Guale Yamassee Tanasi Tribal Government v. Tennessee Department of Children's Services et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION
______________________________________________________________________________
GUALE YAMASSEE TANASI TRIBAL
GOVERNMENT, acting through Prime
Minister Chief Lightfoot, as Sovereign
Tribal Authority and Clan-Authorized
Representative for Indigenous Mother
TWANA COLEMAN and Indigenous
Child J.L.R.,
Petitioners,
v. 	Case No. 2:25-cv-03107-MSN-atc
TENNESSEE DEPARTMENT OF
CHILDREN’S SERVICES, LAWRENCE
PETER RHEA III, SHELBY COUNTY
JUVENILE COURT, CASA, GAL,
FOSTER CARE, and ALL ASSOCIATED
STATE OFFICERS AND CONTRACTORS,
Respondents.
______________________________________________________________________________
ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION, REMANDING TO STATE
COURT, AND DIRECTING CLERK TO CLOSE CASE
______________________________________________________________________________
Before the Court is the United States Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation
(ECF No. 10, “R&R”), filed December 18, 2025. 	Therein, the Magistrate Judge recommended
denial of injunctive relief and sua sponte remand to state court or, in the alternative, dismissal.
(Id.) 	On December 30, 2025, Petitioners timely filed Objections to the R&R.1 	(ECF No. 15.)
1 Because this case is before the Court on a Notice of Removal (ECF No. 2), neither
Chief Lightfoot nor Twana Coleman are properly considered plaintiffs in the traditional sense.
Nevertheless, neither Chief Lightfoot nor Ms. Coleman were defendants in the juvenile court
proceedings at issue; accordingly, they are not situated as typical federal defendants would be
either. For lack of a better designation, the Court refers to them collectively as “Petitioners.”
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Respondent Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) then filed an Emergency
Motion to Ascertain Jurisdictional Status (ECF No. 19) on January 29, 2026. For the reasons given
below, the Court ADOPTS the Report and Recommendation (ECF No. 10), DENIES Petitioners’
Emergency Motion for Immediate Relief (ECF No. 9), GRANTS Respondent’s Emergency
Motion to Ascertain Jurisdictional Status (ECF No. 19), and REMANDS this case to Shelby
County Juvenile Court.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 636 to relieve the burden on the federal judiciary
by permitting the assignment of district court duties to magistrate judges. See United States v.
Curtis, 237 F.3d 598, 602 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 869–70
(1989)); see also Baker v. Peterson, 67 F. App’x 308, 310 (6th Cir. 2003). For dispositive matters,
“[t]he district judge must determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge’s disposition that has
been properly objected to.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1). After reviewing
the evidence, the court is free to accept, reject, or modify the magistrate judge’s proposed findings
or recommendations. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The district court is not required to review—under
a de novo or any other standard—those aspects of the report and recommendation to which no
objection is made. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150 (1985). The district court should adopt
the magistrate judge’s findings and rulings to which no specific objection is filed. See id. at 151.
Objections to any part of a magistrate judge’s disposition “must be clear enough to enable
the district court to discern those issues that are dispositive and contentious.” Miller v. Currie, 50
F.3d 373, 380 (6th Cir. 1995); see also Arn, 474 U.S. at 147 (stating that the purpose of the rule is
to “focus attention on those issues . . . that are at the heart of the parties’ dispute.”). Each objection
to the magistrate judge’s recommendation should include how the analysis is wrong, why it was
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wrong, and how de novo review will obtain a different result on that particular issue. See Howard
v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 932 F.2d 505, 509 (6th Cir. 1991). A general objection, or
one that merely restates the arguments previously presented and addressed by the magistrate judge,
does not sufficiently identify alleged errors in the report and recommendation. Id. When an
objection 	reiterates 	the 	arguments 	presented 	to 	the 	magistrate 	judge, 	the 	report 	and
recommendation should be reviewed for clear error. Verdone v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 16-CV-
14178, 2018 WL 1516918, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 28, 2018) (citing Ramirez v. United States, 898
F. Supp. 2d 659, 663 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)); Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. Dolgencorp,
LLC, 277 F. Supp. 3d 932, 965 (E.D. Tenn. 2017).
FINDINGS OF FACT
The Magistrate Judge’s proposed findings of fact deal almost exclusively with procedural
history, descriptions of the record, and details relevant for determining whether this Court has
subject-matter jurisdiction. (ECF No. 10 at PageID 834–36.) While the Petitioners clearly wish
the R&R had addressed the underlying circumstances of the juvenile court proceedings in detail,
see ECF No. 15 at PageID 902–04, the bulk of their purported factual objections seem to relate to
the Magistrate Judge’s characterization of the Guale Yamassee Tanasi Tribal Government and its
status before the Court. 	(Id. at PageID 906–912.) 	But these objections, besides containing
varyingly relevant citations and legal conclusions, do not ultimately dispute that Petitioners are
not “an Indian tribe or band with a governing body duly recognized by the Secretary of the
Interior,” 28 U.S.C. § 1632, or that their legal theories are “based on their alleged sovereign tribal
status.” (ECF No. 10 at PageID 835.) To the extent their objections are based on offense taken at
the use of the term “sovereign citizen,” the Court will endeavor not to use that term. Otherwise,
the Court ADOPTS the Magistrate Judge’s proposed findings of fact in their entirety.
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PETITIONERS’ OBJECTIONS
The Magistrate Judge concluded that this Court lacks jurisdiction over the removed action
for a number of reasons and thus recommended remand to state juvenile court. First, the domestic
relations 	exception 	to 	federal 	jurisdiction 	precludes 	this 	Court 	from 	overseeing 	juvenile
proceedings. 	(ECF No. 10 at PageID 841–43.) 	Second, the Magistrate Judge determined that
Petitioners’ claims must be dismissed because they are properly considered frivolous based on
“tribal sovereignty theories that have no basis in fact or in law.” (Id. at PageID 845.) Further, the
Magistrate Judge considered the Notice of Removal “fatally defective.” (Id. at PageID 842, n.7.)
The R&R then goes on to recommend dismissal if, in the alternative, Petitioners’ claims are
properly considered an original action rather than as removed. (Id. at PageID 847–53.)
As a starting point, both Parties agree that the matter before the Court is not an original
action. (ECF No. 15 at PageID 905–06; ECF No. 19 at PageID 954.) Petitioners object, however,
to all of the Magistrate Judge’s proposed conclusions of law. 	Nevertheless, because the Court
determines that the domestic relations exception to federal jurisdiction is outcome-determinative
for this matter, it is unnecessary to proceed to Petitioners’ other objections.
28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) provides that “any civil action brought in a State court of which the
district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by . . . defendants,
to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where
such action is pending.” 	And “[d]istrict courts have original jurisdiction over civil actions that
arise under federal law, or that involve parties of diverse citizenship where the amount in
controversy exceeds $75,000.” Youssef v. Rose, No. 3:23-cv-462, 2023 WL 3497136, at *1 (N.D.
Ohio May 17, 2023) (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332). Further, “[i]f at any time before final
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judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be
remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (emphasis added).
Relevant to this case, “federal courts lack jurisdiction over domestic relations matters.”
McFadden v. Boyer, No. 5:25-CV-1692, 2025 WL 3187145, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 14, 2025)
(citing Danforth v. Celebrezze, 76 F.App’x 615, 616 (6th Cir. 2003)). Indeed, “the whole subject
of the domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of the States
and not to the laws of the United States.” 	Ex parte Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593–94 (1890).
Accordingly, the domestic relations exception “divests the federal courts of power to issue divorce,
alimony, and child custody decrees.” Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 703 (1992). Though
this exception does not apply to cases that have only “domestic relations overtones,” “federal
courts lack jurisdiction where the action is a mere pretense and the suit is actually concerned with
domestic relations issues.” Danforth, 76 F.App’x at 616 (citation omitted). To determine what a
suit really concerns, courts “focus on the remedy.” Chevalier v. Est. of Barnhart, 803 F.3d 789,
797 (6th Cir. 2015).
Though Petitioners make much of potential federal issues (including “tribal sovereignty”),
at bottom, the chief concern is “the safety of a child.” (ECF No. 15 at PageID 919.) To that end,
Petitioners ask this Court to “SCHEDULE hearing on child safety” because “[f]ederal courts have
a duty to protect children when state processes fail.” 	(Id. at PageID 920.) 	Petitioners’
recharacterization—“[w]e’re not challenging a custody determination—we’re challenging a
FRAUD”—does not show that Petitioners seek anything other than “[i]mmediate return of the
child” and “[i]mmediate restoration/expansion of visitation” rights. (ECF No. 15 at PageID 904;
ECF No. 2 at PageID 9.) 	Because the remedy requested demonstrates that the core concern of
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Petitioners’ attempted removal is a domestic relations matter, namely the details of child welfare
and custody arrangements, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.2
CONCLUSION
For the reasons given above, the Court concludes that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction
over the case. Accordingly, the Court ADOPTS the Report and Recommendation (ECF No. 10),
DENIES 	Petitioners’ 	Emergency 	Motion 	for 	Immediate Relief 	(ECF 	No. 	9), 	GRANTS
Respondent’s 	Emergency 	Motion 	to 	Ascertain 	Jurisdictional 	Status 	(ECF 	No. 	19), 	and
REMANDS this case to Shelby County Juvenile Court. 	Further, Petitioners’ other pending
motions (ECF Nos. 22, 23, 24, and 25) are DENIED AS MOOT. The Clerk is DIRECTED to
close this case without an entry of judgment.
IT IS SO ORDERED, this 6th day of February, 2026.
s/ Mark S. Norris
MARK S. NORRIS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
2 Because jurisdiction is defeated by the domestic relations exception, the Court need not
take up Petitioners’ objections to the Magistrate Judge’s other conclusions of law, which also
recommended remand for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
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