Partee v. Stepherson, Inc. et al

1
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION
_____________________________________________________________________________
LAQUINTA PARTEE,
Plaintiff,
v. 	Case 2:24-cv-02529-MSN-cgc
STEPHERSON, INC.,
d/b/a SUPERLO FOODS,
et al.,
Defendants.
_____________________________________________________________________________
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON
DEFENDANT STEPHERSON, INC.’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
_____________________________________________________________________________
Before the Court is Defendant Stepherson, Incorporated, d/b/a Superlo Foods’ (“Superlo”
or “Defendant”) Motion for Summary Judgment. 	(Docket Entry (“D.E.”) #46). 	Pursuant to
Administrative Order 2013-05, the instant motion has been referred to the United States Magistrate
Judge for Report and Recommendation. For the reasons set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED
that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment be GRANTED.
I. 	Background
On July 25, 2024, Plaintiff filed a pro se Complaint alleging claims against Superlo and
other named defendants. 	(D.E. #1). 	One day later, on July 26, 2024, Plaintiff filed a pro se
Amended Complaint against the same defendants. (D.E. #8). As to Superlo, Plaintiff alleges that
it violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 626, et seq.,
and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., by discriminating
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against her on the basis of race, color, sex, and age, creating a hostile work environment based on
sex, and retaliating against her for complaining of the unlawful discrimination.1 	Plaintiff’s
Amended Complaint included her Amended Charge of Discrimination with the Tennessee Human
Rights Commission (Charge Number 490-2024-01386) as well as her Notice of Right to Sue letter
from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) which was issued on May 3,
2024. (D.E #8 at PageID 89-93).
On August 11, 2025, Superlo filed the instant Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 	(D.E. #46). 	Superlo asserts that there is no
genuine dispute of material fact on Plaintiff’s claims of hostile work environment, discrimination,
or retaliation under Title VII or the ADEA.
On September 8, 2025, Plaintiff filed her Response to Superlo’s Motion for Summary
Judgment. 	(D.E. #53).2 Plaintiff’s Response fails to clearly respond to Superlo’s Statement of
Undisputed Material Fact in the manner proscribed by Local Rule 56.1(b). 	As such, it is
RECOMMENDED pursuant to Local Rule 56.1(d) that Superlo’s asserted facts are not disputed
for purposes of summary judgment. Further, Plaintiff’s Response does not contain a memorandum
of law setting for her arguments in opposition to Superlo’s motion.
1 	To the extent that Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint sought to raise any other causes of action against
Stepherson in her Amended Complaint, this Court has already dismissed all other claims. (D.E. #10, #16).
2 	To clarify the record, several filings are related to, or purport to be versions of, Plaintiff’s Response to
Stepherson’s Motion for Summary Judgment. On August 18, 2025, Plaintiff filed a motion to extend the
time to respond to Stepherson’s Motion for Summary Judgment due to a recent car accident (D.E. #48),
which was later granted (D.E. #59). On September 2, 2025, Plaintiff filed a 137-page pro se Response to
Stepherson’s Motion for Summary Judgment, which failed to comply with Local Rule 56.1. (D.E. #49).
The following day, Plaintiff, apparently realizing her error regarding the page limit, filed a notice seeking
to withdraw her Response (D.E. #50) as to continue and clarify the deadline for her to properly respond.
(D.E. #51).
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On September 22, 2025, Superlo filed its Reply in Support of its Motion for Summary
Judgment. (D.E. #54). Superlo argues that Plaintiff has failed to comply with Local Rule 56.1(b),
summarizes how her purported disputes of material fact are not properly founded (see D.E. #54 at
PageID 2580), and argues that her claims should be deemed as abandoned for failure to respond
to its legal arguments.3
II. 	Proposed Findings of Fact
Superlo operates grocery stores in the Greater Memphis area, including one on Quince
Road and one on North Watkins Street. Superlo’s human resources functions are managed by J.R.
Stepherson, whose office is located at Superlo’s corporate offices on American Way. 	Superlo
maintains an Employee Handbook that outlines the grocery chain’s policies. An online link to the
handbook is provided to all employees upon hire.
As 	an 	equal 	opportunity 	employer, 	Superlo 	prohibits 	all 	types 	of 	employment
discrimination, including sexual harassment. 	All employees are instructed to report harassing
conduct to their supervisor, Human Resources manager, or other manager at the company. The
policy explicitly states that Superlo prohibits retaliation against any employee who provides
information about, complains, or assists in the investigation of any complaint of harassment or
discrimination. Superlo’s handbook additionally prohibits the use of personal cell phones while
working. Superlo also reserves the right to transfer employees among its stores and has done so
with employees of all races, genders, and ages.
3 	On October 30, 2025, Plaintiff filed her own Motion for Summary Judgment. (Docket Entry (“D.E.”)
#60). This motion was filed outside the dispositive motion deadline (see D.E. #30, #47), and to the extent
Plaintiff intended for this filing to serve as a sur-reply, Local Rule 56.1 does not authorize the filing of a
sur-reply, and no leave was granted to file one. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment
has not been considered by the Court in this Report and Recommendation.
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Latanya Owens, a 43-year-old black female, is the store manager of the Quince Road store.
In 2024, Jeremy Jones, a 49-year-old white male, was the co-manager, and Andrea Brice, a 39-
year-old black female, was the assistant manager. 	In 2024, James Dixon, a 66-year-old white
male, was the store manager of the North Watkins store, and Michelle Johnson, a 58-year-old
white female, was the assistant manager.
Baggers and cashiers are entry level clerk positions in the front end of Superlo with
commensurate pay scales. 	Cashiers are expected to “provide courteous service to customers in
addition to quick and accurate checkout of purchases.” 	Cashiers also bag purchases for the
customer when baggers are not available and perform miscellaneous tasks as may be assigned by
supervisors and managers. 	Though positions in customer service involved some additional
training on selling money orders and lottery tickets, counting pans, and accepting bill payments,
the customer service booth, which is also front-end department, is paid on the same pay scale as
cashiers and does not have managerial authority over cashiers.
Positions in the back-end or grocery, produce, deli, or meat departments, such as stockers,
have a higher pay scale than cashiers and customer service. 	Upon occasion, the store manager
may ask an employee to act as a “manager on duty” (“MOD”) to fill in for a short time in the
manager’s absence. It is not an official position and incurs no extra pay. The MOD does not have
managerial authority over other employees’ employment status, schedule, or compensation.
As much of Superlo’s staff is part-time, Superlo requests that employees provide their
schedule availability in advance. 	Superlo makes it expressly clear that schedules are not
guaranteed. Store managers set the schedule weekly on Fridays.
Superlo serves up to a hundred customers in a store at any given time, which often includes
members of the local police force. The Quince Road store often serves free meals to officers in
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uniform. 	Superlo contracts with Clarion Security to provide security guards at the stores. 	The
guards are not Superlo employees, but they do walkarounds of the store as part of their regular
duties.
Brice and Owens hired Plaintiff, a 39-year-old black female, as an at-will cashier at the
Quince Road store in September 2023. From the beginning of her employment through the third
week of February 2024, Plaintiff’s scheduling availability was accommodated, which included
working Friday afternoons. Through February 14, 2024, Plaintiff did not report any concerns, and
she “got along normally with all of the workers,” even carpooling with some. 	In or around
February 2024, Owens assigned Kimberly Venegas, a 21-year-old Hispanic cashier who had
previous customer service training and had previously worked at Superlo, to the customer service
booth, joining three black (including one who Plaintiff perceived to have a darker skin tone like
her own) and two white employees. 	These employees assigned to the customer service booth
ranged in age from their 20s to their 50s.
On February 15, 2024, after being asked by Brice to train a new hire and then to stock
groceries, Plaintiff prepared a written complaint that Kandis Banks, a black coworker who worked
in customer service, had sexually harassed her, that the security guard had asked her and her son
to remove their hoods, and that she was denied a position in customer service because she is “black
and attempted a complaint to [Owens].” Plaintiff subsequently elaborated that Banks had asked
Plaintiff to engage in sexual activity on two occasions and had, on February 13, 2024, had bumped
into her to “get a feel.”
With respect to Plaintiff’s being asked to stock groceries, Owens advised Plaintiff that this
was a “positive sign of trust and a potential opportunity for an increase in compensation. 	With
respect to another employee being assigned to customer service, Owens explained that that
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employee had previously worked for the store and had customer service training. With respect to
Plaintiff’s complaint about Banks, Owens addressed it.
Even so, after her February 15, 2024 complaint, Plaintiff began recording interactions at
the store, actively soliciting evidence from coworkers and customers, and even offering to pay
individuals for information. This led several coworkers to complain about Plaintiff. Plaintiff also
raised a myriad of complaints for virtually every one of the additional twenty-three days she
worked, including everything from coworkers, customers, and security standing in aisles or
walking behind her, talking and laughing in the vicinity, flirting with her, tapping her, reaching
around her, hugging each other, frowning, requesting she not record them, and calling the police
to the store. Plaintiff also complained that Owens had interfered with her school schedule, which
suddenly required all day on Friday off. Plaintiff also complained about threats that she believed
she overheard, which she believed were efforts to retaliate against her for her February 15, 2024
complaint. Plaintiff continued to call for the discharge of several of her coworkers and managers.
Owens and Stepherson did their best to investigate and address the complaints, which
increased in number, frequency, and vagueness, but for the most part, they were unable to
substantiate them. After Plaintiff complained about her request not to work on Fridays not being
accommodated, 	Stepherson 	investigated 	and 	then 	Owens 	and 	Stepherson 	accommodated
Plaintiff’s updated scheduling requests. As to the behavior that Plaintiff perceived to be sexually
harassing, it ceased after Owens and Stephens, and on one occasion Plaintiff herself, addressed her
concerns with the alleged perpetrators.
Superlo did not issue any formal discipline to Plaintiff at any time at the Quince Road store,
and she was never demoted. However, Superlo did request that Plaintiff put her phone and notes
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about her coworkers away while she was at the register. 	This policy reminder was issued to
everyone. Plaintiff objected to both requests.
Ultimately, as Plaintiff’s dissatisfaction with her coworkers, managers, and customers and
the Quince Road store seemed irreparable, Superlo transferred Partee to the North Watkins store,
which was in fact closer to her home, and assigned her the revised work schedule that she
requested. Dixon accepted Plaintiff’s transfer. Neither Superlo nor Plaintiff informed Dixon of
her complaints from her time at the Quince Road store.
After just one day working at the North Watkins store, Plaintiff started making recordings
once again, announced to her new coworkers and a manager that she is not “touchy-feely” when
they tapped her on her shoulder to attempt to get her attention, snapped at the cash office manager
to “don’t call me baby; I push babies out,” and interrogated coworkers on who they were and what
they did at the store. Plaintiff also took offense to two coworkers hugging in the parking lot and
calling each other “Tenderoni” and to another worker smoking near her car.
On the morning of Plaintiff’s third day working at the North Watkins location, Plaintiff
complained to human resources that a handwritten product listing at her register had the name of
“Niagara” water written in a manner that looked like a racial slur. Stepherson again investigated
and determined that the handwritten product listing was a misspelling made by a black employee
at some point before September 2023 and that no other employee had found it offensive except for
Plaintiff.
On Plaintiff’s fourth day at the North Watkins location, she took offense to two customers’
appearance, who she believed were “not completely dressed for business or the public” and were
wearing “flashy clothing attire” while singing along to the song “Super Freak,” which was playing
in the store. Plaintiff decided to engage the customers in conversation about their behavior being
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of the type that Plaintiff had already “complained about.” As a result of Plaintiff’s statements, the
customers complained to management about her “nasty attitude.”
As a result of the customers’ complaint, the complaints of Plaintiff’s coworkers and
managers at the store from only three days working there, and his own observance of Plaintiff’s
contrary, argumentative, and unrepentant manner, Dixon terminated Plaintiff’s employment.
Dixon notified Plaintiff that he was discharging her because of a “bad attitude that the other
employees don’t appreciate and [his] customers don’t appreciate.”
In the past, Dixon had discharged white, lighter-skinned, younger, and older employees,
including those who had not complained of perceived harassment or discrimination, for similar
attitude issues and customer complaints. 	At the Quince Road store, Owens wrote up a white
cashier, named Kimberly Johnson, for a single customer complaint about profanity Johnson had
directed at a faulty piece of equipment.
Plaintiff obtained employment with an accounting firm a few days later, but she was
terminated from that position a few weeks later. 	Because the accounting firm and Superlo’s
headquarters were located within a mile of each other, Plaintiff blamed Stepherson for her
termination; however, Stepherson does not know the owner of the accounting firm and has never
communicated with him, much less about Plaintiff.
Plaintiff witnessed police officers and police cars in her neighborhood or on the same road.
Because one of Plaintiff’s former coworkers had a relative within the Memphis Police Department,
Plaintiff believed Superlo had convinced the police to launch an investigation of her. The Quince
Road Superlo managers are not related to any police officers and did not call the police on Plaintiff
or ask them to follow, flirt, harass, or annoy her in any way.
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Since the filing of this suit, Plaintiff contends that Superlo has continued to retaliate against
her in the following was: by having Memphis Light Gas and Water drive trucks near her and
interrupt her utility services; by having the City of Memphis’ elected officials close libraries and
parks; by radio stations playing certain songs; by convenience and drug stores not stocking items
she wants; by FedEx and the Federal Aviation Administration flying planes over her; and, by the
price of food increasing. Superlo asserts that it has not had any role in these events.
In addition to Superlo, at least three other employers that employed Plaintiff before and
after her employment at Superlo, have cited her attitude and the turmoil she caused with her
coworkers as the reason for her separations.
III. 	Legal Standard
Summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(c). 	Although hearsay evidence may not be considered on a motion for summary
judgment, Jacklyn v. Schering-Plough Healthcare Prods. Sales Corp., 176 F.3d 921, 927 (6th Cir.
1999), evidentiary materials presented to avoid summary judgment otherwise need not be in a form
that would be admissible at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986); Thaddeus-
X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 400 (6th Cir. 1999). The evidence and justifiable inferences based on
facts must be viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus.
Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Wade v. Knoxville Utilities Bd., 259 F.3d
452, 460 (6th Cir. 2001).
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Summary judgment is proper “against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to
establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will
bear the burden of proof at trial.” 	Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. 	The moving party can prove the
absence of a genuine issue of material fact by showing that there is a lack of evidence to support
the nonmoving party’s case. 	Id. at 325. 	This may be accomplished by submitting affirmative
evidence negating an essential element of the nonmoving party’s claim, or by attacking the
nonmoving party’s evidence to show why it does not support a judgment for the nonmoving party.
10a Charles A. Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 2727 (2d ed. 1998).
Once a properly supported motion for summary judgment has been made, the “adverse
party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of [its] pleading, but . . . must set forth
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). A genuine
issue for trial exists if the evidence would permit a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the
nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). To avoid summary
judgment, the nonmoving party “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical
doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
586 (1986).
IV. Proposed Analysis & Conclusions of Law
a. 	Hostile Work Environment
First, Plaintiff alleges that the sexual harassment that she suffered constitutes a hostile work
environment. To establish a prima facie case of hostile work environment, a plaintiff must show
as follows: (1) that she is a member of a protected class; (2) that she experienced unwelcome sexual
harassment; (3) that the harassment was based on sex; (4) that the harassment created a hostile
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work environment; and, (5) that the employer is liable. See Doe v. City of Detroit, 3 F.4t 294, 300
(6th Cir. 2021).
With respect to the fifth prong, an employer is not automatically liable for sexual
harassment perpetrated by its employees; instead, to meet this prong, there must be evidence that
the employer not only knew or reasonably should have known about the harassment but also failed
to take appropriate remedial action that is reasonably calculated to end the harassment. Gallagher
v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., 567 F.3d 263, 274 (6th Cir. 2009); Hawkins v. Anheuser-Busch,
Inc., 517 F.3d 321, 340 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Jackson v. Quanez Corp., 191 F.3d 647 (6th Cir.
1999)).
Superlo first argues that there is insufficient evidence that the majority of the incidents
were “based on” her sex, asserting instead that they were incidents that Plaintiff simply found
offensive and may have been equally offensive to a male; however, even assuming, arguendo, that
Plaintiff could meet this burden, the undisputed evidence in the record is that, as to all claims of a
potentially sexually harassing nature that Plaintiff reported to Superlo, Superlo took remedial
action and the actions did not continue. These actions included investigating her complains and
addressing them with the perpetrators. With respect to other incidents, Plaintiff admits that she
did not report them and addressed them on her own. 	Accordingly, there is no evidence in the
record that establishes a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Superlo could be held liable
for the actions of its employees that Plaintiff found to be offensive. Thus, it is RECOMMENDED
that Plaintiff’s claim of hostile work environment based on sexual harassment fails as a matter of
law.
b. 	Title VII & ADEA Discrimination
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Under Title VII, discrimination of the basis of “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin”
constitutes an unlawful employment practice. 	42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). 	Likewise, the ADEA
prohibits discrimination in employment on the basis of age. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a). A plaintiff may
establish a claim of disparate treatment either by introducing direct evidence of discrimination or
by proving circumstantial evidence which would support an inference of discrimination. Kline v.
Tennessee Valley Auth., 128 F.3d 337, 348 (6th Cir. 1997). 	“The direct evidence and the
circumstantial evidence paths are mutually exclusive; a plaintiff need only prove one or the other,
not both.” Id.
Under the direct-evidence approach, a plaintiff must present evidence that, “if believed,
requires the conclusion that unlawful discrimination was at least a motivating factor in the
employer’s actions.” Jacklyn v. Schering Plough Healthcare Prods. Sales Corp., 176 F.3d 921,
926 (6th Cir. 2000). 	To successfully pursue a direct-discrimination claim, the evidence must
establish, without any inferences or presumptions, that discriminatory motives caused the adverse
employment action. Nguyen v. City of Cleveland, 229 F.3d 59, 563 (6th Cir. 2000); see also Brack
v. Shoney’s, Inc., 249 F. Supp. 2d 938, 947 (W.D. Tenn. 2003). If the plaintiff introduces evidence
of an adverse employment action on the basis of her protected status, the burden of persuasion
shifts to the employer to prove that it would have taken the adverse employment action even had
it not been motivated by discrimination. Manzer v. Diamond Shamrock Chemicals Co., 29 F.3d
1078, 1081 (6th Cir. 1994) (citing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 244-45 (1989)).
Under the circumstantial evidence approach, the tripartite test established in McDonnell
Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), and later clarified in Texas Department of
Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981), applies to determine if the conduct violated
Title VII and the ADEA. 	First, a plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of discrimination,
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which requires as follows: (1) she was a member of a protected class; (2) she suffered an adverse
employment action; (3) she was qualified for the position; and (4) she was treated differently than
similarly situated, non-protected employees. DiCarlo v. Potter, 358 F.3d 408, 415 (6th Cir. 2004).
If plaintiff establishes the prima facie case, a mandatory presumption of discrimination is
created and the burden shifts to the defendant to “articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for the employee’s rejection.” McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. If the defendant meets
this burden, then a plaintiff must prove that the reason proffered by the defendant is a pretext to
hide unlawful discrimination. 	Id. The plaintiff may establish that the proffered reason is a mere
pretext by showing that the stated reasons had no basis in fact, that the stated reasons were not the
actual reasons, and that the stated reasons were insufficient to explain the defendant’s action.
Wheeler v. McKinley Enters., 937 F.2d 1158, 1162 (6th Cir. 1991). “A reason cannot be proved
to be a pretext for discrimination unless it is shown both that the reason was false, and that
discrimination was the real reason.” St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 515 (1993).
Here, there is no evidence of direct discrimination; thus, Plaintiff must begin by
establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. This requires, inter alia, that the actions taken
by Superlo constituted adverse employment actions, which requires “a significant change in
employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly
different responsibility, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits.” Burlington Indus.,
Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998).
With respect to actions taken by Superlo, the evidence shows that the majority were not
adverse employment actions. 	First, the evidence shows that Plaintiff complained at the Quince
Road store of being denied a position in customer service and believed it to be based upon her
race; however, the evidence further is undisputed that there is no different pay scale for customer
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service positions, and there is no evidence that customer service positions had any significant
change in benefits. Second, Plaintiff complained at the Quince Road store that the store manager
did not accommodate sudden changes to her school schedule; however, again, the evidence is also
undisputed that Superlo “makes it expressly clear that schedules are not guaranteed” for any
employee and that they later were able to accommodate her request not to work on Fridays. Next,
the evidence shows that Plaintiff was asked to do certain additional tasks and not to look at her
cell phone while on duty at the Quince Road store, but the evidence is also undisputed that
performing occasional miscellaneous tasks is within her job requirements, that cell phone usage
while working was prohibited, and that all employees were reminded about the cell phone policy.
Additionally, the evidence is undisputed that, at the Quince Road store, Plaintiff never received
any formal discipline or demotion.
Ultimately, Plaintiff was transferred from the Quince Road store to the North Watkins
store, which was closer to her home and was able to accommodate her requested work schedule.
There is no evidence that her pay, responsibilities, or benefits were affected in any way by the
transfer. See DeLeon v. Kalamazoo Cty. Rd. Comm’n, 739 F.3d 914, 919 (6th Cir. 2013) (citation
omitted) (stating that, in order for a transfer to constitute an adverse employment action, the
employee must be able to show “[a]t a minimum” a quantitative or qualitative change in the terms
and conditions of employment”).
Thus, 	the 	sole 	adverse 	employment 	action 	is 	that 	Superlo 	terminated 	Plaintiff’s
employment from the North Watkins store after her unwelcome interaction with customers and
other behaviors that they did not believe were conducive to running their business. However, as
to her termination, there is no evidence in the record of any similarly situated individual who was
treated differently. In fact, on the contrary, the undisputed evidence shows that Dixon, the North
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Watkins store manager, had previously discharged white, lighter-skinned, younger, and older
employees, including those who had not complained of perceived harassment or discrimination,
for similar attitude issues and customer complaints. 	Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED that
Plaintiff’s claims of discrimination on the basis of race, color, sex, and age in violation of Title
VII and the ADEA fail as a matter of law.
c. 	Retaliation
Plaintiff alleges that she was suffered unlawful retaliation at Quince Road and at the North
Watkins store. With respect to the Quince Road store, she appears to allege that, following her
February 15, 2024 complaint to management, she suffered a retaliatory hostile work environment.
For such a claim, the modified prima facie case for Title VII and ADEA retaliation applies and
requires as follows: (1) Plaintiff engaged in activity protected activity; (2) the exercise of protected
rights was known to Superlo; (3) thereafter, Superlo either took an adverse employment action or
subjected Plaintiff to severe or pervasive retaliatory harassment by a supervisor; and, (4) there
was a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action or
harassment. Mulvey v. Hugler, No. 17-5633, 2018 WL 2771346, at *3 (6th Cir. Apr. 3, 2018).
Here, while Plaintiff alleges various unwelcome interactions between herself and other
employees and customers, this does not suffice. Instead, Plaintiff must show severe or pervasive
retaliatory conduct by a supervisor. At the Quince Road location, the only evidence in the record
that pertains to any actions of a supervisor is that Owens, the Quince Road store manager, briefly
did 	not 	accommodate 	Plaintiff’s 	change 	in 	schedule 	to 	not 	work 	on 	Fridays 	but 	later
accommodated it, and that the managers did their best to investigate and address Plaintiff’s
complaints, which increased in number, frequency, and vagueness, but for the most part, they were
unable to substantiate them. As to the behavior that Plaintiff perceived to be sexually harassing,
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it ceased after Owens and Stephens, and on one occasion Plaintiff herself, addressed her concerns
with the alleged perpetrators. 	Accordingly, there is no evidence of severe or pervasive retaliatory
harassment by a supervisor at the Quince Road location.
As to the North Watkins location, to the extent that Plaintiff seeks to claim that she suffered
a retaliatory discharge, the evidence is undisputed that the decisionmaker (Dixon) was not
informed of any of Plaintiff’s complaints, including her February 15 complaint, at the Quince Road
store. Because there is no evidence that Dixon knew of Plaintiff’s alleged protected activity, any
claim that Plaintiff’s termination constitutes unlawful retaliation therefor fails as a matter of law.
IV. 	Conclusion
For the reasons set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED that Superlo’s Motion for
Summary Judgment is GRANTED.
Signed this 19th day of January, 2026.
s/ Charmiane G. Claxton
CHARMIANE G. CLAXTON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
ANY OBJECTIONS OR EXCEPTIONS TO THIS REPORT MUST BE FILED WITHIN
FOURTEEN (14) DAYS AFTER BEING SERVED WITH A COPY OF THE REPORT. 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). FAILURE TO FILE SAID OBJECTIONS OR EXCEPTIONS
WITHIN 	FOURTEEN 	(14) 	DAYS 	MAY 	CONSTITUTE 	A 	WAIVER 	AND/OR
FORFEITURE OF THE OPPORTUNITY TO RAISE OBJECTIONS, EXCEPTIONS,
AND ANY FURTHER APPEAL.
Case 2:24-cv-02529-MSN-cgc Document 65 Filed 01/19/26 Page 16 of 16
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