waited for a hospital bed. The sheriff does not have the
legal authority to disobey court orders or release inmates sua sponte. See Brown,
2021 WL 1997060, at *18 (“In addition, as we stated earlier, Texas law does not
authorize county sheriffs to release persons confined pursuant to facially valid court
orders by unilaterally determining what circumstances warrant release.”).
Given that the sheriff’s duty is to keep all inmates committed to the jail, subject
to an order of the Court, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that the sheriff or the County
had any authority to release him prior to the trial court’s order releasing him.
Plaintiff has not met his burden on summary judgment to show that Smith County
is the proper party for Article III standing.
Plaintiff’s second objection is overruled.
C.
Plaintiff further argues that Jackson v. Indiana holds that incompetency
confinement cannot continue indefinitely. 406 U.S. 715, 719 (1972). He argues that
once the maximum lawful confinement period expires, restoration treatment may no
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longer be pursued. Plaintiff cites to Texas Code of Criminal Procedure articles
46B.009 and 46B.0095, which limit “confinement of an incompetent defendant to the
maximum sentence for the charged offense.” He also argues that the Fifth Circuit
recently followed Jackson in Harris v. Clay Cnty., Miss., 47 F.4th 271 (5th Cir. 2022),
and in doing so, held “that the prolonged detention violated Jackson and rejected the
sheriffs’ argument that the courts/prosecutor held responsibility for the unlawful
detention,” id. Docket No. 67 at 5.
The Supreme Court in Jackson held that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits
a state from confining a criminal defendant “solely on account of his incapacity to
proceed to trial” for more than “the reasonable amount of time necessary to determine
whether there is a substantial probability that he will attain that capacity in the
foreseeable future.” 405 U.S. at 738. If there is no reasonable probability that the
defendant will become competent, the state must initiate civil commitment
proceedings or release the defendant. Id.
The Court agrees with the Report, which reasoned that Jackson is not
applicable when considering Smith County’s role—or lack thereof—in restoring
Plaintiff’s competency. The commitment order specified that HHSC was charged
with the responsibility of assessing and returning Plaintiff to competency—not Smith
County. Docket No. 56, Ex. F at 3 (the commitment order); Docket No. 66 at 18.
Moreover, the Jackson commit-or-release rule is well-settled: An incompetent
defendant who has no reasonable expectation of restored competency must be civilly
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committed or released. Jackson, 406 U.S. at 738. But here, there was no
determination that Plaintiff’s incompetence could not be restored.
Similarly, an examination of Harris reveals that it is inapplicable. As the Fifth
Circuit explained, Harris was not held pursuant to any court order, as no case was
pending. 47 F.4th at 273–74. Unlike Harris, Plaintiff was incarcerated inside the
Smith County jail pursuant to a specific commitment order that denied him bail while
he awaited transfer to a mental health facility. Docket No. 56, Ex. F. Although
Plaintiff was incarcerated in the jail for an extended period of time due to lack of
hospital beds, no subsequent court order was entered for his release. Extending the
objection to its logical conclusion, Plaintiff is essentially arguing that Smith County
should have ignored the commitment order and sua sponte released him. This is not
what the law provides.
In fact, the sheriffs in Harris held Harris in violation of a court order providing
that Harris “shall remain in custody until the determination of said civil proceedings”
such that once the court dismissed the civil commitment proceedings, Harris should
have been released. 47 F.4th at 278. Here, there is no evidence that the sheriff had
any knowledge that Plaintiff remained detained in violation of a court order, nor
purposely violated any such order.
* * *
Plaintiff was incarcerated pursuant to a commitment order awaiting
admission to a state mental hospital. There was no activity in his criminal case, and
it remained pending. In other words, unlike in Harris, Plaintiff was detained in the
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jail pursuant to an order that remained in effect until the court issued its order for
Plaintiff’s release on November 4, 2022. The commitment order in this case, unlike
the one in Harris, did not direct Smith County or the sheriff to release him at any
time before admission to the hospital. To release Plaintiff sua sponte would have
violated the commitment order. Neither Jackson nor Harris holds that a sheriff can
unliterally violate a court’s commitment order to release an inmate. Additionally,
unlike in Harris, here there was no finding—and the summary judgment evidence
does not reveal—that Plaintiff’s competency could not be restored.2
Plaintiff’s third objection is overruled.
D.
Plaintiff next maintains that the Report improperly credits Smith County’s
assertion that it lacked discretion to act and discounted evidence of a policy to detain
incompetent individuals until a hospital transfer or court order. Plaintiff argues that
he was released on a termination of probation—not competency restoration, which is
a factual dispute that must be resolved by a jury. This alleged “factual dispute” is
not germane to the findings of the Report and the basis for dismissing Plaintiff’s
claims, and the objection is therefore without merit.
Plaintiff’s fourth objection is overruled.
2 Plaintiff again contends that Whirl v. Kern 407 F.2d 781, 791 (5th Cir. 1969), and Douthit v. Jones
619 F.2d 527 (5th Cir. 1980), support his allegations. This is a repeat of arguments made in the
summary judgment briefing. Docket No. 59 at 7–10. Objections that fail to point out any specific
factual or legal error in the Report are generally improper. Wingfield v. Garner, No. 6:21-cv-320-
JDK-KNM, 2023 WL 5835941, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 7, 2023), aff’d, No. 23-40547, 2025 WL 1040649
(5th Cir. Apr. 8, 2025) (holding that merely rearguing claims made in prior motion is an improper
objection). Judge Love already rejected these arguments, and the Court finds no error in the
analysis. Docket No. 66 at 13–15.
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E.
In his final objection, Plaintiff argues that the Report incorrectly suggests that
Plaintiff’s claims should have been brought in Ward v. Young, No. 1:16-cv-917-DAE,
the class action in the Western District of Texas. Plaintiff explains that the class
action in Ward expressly sought only declaratory and injunctive relief and not
monetary damages; therefore, Plaintiff’s claims against Smith County could not have
been litigated in Ward.
This objection, however, again is not germane to the subject of the Report and
Recommendation. Plaintiff has not established Article III standing with respect to
his claims against Smith County.
Plaintiff’s fifth objection is overruled.
F.
Finally, the Court notes that Plaintiff does not object to Judge Love’s
recommendation to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his state-law
claim. Docket No. 66 at 23. After reviewing this portion of the Report for clear error,
the Court determines that the Report is correct, and the Court will decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claim.
II.
After a review of the pleadings, the record, the Magistrate Judge’s Report,
Plaintiff’s objections, Defendant’s response, and the relevant law, the Court finds that
Plaintiff’s objections (Docket No. 67) should be OVERRULED. Accordingly, the
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Court hereby ADOPTS the Report and Recommendation of the United States
Magistrate Judge (Docket No. 66) as the findings of this Court.
Therefore, it is ORDERED that Defendant Smith County’s motion for
summary judgment (Docket No. 56) is GRANTED and Plaintiff’s claims against
Smith County are DISMISSED with prejudice. Plaintiff’s state-law claim against
Defendant Roberson is DISMISSED, without prejudice.
Any other motions which may be pending are DENIED as moot.
So ORDERED and SIGNED this day of
___________________________________
JEREMY D. KERNODLE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
17th	April, 2026.
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