USA v. Graham et al

1:25-cr-00038Txed17 apr 2026

Testo completo

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
BEAUMONT DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
vs.
DAVID DRAKE,
a/k/a Riley Graham,
Defendant.
NO. 1:25-CR-38
REPORT RECOMMENDING DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTIONS
Pro se Defendant, David Drake a/k/a Riley Graham, filed multiple handwritten motions
seeking dismissal of the charges and other relief based on alleged constitutional violations and
purported defects in the charging documents. The motions were referred to the undersigned
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636. Despite the difficulty in deciphering Defendant’s submissions, the
undersigned has made a good-faith effort to construe the filings liberally and identify the issues
presented. Pending before the court are:
“Motion for Court to View Counts 1-15 of the Indictment as One Single Course
of Conduct Charged by the Government as Occurring From June 2019,
Continuing Up to and Including 2024” (Dkt. #83)1;
“NOTICE of Declaration of Fraud and MOTION for the Court Not to Bring
Defendant to Court to Review Fraudulent Discovery” (Dkt. #127);
“NOTICE of Interrogatories and MOTION for Government to Respond to
Interrogatories” (Dkt. #129);
1 This motion challenges the Original Indictment, which was superseded on February 5, 2026. Dkt. #119.
The undersigned previously recommended that the motion be denied, but the report has not been adopted. Now that
a Superseding Indictment has been filed, the Defendant’s motion and the undersigned’s report are moot. Therefore,
the undersigned withdraws the prior report (Dkt. #94) and recommends denying Defendant’s original motion (Dkt.
#83) as moot in light of the Superseding Indictment.
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“MOTION to Dismiss” (Dkt. #141);
“DECLARATION Regarding Indictment and MOTION to Dismiss” (Dkt. #149);
and
“Motion for Bond Hearing and Motion for Return to FCI Oakdale and Permission
to Re-Open Communication with Co-Defendant Brooke Crawford” (Dkt. #164).
Defendant’s motions are disorganized, largely illegible, and unsupported by legal authority. The
undersigned finds that none of the motions establish a viable basis for relief and recommends
denying them for the following reasons.2
I. Motions to Dismiss Superseding Indictment
Defendant’s challenges to the Superseding Indictment lack clarity. Seemingly, he argues
that the Government failed to allege certain elements of each individual offense and that the
underlying charges are supported by fraudulent evidence. As an initial matter, Defendant is not
named in Counts 7-15 (charging codefendants with violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1344 (Wire Fraud))
or Count 19 (charging codefendants with violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1957 and 2 (Money
Laundering)). Accordingly, Defendant’s challenge to Counts 7-15 and 19 should be denied for
lack of standing.3
A. Validity of Indictment
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(c) governs the sufficiency of a criminal indictment.
An indictment must set forth the offense with sufficient clarity and certainty to apprise the
accused of the crime with which he is charged. United States v. Bearden, 423 F.2d 805, 810 (5th
Cir. 1970). An indictment is legally sufficient if (1) each count contains the essential elements of
2 Document No. 164 should be denied in part. Defendant’s request for a detention hearing, raised in Dkt.
#164 inter alia, is granted by separate court order.
3 Defendant also fails to establish how these charges prejudice him (e.g., through spillover prejudice at
trial, misjoinder under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 8, or improper joinder under Rule 14).
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the offense charged, (2) the elements are described with particularity, and (3) the charge is
specific enough to protect the defendant against a subsequent prosecution for the same offense.
United States v. Fairley, 880 F.3d 198, 206 (5th Cir. 2018). Under Fifth Circuit precedent,
“ordinarily, the pleading of the allegations in the terms of the statute is sufficient to fulfill this
dual requirement” of avoiding double jeopardy and providing sufficient notice. United States v.
Cadillac Overall Supply Co., 568 F.2d 1078, 1082 (5th Cir. 1978). At the motion to dismiss
stage, the reviewing court must take all allegations in the indictment as true. Boyce Motor Lines
v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 343 n.16 (1952); United States v. Evans, No. 3:21-CR-2-CWR-
FKB-2, 2021 WL 4099018, at *1 (S.D. Miss. 2021).
To the extent that Defendant asserts the Superseding Indictment fails to state multiple
offenses and/or that the court lacks jurisdiction, he identifies no specific defect and provides no
supporting legal authority. The court must accept the allegations pleaded in the indictment as
true and Defendant’s bare assertions do not overcome the presumption of validity afforded to an
indictment returned by a grand jury. See generally, United States v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738, 756 (5th
Cir. 2004).
B. Government’s Alleged Misuse of Conspiracy or “Continuing Offense Theory”
To the extent that the Defendant seeks to dismiss any counts on the grounds that they are
multiplicitous, that request should also be denied. An indictment is multiplicitous if it charges
the same crime in multiple counts. E.g., United States v. Planck, 493 F.3d 501, 503 (5th Cir.
2007); United States v. Kimbrough, 69 F.3d 723, 729 (5th Cir. 1995). “The chief danger raised
by a multiplicitous indictment is the possibility that the defendant will receive more than one
sentence for a single offense.” United States v. Swaim, 757 F.2d 1530, 1537 (5th Cir. 1985). In
deciding whether an indictment is multiplicitous, the court determines “whether separate and
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distinct prohibited acts, made punishable by law, have been committed.” United States v. Shaid,
730 F.2d 225, 231 (5th Cir. 1984) (quoting Bins v. United States, 331 F.2d 390, 393 (5th Cir.
1964)).
The test for determining whether counts of an indictment are multiplicitous is set forth in
Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932): “[W]here the same act or transaction
constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine
whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each [count] requires proof of an
additional fact which the other does not.” Id. 284 U.S. at 304. Count 1, which alleges a
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349 (Conspiracy to Commit Bank Fraud and Wire Fraud), requires
proof that: (1) two or more persons agreed to commit fraud; (2) the defendant knew the unlawful
purpose of the agreement; and (3) the defendant joined the agreement with the intent to further
the unlawful purpose. See United States v. Bello, No. 4:23-CR-136, 2025 WL 85815, at *4 (E.D.
Tex. Jan. 13, 2025). In comparison, Counts 2-6, which allege violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1344
(Bank Fraud), require proof that (1) “the defendant knowingly executed a scheme or artifice”; (2)
“the scheme or artifice was to defraud a financial institution”; (3) “the defendant had the intent to
defraud the financial institution”; (4) “the scheme or artifice to defraud was material [employed a
false material representation][concealed a material fact]”; and (5) “the defendant placed the
financial institution at risk of civil liability or financial loss.” 5th Cir. Pattern Jury Instr. (Crim.) §
2.58A (2024); United States v. Ryan, 156 F.4th 583, 592 (5th Cir. 2025).
The conspiracy charge in Count 1 requires proof of an agreement between two or more
people, whereas Counts 2-6 do not have that requirement. Therefore, Count 1 does not charge
the same crimes as alleged in Counts 2-6, and is therefore not multiplicitous. Moreover, Counts
2-6 are differentiated by independent acts (new loan applications), victims, banks, and dollar
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amounts. Because “each count of bank fraud in the Indictment concerns a distinct loan package
or disbursement of funds,” “[e]ach loan package imposed a ‘new obligation’ on [d]efendants to
be truthful,” and “created a new, independent risk for the” bank, the undersigned concludes that
Counts 2-6 are not multiplicitous. See United States v. Ryan, 580 F. Supp. 3d 359, 368-9 (E.D.
La. 2022), aff’d, 156 F.4th 583 (5th Cir. 2025) (determining that separate loans made to various
borrowers on multiple dates are not part of a “single, integrally related act, closely planned and
carried out in connection with” one another, and therefore not multiplicitous). Accordingly, the
Defendant does not demonstrate—nor does the face of the Superseding Indictment suggest—that
Counts 2-6 charge the same offense under the applicable unit of prosecution.4 Defendant’s
challenge to any Counts of the Superseding Indictment as multiplicitous therefore fails.
C. Government’s Alleged Misconduct
Defendant repeatedly characterized the Government’s actions as “fraudulent” and
resulting in false imprisonment. However, these are mere conclusory accusations that are not
supported by any facts and lack adequate grounds for dismissal of the Superseding Indictment.
II. Motion to Avoid Court Appearances
The undersigned liberally construes this request to allow Defendant to litigate the matter
through filings and discovery and not appear in court. With respect to court appearances, a
criminal defendant is generally required to be present at critical stages of the proceedings. See
Fed. R. Crim. P. 43. A defendant may not unilaterally elect to avoid appearing in court absent a
valid legal basis, which is not asserted here. His request should be denied.
4 Moreover, there is no pretrial procedural mechanism to collapse multiple counts based on a “single
course of conduct” theory. Defendant’s argument appears to conflate charging standards with sentencing principles.
The relevance of a “single course of conduct” is considered under the Sentencing Guidelines, particularly with
respect to relevant conduct and grouping of offenses. See U.S.S.G. §§ 1B1.3, 3D1.2.
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III. Motion for Government to Respond to Interrogatories
Defendant’s request to propound and compel interrogatories from the Government is
likewise not cognizable. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure do not authorize
interrogatories, and criminal discovery is limited by Rule 16 and the Government’s obligations
under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 405 U.S. 150
(1972); and the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500; see also United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456,
462 (1996) (Rule 16 defines the scope of criminal discovery). Accordingly, Defendant’s request
should be denied.
IV. Motion for Communication with Co-Defendant and Transfer
Defendant asks the court to permit communication with co-defendant Brooke Crawford
for reasons that he claims “will be clear as to the legitimacy of the defendant[’]s request,” but
does not advance any argument or factual basis to support his request. Dkt. #164. His request
should be denied. Any such communication must occur only upon notice to, and with the
consent of, Ms. Crawford’s counsel. See Tex. Disciplinary R. Prof’l Conduct 4.02(a) (“In
representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate or cause or encourage another to
communicate about the subject of the representation with a person the lawyer knows to be
represented by another lawyer regarding that subject, unless the lawyer has the consent of the
other lawyer or is authorized by law to do so.”); United States v. McCurdy, No. 1:24-CR-184-1,
2026 WL 352868, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 9, 2026) (applying state Rules of Professional Conduct
to deny pro se criminal defendant’s request to communicate with co-defendant absent approval
from co-defendant’s counsel).
Defendant requests transfer to a different Bureau of Prisons facility. However, decisions
regarding the designation and placement of inmates are committed to the discretion of the
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Bureau of Prisons, not the court. See 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b). Accordingly, the undersigned
recommends denying the request.
V. Recommendation
Even affording Defendant’s motions a liberal construction, the undersigned cannot
discern any viable legal claim or factual basis that would justify dismissal of the Superseding
Indictment or any other relief.5 Accordingly, the undersigned recommends that all pending pro
se motions be denied (Dkt. #83 (denied as moot), 127, 129, 141, 149, and 164 (denied in part)).
Defendant has repeatedly filed motions raising arguments that the court has already
considered and rejected. Repetitive motions that reassert previously rejected arguments waste
judicial resources and will not receive further consideration. Defendant is cautioned that
continued submission of duplicative or frivolous motions may result in the imposition of filing
restrictions, including a requirement that he obtain leave of court before filing additional motions
raising arguments previously presented and resolved, absent new facts or a material change in
circumstances.
VI. Objections
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C), each party to this action has the right to file
objections to this Report and Recommendation. Objections to this Report must (1) be in writing,
(2) specifically identify those findings or recommendations to which the party objects, (3) be
served and filed within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of this Report, and (4)
be no more than eight (8) pages in length. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); FED. R. CRIM. P.
59(b)(2); E.D. TEX. CRIM. R. CR-59(c). A party who objects to this Report is entitled to a de
novo determination by the United States District Judge of those proposed findings and
5 This recommendation excludes Defendant’s request for a detention hearing, which is granted by separate
court order.
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recommendations to which a specific objection is timely made. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); FED.
R. CRIM. P. 59(b)(3).
A party’s failure to file specific, written objections to the proposed findings of fact and
conclusions of law contained in this report, within fourteen (14) days of being served with a copy
of this report, bars that party from: (1) entitlement to de novo review by the United States District
Judge of the findings of fact and conclusions of law, see Rodriguez v. Bowen, 857 F.2d 275,
276–77 (5th Cir. 1988), and (2) appellate review, except on grounds of plain error, of any such
findings of fact and conclusions of law accepted by the United States District Judge, see
Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428–29 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
_________________________
Zack Hawthorn
United States Magistrate Judge
SIGNED this 17th day of April, 2026.
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