Aleman et al v. Flower Mound Hospital Partners, LLC d/b/a Texas Health Presbyterian Hospital Flower Mound et al

United States District Court
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
SHERMAN DIVISION
BEVERLY ALEMAN and ROGER
ALEMAN,
Plaintiffs,
v.
TEXAS HEALTH PREBYSTERIAN
HOSPITAL FLOWER MOUND, et al.,
Defendants.
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
Civil Action No. 4:24-cv-962
Judge Mazzant
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Pending before the Court is Defendant Flower Mound Hospital Partners LLC, d/b/a Texas
Health Presbyterian Hospital – Flower Mound’s Motion for Leave to Designate Responsible Third
Parties (Dkt. #63) and Opposed Motion for Leave to Supplement Rule 26(a)(1)(A) Disclosure
(Dkt. #75) (together, the “Motions”). Having considered the Motions and the relevant pleadings,
the Court finds that the Motions should be DENIED.
BACKGROUND
This is a personal injury case. The underlying facts are more thoroughly set forth in the
Court’s December 3, 2025 Memorandum Opinion and Order (Dkt. #64). The present dispute
implicates the following facts:
On October 26, 2022, Plaintiff Beverly Aleman underwent spinal surgery at Texas Health
Presbyterian Hospital Flower Mound (Dkt. #1 at pp. 4–5). After experiencing serious
complications, Beverly Aleman and her husband, Roger Aleman (together “Plaintiffs”), filed suit
on October 24, 2024 (Dkt. #1). Under Texas’s two-year statute of limitations for medical
malpractice claims, the limitations period expired two days later, on October 26, 2024 (Dkt. #74
Case 4:24-cv-00962-ALM Document 92 Filed 01/06/26 Page 1 of 13 PageID #:
<pageID>

2
at p. 2 (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 74.251(a)). The deadline for joinder of parties
expired on March 14, 2025 (Dkt. #40). Expert discovery closed on August 8, 2025 (Dkt. #40). The
dispositive motion deadline expired on August 15, 2025 (Dkt. #40). Discovery closed on September
15, 2025 (Dkt. #40). The Court denied Plaintiffs leave to amend on December 3, 2026 (Dkt. #64).
On November 25, 2025, Defendant Flower Mound Hospital Partners LLC, d/b/a Texas
Health Presbyterian Hospital – Flower Mound (“Defendant”) moved for leave to designate
responsible third parties (Dkt. #63). Specifically, it seeks to designate Dr. Eric Chang-Tung (“Dr.
Chang-Tung”) and Dr. Dennis J. Robison (“Dr. Robison”) (Dkt. #63 at pp. 1–2). According to
Defendant, the motion is timely because it was filed at least 60 days before trial, a deadline set by
Texas’s responsible third party statute, TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 33.004(a).
Plaintiffs oppose the motion and object to the designation of responsible third parties
(Dkt. #74). In their view, the motion is barred by a different section of the statute which prohibits
designating responsible third parties when (1) the statute of limitations for the plaintiff to pursue
claims against the responsible third parties has expired; and (2) the defendant fails to comply with
its disclosure obligations “under the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure” (Dkt. #74 at pp. 1–2 (quoting
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 33.004(d)).
Defendant replies that the motion is timely because Plaintiffs filed suit too close to the
statute of limitations, and the facts providing a basis to designate the responsible third parties were
not revealed until an October 30, 2025 deposition (Dkt. 80 at pp. 2, 5). Neither party addressed
whether the sixty-day deadline controls in federal court.
On December 11, 2025, Defendant sought leave to supplement its Rule 26(a)(1)(A)
disclosures to name individuals with relevant knowledge (Dkt. #75). These individuals “were
Case 4:24-cv-00962-ALM Document 92 Filed 01/06/26 Page 2 of 13 PageID #:
<pageID>

3
closely involved in the surgery or post-operative period that is squarely at issue” (Dkt. #75 at p. 2).
One of them is Dr. Robison, who Defendant also seeks to designate as a responsible third party
(Dkt. #75-1 at p. 5). The motion is opposed (Dkt. #90). In sum, among other things, Defendant
argues that supplementation is harmless because these individuals were named in medical records
and a (now settled) co-defendant’s disclosures, and Plaintiffs respond that the supplementation is
prejudicial because all discovery deadlines have passed and trial is looming.
LEGAL STANDARD
I. Designation of Responsible Third Parties
In every cause of action based in tort under Texas law, the trier of fact is required to
apportion responsibility among each responsible claimant, defendant, settling person, and
“responsible third party.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §§ 33.002(a)(1), 33.003(a); accord
Challenger Gaming Sols., Inc. v. Earp, 402 S.W.3d 290, 292 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, no pet.)
(acknowledging that the proportional responsibility statute applied to “claims for negligence, fraud,
products liability, and any other conduct that violates an applicable legal standard”) (internal
quotations omitted). A responsible third party is defined as follows:
[A]ny person who is alleged to have caused or contributed to causing in any way the
harm for which recovery of damages is sought, whether by negligent act or omission,
by any defective or unreasonably dangerous product, by other conduct or activity
that violates an applicable legal standard, or by any combination of these. The term
“responsible third party” does not include a seller eligible for indemnity under
Section 82.002.
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 33.011(6).
Section 33.004 provides that a “defendant may seek to designate a person as a responsible
third party by filing a motion for leave to designate . . . on or before the 60th day before the trial
date.” Id. § 33.004(a). The purpose of § 33.004 is to allow the trier of fact to allocate responsibility
Case 4:24-cv-00962-ALM Document 92 Filed 01/06/26 Page 3 of 13 PageID #:
<pageID>

4
among all persons responsible for a claimant’s injuries, “regardless of whether they are subject to
the court’s jurisdiction or whether there is some other impediment to the imposition of liability on
them.” Galbraith Eng’g Consultants Inc. v. Pochucha, 290 S.W.3d 863, 869 n.6 (Tex. 2009) (quoting
19 DORSANEO, TEXAS LITIGATION GUIDE § 291.03(2)(b)(i)(2009)).
II. Untimely Discovery Disclosures
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 37(c) allows evidence that was not properly or timely
disclosed to be excluded if a party “fails to provide information or identify a witness as required by
Rule 26(a) or (e) . . . unless the failure was substantially justified or harmless.” FED. R. CIV. P.
37(c)(1). In determining the propriety of excluding evidence under Rule 37(c)(1), the Court
considers four factors: (1) the party’s explanation for its failure to disclose evidence; (2) the
importance of the evidence; (3) the prejudice, if any, to the party opposing the admission of the
evidence; and (4) the possibility of curing any prejudice with a continuance. Barrett v. Atlantic
Richfield Co., 95 F.3d 375, 380 (5th Cir. 1996).
ANALYSIS
I. Defendant’s Motion for Leave to Designate Responsible Third Party
It is undisputed that Defendant moved to designate Dr. Chang-Tung and Dr. Robison as
responsible third parties prior to sixty days before trial. It is also undisputed that the statute of
limitations on any tort claims Plaintiffs could pursue against these doctors has expired. Thus,
according to the parties, the remaining question for the Court is whether Section 33.004(d) of the
Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code bars the designation. Under that section, after the
limitation period expires, a defendant “may not designate a person as a responsible third party . . . if
the defendant has failed to comply with its obligations, if any, to timely disclose that the person may
Case 4:24-cv-00962-ALM Document 92 Filed 01/06/26 Page 4 of 13 PageID #:
<pageID>

5
be designated as a responsible third party under the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.” TEX. CIV.
PRAC. & REM. CODE § 33.004(d). The matter “is complicated in the instant case—a federal
diversity action—where discovery is generally governed by the Federal, rather than Texas Rules of
Civil Procedure.” Withers v. Schneider Nat’l Carriers, Inc., 13 F. Supp. 3d 686, 690 (E.D. Tex. 2014).
The parties do not address this complication. They debate whether the purpose
of § 33.004(d) applies in this case because Plaintiffs filed suit two days before the statute of
limitations expired, and whether Defendant diligently sought leave to designate. But the Court is
bound “to apply state substantive law and federal procedural law.” Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460,
465 (1965). It is therefore necessary to determine what law governs. To do so, the Court must first
determine whether § 33.004(a)’s sixty-day deadline applies in federal court.
This section proceeds in three parts. First, the Court summarizes the split of authority on
whether § 33.004 is procedural and whether the joinder or dispositive motion deadlines control
motions for leave to designate. Next, the Court explains why it concludes that § 33.004’s deadline
is procedural (which makes the Court’s scheduling order govern). Finally, the Court analyzes
whether good cause exists to modify the scheduling order, finding that it does not.
A. Courts are divided on whether the sixty-day deadline governs in federal court.
Federal courts exercising diversity jurisdiction “should not apply a state law or rule if (1) a
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure answers the same question as the state law or rule and (2) the
Federal Rule does not violate the Rules Enabling Act.” Klocke v. Watson, 936 F.3d 240, 244 (5th Cir.
2019) (citation modified). If a state law “directly collides” with a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
by providing a different answer to the same question, federal courts cannot apply the state law.
Passmore v. Baylor Health Care Sys., 823 F.3d 292, 296 (5th Cir. 2016) (citing Shady Grove Orthopedic
Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 398 (2010)). To directly collide, the rules at issue need
Case 4:24-cv-00962-ALM Document 92 Filed 01/06/26 Page 5 of 13 PageID #:
<pageID>

6
not be identical in purpose or scope. Id. at 297. Rather, the question is whether the “scope of the
Federal Rule is sufficiently broad to control the issue before the court.” Id. (citation modified).
Courts are split on whether the sixty-day rule and the Federal Rules directly collide. In
Withers, Judge Gilstrap considered the argument that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 14, which
governs third-party practice, conflicted with § 33.004. Withers, 13 F. Supp. 3d at 688. He found that
it did not. Rule 14 governs the formal joinder of parties, while § 33.004 merely provides a
mechanism to apportion responsibility to a third party without joinder—responsibility that does
not impose liability or create any res judicata effect. Id. Therefore, according to Withers and other
authorities, Rule 14 and § 33.004 are not in conflict. Under this view, § 33.004 is substantive.
In Hayes, this Court considered whether Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16, which governs
pretrial conferences, scheduling, and management, conflicts with § 33.004. Hayes v. Locke Supply
Co., No. 4:22-CV-767, 2024 WL 1258369, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 25, 2024). After turning to Passmore
for guidance, the Court found a conflict. In that case, the question was whether a Texas medical
malpractice statute—which required serving an expert report within 120 days of the defendant’s
answer to avoid dismissal—applied in federal court. Passmore, 823 F.3d at 296. The Fifth Circuit
examined Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26, which imposes expert disclosure requirements “at
the times and in the sequence that the court orders.” Id. (citation modified). The Fifth Circuit also
examined Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(c), which provides the consequences for failing to
comply with Rule 26. Id. These two rules, the Fifth Circuit concluded, conflicted with the Texas
120-day deadline and its mandatory dismissal provision because Rule 26 “does not require plaintiff
to serve expert reports on defendants within 120 days” and Rule 37’s sanction scheme is
discretionary. Id. at 297. By analogy, this Court concluded that Rule 16(b)(3)(A), which requires the
Case 4:24-cv-00962-ALM Document 92 Filed 01/06/26 Page 6 of 13 PageID #:
<pageID>

7
Court to “limit the time to . . . file motions,” was sufficiently broad to answer the same question as
the sixty-day deadline. Hayes, 2024 WL 1258369, at *5. For that reason (and because neither party
argued Rule 16 was invalid), this Court declined to apply the sixty-day deadline. Id. at *6. Under
this view, § 33.004 is procedural.
After finding a direct collision between Rule 16 and the sixty-day deadline, the Court
proceeded to consider “by what point must a party file a motion for leave to designate a responsible
third party.” Hayes, 2024 WL 1258369, at *6. The Court chose to “follow precedent of the United
States District Court for the Western District of Texas” to find that a party must file such a motion
“by the dispositive motions deadline specified in the governing scheduling order.” Id.1
But even the Western District is now split on the issue. Judge Cardone found that the
dispositive motion deadline is inappropriate, and that the joinder deadline governs motions to
designate. Guadian v. Americor Funding LLC, 724 F. Supp. 3d 668, 671–72 (W.D. Tex. 2024). She
reasoned that even though designating responsible third parties does not join them as parties
subject to liability, designation is not a dispositive motion because it “does not resolve any claims
in the case.” Id. at 671. Thus, in her view, the dispositive motion deadline “is no more a natural fit”
than the joinder deadline. Id. at 670. Judge Cardone pointed to practical concerns in support of
choosing the joinder deadline. Namely, allowing a designation after discovery forces a plaintiff to
choose between elongating the litigation process through an extended discovery period or forfeiting
the ability to adequately investigate the designated third parties. Id. at 671.
1 The Court cited the following cases from the Western District of Texas: Am. Home Assurance Co. v. Medina, No.
1:21-CV-00126, 2022 WL 1957807, at *2 (W.D. Tex. June 6, 2022); Aguilar v. Pick Five Imps., Inc., No. SA-21-CV-
01048, 2022 WL 1570627, at *2 (W.D. Tex. May 27, 2022); Al - Khawaldeh v. Tackett, No. 1:20-CV-1079-RP, 2021
WL 5986053, at *4 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 16, 2021), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:20-CV-1079-RP, 2022 WL
2718537 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 20, 2022).
Case 4:24-cv-00962-ALM Document 92 Filed 01/06/26 Page 7 of 13 PageID #:
<pageID>

8
This Court need not decide whether the dispositive motion deadline remains appropriate
as it decided in Hayes. Here, Defendant’s motion would be untimely under either deadline. Thus,
the question remains whether the sixty-day deadline conflicts with the Federal Rules.
B. Rule 16 conflicts with the sixty-day deadline.
Without Fifth Circuit precedent on point, this Court again turns to Passmore for guidance
and concludes that Rule 16 and § 33.004 conflict. In Passmore, the Fifth Circuit found that Rule 26
and Texas law answered the question of when an expert report must be served differently because
Rule 26 “does not require plaintiff to serve expert reports on defendants within 120 days as [Texas
law would require.]” Passmore, 823 F.3d at 296. Here, Rule 16 is sufficiently broad to answer the
same question as the sixty-day deadline because it provides that the Court must issue a scheduling
order that limits the time to file motions. FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(3)(A). The rules are in conflict
because one sets a statutory deadline and the other entrusts that decision to the Court. Here,
Defendant’s motion is untimely whether the dispositive motion or joinder deadline applies.
The Court acknowledges that the designation of responsible third parties differs from
dispositive motions and formal joinder in significant respects. Nevertheless, “[s]cheduling orders
and their enforcement are regarded as essential in ensuring that cases proceed to trial in a just,
efficient, and certain manner.” Hernandez v. Mario’s Auto Sales, Inc., 617 F. Supp. 2d 488, 493 (S.D.
Tex. 2009) (citation modified). It cannot be the case that because designation of responsible third
parties is different from joinder or a dispositive motion, the Court has no power to prevent the
motion from being filed after the close of discovery. As Judge Cardone noted, another section of
the Texas statute expressly contemplates that plaintiffs have “‘an adequate time for discovery’”
following responsible third party designations in order to file a motion to strike the designation.
Guardian, 724 F. Supp. 3d at 671 (quoting TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 33.004(l)). Here,
Case 4:24-cv-00962-ALM Document 92 Filed 01/06/26 Page 8 of 13 PageID #:
<pageID>

9
applying § 33.004’s scheme would directly conflict with the Court’s authority to manage its cases
under Rule 16 by requiring more time for discovery. Further, neither party challenges the validity
of Rule 16. Thus, the Court cannot apply the directly conflicting state rule. Passmore, 823 F.3d at
296. Accordingly, the Court’s scheduling order governs, making Defendant’s motion untimely.
C. No good cause exists to modify the scheduling order.
The Court construes Defendant’s arguments that it diligently designated the responsible
third parties under § 33.004 as an argument that good cause exists to modify the scheduling order.
The Court is unpersuaded.
The Fifth Circuit has applied a four-part test when determining if good cause to modify a
scheduling order exists. S&W Enters., L.L.C. v. SouthTrust Bank of Ala., 315 F.3d 533, 536 (5th Cir.
2003). The four applicable factors are: (1) the explanation for the failure to adhere to the deadline
at issue; (2) the importance of the proposed modification; (3) potential prejudice; and (4) the
availability of a continuance to cure such prejudice. Id. (citing Reliance Ins. Co. v. La. Land &
Exploration Co., 110 F.3d 253, 257 (5th Cir. 1997)). Here, the first and second factors weigh in favor
of modifying the scheduling order, but the third and fourth factors weigh against it.
Defendant’s explanation for the late designation is that it did not know Dr. Robison and Dr.
Chang-Tung were potentially responsible until an October 30, 2025 deposition of Plaintiffs’ expert
(Dkt. #80 at p. 5).2 Defendant alleges that because it received the transcript of the deposition on
November 24, 2025, it acted diligently by seeking leave to designate on November 25, 2025
2 This explanation is provided for the first time in Defendant’s reply (Dkt. #80). Defendant’s motion did little work
to show good cause, presumably because Defendant assumed the sixty-day deadline controlled, and instead spent
its time explaining why the doctors are potentially responsible. But because § 33.004’s application in federal court
is a thorny issue and the Court ultimately declines to modify the scheduling order, the Court will consider
Defendant’s explanation for the delay.
Case 4:24-cv-00962-ALM Document 92 Filed 01/06/26 Page 9 of 13 PageID #:
<pageID>

10
(Dkt. #80 at p. 5). The Court will assume Defendant’s representations are correct and find this
factor weighs in favor of modifying the scheduling order.
The second factor, the importance of the proposed modification, also supports modifying
the scheduling order. Courts have found that a modification is important when it “directly affects
[a party’s] prospects of ultimate recovery.” Hayes, 2024 WL 1258369, at *7 (citing The Richards
Grp., Inc. v. Brock, No. 3:06-CV-0799, 2008 WL 1722250, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 14, 2008)).
Apportionment of fault to a responsible third party affects a plaintiff’s prospects of ultimate
recovery. Id. (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 33.003); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.
CODE § 33.001. Therefore, the Court assumes that this factor weighs in favor of Defendant.
However, the third factor heavily weighs against modification. Plaintiffs will be substantially
prejudiced if the scheduling order is modified. This case is set for a final pre-trial conference on
January 30, 2026 (Dkt. #91). The case will potentially go to trial as soon as February 9, 2026
(Dkt. #91). Discovery has closed (Dkt. #40). Even if Plaintiffs have been aware of Dr. Robison’s
and Dr. Chang-Tung’s potential roles in the alleged harm, they have not been aware of the need to
prepare a defense on their behalf to reduce the percentage of responsibility the jury assigns them.
Thus, this factor weighs against Defendant.
The fourth factor considers the availability of a continuance to cure prejudice. Trial is set
for next month and a continuance is not available under the present circumstances. Thus, this
factor weighs against Defendant.
After considering the factors holistically, the Court finds that Defendant has not
demonstrated good cause to modify the Court’s scheduling order. Therefore, the Court will deny
the motion for leave to designate responsible third parties (Dkt. #63).
Case 4:24-cv-00962-ALM Document 92 Filed 01/06/26 Page 10 of 13 PageID #:
<pageID>

11
II. Defendant’s Motion for Leave to Supplement Rule 26(a)(1)(A) Disclosure
In its initial disclosures, Defendant broadly identified itself (Texas Health Presbyterian
Hospital Flower Mound) as an entity with relevant information to Plaintiffs’ claims—but did not
identify the doctors and nurses caring for Plaintiff Beverly Aleman (Dkt. #75 at p. 1). It seeks to do
so now. The parties brief the four-part test the Court discussed earlier, which also applies when
determining if a failure to comply with Rule 26 is substantially harmless. Texas A&M Research
Found. v. Magna Transp., Inc., 338 F.3d 394, 402 (5th Cir. 2003). After considering the factors, the
Court is unpersuaded that Defendant’s failure to timely name these individuals is substantially
harmless. It will therefore deny leave to supplement.
To recap, the four applicable factors are: (1) the explanation for the failure to adhere to the
deadline at issue; (2) the importance of the evidence; (3) potential prejudice; and (4) the availability
of a continuance to cure such prejudice. Id. Here, the Court finds that two factors weigh against the
requested relief, one weighs in its favor, and one is neutral.
The first factor (explanation for the delay) weighs against Defendant. Defendant argues that
its “failure to specifically identify its own doctors and nurses by name was a clerical oversight”
(Dkt. #75 at p. 4). Moreover, it argues that the individuals it seeks to list “were all closely involved
in [Plaintiff Beverly Aleman’s] care and have been routinely discussed in both party depositions
and expert depositions by name” (Dkt. #75 at p. 4). Whether the parties have discussed these
individuals is not an explanation for the delay. And, in light of the eleven-month delay between
Defendant’s initial disclosures and the relief sought, the Court finds the clerical error explanation
insufficient. Accordingly, this factor weighs against the requested relief.
The Court assumes the second factor weighs in favor of Defendant. As to this factor,
importance, Defendant points to the individuals’ close involvement “in the surgery or
Case 4:24-cv-00962-ALM Document 92 Filed 01/06/26 Page 11 of 13 PageID #:
<pageID>

12
post-operative period that is squarely at issue in this case” (Dkt. #75 at p. 2). Defendant argues it
is important that the individuals “be permitted to testify as to their recollection of events to give
the jury context” (Dkt. #75 at p. 2). Plaintiffs do not meaningfully contest importance but argue
that other factors should outweigh it (Dkt. #90 at p. 7). Thus, this factor weighs in favor of relief.
The third factor, prejudice, is neutral at best. Defendant points to the fact that a
co-defendant, who has now settled, included the individuals with knowledge in his initial
disclosures and expert designations (Dkt. #75 at p. 3). Moreover, Defendant notes that Plaintiffs
broadly included all physicians, nurses, and medical staff employed by Defendant in their expert
designations (Dkt. #75 at p. 3). Finally, Defendant argues that the individuals all appear by name in
the medical records and had well-defined roles in the surgery and post-surgery period, limiting
potential prejudice (Dkt. #75 at p. 3). Plaintiffs make several arguments in opposition (Dkt. #90 at
pp. 4–6), but the Court will mention two. First, Plaintiffs argue that prejudice exists because they
were unable to depose the individuals or propound targeted discovery for them because discovery
has closed. Second, they argue that each Defendant has independent obligations under Rule 26, so
it is irrelevant that a settled co-defendant included the individuals.
The Court disagrees that disclosures of co-defendants are irrelevant to the prejudice factor,
because they tend to bear on whether supplementation would cause unfair surprise. However,
because the Court does not know when the co-defendant settled, the Court cannot determine how
much weight to give to this fact. If the co-defendant settled recently, it is questionable that Plaintiffs
had any intention to conduct discovery about the individuals in his disclosures because they would
have done so already. If the co-defendant settled early, that would bolster Plaintiffs’ argument
Case 4:24-cv-00962-ALM Document 92 Filed 01/06/26 Page 12 of 13 PageID #:
<pageID>

13
because they would not know of the need to prepare for these individuals’ appearance at trial after
the disclosing co-defendant settled. The Court will thus consider this factor neutral.
The Court finds that the fourth factor, availability of a continuance to cure prejudice,
weighs against Defendant. Defendant argues that if any prejudice exists, a continuance will cure it
(Dkt. #75 at p. 3). Plaintiffs argue, among other things, that this case involves serious injuries and
ongoing suffering, and that Plaintiff Beverly Aleman deserves her day in court without further delay
(Dkt. #90 at p. 7). Trial is set for next month and a continuance is not available under the present
circumstances. Therefore, this factor weighs against the requested relief.
After considering the factors holistically, the Court concludes that permitting
supplementation at this time would not be substantially harmless. Accordingly, the Court will deny
Defendant’s motion for leave to supplement its Rule 26(a)(1)(A) disclosures (Dkt. #75).
CONCLUSION
It is therefore ORDERED that Defendant Flower Mound Hospital Partners LLC, d/b/a
Texas Health Presbyterian Hospital – Flower Mound’s Motion for Leave to Designate Responsible
Third Parties (Dkt. #63) and Opposed Motion for Leave to Supplement Rule 26(a)(1)(A)
Disclosure (Dkt. #75) are hereby DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Case 4:24-cv-00962-ALM Document 92 Filed 01/06/26 Page 13 of 13 PageID #:
<pageID>