2:25-cv-02949•Rousseau v. Government of Tennessee
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE WESTERN DIVISION ________________________________________________________________ PAMELA RENEE ROUSSEAU, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) No. 25-cv-2949-MSN-tmp ) TENNESSEE, ) ) Defendant. ) ________________________________________________________________ REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ________________________________________________________________ Before the court is pro se plaintiff Pamela Renee Rousseau’s Complaint.1 (ECF No. 2.) Because Rousseau is proceeding in forma pauperis, the undersigned must screen the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).2 For the reasons below, the undersigned recommends that Rousseau’s complaint be dismissed. I. PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT Rousseau’s complaint was filed on October 14, 2025. (ECF No. 2.) In her complaint, which is styled as a § 1983 civil rights claim, she states that “[a]t birth [she] was issued a birth certificate and social security number that . . . are linked to 1Pursuant to Administrative Order No. 2013-05, this case has been referred to the United States magistrate judge for management and for all pretrial matters for determination and/or report and recommendation, as appropriate. 2The undersigned granted Rousseau leave to proceed in forma pauperis on December 5, 2025. (ECF No. 8.) Case 2:25-cv-02949-MSN-tmp Document 9 Filed 12/05/25 Page 1 of 5 PageID <pageID>
- 2 - financial instrument trades on [the] global market without [her] knowledge or consent.” (Id. at PageID 2.) She states that “[t]he number on the back of [her] Social Security card, in particular, appears to be tied to an account or instrument used within global markets.” (Id. at PageID 5.) She requests “full disclosure of any financial activity or bond associated with [her] birth certificate or Social Security number[,]” “a written statement confirming or denying any such use of [her] identity for financial purposes[,]” and “compensation of $10,000,000 for the unauthorized use of [her] legal identity and the violation of [her] human and civil rights.” (Id. at PageID 5-6.) II. PROPOSED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW A. Standard of Review This court is required to screen in forma pauperis complaints and must dismiss any complaint, or any portion thereof, if the action: (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i-iii). To avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “A claim is plausible on its face if the ‘plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw Case 2:25-cv-02949-MSN-tmp Document 9 Filed 12/05/25 Page 2 of 5 PageID <pageID>
- 3 - the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’” Ctr. for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v. Napolitano, 648 F.3d 365, 369 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678); see also Crestman as Next Friend to Wooden v. Metro. Gov’t of Nash. and Davidson Cnty., Tenn., No. 24-6018, 2025 WL 2650582, at *2 (6th Cir. Sept. 16, 2025). Without factual allegations in support, mere legal conclusions are not entitled to the assumption of truth. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Pro se complaints are held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers and are thus liberally construed. Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011); Kremer v. Unilever, PLC, No. 24-cv-01410, 2025 WL 2674556, at *6 (M.D. Tenn Sept. 18, 2025). Even so, pro se litigants must adhere to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, see Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989); Kremer, 2025 WL 2674556, at *6, and the court cannot create a claim that has not been spelled out in a pleading. See Brown v. Matauszak, 415 F. App’x 608, 613 (6th Cir. 2011); Payne v. Sec’y of Treas., 73 F. App’x 836, 837 (6th Cir. 2003); Wooden v. Lee, No. 24-cv-01052, 2025 WL 2678796, at *5 (W.D. Tenn. Sept. 18, 2025). B. Section 1983 Claims Rousseau’s complaint is styled as an action brought under § 1983. “To succeed on a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must first identify a constitutional right, then show that a person acting Case 2:25-cv-02949-MSN-tmp Document 9 Filed 12/05/25 Page 3 of 5 PageID <pageID>
- 4 - under the color of state law deprived him of that right.” Susselman v. Washtenaw Cty. Sheriff’s Office, 109 F.4th 864, 870 (6th Cir. 2024) (citing Troutman v. Louisville Metro Dep’t of Corr., 979 F.3d 472, 482 (6th Cir. 2020)). Rousseau brings her claim against the State of Tennessee. States are not considered “‘persons’ under § 1983.” Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989); Grose v. City of Bartlett, Nos. 23-5937/6117, 2025 WL 1158764, at *2 (6th Cir. Jan. 10, 2025). While “[§] 1983 provides a federal forum to remedy many deprivations of civil liberties, . . . it does not provide a federal forum for litigants who seek a remedy against a State for alleged deprivations of civil liberties.” Will, 491 U.S. at 66. Therefore, Rousseau cannot bring a § 1983 claim against the defendant. Further, Rousseau fails to allege specific facts regarding the defendant’s alleged wrongdoing. She also fails to allege which of her constitutional rights were violated or that a person acting under the color of state law deprived her of that right. Her general allegation, without more, cannot meet the pleading requirements under Iqbal, and her complaint therefore fails to state a claim. III. RECOMMENDATION Based on the above, it is recommended that the complaint be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Respectfully submitted, Case 2:25-cv-02949-MSN-tmp Document 9 Filed 12/05/25 Page 4 of 5 PageID <pageID>
- 5 - s/ Tu M. Pham TU M. PHAM Chief United States Magistrate Judge December 5, 2025 Date NOTICE WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS AFTER BEING SERVED WITH A COPY OF THIS REPORT AND RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION, ANY PARTY MAY SERVE AND FILE SPECIFIC WRITTEN OBJECTIONS TO THE PROPOSED FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS. ANY PARTY MAY RESPOND TO ANOTHER PARTY’S OBJECTIONS WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS AFTER BEING SERVED WITH A COPY. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b)(2); L.R. 72.1(g)(2). FAILURE TO FILE OBJECTIONS WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS MAY CONSTITUTE A WAIVER AND/OR FORFEITURE OF OBJECTIONS, EXCEPTIONS, AND FURTHER APPEAL. Case 2:25-cv-02949-MSN-tmp Document 9 Filed 12/05/25 Page 5 of 5 PageID <pageID>
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