Abedian v. Mueller et al

United States District Court
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
SHERMAN DIVISION
LAILA ABEDIAN,
Plaintiff,
v.
BRIAN MUELLER, KAG LEASING,
INC., TRANSPORT RESOURCES,
INC., KAG SPECIALTY PRODUCTS
GROUP, LLC, and YOKOHAMA TIRE
CORPORATION,
Defendants.
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Civil Action No. 4:25-cv-512
Judge Mazzant
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Pending before the Court are various motions. Having considered the motions, the relevant
pleadings, and the applicable law, the Court finds as follows:
1. Defendants Brian Mueller and KAG Specialty Products Group, LLC’s Motion to
Dismiss Plaintiff’s Third Amended Petition Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) (the
“Motion to Dismiss”) (Dkt. #30) should be DENIED;
2. Defendants Brian Mueller and KAG Specialty Products Group, LLC’s First Amended
Motion for Summary Judgment (the “Motion for Summary Judgment”) (Dkt. #39)
should be DENIED; and
3. Plaintiff’s Motion to Quash Defendant Yokohama Tire Corporation’s Notice of
Deposition of Plaintiff Laila Abedian and Defendant KAG Specialty Products Group,
LLC’s Cross Notice of Intention to Take the Deposition of Plaintiff (the “Motion to
Quash) (Dkt. #45) should be GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
This lawsuit arises from a motor vehicle accident that occurred on May 28, 2023 (Dkt. #18).
The factual background of the instant case has been set forth in the Court’s February 17, 2026
Memorandum Opinion and Order and is incorporated herein (Dkt. #53).
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On May 14, 2025, Plaintiff Laila Abedian (“Plaintiff”) initiated this lawsuit against various
defendants, including Defendant Brian Mueller (“Mueller”) and his employer, Defendant KAG
Specialty Products Group, LLC (“KAG Specialty”) (Dkt. #1; Dkt. #7). On July 17, 2025, Plaintiff
filed her Third Amended Petition (the “Complaint”) (Dkt. #18).1 In the Complaint, Plaintiff
asserts the following relevant claims: (1) negligence against Mueller; (2) vicarious liability against
KAG Specialty under a respondeat superior theory; and (3) negligence and negligence per se
against KAG Specialty (Dkt. #18 at ¶¶ 11–12).
On September 11, 2025, Mueller and KAG Specialty filed their Motion to Dismiss urging
the Court to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims under Rule 12(b)(6) (Dkt. #30). Specifically, Mueller and
KAG Specialty argue Plaintiff’s Complaint is “devoid of any facts” to support Plaintiff’s claims
against them (Dkt. #30). Plaintiff responded (Dkt. #33).
On October 30, 2025, Mueller and KAG Specialty filed their First Amended Motion for
Summary Judgment arguing Plaintiff’s claims against them fail as a matter of law (Dkt. #39).2
Plaintiff responded (Dkt. #42).
Finally, on November 11, 2025, Plaintiff filed her Motion to Quash objecting to Defendants’
Notice of Deposition of Plaintiff for her second deposition, which was unilaterally set for
November 25, 2025 (Dkt. #45). Defendants did not respond. The motions are ripe for adjudication.
1 Within Plaintiff’s Third Amended Petition, Plaintiff identifies the following as Defendants: Brian Mueller, KAG
Leasing Inc., Transport Resources Inc., KAG Specialty Products Group, LLC, and Yokohama Tire Corporation
(Dkt. #18 at ¶¶ 5–9). Mueller and KAG Specialty contend Plaintiff improperly named KAG Leasing, Inc., and
Transport Resources, Inc. as Defendants in this case (Dkt #39 at p. 1). Seemingly, Plaintiff does not dispute this
(Dkt. #42).
2 Previously, on August 8, 2025, Mueller and KAG Specialty filed a motion for summary judgment on similar grounds
(Dkt. #24). The parties briefed various issues raised in this original motion (Dkt. #27; Dkt. #28). However, the
Court considers the arguments made in the First Amended Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. #39) and in the
Amended Response (Dkt. #42).
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LEGAL STANDARD
I. Motion to Dismiss
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that each claim in a complaint include a “short
and plain statement . . . showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). Each
claim must include enough factual allegations “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion allows a party to move for dismissal of an action when the complaint
fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). When considering a
motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must accept as true all well-pleaded facts in the
plaintiff’s complaint and view those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Bowlby v. City
of Aberdeen, 681 F.3d 215, 219 (5th Cir. 2012). The Court may consider “the complaint, any
documents attached to the complaint, and any documents attached to the motion to dismiss that
are central to the claim and referenced by the complaint.” Lone Star Fund V (U.S.), L.P. v. Barclays
Bank PLC, 594 F.3d 383, 387 (5th Cir. 2010). The Court must then determine whether the
complaint states a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. “A claim has facial plausibility when
the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). “But
where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the [C]ourt to infer more than the mere possibility of
misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader is entitled to
relief.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)).
In Iqbal, the Supreme Court established a two-step approach for assessing the sufficiency
of a complaint in the context of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. First, the Court should identify and
disregard conclusory allegations, for they are “not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Iqbal, 556
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U.S. at 664. Second, the Court “consider[s] the factual allegations in [the complaint] to determine
if they plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.” Id. “This standard ‘simply calls for enough facts
to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary claims or
elements.’” In re S. Scrap Material Co., LLC, 541 F.3d 584, 587 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. at 570). This evaluation will “be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court
to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Thus, “[t]o survive a
motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
II. Motion for Summary Judgment
The purpose of summary judgment is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims
or defenses. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323–24 (1986). Summary judgment is proper
under Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). A dispute about a material fact is genuine when “the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Substantive law identifies which facts are material. Id. The trial court “must
resolve all reasonable doubts in favor of the party opposing the motion [for summary judgment].”
Casey Enters., Inc. v. Am. Hardware Mut. Ins. Co., 655 F.2d 598, 602 (5th Cir. 1981).
The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the court of its
motion and identifying “depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or
declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions,
interrogatory answers, or other materials” that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(1)(A); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. If the movant bears the burden
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of proof on a claim or defense for which it is moving for summary judgment, it must come forward
with evidence that establishes “beyond peradventure all of the essential elements of the claim or
defense.” Fontenot v. Upjohn Co., 780 F.2d 1190, 1194 (5th Cir. 1986). Where the nonmovant bears
the burden of proof, the movant may discharge the burden by showing that there is an absence of
evidence to support the nonmovant’s case. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325; Byers v. Dall. Morning News,
Inc., 209 F.3d 419, 424 (5th Cir. 2000). Once the movant has carried its burden, the nonmovant
must “respond to the motion for summary judgment by setting forth particular facts indicating
there is a genuine issue for trial.” Byers, 209 F.3d at 424 (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248–49). A
nonmovant must present affirmative evidence to defeat a properly supported motion for summary
judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257. Mere denials of material facts, unsworn allegations, or
arguments and assertions in briefs or legal memoranda will not suffice to carry this burden. See
Solomon v. Hous. Corrugated Box Co., 526 F.2d 389, 396–97 (5th Cir. 1976). Rather, the Court
requires “significant probative evidence” from the nonmovant to dismiss a request for summary
judgment. In re Mun. Bond Reporting Antitrust Litig., 672 F.2d 436, 440 (5th Cir. 1982) (quoting
Ferguson v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 584 F.2d 111, 114 (5th Cir. 1978)). The Court must consider all of the
evidence but “refrain from making credibility determinations or weighing the evidence.” Turner v.
Baylor Richardson Med. Ctr., 476 F.3d 337, 343 (5th Cir. 2007).
ANALYSIS
Pending before the Court are various motions (Dkt. #30; Dkt. #39; Dkt. #45). The Court
will first consider the Motion to Dismiss, then the Motion for Summary Judgment, and finally, the
Motion to Quash.
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I. Motion to Dismiss
After reviewing Plaintiff’s Complaint and the arguments presented in the briefs, the Court
finds that Plaintiff has stated plausible claims for relief against Mueller and KAG Specialty under
Rule 12(b)(6). Dismissal is unwarranted. Defendants Mueller and KAG Specialty’s Motion to
Dismiss should therefore be DENIED.
II. Motion for Summary Judgment
Mueller and KAG Specialty move for summary judgment arguing the following: (1) Mueller
did not breach any duty of care while operating the tractor-trailer whenever the tire tread detached
and collided with Plaintiff’s vehicle; (2) Mueller did not breach any duty of care as to ensuring the
vehicles safe condition; and (3) Plaintiff has no evidence to support that KAG Specialty was
negligent or negligent per se in hiring, training, or entrusting Mueller as commercial vehicle
operator (Dkt. #39 at pp. 4–10). In response, Plaintiff argues summary judgment would be
inappropriate (Dkt. #42). Specifically, Plaintiff alleges Mueller and KAG Specialty breached their
duties under both Texas common law and the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations by failing
to properly inspect, maintain, and operate the commercial tractor-trailer involved in the accident
(Dkt. #42 at p. 1). To support this allegation, Plaintiff attaches the following evidence to their
Response: (1) Deposition of Plaintiff (Dkt. #42-1); (2) Deposition of Daniel Wright, KAG
Specialty’s corporate representative (Dkt. #42-2); (3) photographs of the Subject Tire and damage
to Plaintiff’s vehicle; (4) June 28, 2023 Texas Peace Officers’ Crash Report (Dkt. #42-4); (5) Texas
Peace Officer’s Crash Report – Code Sheet (Dkt. #42-5); (6) maintenance receipt for the Subject
Tire (Dkt. #42-6); and (7) Deposition of Mueller (Dkt. #42-7).
After careful review of the record and the arguments, the Court is not convinced that
Mueller and KAG Specialty have met their burden demonstrating that there is no material issue of
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fact as to Plaintiff’s claims entitling Mueller and KAG Specialty to judgment as a matter of law.
Ultimately, whether Plaintiff can prevail and recover damages for those claims before a jury is a
question for another day. Accordingly, Mueller and KAG Specialty’s Motion for Summary
Judgment against Plaintiff should be DENIED.
III. Motion to Quash
The Court finally addresses Plaintiff’s Motion to Quash. To quash a notice of deposition,
the movant must “show good cause and the need for protection.” United States ex rel. Woodard v.
Davita, Inc., No. 1:05-cv-2274, 2011 WL 13199233, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Sep. 26, 2011) (citing Staton
Holdings, Inc. v. Russell Athletic, Inc., No. 3:09-cv-419, 2010 WL 1372749, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 7,
2010)). “‘Good’ cause exists when justice requires the protection of ‘a party or person from
annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.’” Ferko v. Nat’l Ass’n for
Stock Car Racing, Inc., 218 F.R.D. 125, 133 (E.D. Tex. 2003) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)).
Here, Plaintiff’s Motion to Quash argues that Defendants unilaterally selected a date and
time to take Plaintiff’s second deposition and such request imposed an undue burden on Plaintiff
(Dkt. #45 at ¶¶ 2, 4). Without a response, the Court presumes Defendants agree.3 Accordingly, the
Court finds Plaintiff’s Motion to Quash should be GRANTED.
CONCLUSION
It is therefore ORDERED that Defendant Brian Mueller and KAG Specialty Products
Group, LLC’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Third Amended Petition Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)
(Dkt. #30) is hereby DENIED.
3 “A party’s failure to oppose a motion in the manner prescribed herein creates a presumption that the party does not
controvert the facts set out by movant and has no evidence to offer in opposition to the motion.” LOCAL RULE
CV-7(d).
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It is further ORDERED that Defendant Brian Mueller and KAG Specialty Products
Group, LLC’s First Amended Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. #39) is hereby DENIED.
It is further ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Quash Defendant Yokohama’s Tire
Corporation’s Notice of Deposition of Plaintiff Laila Abedian and Defendant KAG Specialty
Products Group, LLC’s Cross Notice of Intention to Take the Deposition of Plaintiff (Dkt. #45)
should be GRANTED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
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