EireOg Innovations Ltd. v. Cisco Systems Inc.

2:24-cv-00224Txed6 apr 2026

Testo completo

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
MARSHALL DIVISION
EIREOG INNOVATIONS LTD.,
Plaintiff,
v.
CISCO SYSTEMS INC.,
Defendant.
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Case No. 2:24-cv-00224-RWS-RSP
(Lead Case)
MEMORANDUM ORDER
Before the Court is Plaintiff EireOg Innovations LTD’s (“EireOg”) Motion to Exclude
Certain Opinions of Dr. Emmett Witchel and to Strike Portions of His Expert Reports. Dkt. No.
189. In the Motion, Plaintiff argues that Dr. Witchel’s written description and anticipation opinions
apply the incorrect legal standard, and that his report offers untimely claim construction opinions.
Having considered the Motion, and for the reasons discussed below, the Motion is DENIED.
I. 	BACKGROUND
In the instant Case, EireOg has accused Cisco products that contain certain Intel and AMD
chips of infringing U.S. Patent Nos. 8,504,777 (“the ’777 patent”), 9,436,626 (“the ’626 patent”)
and 9,442,870 (“the ’870 patent”) (together, “asserted patents”).1 See generally Dkt. No. 1. The
asserted patents are generally directed at managing “virtual divisions” of computer chips, which
allow each “partition” to operate as a separate machine. As a defense to infringement of the ’777
patent, Defendant argues that it lacks adequate written description support, and is anticipated by
the prior art. Defendant supports these defenses with testimony from its technical expert, Dr.
Witchel.
1 U.S. Patent No. 8,117,399 (“the ’399 patent”), is no longer asserted in this Case.
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II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
An expert witness may provide opinion testimony if “(a) the expert’s scientific, technical,
or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine
a fact in issue; (b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; (c) the testimony is the product
of reliable principles and methods; and (d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and
methods to the facts of the case.” Fed. R. Evid. 702.
Rule 702 requires a district court to make a preliminary determination, when requested, as
to whether the requirements of the rule are satisfied with regard to a particular expert’s proposed
testimony. See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 149 (1999); Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592-93 (1993). District courts are accorded broad discretion in making
Rule 702 determinations of admissibility. Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 152 (“the trial judge must have
considerable leeway in deciding in a particular case how to go about determining whether
particular expert testimony is reliable”). Although the Fifth Circuit and other courts have identified
various factors that the district court may consider in determining whether an expert’s testimony
should be admitted, the nature of the factors that are appropriate for the court to consider is dictated
by the ultimate inquiry—whether the expert’s testimony is sufficiently reliable and relevant to be
helpful to the finder of fact and thus to warrant admission at trial. United States v. Valencia, 600
F.3d 389, 424 (5th Cir. 2010).
Importantly, in a jury trial setting, the Court’s role under Daubert is not to weigh the expert
testimony to the point of supplanting the jury’s fact-finding role; instead, the Court’s role is limited
to that of a gatekeeper, ensuring that the evidence in dispute is at least sufficiently reliable and
relevant to the issue before the jury that it is appropriate for the jury’s consideration. See Micro
Chem., Inc. v. Lextron, Inc., 317 F.3d 1387, 1391-92 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (applying Fifth Circuit law)
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(“When, as here, the parties’ experts rely on conflicting sets of facts, it is not the role of the trial
court to evaluate the correctness of facts underlying one expert’s testimony.”); Pipitone v.
Biomatrix, Inc., 288 F.3d 239, 249-50 (5th Cir. 2002) (“‘[t]he trial court’s role as gatekeeper [under
Daubert] is not intended to serve as a replacement for the adversary system.’ . . . Thus, while
exercising its role as a gate-keeper, a trial court must take care not to transform a Daubert hearing
into a trial on the merits,” quoting Fed. R. Evid. 702 advisory committee note). As the Supreme
Court explained in Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596, “Vigorous cross-examination, presentation of
contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate
means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence.” See Mathis v. Exxon Corp., 302 F.3d 448, 461
(5th Cir. 2002).
III. 	ANALYSIS
A. 	Written Description
Plaintiff argues that Dr. Witchel’s written description opinions should be excluded because
they improperly compare the written description to the accused products. Id. at 2. Plaintiff notes
that Dr. Witchel’s report admits that his written description opinions are based on “what
[Plaintiff’s] infringement theories were and the terms that they used and then [he] tried to see if
those were supported in the written description of the patent.” Id. at 2-3. Plaintiff cites Dr.
Witchel’s testimony, where he purports to admit the asserted claims meet the written description
requirement
Q. … [A]re you offering any opinion that there is a claim limitation of Claim 16 of the
’777 patent that is not adequately described in the patent specification such that the claim
is invalid under the written description requirement?
A. No. I believe that the claims, as written, can be understood by a person of ordinary skill
in the art.
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Q. You believe that the claims as written are adequately described in the specification such
that a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand that the inventors were in
possession of the invention?
A. Yes, I believe that they -- they constitute an adequate description of the full scope of
what is claimed. Dkt. No. 189-4 at 145:17-146:11.
Plaintiff cites several portions of Dr. Witchel’s report, and argues that he improperly compares the
accused products to the ’777 patent’s written description. See e.g. Dkt. No. 189 at 3 (“he opines
that there is not ‘any disclosure in the 777 patent of a decoration being used to alter the number of
bytes that are written to the target memory,’ which is an aspect of EireOg’s infringement theory.”).
Plaintiff concludes that because Dr. Witchel improperly applies the law, his opinions are improper
and should be excluded.
Defendant responds that while Plaintiff is correct to characterize Dr. Witchel’s written
description opinions as “rooted in [Plaintiff’s] infringement theories,” Plaintiff is incorrect to argue
he directly compares the accused product to the ’777 patent’s written description. Dkt. No. 261 at
9. Defendant identifies several portions of Dr. Witchel’s report to explain that under Plaintiff’s
infringement theories, the asserted claims lack written description support. Id. at 10. Defendant
argues this is consistent with the Federal Circuit’s requirement that claims be construed the same
way for infringement as for invalidity. Id.
“A patent may not, like a nose of wax, be twisted one way to avoid anticipation and another
to find infringement.” Amazon.com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 239 F.3d 1343, 1351 (Fed.
Cir. 2001) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Plaintiff overlooks the Federal
Circuit’s clear command that patent terms must be interpreted the same for infringement and
invalidity purposes.
Plaintiff provides no evidence to demonstrate that Dr. Witchel makes any direct
comparison between the accused products and the ’777 patent’s written description. Instead, Dr.
Witchel made this comparison through his written description analysis, as understood by
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Plaintiff’s infringement theories. While Dr. Witchel’s analysis strays from his understanding of
the ’777 patent’s claims,2 he does so to argue that Plaintiff’s infringement and invalidity positions
are necessarily inconsistent. His conclusion – that if the accused products infringe under Plaintiff’s
theories, the asserted claims are invalid for lack of written description – is not inconsistent with
the Federal Circuit’s command. Therefore, the Court finds Dr. Witchel’s written description
analysis should not be stricken.
B. 	Anticipation
The same misunderstanding underlies Plaintiff’s anticipation argument. Plaintiff argues
that Dr. Witchel opines to an improper “practicing the prior art” infringement defense, because his
anticipation analysis is based on “[Plaintiff’s] infringement theories,” and not the claims
themselves. Dkt. No. 189 at 5.
Patent terms must be interpreted in the same way for infringement and invalidity purposes.
See Amazon, 239 F.3d at 1351. Therefore, an anticipation analysis may consider the patent claims
as informed by Plaintiff’s infringement theories. Dr. Witchel’s invalidity report seeks to do that.
Therefore, the Court finds Dr. Witchel’s anticipation analysis should not be stricken on that basis.
C. 	Claim Construction
1. 	“two operations”
Plaintiff argues that Dr. Witchel’s report improperly adds a limitation to claim 16 of the
’777 Patent, that requires “two operations” to perform the claimed “decoration operation.” Dkt.
No. 189 at 9. Plaintiff adds that Dr. Witchel’s report, which purports to interpret the claim’s plain
meaning, is contradicted by the claim language, which Plaintiff argues contains no mention of a
2 Dr. Witchel’s testimony, where he testifies that the claims have proper written description support, merely admits
that to his understanding, the ’777 patent has proper written description support. This testimony does not opine to
whether under Plaintiff’s understanding, outlined in their infringement theories, the ’777 patent has proper written
description support.
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second 	operation 	requirement. 	Id. at 	9-10. Plaintiff 	notes 	that 	Dr. 	Witchel 	provides 	no
“lexicography or disclaimer” to support his theories and instead relies on examples “from the
specification.” Id. Plaintiff argues that this reliance is misplaced, because other examples in the
specification “are not associated with multiple operations.” Id. at 10.
2. 	“decoration operation”
Plaintiff argues that Dr. Witchel’s report improperly adds a limitation to claim 16 of the
’777 Patent, that requires the claimed “decoration operation” to “result in the memory controller
performing an operation that would otherwise be performed by the processor core.” Dkt. No. 189
at 11. Plaintiff refutes Dr. Witchel’s claim that he opines to the claim’s plain meaning and cites to
his repeated inability to “provide a citation to any portion of the specification” for his analysis. Id.
Plaintiff points to the claim language, which does not mention any “operations that would
otherwise be performed by the processor core.” Id. at 12.
3. 	“decoration value”
Plaintiff argues that Dr. Witchel’s report improperly adds a limitation to claim 16 of the
’777 Patent, that requires a “decoration value” to be provided to the memory controller. Dkt. No.
189 at 13. Plaintiff refutes Dr. Witchel’s claim that he opines to the claim’s plain meaning and
cites to his repeated inability to “provide a citation to any portion of the specification,” or “any
lexicography or disclaimer in the intrinsic record” that supports his analysis. Id. Plaintiff adds that
in his deposition, Dr. Witchel admitted that a “decoration value” may be included, which Plaintiff
argues implies such a value is not required. Id. at 14.
4. 	“plain and ordinary” meaning
Defendant responds that Dr. Witchel’s non-infringement analysis merely applies the plain
and ordinary meaning of claim 16 of the ’777 Patent and adds no limitations to the claim. Dkt. No.
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261 at 12. Defendant notes that Dr. Witchel’s report relies on Plaintiff’s infringement theories,
along with the ’777 Patent’s specification and prosecution history, to provide his non-infringement
analysis. Id. Defendant adds that Dr. Witchel does not “rely on any claim construction or legal
argument…principles such as lexicography, disavowal, or claim differentiation, and…any
distinctions in the prosecution history over prior art.” Id. at 13 (cleaned up). Defendant argues that
Dr. Witchel’s analysis – where he opines the “accused functionality does not meet the text of the
limitation” – is repeatedly permitted by courts and does not constitute claim construction. Id.
5. 	Analysis
The Court finds that Dr. Witchel’s infringement report does not improperly perform claim
construction. Plaintiff provides several examples of non-infringement opinions “contradicted” by
the claim language. However, determining a term’s plain and ordinary meaning commonly
requires analysis outside the patent’s specification. Dr. Witchel’s report does not purport to rely
on any claim construction methods. Instead, he applies his expertise to the terms’ plain and
ordinary meaning to form his non-infringement opinions. Because no claim construction
arguments were made, Plaintiff’s argument fails. Therefore, Dr. Witchel’s analysis should not be
stricken.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s Motion should be, and
hereby is, DENIED.
.
____________________________________
ROY S. PAYNE
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
SIGNED this 3rd day of January, 2012.
SIGNED this 6th day of April, 2026.
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