Sneed et al v. Gibbs et al

United States District Court
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
SHERMAN DIVISION
KATHRYN SNEED and SNEED
EQUESTRIAN ESTATES, LLC,
Plaintiffs,
v.
JEFFREY GIBBS, CALLI ROUSE,
GIBBS SHOW HORSES, CALLI ROUSE
SHOW HORSES, FRANK BONAPARTE,
FRANK BONAPARTE IN HIS
CAPACITY AS CO-TRUSTEE OF THE
BONAPARTE FAMILY LIVING TRUST,
PATRICIA BONAPARTE, PATRICIA
BONAPARTE IN HER CAPACITY AS
CO-TRUSTEE OF THE BONAPARTE
FAMILY LIVING TRUST, JUSTIN
SCHMIDT, JEANNIE SCHMIDT,
HAILO INVESTMENTS, LLC, DR.
CAMERON STOUDT DONNELL,
EQUINE SPORTS MEDICINE AND
REHABILITATION, DR. DALTON
PATE, and MID-SOUTH EQUINE
SPORTS MEDICINE & SURGERY
Defendants.
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Civil Action No. 4:23-cv-871
Judge Mazzant
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Pending before the Court are several motions:
• Defendants Cameron Stoudt Donnell, D.V.M., and Equine Sports
Medicine’s Motion for Summary Judgment Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
56 (Dkt. #123).
• Defendants Mid-South Equine Sports Rehabilitation and Dr. Dalton
Pate’s Motion for Summary Judgment Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56
(Dkt. #145);
• Defendants Justin Schmidt, Jeannie Schmidt, and Hailo Investments,
LLC’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. #146); and
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• The Hailo Defendants’ Corrected Motion Re-urging and
Supplementing Defendants’ Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony
(DOC 141) and Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (DOC 146)
(the “Motion to Re-urge”) (Dkt. #169).
Having considered the Motions and the relevant pleadings, the Court finds that the
Motions for Summary Judgment should be GRANTED, and the Motion to Re-urge should be
DENIED as moot.
BACKGROUND
This is a negligence and veterinary malpractice case. The facts of the case are more
thoroughly set forth in the Court’s January 12, 2026 Memorandum Opinion and Order
(the “Memorandum Order”). An abbreviated summary follows.
Plaintiffs Dr. Kathryn Sneed (“Dr. Sneed”)1 and her company, Sneed Equestrian Estates,
LLC, filed suit against several groups of defendants seeking recovery for the injury or death of five
show horses. Three out of the five groups of defendants in the case filed motions for summary
judgment (Dkt. #123; Dkt. #145; Dkt. #146).
On July 17, 2025, Defendants Cameron Stoudt Donnell, D.V.M. (“Dr. Stoudt”), and
Mendota Equine Sports Medicine, PLLC d/b/a Equine Sports Medicine2 (“ESM” and together
with Dr. Stoudt, the “Stoudt Defendants”) moved for summary judgment (Dkt. #123). The Court
allowed Plaintiffs to file a late response, which they filed on August 25, 2025 (Dkt. #132). The
Stoudt Defendants filed a reply, and Plaintiffs filed a sur-reply (Dkt. #137; Dkt. #148). The reply
1 The operative complaint identifies Plaintiff Kathryn Sneed without using the “Dr.” title (See, e.g., Dkt. 94 at p. 3).
But Sneed Equestrian Estates, LLC’s Corporate Disclosure Statement (Dkt. #168) identifies her as “Dr. Kathryn
Sneed,” so the Court does the same.
2 In its Rule 7.1(a)(2) Disclosure Statement (Dkt. #164), Mendota Equine Sports Medicine, PLLC alleges it was
erroneously identified as Equine Sports Medicine and Rehabilitation in Plaintiffs’ complaint.
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included objections to the evidence attached to Plaintiffs’ response (Dkt. #137-1). The Stoudt
Defendants filed supplemental objections to Plaintiffs’ sur-reply (Dkt. #140).
On September 15, 2025, Defendants Mid-South Equine Sports Medicine and
Rehabilitation and Dr. Dalton Pate (“Dr. Pate”) (collectively “Mid-South Defendants”), moved
for summary judgment (Dkt. #145). Plaintiffs responded, and the Mid-South Defendants replied
(Dkt. #150; Dkt. #153). Plaintiffs then filed a sur-reply (Dkt. #154).
On September 15, 2025, Defendants Justin Schmidt, Jeannie Schmidt, and Hailo
Investments, LLC (collectively the “Hailo Defendants”) moved for summary judgment
(Dkt. #146). Plaintiffs responded, and the Hailo Defendants replied (Dkt. #151; Dkt. #152).
Each Motion for Summary Judgment attaches, among other evidence, testimony from
licensed veterinarians. Reese Hand, DVM, claims that Dr. Stoudt met or exceeded the veterinary
standard of care (Dkt. #123-12 at p. 2). He also claims that, based on the incubation period and the
timing of the symptoms, Plaintiffs’ horses were not exposed to strangles3 during their stay in the
property owned by the Hailo Defendants (Dkt. #146-4 at p. 4). The Mid-South Defendants provide
the testimony of Bruce Lyle, DVM, who claims that Dr. Pate also met or exceeded the veterinary
standard of care (Dkt. #145-4).
When responding to the Motions for Summary Judgment, Plaintiffs requested more time
for discovery and quoted their expert disclosures (Dkt. #132 at pp. 12, 16–17; Dkt. #150 at pp. 7,
10–11; Dkt. #151 at pp. 5, 7–8).4
3 Streptococcus equi, referred to as “strangles,” is a bacterial infection that affects horses of all ages (Dkt. #146-4).
4 Plaintiffs did not attach their expert disclosures as a separate document as required by Local Rule CV-5(a)(6).
Additionally, Plaintiffs responses to two of the Motions for Summary Judgment fail to include a response to the
movants’ statement of material facts (Dkt. #150; Dkt. #151), violating Local Rule CV-56(b). Given that the Motions
for Summary Judgment will be granted, the Court need not address these violations further.
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The Hailo Defendants, and another group of Defendants not addressed here, moved to
exclude Plaintiffs’ non-retained experts because Plaintiffs’ expert disclosures failed to provide a
summary of facts and opinions (Dkt. #141; Dkt. #142). Plaintiffs did not respond to the Hailo
Defendants’ motion to exclude.
On January 12, 2026, the Court issued its Memorandum Opinion and Order (Dkt. #163)
(the “Memorandum Order”). The Court found that Plaintiffs’ expert disclosures violated Rule 26
because they provided general topics of testimony rather than the experts’ opinions (Dkt. #163 at
pp. 13, 14). Despite the fact that Plaintiffs filed no response and violated Rule 26, the Court denied
the motions to exclude without prejudice, giving Plaintiffs an opportunity to amend their
disclosures instead of excluding Plaintiffs’ experts (Dkt. #163 at pp. 13, 15). In its decision to deny
the motions to exclude, the Court gave significant weight to the importance of expert testimony in
the case given the pending Motions for Summary Judgment. The Memorandum Order strongly
advised Plaintiffs “to amend or supplement their responses [to the Motions for Summary
Judgment] if discovery enables them to meaningfully respond” (Dkt. #163 at p. 12). Otherwise, the
Court explained, it would “take up the motions for summary judgment as currently briefed”
(Dkt. #163 at p. 12). The Memorandum Order also required Plaintiffs to file a notice of compliance
with the Court by January 26, 2026 (Dkt. #163).5 Plaintiffs did not comply.
5 On January 26, 2026, a disclosure statement providing the citizenship of Plaintiff Sneed Equestrian Estates, LLC,
was also due (Dkt. #162). Plaintiffs did not comply. On its own accord, the Court extended the deadline (Dkt. #166).
The LLC has now filed its disclosure statement (Dkt. #168). It states that the LLC’s “sole managing member is Dr.
Kathryn Sneed,” a citizen of Tennessee (Dkt. #168). The disclosure statement leaves ambiguous whether all of the
LLC’s members have been identified. See, e.g., Forsyth Bus. Ctr. LLC v. Westchester Surplus Lines Ins. Co., No. 6:24-
CV-28-JA-DCI, 2024 WL 580135, at *1–2 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 13, 2024) (ordering amended disclosure statement
because “Plaintiff is required to identify all its members, not just its ‘sole Managing-Member.’”). Plaintiffs must
remedy this deficiency no later than February 17, 2026.
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On February 6, 2026, the Hailo Defendants filed their Motion to Re-urge (Dkt. #169). They
represent that, since the issuance of the Memorandum Order, Plaintiffs have not filed any amended
expert disclosures or served any other expert discovery. The Hailo Defendants therefore ask the
Court to take up their motion for summary judgment and revisit the unopposed motion to exclude
that it denied without prejudice. The response is not yet due, but none is needed.
This case has been pending since 2023, and the individual Hailo Defendants were included
in the lawsuit from the start (Dkt. #1). Several months have passed since Plaintiffs requested more
time for discovery in response to the Motions for Summary Judgment. Despite the Court extending
the discovery period to February 27, 2026—and giving Plaintiffs the opportunity to amend their
summary judgment responses and deficient expert disclosures—Plaintiffs failed to comply with
several Court orders (Dkt. #162; Dkt. #163).
Given that Plaintiffs have not taken advantage of the Court’s extensions so far, the Court
sees no reason for further delay. Thus, the Court now resolves the Motions for Summary Judgment
as currently briefed.
LEGAL STANDARD
The purpose of summary judgment is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims
or defenses. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323–24 (1986). Summary judgment is proper
under Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). A dispute about a material fact is genuine when “the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Substantive law identifies which facts are material. Id. The trial court “must
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resolve all reasonable doubts in favor of the party opposing the motion [for summary judgment].”
Casey Enters., Inc. v. Am. Hardware Mut. Ins. Co., 655 F.2d 598, 602 (5th Cir. 1981).
The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the court of its
motion and identifying “depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or
declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions,
interrogatory answers, or other materials” that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(1)(A); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. If the movant bears the burden
of proof on a claim or defense for which it is moving for summary judgment, it must come forward
with evidence that establishes “beyond peradventure all of the essential elements of the claim or
defense.” Fontenot v. Upjohn Co., 780 F.2d 1190, 1194 (5th Cir. 1986). Where the nonmovant bears
the burden of proof, the movant may discharge the burden by showing that there is an absence of
evidence to support the nonmovant’s case. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325; Byers v. Dall. Morning News,
Inc., 209 F.3d 419, 424 (5th Cir. 2000). Once the movant has carried its burden, the nonmovant
must “respond to the motion for summary judgment by setting forth particular facts indicating
there is a genuine issue for trial.” Byers, 209 F.3d at 424 (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248–49). A
nonmovant must present affirmative evidence to defeat a properly supported motion for summary
judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257. Mere denials of material facts, unsworn allegations, or
arguments and assertions in briefs or legal memoranda will not suffice to carry this burden. See
Solomon v. Hous. Corrugated Box Co., 526 F.2d 389, 396–97 (5th Cir. 1976). Rather, the Court
requires “significant probative evidence” from the nonmovant to dismiss a request for summary
judgment. In re Mun. Bond Reporting Antitrust Litig., 672 F.2d 436, 440 (5th Cir. 1982) (quoting
Ferguson v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 584 F.2d 111, 114 (5th Cir. 1978)). The Court must consider all of the
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evidence but “refrain from making credibility determinations or weighing the evidence.” Turner v.
Baylor Richardson Med. Ctr., 476 F.3d 337, 343 (5th Cir. 2007).
ANALYSIS
Although each Motion for Summary Judgment raises numerous grounds that Plaintiffs fail
to adequately address, the Court need only address one: the absence of expert testimony.
To start, even assuming Plaintiffs’ expert disclosures are competent summary judgment
evidence, the Court will not consider them because Plaintiffs failed to comply with the Court’s
Memorandum Order which allowed Plaintiffs to amend the disclosures to comply with Rule 26.6
The Stoudt Defendants, the Mid-South Defendants, and the Hailo Defendants
(collectively, “Defendants”) each argue that no genuine issue of material fact exists because
Plaintiffs failed to provide expert testimony addressing several dispositive issues. The Court agrees.
Under Texas law, a veterinary malpractice claim requires “expert testimony . . . from a
member of the veterinary medical profession with education, skill and experience similar to those
of the defendant.” Simpson v. Baronne Veterinary Clinic, Inc., 803 F. Supp. 2d 602, 607 (S.D. Tex.
2011) (citing Downing v. Gully, 915 S.W.2d 181, 185–86 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth, 1996, writ
denied)); accord McGee v. Smith, 107 S.W.3d 725, 727 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, pet. denied).
Although there could be an exception to this general rule in a case where “the form or mode
of treatment is a matter of common knowledge, or the matter is within the experience of a
layperson,” Smith, 107 S.W.3d at 727 (citation omitted), the Court sees no reason to hold that this
is one of those cases. Nor do Plaintiffs argue that an exception applies. Instead, Plaintiffs dispute
6 All of Plaintiffs’ non-retained expert opinions are excluded from the case, with two exceptions: Dr. Kevin Claunch’s
opinion that “Ava’s injury could only have been caused by 1) running into a fixed object with the head down; 2) a
rotational fall; 3) by flipping over” (Dkt. #141-1 at p. 6), and Charles S. North’s opinions regarding reasonable and
necessary attorney’s fees (Dkt. #141-1 at p. 5).
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that expert testimony is required in veterinary malpractice cases, relying on Pruitt v. Box, 984 S.W.
2d 709, 711 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1998, no pet.). In dicta, the Pruitt court expressed skepticism that
the same standard of care governs veterinary and medical malpractice. Id. But, in that case, the
court reviewed a grant of summary judgment “decided by a battle of expert affidavits.” Id. at 710.
Because Pruitt had competing expert testimony from veterinarians, it is inapposite here. To resolve
the Motions for Summary Judgment, the Court need not decide if veterinary and medical
malpractice have the same standard of care, but whether expert testimony is required here. It is.
Given the multiple potential sources of harm to Plaintiffs’ horses— including alleged abuse and
illness that pre-dated Dr. Stoudt7 and Dr. Pate’s treatment— a finding of breach and causation
would require experience beyond that of a layperson. The Stoudt Defendants and the Mid-South
Defendants are therefore entitled to summary judgment.
The Declaration of Kathryn Sneed (Dkt. #132-1), attached in response only to the Stoudt
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, is insufficient to avoid this result. As the Court
advised in its Memorandum Order, “as a general rule, the admissibility of evidence on a motion for
summary judgment is subject to the same rules that govern the admissibility of evidence at trial”
(Dkt. #163 at p. 12 (citation modified)). “This means that . . . the evidentiary requirements for
expert testimony . . . apply to any evidence Plaintiffs seek to use to demonstrate the existence of a
genuine issue of material fact” (Dkt. #163 at p. 12). The Declaration plainly does not satisfy Federal
Rule of Evidence 702’s evidentiary requirements.
7 Dr. Stoudt submitted an affidavit with her Motion for Summary Judgment, which states that prior to providing
emergency treatment to one of Plaintiffs’ horses on August 10, 2023, she never treated any of Plaintiffs’ horses
(Dkt. #123-10 at p. 5). Plaintiffs failed to controvert her affidavit with competent evidence.
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The Smith case is instructive. There, to prove that a foal died from malnourishment, the
plaintiff relied on his own testimony and that of his father-in-law. Smith, 107 S.W.3d at 727.
“Although both men had been involved in the horse industry for many years, neither was qualified
in veterinary medicine.” Id. The only experts in the case testified in favor of the defendant
veterinarian on issues of breach and causation. Id. at 727–28. Because the plaintiff failed to
introduce controverting expert testimony, the Smith court reversed the district court’s denial of
judgment as a matter of law and rendered judgment for the veterinarian. Id. Here, the Court does
not doubt that Dr. Sneed has significant experience training and caring for her horses, but that is
not legally sufficient to controvert testimony from licensed veterinarians on breach and causation.
The Hailo Defendants are also entitled to summary judgment. Although the negligence
claim against them is not based on a veterinary malpractice theory, their motion for summary
judgment implicates veterinary medicine. According to their expert, the incubation period for
strangles and the timing of the horses’ symptoms indicate that the horses could not have been
exposed to strangles during their stay at the Hailo Defendants’ property (Dkt. #146-4 at p. 4).
Plaintiffs offered no evidence to controvert his testimony. Accordingly, the Hailo Defendants are
entitled to summary judgment.
In sum, no genuine issue of material fact exists as to Defendants’ liability. As a result,
summary judgment will be granted.
CONCLUSION
It is therefore ORDERED that Defendants Cameron Stoudt Donnell, D.V.M., and Equine
Sports Medicine’s Motion for Summary Judgment Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (Dkt. #123),
Mid-South Equine Sports Rehabilitation and Dr. Dalton Pate’s Motion for Summary Judgment
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Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (Dkt. #145), and Defendants Justin Schmidt, Jeannie Schmidt, and
Hailo Investments, LLC’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. #146) are hereby GRANTED.
It is further ORDERED that all claims against Defendants Cameron Stoudt Donnell,
D.V.M., Equine Sports Medicine and Rehabilitation, Mid-South Equine Sports Rehabilitation, Dr.
Dalton Pate, Justin Schmidt, Jeannie Schmidt, and Hailo Investments, LLC are DISMISSED
with prejudice.
It is further ORDERED that the Hailo Defendants’ Corrected Motion Re-urging and
Supplementing Defendants’ Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony (DOC 141) and Defendants’
Motion for Summary Judgment (DOC 146) (Dkt. #169) is DENIED as moot.
It is further ORDERED that Plaintiff Sneed Equestrian Estates, LLC must file an
Amended Corporate Disclosure Statement identifying all of its members, whether managing or
non-managing, no later than February 17, 2026.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
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