Harris v. Carlson

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
SHERMAN DIVISION
THOMAS ROY HARRIS, JR., d/b/a
SPORTING ARMS COMPANY
v.
KRISSY Y. CARLSON, in her official
capacity as Director of Industry
Operations, Dallas Field Division,
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms
and Explosives
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CIVIL NO. 4:24-CV-737-SDJ
FILED UNDER SEAL
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before 	the 	Court 	is 	Petitioner’s 	Motion 	to 	Defer 	Summary 	Judgment
Proceedings or, in the Alternative, for Extension of Time. (Dkt. #11). Respondent filed
a brief in opposition. (Dkt. #12). Having considered the motion, the parties’ briefing,
and the applicable law, the Court concludes that the motion should be GRANTED
in part and DENIED in part.
I. B ACKGROUND
Petitioner Thomas Roy Harris, Jr. (“Harris”) has held a federal firearms license
(“FFL”) to engage in business as a firearms dealer since 1994. (Dkt. #1 ¶ 5). Harris
does business as “Sporting Arms Company,” which conducts business as both a retail
firearms dealer and a distributor for certain manufacturers. (Dkt. #1 ¶ 5). But after
an administrative hearing, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives
(“ATF”) denied Harris’s application to renew his FFL,1 finding that Harris willfully
1 On February 27, 2024, the ATF held an administrative hearing on its notice to revoke
Harris’s FFL. (Dkt. #1 ¶ 23). However, Harris’s FFL was set to expire on June 1, 2024—
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violated the Gun Control Act of 1968 (18 U.S.C. §§ 921, et seq.), and the regulations
issued thereunder (collectively “GCA”). (Dkt. #1 ¶ 29); (Dkt. #18 at 1–2).
The ATF alleges that Harris violated 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1)(A) on ten occasions
by willfully aiding and abetting a non-licensee in dealing firearms without a license.
(Dkt. #1 ¶ 21). Additionally, the ATF asserts that Harris violated 18 U.S.C. § 922(m)
and 27 C.F.R. § 478.123(c) on forty-six occasions by willfully making a false statement
or representation with respect to information required by the GCA. (Dkt. #1 ¶ 21).
These alleged violations all occurred in connection with Harris’s transfer of several
firearms to Chris Remley (“Remley”) and Lane Koroly (“Koroly”). (Dkt. #1 ¶¶ 12, 29).
According to the ATF, Harris began selling firearms to Remley and Koroly
after meeting them at a gun show in 2021. (Dkt. #10 at 3). Remley and Koroly
purchased forty-six firearms from Harris, attesting each time that Remley was “the
actual transferee/buyer of the firearms.” (Dkt. #1 ¶ 12). But Remley and Koroly
illegally resold the firearms for profit. (Dkt. #1 ¶¶ 14–17). As a result, they were
indicted for dealing firearms without a license, and both were convicted after pleading
guilty. (Dkt. #1 ¶ 17). The ATF’s revocation of Harris’s FFL rested on Remley and
Koroly’s 	guilty pleas along 	with the 	ATF’s 	investigation reports 	into 	the two
individuals. (Dkt. #18 at 569–72). The pleas for both individuals alleged that Harris
was fully aware that Remley and Koroly were not the true purchasers or transferees
of the firearms and that they planned to illegally sell the firearms Harris gave them.
(Dkt. #18 at 19) (Factual Basis for Chris Remley) (“Any firearms that were purchased
before the ATF’s revocation decision would be released—so the decision of the hearing was
converted to concern whether to deny Harris’s renewal application. (Dkt. #1 ¶ 25).
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from Thomas Harris, Sporting Arms Company FFL, were done so with Harris’[s] full
knowledge that they would be resold for profit and that I was not the true
purchaser/transferee.”); (Dkt. #18 at 21) (Factual Basis for Lane Koroly) (“Most
firearms that were purchased from Thomas Harris, Sporting Arms Company FFL,
were done so with Harris’[s] full knowledge that they would be resold for profit and
that I was not the true purchaser/transferee.”).
Harris tells a different story. According to him, in September 2021, Remley
and Koroly approached Harris for help in starting their own firearms business—
Elevated Firearms. (Dkt. #1 ¶¶ 10–13). Harris knew that Remley and Koroly were in
the process of obtaining their FFL because an ATF agent interviewed Harris to verify
some of Remley and Koroly’s qualifications. (Dkt. #1 ¶ 11). Harris transferred
forty-six firearms to Remley and completed ten 4473 Forms2 to supply Elevated
Firearms with stock and for Remley’s personal use. (Dkt. #1 ¶ 12). Without Harris’s
knowledge, Remley and Koroly then resold these firearms illegally because they had
not yet obtained their FFL. (Dkt. #1 ¶¶ 14–17).
To support his version of events, Harris provided witness statements from
Corey Staub (“Staub”), who has worked for another federal firearms licensee, and
Slade Turner (“Turner”), another federal firearms licensee. (Dkt. #1 ¶ 16). Both
witnesses 	claimed 	to 	know 	Harris, 	Remley, 	and 	Koroly, 	and 	provided 	their
understanding of the events that transpired. Staub and Turner explained that both
2 A Form 4473, or a firearms transaction record, is a form that must be completed for
the sale, transfer, or other disposition of a firearm between a federal firearms licensee and a
non-licensee. 27 C.F.R. § 478.124(a).
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Remley and Koroly had stated that they believed Harris was unaware of their illegal
sales. (Dkt. 1 ¶ 16); (Dkt. #18 at 309) (Witness Statement of Corey Staub) (“Remley
frequently boasted and laughed that he bought several guns from Sporting Arms to
resell them and that [Harris] didn’t know he was doing this.”); (Dkt. #18 at 169)
(Witness Statement of Slade Turner) (“[Remley] asked me not to tell [Harris] that he
was selling the shotgun at the Canton flea market.”). Nevertheless, the ATF found
that Harris’s statements and documents “lack[ed] credibility” and that the decision
to deny Harris’s renewal application was proper. (Dkt. #18 at 572).
Harris filed this lawsuit seeking judicial review of the ATF’s decision to revoke
his FFL and deny his renewal application. (Dkt. #1 ¶ 1). Respondent Krissy Y.
Carlson (“Carlson”), the Director of Industry Operations (“DIO”) for the Dallas field
division of the ATF, moved for summary judgment before the parties had conducted
any discovery. (Dkt. #10). Carlson asserts that “[t]here is no need for the parties to
engage in discovery for this Court to conduct its de novo review,” and that “the
[Certified Administrative Record] contains all evidence necessary for this Court to
determine that Respondent was authorized to revoke Petitioner’s FFL.” (Dkt. #10
at 2). In response, Harris moved to defer summary-judgment proceedings until after
limited discovery. (Dkt. #11). In particular, Harris seeks permission to (1) depose
Remley and Koroly, (2) obtain the ATF’s recordings of Remley’s and Koroly’s
interviews, (3) obtain the ATF’s instructions given to DIOs during revocation
proceedings, and (4) subpoena the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) for records on
Remley’s and Koroly’s criminal proceedings. (Dkt. #11 at 7–11).
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II. S TANDARD OF R EVIEW
Under the GCA, “[t]he Attorney General may, after notice and opportunity for
hearing, revoke any license issued under [the GCA] if the holder of such license has
willfully violated any provision of [the GCA] or any rule or regulation prescribed by
the Attorney General under [the GCA.]”3 18 U.S.C. § 923(e). A licensee may then
appeal to the district court. A district court’s review of a license revocation is de novo.
18 U.S.C. § 923(f)(3). While the district court may weigh the ATF’s conclusions as it
deems appropriate, it need not “attach any presumption of correctness to the ATF’s
decision.” Fairmont Cash Mgmt., L.L.C. v. James, 858 F.3d 356, 361 (5th Cir. 2017);
see also Stein’s, Inc. v. Blumenthal, 649 F.2d 463, 466–67 (7th Cir. 1980) (“the
decision 	of 	the 	Secretary 	is 	not 	necessarily 	clothed 	with 	any 	presumption 	of
correctness or other advantage” (quotation omitted)). The court, in its discretion,
“may consider evidence not presented at the administrative hearing,” or it “may enter
judgment 	solely 	based 	upon 	the 	administrative 	record.” 	18 U.S.C. 	§ 923(f)(3);
Fairmont Cash Mgmt., 858 F.3d at 361–2. “The ultimate decision as to the law and
the facts remains with” the district court. Stein’s, 649 F.2d at 466.
III. LEGAL S TANDARD
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d), a court may defer considering a
motion for summary judgment and allow the nonmovant time to take discovery if the
nonmovant shows that, “for specified reasons, [he] cannot present facts essential to
justify [his] opposition.” F ED. R. CIV. P. 56(d). Rule 56(d) motions are broadly favored
3 The Attorney General has delegated this authority to the ATF under 28 C.F.R.
§ 0.130. Fairmont Cash Mgmt., L.L.C. v. James, 858 F.3d 356, 361 (5th Cir. 2017).
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“[t]o provide litigants time to develop facts necessary to defend their claims,” and
“should be liberally granted.” Dominick v. Mayorkas, 52 F.4th 992, 995 (5th Cir. 2022)
(quotation omitted).
The movant must show how additional discovery will create a genuine issue of
material fact and may not rely on vague assertions or speculation. Int’l Shortstop,
Inc. v. Rally’s, Inc., 939 F.2d 1257, 1267 (5th Cir. 1991); see also January v. City of
Huntsville, 74 F.4th 646, 651–52 (5th Cir. 2023) (holding that providing a list of
discovery sought without specifying which facts the discovery would support or how
the 	“emergent 	facts” 	would 	influence 	the 	outcome 	of 	summary 	judgment 	is
insufficient to warrant additional time for discovery). In the context of petitions for
review brought under Section 923(f)(3), a district court may allow for additional
discovery when it would be useful for resolving a pending summary-judgment motion.
See Crusader Gun Grp., L.L.C. v. James, 118 F.4th 648, 654 (5th Cir. 2024) (quoting
Sapp v. Mem’l Hermann Healthcare Sys., 406 F.App’x 866, 870 (5th Cir. 2010) (per
curiam) (“Where discovery would not be useful to the resolution of a pending
summary judgment motion presenting a question of law, it is not an abuse of
discretion to grant such a motion to stay discovery.” (citation modified))). Ultimately,
“it 	is 	a 	court’s 	own 	decision 	whether 	to 	receive 	evidence 	in 	addition 	to 	the
administrative 	record.” 	Arwady 	Hand 	Trucks 	Sales, 	Inc. 	v. 	Vander 	Werf,
507 F.Supp.2d 754, 758 (S.D. Tex. 2007).
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IV. DISCUSSION
Harris requests four categories of discovery. After reviewing each request, the
Court grants in part and denies in part Harris’s discovery requests under Rule 56(d)
because he has shown that only some of the requested discovery may create genuine
issues of material fact.
A. Depositions of Remley and Koroly
Harris principally seeks to defer summary-judgment proceedings so that he
can depose Remley and Koroly. (Dkt. #11 at 7). Remley’s and Koroly’s guilty pleas
underpin nearly the entire factual basis of the ATF’s claim that Harris violated the
GCA. See (Dkt. #18 at 569–72) (Findings of the ATF Hearing). But Harris has
continually denied any knowledge of Remley and Koroly’s illegal activities. See, e.g.,
(Dkt. #1 ¶ 13) (“Petitioner believed that Remley and Koroly were operating in
compliance 	with 	federal 	firearms 	laws.”). 	And 	through 	Staub 	and 	Turner’s
declarations, Harris has given this Court reason to question the credibility of
Remley’s and Koroly’s statements. See (Dkt. #18 at 169, 309) (Staub and Turner’s
Statements); (Dkt. #1 ¶ 16).
Harris believes that by deposing Remley and Koroly he can “elicit testimony
directly probative of their truthfulness,” “show that Remley and Koroly . . . are not
credible,” and demonstrate “that Remley and Koroly falsely accused [Harris] of
backfilling Form 4473s, which is a practice that [Harris] suspects Remley has used
elsewhere.” (Dkt. #11 at 7). These are not “vague assertions,” but instead specifically
show how deposing Remley and Koroly will influence the outcome of summary
judgment, because a genuine dispute of Remley and Koroly’s credibility may preclude
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summary judgment. See Thomas v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 233 F.3d 326, 331
(5th Cir. 2000) (“[A] motion for summary judgment cannot be defeated solely by
conclusional allegations that a witness lacks credibility. Nevertheless, . . . when
questions about the credibility of key witnesses loom as large as they do here,
summary judgment is inappropriate.”); see also Lodge Hall Music, Inc. v. Waco
Wrangler Club, Inc., 831 F.2d 77, 81 (5th Cir. 1987) (“[W]here specific facts are alleged
that if proven would call the credibility of the moving party’s witness into doubt,
summary judgment is improper.”) Further, Remley and Koroly’s credibility is a
material fact that “looms large.” Because Remley and Koroly are the ATF’s key
witnesses, if they are not credible, the main issue of the case—whether Harris
“willfully violated” the GCA—is called into question. Cf Weaver v. Harris, 486 F.App’x
503, 506 (5th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (denying additional discovery because proposed
discovery was unrelated to whether GCA violations were willful, and therefore not
reasonably calculated to lead to discovery of admissible evidence); Moreno v. Bureau
of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, Explosives, 113 F.Supp.3d 916, 922 (W.D. Tex. 2015)
(citing Weaver, 486 F.App’x at 505–06). Accordingly, Harris’s request to depose
Remley and Koroly will be granted.
B. Discovery of Recordings of the Remley and Koroly Interviews
The Court also finds that it would be useful to grant Harris’s request for the
recordings of Remley’s and Koroly’s ATF interviews. The Supreme Court has
emphasized the importance of “the variations in demeanor and tone of voice that bear
so heavily on the listener’s understanding of and belief in what is said” when
determining the credibility of a witness. Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S.
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564, 575, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985). Yet here, the administrative record
contains only summaries of the interviews conducted by the ATF agents, while
acknowledging that recordings of those interviews exist. See (Dkt. #18 at 25) (“The
above is a summary of the interview; refer to the recording for all statements made.”).
Harris believes that the audio recordings of the ATF’s interviews will provide better
insight into the accuracy of the ATF’s written summaries, and, like the depositions,
may 	help 	demonstrate 	that 	Remley 	and 	Koroly’s 	statements 	lack 	credibility.
(Dkt. #11 at 9).
As stated above, Harris has given this Court reason to question Remley’s and
Koroly’s credibility. See (Dkt. #18 at 309) (Witness Statement of Corey Staub);
(Dkt. #18 at 169) (Witness Statement of Slade Turner); (Dkt. #1 ¶ 16). Therefore, the
Court finds that the recordings of Remley’s and Koroly’s interviews will be useful in
resolving the ATF’s pending summary-judgment motion. See Thomas, 233 F.3d
at 331 	(explaining 	why 	witness 	credibility 	impacts 	summary 	judgment); 	Int’l
Shortstop, 939 F.2d at 1267 (explaining requirements for additional discovery to be
granted). Accordingly, Harris’s request for the recordings of Remley’s and Koroly’s
interviews will be granted.
C. Discovery of Instructions to Directors of Industry Operations
Harris also requests permission to conduct written discovery so he can “request
from the ATF any instructions provided to directors of industry operations—or other
officials when deciding revocation (and similar) proceedings—over recent years.”
(Dkt. #11 at 10). But, unlike his first two requests, Harris’s justifications for this
request are vague and speculative.
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Harris argues that any instructions the ATF provided to directors of industry
operations will help determine “the fairness of the administrative proceedings” and
could 	“compel 	viewing 	those 	administrative 	proceedings 	with 	skepticism.”
(Dkt. #11 at 10). However, other than providing an article explaining the effect that
the Biden administration’s “zero tolerance policy” has had in increasing the rate at
which FFLs were revoked, Harris provides no reasonable basis for the Court to
believe that his administrative proceeding was unfair. (Dkt. #11 at 10). Therefore,
the Court does not believe that this request would be useful in resolving the ATF’s
pending summary-judgment motion, and the request will be denied. See Weaver, 486
F.App’x at 506 (denying discovery of internal ATF materials because the proposed
inquiry was unrelated to the issue of willfulness and not reasonably calculated to lead
to the discovery of admissible evidence); Int’l Shortstop, 939 F.2d at 1267 (explaining
requirements for additional discovery to be granted).
D. Subpoenas to DOJ Concerning Criminal Proceedings
Finally, Harris’s justification for his request “to send a subpoena to the
Department of Justice to obtain records related to Remley’s and Koroly’s criminal
proceedings,” (Dkt. #11 at 10), is also speculative. Harris suggests that if “an
agreement 	(or 	offer) 	for 	a 	downward-departure 	recommendation 	was 	made 	in
exchange for Remley’s or Koroly’s ‘corroboration’ against [Harris], such evidence
would illustrate their biases against Petitioner and severely undermine [Carlson’s]
arguments.” (Dkt. #11 at 11). Carlson has stated that neither Remley nor Koroly
“receive[d] any favorable treatment from the ATF” by explaining Harris’s alleged
involvement in the conspiracy. (Dkt. #10 at 10–11). While Harris points out that
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“[Remley’s and Koroly’s] statements would lack credibility even if they merely
thought that they might receive favorable treatment,” the Court does not believe that
allowing a subpoena directed to the DOJ would help resolve the ATF’s pending
summary-judgment motion. (Dkt. #14 at 5); see Int’l Shortstop, 939 F.2d at 1267
(explaining 	requirements 	for 	additional 	discovery 	to 	be 	granted). 	Any 	useful
information that might come from such a subpoena may be obtained through the
other discovery this Court is allowing Harris to conduct. For example, Harris can ask
Remley or Koroly during their depositions if they were offered or thought they might
be offered an agreement in exchange for their statements against him. Harris can
also listen to the recordings of their ATF interviews to discern whether Remley or
Koroly had any reason to believe that the ATF would provide favorable treatment in
exchange for their statements implicating Harris. For the reasons stated above, this
Court therefore denies Harris’s request to subpoena the DOJ for records related to
Remley’s and Koroly’s criminal proceedings.
* 	* 	*
This Court has the authority to grant additional discovery if it believes such
discovery would help resolve the ATF’s pending summary-judgment motion. See
Crusader Gun Grp., 118 F.4th at 654 (explaining when a district court should grant
discovery when reviewing an ATF decision). Harris has shown how deposing Remley
and Koroly and obtaining recordings of their ATF interviews could help resolve the
pending summary-judgment motion. But Harris has not shown how his requests for
the ATF’s instructions to DIOs or subpoenas to the DOJ will create genuine issues of
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material fact. Because the Court has granted Harris’ motion in part, it denies his
alternative request for extension of time.
V. CONCLUSION
It is therefore ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion to Defer Summary Judgment
Proceedings or, in the Alternative, for Extension of Time, (Dkt. #11), is GRANTED
in part and DENIED in part.
It is further ORDERED that the stay of proceedings in this case is LIFTED.
Plaintiff Harris may conduct the discovery authorized by this Order, which shall be
completed by no later than April 30, 2026. The Court defers consideration of
Respondent’s Motion for Summary Judgment, (Dkt. #10), pending the completion of
such discovery.
Plaintiff Harris must file his response to the pending summary-judgment
motion by May 15, 2026. Respondent may file a reply in support of summary
judgment by no later than May 22, 2026.
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