USA v. Ardoin et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA §
§
versus § CASE NO. 1:15-CR-119(5)
§
KODY DWAYNE ARDOIN §
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Pending before the court for reconsideration is Defendant Kody Dwayne Ardoin’s
(“Ardoin”) § 3582(c)(1)(A) Motion seeking compassionate release/reduction in sentence (#802).
The Government previously filed a response in opposition to Ardoin’s motion (#803). On
February 23, 2026, the Government filed a response to Ardoin’s Motion for Reconsideration
(#851), which contains a supplemental response to the compassionate release/reduction in sentence
motion.1 United States Probation and Pretrial Services (“Probation”) reviewed the filings and
recommends denying the motion. Having considered the motion, the Government’s responses,
Probation’s recommendation, the record, and the applicable law, the court is of the opinion that
the motion should be denied.
1 The court previously denied Ardoin’s motion for failure to exhaust his administrative remedies
because he made no mention and gave no indication in his motion that he had attempted to exhaust his
administrative remedies and there was no evidence before the court that he had sought relief from the
warden or other BOP personnel. Further, counsel for the Government “attest[ed] that the BOP has no
records in its possession supporting the proposition that Ardoin has exhausted his administrative remedies.”
(#828). Ardoin subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration (#845) in which he stated that he had
sought an administrative remedy while confined at Federal Correctional Institution Big Spring (“FCI Big
Spring”), which the warden denied. He attached a copy of the warden’s response dated September 17,
2024. The warden’s response references an Inmate Request to Staff dated September 5, 2024, and
addresses allegations of “the wrong criminal history, a charge of 4,100 grams of ‘speculation drugs,’ and
a charge with a leadership role based off of false statements.” The court ordered the Government to
respond to Ardoin’s motion for reconsideration and to include a copy of the Inmate Request to Staff dated
September 5, 2024 (#846), which the court subsequently received. The court granted Ardoin’s motion for
reconsideration on February 23, 2026 (#852), and his Motion for Compassionate Release/Reduction in
Sentence (#802) was reinstated. The court now reconsiders its prior ruling.
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I. Background
On May 4, 2016, a federal grand jury in the Eastern District of Texas returned a four-count
Third Superseding Indictment (#52) charging Ardoin in Count One with Conspiracy to Possess
With Intent to Distribute a Controlled Substance in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. He was not
named in the remaining three counts. On January 25, 2017, following a three-day trial, a jury
returned a guilty verdict against Ardoin as to Count 1 of the Third Superseding Indictment.
Subsequently, on October 2, 2017, the court sentenced Ardoin to 324 months’ imprisonment
(adjusted by 51 months to 273 months’ imprisonment pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(b)). On
September 28, 2018, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed Ardoin’s
conviction and sentence. See United States v. Walker, 750 F. App’x 324 (5th Cir. 2018). He did
not seek a writ of certiorari from the Supreme Court of the United States. On April 11, 2019,
Ardoin filed a Motion to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
On August 30, 2021, the court entered Final Judgment dismissing the motion without prejudice,
which Ardoin did not appeal to the Fifth Circuit. On January 17, 2025, former President Joseph
Biden accorded Ardoin an Executive Grant of Clemency, which reduced his sentence to 180
months’ imprisonment (#813).
Ardoin seeks compassionate release/reduction in sentence contending that various
sentencing errors violated his right to due process of law: (1) an enhancement that increased his
offense level by 3 points for having a leadership role in the drug conspiracy; (2) categorizing his
criminal history as Category III rather than Category II; and (3) being held accountable for 4,881
grams of cocaine base that should not have been attributed to him because 4,620 grams were
“unreliable.” Ardoin is currently housed at Federal Correctional Institution Manchester (“FCI
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Manchester”), located in Manchester, Kentucky, with a projected release date of February 8,
2029.
II. Nature and Circumstances of the Offense of Conviction
The Fifth Circuit summarized the facts of Ardoin’s offense of conviction in its opinion
affirming the verdict and sentence, stating:
For about two decades, the home at 1107 Avenue A in Beaumont was the
headquarters of a family-operated business. Crack cocaine was the product. The
operation included the mother and father, their five sons, several cousins, and other
family friends. Local police would occasionally make arrests, and some family
members served time on state charges, but others would quickly pick up the slack
and continue the operation. Taking a new approach, a federal investigation led to
a grand jury indictment of thirteen people for conspiring to distribute 280 grams
or more of crack cocaine between January 2006 and May 2016. Six were also
charged with conspiring to possess firearms in furtherance of the drug trafficking.
Three defendants went to trial: two of the sons, Kristopher and Kody Ardoin, and
one of the cousins, Zerrick Walker. All three faced the drug conspiracy charge.
Only Kristopher was charged with the firearm conspiracy. The jury found them
guilty on all counts, attributing 280 grams or more of crack to both the drug
conspiracy and each defendant individually. The district court sentenced Kody to
27 years, Walker to a mandatory minimum of 20 years, and Kristopher to
concurrent sentences of mandatory life for the drug offense and 20 years for the
firearms conviction.
* * *
Evidence about the conspiracy generally. Numerous people in the community told
police about buying crack at 1107 Avenue A. A constant stream of people entered
and exited the house, perhaps as many as 15 an hour, and the two-block
surrounding area received hundreds of disturbance calls. Police found crack in the
house (among other drugs and paraphernalia) while executing four different search
warrants, seizing 151.6 grams in the investigation. One witness bought crack from
each of the defendants between 20-50 times after he began using in 2013.
***
Evidence specific to Kody. Witnesses also observed Kody repeatedly engaging in
hand-to-hand drug transactions. He was present when police found crack cocaine
during three searches of 1107 Avenue A. When police found crack after searching
3
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another house a block away, Kody was again at he scene. After one arrest, Kody
informed an officer that he had hidden crack in his anal cavity; when recovered it
weighed about 5.5 grams. A customer said he had observed Kody with as much
as 28 grams of crack cocaine on one occasion. Another explained that Kody
“rented” his car in exchange for crack cocaine for five months, giving him about
an ounce a week (about 28.3 grams), an amount Kody later told him was worth
more than $20,000. This witness noted that he sometimes rode with Kody and
Walker as they sold drugs from his car.
Ardoin, 750 F. App’x at 325-27. The opinion contains a chart detailing the quantity of drugs with
which each defendant was personally involved. With regard to Kody, the court lists the following
quantities attributed to him: Seized and Tested Crack Cocaine–151.6g; Kristopher’s 2010
Arrest–3.9g; Kody’s Car Stop–5.5g; Broussard’s testimony–63g; Roberson’s testimony–255g;
Walker’s admissions–24g; Total–503g.” Id. at 328.
In Part II of the opinion, the Fifth Circuit addressed the sentencing issue regarding the
quantity of crack cocaine that Ardoin now raises:
Kody disputes the 4.88 kilograms of crack cocaine the district court
attributed to him in calculating his Guidelines range. The sentencing judge’s
assessment of the drug quantity reasonably foreseeable to a defendant is reviewed
for clear error. United States v. Alaniz, 726 F.3d 586, 618 (5th Cir. 2013).
The Presentence Report attributed 4.92 kilograms2 of crack cocaine to Kody
based on witness testimony, traffic stops, officer surveillance, and search warrants.
With two unremarkable exceptions, the report and the trial evidence present
identical information. The judge relied on the PSR and attributed the slightly
smaller amount to Kody.
2 The appellate court appears to overlook the fact that Paragraph 38 of the initial disclosure copy
of the Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) dated May 15, 2017, which calculated 4.92 kilograms
of crack cocaine attributable to the conspiracy, was revised after further investigation by Probation. In
the final report dated July 20, 2017, Paragraph 38 states that “the conspiracy involved at least 4.88
kilograms of ‘crack’ cocaine.” This change occurred when the estimated grams of crack cocaine attributed
to officer traffic stops of customers were decreased from 60 grams to 12.6 grams.
4
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Kody first argues this sentencing determination is at odds with the jury’s
attributing exactly 280 grams to him. This ignores the words “or more” in the
question the jury answered.
He next argues that the judge attributed at least 2.8 kilograms of crack
cocaine to him based on only “nebulous” officer surveillance operations. But the
drug quantity derived from surveillance was based on the trial testimony of police
officers, in particular one officer who saw 10-15 transactions per hour at 1107
Avenue A during his biweekly observations over five years. This testimony was
sufficiently reliable to support the court’s drug quantity finding. See Valdez, 453
F.3d at 267. We find no error in Kody’s sentence.
Id. at 329.
Paragraph 38 of the PSR also contains a summary of the calculations made by the
Probation Officer as set forth in an accompanying table:
In summary, the conspiracy involved at least 4.88 kilograms of “crack” cocaine,
as summarized in the following table. It is noted that estimates obtained from officers’
testimonies and witnesses’ testimonies are concentrated on conspiracy conduct during the
period approximately four years before the date of indictment. Although the defendant is
responsible for drugs throughout the entire period of the conspiracy, in formulating a
reasonable estimate, the base offense level will be determined considering the period
approximately four years before the date of indictment.
The table lists the following incidents and estimated grams of “crack” cocaine involved:
9/10/15: Search warrant of the “trap” and house next door (cocaine HCl intended
to be cooked into “crack cocaine”)—84 grams
Search warrants as testified by one officer—43 grams
Officer traffic stop of customers—12.6 grams
Witness testimony—580 grams
Officer surveillance operations—4,100 grams
Cash associated with Kody Ardoin (9/2/13 - 3.8 grams, and 6/18/14 - 28.7
grams)—32.5 grams
Total of the traffic stops involving Kody Ardoin (5/13/12 - 4.53 grams, 10/26/12 -
0.03 gram, 8/20/15 - 0.08 gram, and 3/26/16 - 25.15 grams)—29.79 grams
TOTAL—4,881.29 grams (4.88 kilograms)
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The court previously addressed the calculation of drug quantity in its Memorandum and
Order Denying Ardoin’s Emergency Motion to Correct Clerical Error Under Federal Rule
Criminal Procedure 36 (#850) and rejected Ardoin’s challenge.
III. Compassionate Release
A. Overview
A judgment of conviction that imposes a sentence of imprisonment is a “‘final judgment’
and may not be modified by a district court except in limited circumstances.” Dillon v. United
States, 560 U.S. 817, 824 (2010) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3582(b)); see 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c).
Section 3582(c)(1)(A) embodies a rare exception to a conviction’s finality. This statute gives the
court discretion, in certain circumstances, to reduce a defendant’s term of imprisonment. The
First Step Act of 2018 (“the Act”), Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194, in part, amended 18
U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), which currently provides:
(A) the court, upon motion of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons [(“BOP”)], or
upon motion of the defendant after the defendant has fully exhausted all
administrative rights to appeal a failure of the [BOP] to bring a motion on the
defendant’s behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the
warden of the defendant’s facility, whichever is earlier, may reduce the term of
imprisonment (and may impose a term of probation or supervised release with or
without conditions that does not exceed the unserved portion of the original term
of imprisonment), after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a)3 to the
extent that they are applicable, if it finds that—
3 Section 3553(a) directs courts to consider: the nature and circumstances of the offense and the
defendant’s history and characteristics; the need to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote
respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense; the need to deter criminal conduct; the
need to protect the public; the need to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training,
medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner; the kinds of sentences and
sentencing ranges established for defendants with similar characteristics under applicable United States
Sentencing Guidelines (“U.S.S.G.” or “Guidelines”) provisions and policy statements; any pertinent policy
statement of the United States Sentencing Commission in effect on the date of sentencing; the need to avoid
unwarranted disparities among similar defendants; and the need to provide restitution to the victim.
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
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(i) extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction; or
(ii) the defendant is at least 70 years of age, has served at least 30 years in
prison, pursuant to a sentence imposed under section 3559(c), for the
offense or offenses for which the defendant is currently imprisoned, and a
determination has been made by the Director of the [BOP] that the
defendant is not a danger to the safety of any other person or the
community, as provided under section 3142(g);
and that such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements
issued by the Sentencing Commission . . . .
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). This provision is commonly referred to as “compassionate release.”
See, e.g., United States v. Escajeda, 58 F.4th 184, 186 (5th Cir. 2023) (“We often refer to this
as ‘compassionate release’ because courts generally use it for prisoners with severe medical
exigencies or infirmities.”).
Rather than define “extraordinary and compelling reasons,” Congress elected to delegate
its authority to the United States Sentencing Commission (“Commission”). See 28 U.S.C.
§ 994(t) (directing the Commission to “describe what should be considered extraordinary and
compelling reasons for sentence reduction, including the criteria to be applied and a list of specific
examples”); United States v. Jean, 108 F.4th 275, 278 (5th Cir. 2024), abrogated on other
grounds by United States v. Austin, 125 F.4th 688, 692 (5th Cir. 2025); United States v. Jackson,
27 F.4th 1088, 1090 (5th Cir. 2022); United States v. Cooper, 996 F.3d 283, 287 (5th Cir. 2021);
United States v. Shkambi, 993 F.3d 388, 392 (5th Cir. 2021). Although the Commission issued
a policy statement prior to the passage of the Act that described the reasons that qualify as
extraordinary and compelling, that policy statement referenced only those motions filed by the
Director of the BOP—thus, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit and other
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courts held that it was inapplicable to motions filed by defendants on their own behalf. See
Jackson, 27 F.4th at 1090; Cooper, 996 F.3d at 287-88; Shkambi, 993 F.3d at 392.
Effective November 1, 2023, the Commission—responding to, among other things, the
Act—amended the Guidelines to extend the applicability of the policy statement set forth in
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 to defendant-filed motions and to broaden the scope of what qualifies as
“extraordinary and compelling” reasons potentially warranting compassionate release. See
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13. Section 1B1.13(b), as amended, identifies six categories of circumstances
that may qualify as “extraordinary and compelling.” Id. § 1B1.13(b). These categories are:
(1) the medical circumstances of the defendant;
(2) the age of the defendant;
(3) the family circumstances of the defendant;
(4) whether the defendant was a victim of abuse while in custody;
(5) other reasons similar in gravity to those previously described; and
(6) an unusually long sentence.
Id. § 1B1.13(b)(1)-(6).
As a result, a prisoner seeking compassionate release or a sentence reduction on his own
motion must satisfy the following hurdles:
(1) the defendant must have exhausted his administrative remedies;
(2) “extraordinary and compelling reasons” must justify the reduction of his
sentence or he must satisfy the requirements of § 3582(c)(1)(A)(ii);
(3) the reduction must be consistent with the Commission’s applicable policy
statements; and
(4) the defendant must convince the court to exercise its discretion to grant the
motion after considering the § 3553(a) factors.
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Jackson, 27 F.4th at 1089; Shkambi, 993 F.3d at 392; accord United States v. Rollins, 53 F.4th
353, 358 (5th Cir. 2022); see Austin, 125 F.4th at 692.
B. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
Section 3582(c)(1)(A)’s plain language makes it clear that the court may not grant a
defendant’s motion for compassionate release unless the defendant has complied with the
administrative exhaustion requirement. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A); United States v. Garrett, 15
F.4th 335, 337 (5th Cir. 2021) (“[T]o file a proper motion for compassionate release in the district
court, a prisoner must first exhaust the available administrative avenues.”); United States v.
Franco, 973 F.3d 465, 467 (5th Cir. 2020) (holding that the statutory requirement that a defendant
file a request with the BOP before filing a motion for compassionate release in federal court “is
not jurisdictional, but that it is mandatory”). The exhaustion requirement applies whether the
motion is styled as one for compassionate release or merely for a reduction of sentence under 18
U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Accordingly, before seeking relief from the court, a defendant must first
submit a request to the warden of his facility to move for compassionate release on his behalf and
then either exhaust his administrative remedies or wait for the lapse of 30 days after the warden
received the request. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A); Garrett, 15 F.4th at 338 (“[A]n inmate has two
routes by which he may exhaust his administrative remedies. Both begin with ‘requesting that the
[BOP] bring a motion on the defendant’s behalf.’” (quoting Franco, 973 F.3d at 467)).
Although this requirement is said to be mandatory, the Fifth Circuit has treated it as “a
nonjurisdictional claim-processing rule.” Franco, 973 F.3d at 468. “Mandatory but
nonjurisdictional procedural filing requirements may be waived.” United States v. McLean, Nos.
21-40015, 21-40017, 2022 WL 44618, at *1 (5th Cir. Jan. 5, 2022); see United States v. Harden,
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No. 4:11-CR-127-SDJ, 2025 WL 562716, at *5 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 20, 2025). Therefore, if the
Government fails to “invoke § 3582(c)(1)(A)’s exhaustion requirement as a basis for denying
relief,” that argument is deemed waived. McLean, 2022 WL 44618, at *1.
The defendant bears the burden of proving that he has exhausted his administrative
remedies before filing a motion for compassionate release. United States v. Garcia-Martinez, No.
EP-24-CR-0764-DCG-1, 2025 WL 2427619, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 18, 2025); accord United
States v. DeJean, No. 2:18-cr-120, 2025 WL 3687269, at *3 (E.D. La. Dec. 19, 2025); United
States v. Mahaffey, No. 17-54-DLB-MAS-1, 2025 WL 1840598, at *2 (E.D. Ky. July 3, 2025);
United States v. Escobar, No. 15-CR-150-2 (ARR), 2024 WL 2111573, at *2 (E.D. N.Y. May
10, 2024); United States v. Avelar, No. 3:16-cr-0351-B-2, 2022 WL 17096173, at *2 (N.D. Tex.
Nov. 20, 2022); United States v. Singleton, No. 14-168, 2022 WL 3576767, at *1-2 (E.D. La.
Aug. 19, 2022). Without evidence that the defendant requested compassionate release from the
warden and that thirty days have passed since the warden received or denied the request, the
defendant fails to satisfy § 3582(c)(1)(A)’s exhaustion requirement. Avelar, 2022 WL 17096173,
at *2 (citing United States v. Knox, No. 3:12-CR-0252-B, 2020 WL 4432852, at *2 (N.D. Tex.
July 31, 2020) (finding the exhaustion requirement was not met where a defendant provided a copy
of a letter purportedly sent to the warden but did not provide proof the warden received the
letter)).
A defendant’s motion for compassionate release must be based on the same circumstances
as those raised in his request for release to the warden of the facility where he is housed. United
States v. Dodd, No. 4:13-CR-182-SDJ, 2020 WL 7396527, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 17, 2020)
(stating that “[i]n order to exhaust her administrative remedies, a prisoner must first present to the
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BOP the same grounds warranting release that the prisoner urges in her motion”); accord United
States v. Gonzalez, 849 F. App’x 116, 117 (5th Cir. 2021); United States v. Williams, 987 F.3d
700, 703 (7th Cir. 2021); United States v. York, No. 4:07-CR-181-SDJ, 2025 WL 1397198, at
*2-3 (E.D. Tex. May 14, 2025); United States v. Thomas, No. 4:19-CR-28-SDJ, 2023 WL
5279457, at *5 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 16, 2023) (citing United States v. Mendoza-Garibay, No. 4:13-
CR-00281, 2023 WL 307459, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 18, 2023)). “It would disrupt the ‘orderly
system for reviewing compassionate-release applications’ and ‘incentivize[] line jumping’ to permit
defendants to present grounds for compassionate release to the Court that the BOP had not already
received the opportunity to consider.” United States v. Silcox, No. 3:17-CR-134-TAV-HBG-1,
2020 WL 4341758, at *2 (E.D. Tenn. July 28, 2020) (quoting United States v. Alam, 960 F.3d
831, 834 (6th Cir. 2020)). Hence, the facts asserted in an inmate’s request to the warden and in
his motion for compassionate release must be consistent. United States v. Scott, No. CR 17-114,
2024 WL 2187849, at *2 (E.D. La. May 14, 2024); United States v. Reeves, No. 3:18-cr-313-B,
2020 WL 3895282, at *2 (N.D. Tex. July 10, 2020); United States v. Samak, No. 91-189, 2020
WL 2473780, at *2 (E.D. La. May 13, 2020); see Gonzalez, 849 F. App’x at 117.
Further, “the exhaustion requirement applies to new arguments or grounds for
compassionate release developed after an earlier request for compassionate release.” United States
v. Cantu, No. 7:17-cr-01046-2, 2022 WL 90853, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 5, 2022) (citing United
States v. Rivas, 833 F. App’x 556, 558 (5th Cir. 2020)); accord DeJean, 2025 WL 3687269, at
*3; Mendoza-Garibay, 2023 WL 307459, at *2. “It is well-settled that the exhaustion requirement
is not satisfied when the defendant previously sought administrative relief on a different ground
than the ground presented to the district court.” DeJean, 2025 WL 3687269, at *3. Successive
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compassionate release motions must independently satisfy the exhaustion requirement. United
States v. Ford, No. 1:16-CR-19-HAB, 2021 WL 5980368, at *2 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 16, 2021). “If
a prisoner were only required to make one request to the BOP and forever after [be] able to file
new motions asserting new grounds for relief, the purpose of the exhaustion requirement would
be severely undermined.” United States v. Wardle, No. 5:18-57-KKC, 2021 WL 4822827, at *3
(E.D. Ky. Oct. 14, 2021); accord Rivas, 833 F. App’x at 558; Ford, 2021 WL 5980368, at *2.
Here, Ardoin has exhausted his administrative remedies. On September 5, 2024, he
submitted a request for reduction in sentence to the warden of the facility where he was housed
at the time. In his request, he stated:
I would like reduction in sentence or compassnate [sic] release on 3 grounds:
1. I was sentence[d] in wrong criminal history
2. I was charge[d] with 4,100 grams speculation drugs
3. I was charge[d] with a leadership role in case off false statements.
On September 17, 2024, Warden C. Humphrey denied Ardoin’s request, explaining that “[t]he
circumstances you requested to be reviewed do not meet the criteria listed in BOP Program
Statement 5050.50, Compassionate Release/Reduction in Sentence: Procedures for Implementation
of 18 U.S.C. §§ 3582(c)(1)(A) and 4505(g) [sic]. The warden elaborated:
You do not present any extraordinary or compelling reasons stated above. You are
29 years old, you do not have a terminal, incurable disease with a life expectancy
of 18 months or less, you do not have a debilitating medical condition, and you do
not have the death or incapacitation of the family caregiver of your child, or the
incapacitation of your spouse or registered partner.
Based on the above-stated information, you are not eligible for compassionate
release/reduction in sentence (RIS) consideration at this time.
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Nevertheless, while Ardoin may have complied with the exhaustion requirement before filing his
motion for compassionate release/sentence reduction, nothing in the motion indicates that
extraordinary and compelling reasons exist to release him from confinement or reduce his sentence
of imprisonment.
C. Analysis of Claims
1. Leadership Role
Ardoin challenges the 3-point offense level enhancement attributed to him pursuant to
U.S.S.G. §3B1.1 for having a managerial or supervisory role in the drug-trafficking conspiracy
described above which involved five or more participants. U.S.S.G. §3B1.1(b) specifies, “If the
defendant was a manager or supervisor (but not an organizer or leader) and the criminal activity
involved five or more participants or was otherwise extensive, increase by 3 levels.” Although
Ardoin objected to the enhancement at sentencing, he did not raise this claim in his appeal to the
Fifth Circuit, which affirmed his sentence, including the 3-level enhancement of his offense level
for serving as a manager or supervisor of the drug-trafficking conspiracy. In his current motion,
Ardoin asserts that the resulting sentence violated his due process right not to be sentenced based
on false or unreliable information, claiming that the transcript shows “nobody took lead.”
Paragraph 45 of the PSR addresses the 3-level sentencing enhancement imposed for
Ardoin’s managerial or supervisory role in the offense:
45. Adjustment for Role in the Offense: Pursuant to USSG §3B1.1(b), if the
defendant was a manager or supervisor, but not an organizer or leader, and
the criminal activity involved five or more participants, the offense level is
to be increased by three levels. A witness testified Kody Ardoin has been
in charge of the “trap” when other Ardoin brothers were in custody. After
many of the family members were arrested, Kody Ardoin was in charge of
the “trap” at times. The defendant also gave instructions to those who
assisted him with selling drugs, such as telling Witness 2 how to run from
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police officers. Furthermore, Witness 2 was a runner who worked at the
direction of Kody Ardoin. At Kody Ardoin’s direction, Walker would get
drugs from the house next door to the “trap.” Several people were
involved with the conspiracy as listed in the Indictment. Specifically, the
following individuals were directly associated with Kody Ardoin, in
addition to his association with his brothers: (1) the defendant, (2) Witness
2, (3) Ashton Randolph, (4) Zerrick Walker, (5) Christopher Ooten, (6)
Clifton Freeman, and (7) Witness 3. Therefore, the adjustment is
appropriate.
At sentencing, the court overruled Ardoin’s objections to the enhancement, finding that
there was sufficient evidence to support the increase in the offense level. Contrary to his
assertion, Ardoin was not found to be the leader of the conspiracy—rather, he was found to have
a managerial or supervisory role. This was based on Ardoin’s running the trap house in 2016 after
his brothers were arrested and at other times along with his directing the activities of others,
including Witness 2, Ashton Randolph, Zerrick Walker, Christopher Ooten, Clifton Freeman, and
Witness 3, on a number of occasions. Various witnesses testified about receiving instructions
from him. For example, as reflected in Paragraph 34 of the PSR, “Witness 2 was a runner for
Kody Ardoin, and received directions from Kody Ardoin about how to run away with drugs if
stopped by police officers. Furthermore, Witness 2 testified about how he had been held hostage
by Kody Ardoin due to a drug debt.” The Government pointed out at sentencing that once Ardoin
was arrested after the execution of a search warrant in 2016 and he was taken off the street, the
trap house shut down. The prosecutor noted, “So him coming off the street – and he got indicted
shortly thereafter – seems to have shut down the house, which means that he played a significant
role in that in and of itself.” Ultimately, Ardoin’s current argument regarding the increase in his
offense level for having a leadership role was rejected by the trial court at sentencing, he did not
raise the issue in his appellate brief, and the Fifth Circuit upheld Ardoin’s sentence on appeal.
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Ardoin now makes no showing that the sentence enhancement was based on false or unreliable
information. Hence, the court finds no reason to disturb this finding in connection with Ardoin’s
post-conviction motion for compassionate release/reduction in sentence, as it is consistent with the
evidence presented at trial.
2. Criminal History Category
Ardoin maintains that he was “put in wrong catagory[sic],” claiming that he should have
been determined to be a Criminal History Category II, rather than a Category III. He complains
that he was sentenced on the same day, January 13, 2014, for three prior misdemeanors for which
he received 90 days in jail that ran concurrently. Ardoin was assessed 2 criminal history points
each for two of the offenses. He asserts that these sentences should have been treated as a single
sentence because they were imposed on the same day.
Ardoin did not object to the calculation of his criminal history points at trial and did not
raise this issue on appeal. He now belatedly claims he should have been placed in Criminal
History Category II, which, when considered in connection with an Offense Level of 36
(apparently based on his argument regarding the 3-level enhancement), would have yielded a
sentencing range of 210-262 months, rather than the range applied at sentencing, 324-405 months,
for an Offense Level of 39 with a Criminal History Category of III.
U.S.S.G. §4A1.2, entitled “Definitions and Instructions for Computing Criminal History,”
sets forth directions for the computation of criminal history in cases that involve prior sentences.
As provided in §4A1.2(a)(1), “The term ‘prior sentence’ means any sentence previously imposed
upon adjudication of guilt, whether by guilty plea, trial, or plea of nolo contendere, for conduct
not part of the instant offense.” Section 4A1.2(a)(2) states:
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If the defendant has multiple prior sentences, determine whether those sentences
are counted separately or treated as a single sentence. Prior sentences always are
counted separately if the sentences were imposed for offenses that were separated
by an intervening arrest (i.e., the defendant is arrested for the first offense prior to
committing the second offense). For purposes of this provision, a traffic stop is not
an intervening arrest. If there is no intervening arrest, prior sentences are counted
separately unless (A) the sentences resulted from offenses contained in the same
charging instrument; or (B) the sentences were imposed on the same day. Treat
any prior sentence covered by subparagraph (A) or (B) as a single sentence. See
also §4A1.1(d).
Here, each of Ardoin’s three prior misdemeanor offenses was separated by an intervening arrest.
Ardoin was arrested on May 14, 2012, for possession of marijuana. He pleaded guilty to
the offense and was sentenced on January 13, 2014, to 90 days in jail. Because this conviction
was considered relevant conduct to the instant federal offense, no criminal history points were
assessed. Ardoin was arrested again on May 16, 2012, for trespassing at a vacant house with a
posted “no trespassing” sign. He pleaded guilty to the offense and was sentenced on January 13,
2014, to 90 days in jail. He was assessed 2 criminal history points for this offense because the
offenses were separated by the intervening arrest on May 16, 2012, as he was arrested for the first
offense prior to committing the second offense. Ardoin was arrested once again on June 8, 2013,
for evading detention when he fled to avoid arrest on an outstanding warrant. He pleaded guilty
to this offense and was sentenced on January 13, 2014, to 90 days in jail. He was assessed 2
criminal history points for this offense because the latter two offenses were separated by the
intervening arrest on June 8, 2013, as he was arrested for the second offense prior to committing
the third offense. Therefore, although he was sentenced on the same day for all three offenses,
the offenses were properly counted separately because there were intervening arrests. Hence,
Ardoin’s Criminal History Category of III as calculated in the PSR is correct. Accordingly,
Ardoin’s claim based on the calculation of his Criminal History Category is without merit.
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3. Drug Quantity
Ardoin complains that the was held accountable for 4,881 grams of cocaine base at
sentencing. He seeks a reduction in sentence on the grounds that 4,620 grams were unreliable
under case law and the U.S.S.G. Manual. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit addressed Ardoin’s
challenges to the calculation in some detail and rejected his claims. As set forth above in Section
II, the appellate court reviewed the calculations carefully and found that the testimony presented
at trial was sufficiently reliable to support the trial court’s drug quantity finding and found no error
in Ardoin’s sentence. Ardoin did not seek a writ of certiorari to challenge the calculation of the
drug quantity at the Supreme Court. Contrary to his contentions, Ardoin has not adduced
sufficient evidence to dispute the courts’ findings via a post-conviction motion for sentence
reduction. “The defendant bears the burden of showing that the information in the PSR relied on
by the district court is materially untrue.” United States v. Valdez, 453 F.3d 252, 262 (5th Cir.
2006) (quoting United States v. Valencia, 44 F.3d 269, 274 (5th Cir. 1995)); accord United States
v. Barfield, 941 F.3d 757, 763 (5th Cir. 2019). Ardoin has not met his burden.
As set forth above, the Probation Officer provided extensive information in the PSR
regarding the calculation of drug quantity, which both the district court and the appellate court
utilized. Beaumont police officers testified about the frequent surveillance performed at the
Ardoin residence on Avenue A over the years, including one officer who conducted surveillance
once a week for an extended period of time and another officer who conducted surveillance twice
a week. Other officers testified about responding to numerous, even hundreds, of calls for service
involving drugs and/or firearms at that location for a number of years. Other witnesses included
individuals who bought drugs at the Ardoin residence, rented a car to Ardoin in exchange for
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crack cocaine for four to five months, and assisted or took directions from Ardoin regarding his
drug-trafficking activities. Moreover, when calculating a base offense level for a drug offense,
district courts may extrapolate from reliable information and convert an amount of money into an
approximate drug quantity. United States v. Garcia, No. 24-40658, 2026 WL 66857, at *4-5 (5th
Cir. Jan. 8, 2026) (citing United States v. Barry, 978 F.3d 214, 217 (5th Cir. 2020); Barfield, 942
F.3d at 762)). Courts may also consider estimates of the quantity of drugs involved in the offense.
Id. at * 4 (citing Barry, 978 F.3d at 218). Testimony of a coconspirator regarding non-exact
estimates will even suffice. See United States v. Alford, 142 F.3d 825, 832 (5th Cir. 1998). In
sum, “[w]hen determining the drug quantity, the district ‘court may extrapolate . . . from any
information that has sufficient indicia of reliability to support its probable accuracy.’” Garcia,
2026 WL 66857, at * 4 (quoting Barfield, 941 F.3d at 762). In this instance, as the Fifth Circuit
found, there was more than adequate evidence to substantiate the drug quantity calculation and
there was no error in Ardoin’s sentence.
D. Section 3553(a) Factors
The court further finds that compassionate release is not merited in light of the applicable
factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) (requiring courts to
consider the § 3553(a) factors before granting compassionate release); United States v. Chavez,
No. 23-50684, 2024 WL 940263, at *1 (5th Cir. Mar. 5, 2024); Rollins, 53 F.4th at 358-59;
United States v. Shorter, 850 F. App’x 327, 328 (5th Cir. 2021) (finding that the court did not
abuse its discretion in denying compassionate release after balancing the § 3553(a) factors); United
States v. Keys, 846 F. App’x 275, 276 (5th Cir. 2021); Shkambi, 993 F.3d at 392; United States
v. Thompson, 984 F.3d 431, 435 n.11 (5th Cir. 2021) (collecting cases); United States v.
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Chambliss, 948 F.3d 691, 693-94 (5th Cir. 2020). Section 3553(a)(1) requires the court to
consider the nature and circumstances of the defendant’s offense of conviction as well as the
history and characteristics of the defendant. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). Here, neither the nature of
Ardoin’s offense nor his history and characteristics warrant a sentence reduction.
Ardoin’s offense of conviction entails his participation in a multi-year, drug-trafficking
conspiracy involving the distribution of approximately 4.88 kilograms of cocaine. Ardoin
routinely sold multiple-gram quantities of cocaine base from a family home located in Beaumont,
Texas, which was known as a “trap house.” Ardoin was present during searches of the residence
in 2012, 2015, and 2016 that yielded contraband including crack cocaine and drug paraphernalia.
In addition, Ardoin played a supervisory or managerial role in the conspiracy.
At the time of sentencing, Ardoin’s criminal history included prior convictions for
possession of marijuana, possession of a controlled substance (cocaine) (2x), trespassing, and
evading detention. His probation was revoked in one of the cases when he failed to comply with
the conditions of his release, and he was sentenced to 2 years’ imprisonment. Ardoin also had six
prior arrests for possession of cocaine and a history of marijuana use. Since being incarcerated
for his offense of conviction, Ardoin has incurred a number of prison disciplinary violations, some
quite recently. On February 18, 2026, he was cited for being unsanitary or untidy and lost 30
days of commissary privileges, and on January 9, 2026, he was found guilty of disruptive conduct
when he appeared high, causing him to lose good conduct time, forfeit non-vested good conduct
time, and lose commissary and email privileges. On December 28, 2025, Ardoin was cited for
refusal to obey an order and lost commissary privileges, and on September 16, 2025, he was
absent from an assignment and lost commissary, email, phone, and tablet privileges. On June 29,
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2025, he refused to stand for count and lost good conduct time, and on June 26, 2025, he refused
to obey an order which led to the loss of phone privileges. On June 23, 2025, Ardoin was found
guilty of refusing a work/program assignment and refusing to obey an order for which he lost
commissary and visitation privileges. Ardoin was found to have engaged in disruptive conduct
on June 9, 2025, which led to the loss of good conduct time as well as commissary, phone, and
visitation privileges, and he also refused a work/program assignment for which he lost phone
privileges. On October 16, 2024, he was sanctioned for being absent from assignment and lost
email privileges. On May 19, 2021, Ardoin was found to have engaged in phone abuse/disrupt
monitoring for which he lost good conduct time and phone privileges. On January 24, 2020, he
was cited for disruptive conduct likely stemming from the use of drugs for which he lost good
conduct time and email privileges, was assessed a monetary fine, and was placed in disciplinary
segregation. On January 23, 2020, he interfered with staff and lost email privileges. Ardoin was
found to have engaged in disruptive conduct on November 19, 2019, for which he lost good
conduct time as well as commissary and visitation privileges, and he was placed in disciplinary
segregation. He was cited for failing to stand count on both October 30, 2019, for which he lost
phone privileges, and October 28, 2019, for which he lost commissary privileges. On September
17, 2018, Ardoin was sanctioned for possessing an unauthorized item, lying or falsifying a
statement, and interfering with staff for which he lost phone privileges. Hence, Ardoin has an
extensive and troublesome prison disciplinary record which gives no indication that he would abide
by the law or comply with the conditions of supervised release if he were released from custody
at this time. In essence, Ardoin continues to pose a danger to the community.
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Moreover, courts have long recognized that continued drug dealing, like that in which
Ardoin engaged for years, constitutes a danger and threat to the community. United States v.
Hare, 873 F.3d 796, 799 (5th Cir. 1989); see United States v. Grimaldo, No. 4:08-cr-107-SDJ,
2022 WL 4126106, at *7 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 9, 2022) (denying compassionate release to inmate
found guilty of participating in a drug trafficking conspiracy involving large amounts of cocaine
and marijuana despite his completion of numerous programs and saving his cellmate’s life by
performing CPR, reasoning that he continues to pose a danger to the community based on the
totality of the circumstances); United States v. Dotrey, No. 2:13-CR-004, 2021 WL 4191454, at
*8 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 15, 2021) (denying compassionate release to drug trafficker despite his
insistence that his offense was non-violent, he had been rehabilitated, and he had been rated by
the BOP as having a low risk of recidivism). “Although a defendant may not have been convicted
of a violent crime, ‘that does not make his offense any less serious or dangerous to the
community.’” United States v. Thomas, No. 14-246, 2021 WL 1721014, at *3 (E.D. La. Apr.
30, 2021) (quoting United States v. Bailey, No. 17-244, 2020 WL 6701533, at *3 (E.D. La. Nov.
13, 2020) (citing United States v. Leon, 766 F.2d 77, 81 (2d Cir. 1985) (“The harm to society
caused by narcotics trafficking is encompassed within Congress’ definition of ‘danger.’”))).
“[C]ompassionate release is discretionary, not mandatory, and [may] be refused after
weighing the sentencing factors of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” Chambliss, 948 F.3d at 693; see
Rollins, 53 F.4th at 358-60 (upholding the denial of compassionate release to the defendant, who
suffered from a “dire” medical situation stemming from a gunshot wound that required the
amputation of his right leg and left him paralyzed, but deferring to the district court’s balancing
of the § 3553(a) factors, including the defendant’s “history, the serious nature of his offense, and
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the danger his release would pose to the community at-large”); United States v. Gharib, No.
21-40779, 2022 WL 1565352, at *1 (5th Cir. May 18, 2022). Where, as here, a prisoner has
engaged in “severe” criminal conduct and has a criminal history and a number of prison
disciplinary violations, the district court has discretion to deny compassionate release under the
circumstances. Chambliss, 948 F.3d at 693-94; accord Rollins, 53 F.4th at 358-60; Gharib, 2022
WL 1565352, at *1 (refusing to consider the defendant’s contention that extraordinary and
compelling reasons justified compassionate release due to the defendant’s no longer being subject
to the career offender enhancement when the district court found that the § 3553(a) factors
outweighed granting relief); Keys, 846 F. App’x at 276 (rejecting the defendant’s argument that
the court gave too much weight to his criminal history and finding that “a mere disagreement with
the court’s balancing of the § 3553(a) factors . . . is not a sufficient ground for reversal”).
In United States v. McKinney, the court denied relief to a prisoner who had end-stage renal
failure and had a portion of his foot amputated despite the Government’s concession that the
defendant had established an “extraordinary and compelling reason” within the meaning of
§ 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), finding that “granting compassionate release would not comport with the
factors enumerated in Section 3553(a).” No. 19-00394-03, 2023 WL 2993020, at *1, 3 (W.D.
La. Apr. 18, 2023). In view of Ardoin’s conviction of a serious drug offense, his criminal
history, his violation of a previous term of probation, his repeated failures to comply with prison
disciplinary rules, and the already generous reduction in sentence he received from his grant of
clemency, a further reduction in sentence would not equate to a “just punishment” under
§ 3553(a)(2)(A). As the McKinney court expounded: “It is this court’s belief that a reduced
sentence simply would not reflect the seriousness of the offense, would not promote respect for
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the law, would not afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct, and would not protect the
public from further crimes of this Defendant.” Id. at *3. This court holds the same belief in the
case at bar. Thus, in light of the nature and circumstances of his offense of conviction, his
criminal history, his history of substance abuse, and his repeated failure to comply with prison
rules, the court cannot conclude that Ardoin’s early release from prison would afford adequate
deterrence or protect the public, as he continues to pose a danger to other persons and to the
community as a whole. On balance, compassionate release is not warranted in this case in light
of the applicable factors set forth in § 3553(a).
IV. Improper Remedy
In his motion, Ardoin challenges his conviction and sentence, including the application of
a sentence enhancement for his role in the offense of conviction, the calculation of the quantity of
drugs involved in the offense, and the determination of his criminal history category. Ardoin’s
arguments constitute nothing more than an attempt to revisit determinations made years ago at the
time of his sentencing in 2017. Yet, a “compassionate release motion ‘is not an opportunity to
second guess or to reconsider’ the sentencing court’s original decision.” United States v. Jabateh,
No. CR 18-216-3, 2021 WL 5802493, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 7, 2021) (quoting United States v.
Roney, 833 F. App’x 850, 854 (2d Cir. 2020)); cf. United States v. Jones, No. 24-30236, 2025
WL 1232927, at *6 (5th Cir. Apr. 29, 2025) (noting that a § 3582(c)(2) motion “is simply a
vehicle through which appropriately sentenced prisoners can urge the court to exercise leniency
to give certain defendants the benefits of an amendment to the Guidelines” (quoting United States
v. Whitebird, 55 F.3d 1007, 1011 (5th Cir. 1995))). Ardoin does not allege that “extraordinary
and compelling reasons” warrant a reduction in his sentence or compassionate release due to some
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severe exigency, not foreseeable at the time of sentencing, and unique to his life. See Chambliss,
948 F.3d at 693. He does not seek relief based on a serious medical condition, his age, his family
circumstances, an outbreak of disease within the prison, his abuse while in prison, or other reasons
of similar gravity within the purview of 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1). In fact, as the Government
points out, his claims are entirely misplaced in this context. Ardoin’s claims are instead “the
province of direct appeal or a § 2255 motion, not a compassionate release motion.” Escajeda, 58
F.4th at 187.
The Fifth Circuit has explicitly held that “a prisoner cannot use § 3582(c) to challenge the
legality or the duration of his sentence.” Id.; accord United States v. Corrales, No. 23-50609,
2024 WL 448350, at *1 (5th Cir. Feb. 6, 2024). The Fifth Circuit joined several other federal
courts of appeal in reaching that result. See United States v. Jenkins, 50 F.4th 1185, 1202 (D.C.
Cir. 2022); United States v. King, 40 F.4th 594, 595 (7th Cir. 2022); United States v. Crandall,
25 F.4th 582, 586 (8th Cir. 2022); United States v. Hunter, 12 F.4th 555, 567 (6th Cir. 2021).
More recently, additional courts of appeal have reached the same conclusion. See United States
v. Fernandez, 104 F.4th 420, 430-31 (2d Cir. 2024), cert. granted, 145 S. Ct. 2731 (2025);
United States v. Holland, No. 23-2157, 2023 WL 6249910, at *2 (3d Cir. Sept. 26, 2023); United
States v. Wesley, 60 F.4th 1277, 1289 (10th Cir. 2023); United States v. Ferguson, 55 F. 4th 262,
272 (4th Cir. 2022). As the court elaborated in Escajeda:
Section 3582(c)(1)’s authorization for compassionate release stands in
contradistinction to other statutes that Congress passed to govern prisoners’
post-conviction proceedings. In Chapter 153 of Title 28, Congress provided
specific avenues for post-conviction relief that permit prisoners to challenge the
legality of their confinement in federal court. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241, 2244,
2254, 2255. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that by codifying these
specific provisions, Congress required prisoners to bring their legality-of custody
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challenges under Chapter 153 and prohibited prisoners from bringing such claims
under other, more-general statutes like 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
58 F.4th at 186-87. This “habeas-channeling rule” likewise “forecloses using compassionate
release to correct sentencing errors.” Id. at 187 (quoting Jenkins, 50 F.4th at 1202). Chapter 153
of Title 28 contains the exclusive avenues for prisoners to bring their legality-of-custody
challenges. Escajeda, 58 F.4th at 186-87 (citing Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81 (2005);
Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 481-82 (1994); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 486
(1973)). “[A] prisoner cannot use § 3582(c) to challenge the legality or the duration of his
sentence; such arguments can, and hence must, be raised under Chapter 153.” Escajeda, 58 F.4th
at 187; accord United States v. Cardenas, No. 19-40425, 2024 WL 615542, at *2 (5th Cir. Feb.
14, 2024); United States v. McMaryion, No. 21-50450, 2023 WL 4118015, at *1 (5th Cir. June
22, 2023).
Following his trial and conviction, Ardoin filed an appeal raising some of the claims he
now asserts, but the Fifth Circuit affirmed his conviction and sentence in 2018. He did not file
a petition for a writ of certiorari seeking review by the Supreme Court, and his conviction and
sentence became final in January 2019. Ardoin filed a timely Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or
Correct Sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 on April 11, 2019, in which he raised two claims of
ineffective assistance of trial counsel. See Ardoin v. United States, No. 1:19-cv-180-MAC-ZJH
(#1). He claimed that “[d]efense counsel was ineffective in bringing collateral challenge to a
materially false and unreliable Presentence Investigation Report which served as basis to
sentencing” and “[d]efense [c]ounsel was ineffective in bringing a collateral challenge to the
meeting of [S]entencing Guidelines Manual Policy objectives where a firearm and leadership role
enhancements were assessed.” On August 19, 2021, Ardoin filed a document entitled Letter
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Motion to Cancel Civil Action No. 1:19-CV-180 under § 2255 (#10). He explained, “the federal
prisoner wishes to persue [sic] other avenues to claim his innocence under a new petition.” On
August 30, 2021, the court granted Ardoin’s letter motion and dismissed his § 2255 motion
without prejudice (#12). Ardoin, however, did not timely file a subsequent Motion to Vacate, Set
Aside, or Correct Sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 nor did he appeal the court’s order of
dismissal. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(1), the prisoner has a one-year limitation period for the
filing of such a motion, calculated from the date on which the judgment of conviction became
final, which in this case occurred in January 2019. Therefore, Ardoin’s belated attempts in 2025
to file such a motion or to amend his prior motion (#’s 35, 36) were clearly time-barred and were
denied (#38). At this time, the deadline for Ardoin to file another Motion to Vacate, Set Aside,
or Correct Sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 expired years ago and any additional filings in that
regard would be fruitless.
It has long been recognized that “the principle of finality . . . is essential to the operation
of our criminal justice system.” Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 309 (1989). Indeed, as the
Supreme Court has observed, “a final judgment commands respect.” United States v. Frady, 456
U.S. 152, 165 (1982). “Once the defendant’s chance to appeal has been waived or
exhausted, . . . we are entitled to presume he stands fairly and finally convicted.” Id. at 164.
Appreciating the importance of finality, Justice Harlan stated in his concurring opinion in Mackey
v. United States:
No one, not criminal defendants, not the judicial system, not society as a whole is
benefited by a judgment providing that a man shall tentatively go to jail today, but
tomorrow and every day thereafter his continued incarceration shall be subject to
fresh litigation.
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401 U.S. 667, 691 (1971). This principle of finality forecloses Ardoin’s current endeavor to
circumvent the limitations on post-conviction relief by challenging determinations made long ago
at sentencing under the guise of a compassionate release motion where his conviction and sentence
were affirmed on appeal in 2018 and his habeas motion was dismissed in 2021 and was not
appealed.
V. Conclusion
Accordingly, to the extent Ardoin’s claims under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) are cognizable
in this context, he has failed to satisfy his burden of showing the necessary circumstances to
warrant relief under the statutory framework to which the court must adhere. The sentence
imposed upon Ardoin for his offense of conviction comports with the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors,
and he has adduced no extraordinary and compelling reasons to lessen his sentence or justify his
release from prison at this time.
Therefore, consistent with the foregoing analysis, Ardoin’s Motion for Compassionate
Release/Reduction in Sentence (#802) is DENIED.
27
________________________________________
MARCIA A. CRONE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
SIGNED at Beaumont, Texas, this 5th day of March, 2026.
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