H.H. et al v. Quin et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION
H.H., ET AL.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
MARGIE QUIN, ET AL.,
Defendants.
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NO. 3:25-cv-01360
JUDGE RICHARDSON
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Pending before the Court is the “Motion and Memorandum of Law to Dissolve Temporary
Restraining Order” (Doc. No. 18, “Motion”), filed by Defendant Margie Quin (“Defendant
Quin”).1 Via the Motion, Defendant Quin moves to dissolve the temporary restraining order (Doc.
No. 12, “Temporary Restraining Order”), issued by the Court on November 26, 2025, for “lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction and because Plaintiffs cannot establish that they are entitled to a TRO.”
(Doc. No. 18 at 1). Plaintiffs, H.H., (“Plaintiff H.H.”),2 Kelli Hewitt (“Plaintiff Kelli Hewitt”),
James Hewitt (“Plaintiff James Hewitt”), and Lacey Perry (“Plaintiff Perry”), have filed a response
(Doc. No. 20, “Response”) in opposition to the Motion. Defendant Quin has filed a reply (Doc.
No. 21, “Reply”), in further support of the Motion.
1 In addition to Defendant Quin, Cole Law Group (hereinafter sometimes “Defendant CLG” or “CLG”),
Andrew Goldstein (“Defendant Goldstein”), and Leen Heresh (“Defendant Heresh”) are also Defendants
in this action.
2 Although Plaintiff H.H. has now turned eighteen such that the Court could refer to him by his full name,
Hudson Hewitt, for the sake of consistency and coherence with its previous rulings in this case, the Court
will continue to refer to him as Plaintiff H.H. herein.
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For the reasons described herein, the Court will grant the Motion (Doc. No. 18) in an
accompanying order.3 Moreover, in line with the analysis herein, the Court will dismiss Counts I,
II, III, and IV of the complaint (Doc. No. 1) without prejudice and will dismiss this action in the
accompanying order. Additionally, because the Temporary Restraining Order will be dissolved
and this action will be dismissed in its entirety, Plaintiffs’ pending “Motion to Convert Temporary
Restraining Order Into Preliminary Injunction” (Doc. No. 22) will also be denied as moot.4
BACKGROUND5
The reader’s familiarity of this case is presumed. The Court will provide only a brief
overview of the claims underlying this case, which are further detailed in the Court’s memorandum
opinion issued on November 26, 2025 (Doc. No. 11 at 3-11, “Memorandum Opinion”), before
providing a brief overview of the procedural background underlying the Motion and this action as
well as the parties’ arguments on the Motion.
1. 	Factual Background
Via the complaint (Doc. No. 1, “Complaint”), Plaintiffs bring four claims.
Count I is a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“§ 1983 claim”) brought by Plaintiff Kelli
Hewitt, Plaintiff James Hewitt, and Plaintiff Perry (collectively, “Count I Plaintiffs”) against
Defendant Quin for violation of the due process rights of the Count I Plaintiffs under the Fourteenth
3 Owing to the expedited nature of this matter, the Court’s write-up of its analysis herein may be briefer
than it otherwise might be.
4 If a party wishes to convert a temporary restraining order into a preliminary injunction without
experiencing a temporal gap between the two, it would be very well advised to move for such relief prior
to the evening before the expiration of the temporary restraining order.
5 When citing to a page in a document filed by one of the parties, the Court endeavors to cite to the page
number (“Page __ of __”) added by the Clerk’s Office as part of the pagination process associated with
Electronic Case Filing if such page number differs from the page number originally provided by the
author/filer of the document. In addition, where the Complaint is cited herein without including a paragraph
symbol, the citation is not to a paragraph number but rather to a page that contains the cited content outside
the boundaries of any paragraph
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Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Via Count I, Plaintiffs allege that the Count I Plaintiffs “have
a constitutional right to decisions about the care, custody, and control of Plaintiff H.H[.], as well
as [the] minor children R.J., W.H., R.M., and B.M.,” (Doc. No. 1 at ¶ 82), and that Defendant
Quin, “acting under color of law, seeks to remove [Plaintiff] H.H., R.J., W.H., R.M., and B.M.
from the Hewitt-Perry family due to [Plaintiff] H.H.’s refusal to sign a false immigration
application.” (Id. at ¶ 86). Thus, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Quin’s conduct violated the Count
I Plaintiffs’ “due process rights to family unity.” (Id. at ¶ 89).
Count II is also a § 1983 claim against Defendant Quin for violation of due process rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment. Unlike Count I, though, Count II is brought by Plaintiff H.H.
(and only Plaintiff H.H.). Via Count II, Plaintiffs allege that “Plaintiff H.H. has a constitutional
right to fundamental fairness in proceedings related to his living placement and immigration
status,” and that “[t]his right protects him from being coerced to sign any documents that affect
his immigration status or being removed from his family’s care due to his refusal to sign any
documents that affect his immigration status.” (Id. at ¶ 94).
Plaintiffs also bring two state-law tort claims. One (Count III) is a claim for false
imprisonment against Defendant CLG, Defendant Goldstein, and Defendant Heresh. The other
(Count IV) is a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress against Defendant CLG,
Defendant Goldstein, and Defendant Heresh.
Via the Complaint, Plaintiffs request several types of relief.
First, Plaintiffs request,6 presumably in connection with Count I and Count II, a TRO:
. . . enjoining Defendant Margie Quin, and her employees and agents, from: (1)
forcing, coercing, or pressuring Plaintiff H.H. into signing any immigration
documents without the presence of his chosen legal counsel; (2) threatening
Plaintiff H.H. with deportation or any other adverse immigration consequences as
a means to coerce his signature on immigration documents; (3) preventing Plaintiff
6 As noted below, this request was granted in the form of the Temporary Restraining Order.
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H.H. from accessing legal counsel of his choice; (4) physically restraining H.H. or
preventing him from leaving any meeting or location; (5) removing or threatening
to remove Plaintiff H.H. from his current kinship placement with his sister Lacey
Perry, or removing or threatening to remove his minor siblings, R.J., W.H., R.M.,
and B.M., from that same placement, where such removal is based on (i) his refusal
to sign immigration documents without legal counsel, (ii) his exercise of his
constitutional right to counsel, (iii) his pursuit of this legal action; (6) using coercive
tactics, threats, raised voices, and intimidation directed at Plaintiff H.H. regarding
his immigration status or any legal documents; (7) requiring Defendant and her
employees and agents to permit Plaintiff H.H.’s attorney of choice to be present at
all meetings, proceedings, or discussions concerning Plaintiff H.H.’s immigration
status, legal status, or any documents requiring his signature; (8) requiring
Defendant and her employees and agents to provide Plaintiff H.H. with reasonable
time—not less than 48 hours—to review any legal documents with counsel of his
choice before requesting his signature, unless a court of competent jurisdiction has
set a shorter deadline.
(Doc. No. 1 at 20-21).
Plaintiffs additionally seek, presumably also in connection with Counts I and II “[a]
declaratory judgment determining that Defendant [ ] Quin violated the Plaintiffs’ constitutional
rights.” (Id.). Via the Complaint, and in connection with Counts III and IV, Plaintiffs further seek
“[a]n award of compensatory damages” and an award of “punitive damages” against Defendant
CLG, Defendant Goldstein, and Defendant Heresh. (Id. at 21). Additionally, Plaintiffs seek
“[r]easonable attorney’s fees, expert fees, and all costs of litigation incurred by Plaintiffs pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1988,” and “[a]n award of pre-judgment and post-judgment interest.” (Id.).
2. 	Procedural Background
On November 21, 2025, Plaintiffs filed a “Motion for Temporary Restraining Order.”
(Doc. No. 3, “TRO Motion”). On November 26, 2025—prior to any response from Defendants in
this action—the Court granted the TRO Motion for the reasons set forth in the Memorandum
Opinion (Doc. No. 11) and accordingly granted the Temporary Restraining Order (Doc. No. 12),
which provided in relevant part:
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant Margie Quinn, as Commissioner of the
Tennessee Department of Children’s Services, her officers, agents, servants,
employees, attorneys, and all persons in active concert or participation with them,
are immediately RESTRAINED AND ENJOINED as follows:
1. Defendant is restrained from forcing, coercing, or pressuring H.H. to sign
any immigration documents without the presence of his chosen legal
counsel, including but not limited to: (a) forcing H.H. to sign documents
without adequate time for review; (b) presenting documents for signature
without full explanation of their contents and consequences; (c) refusing to
provide copies of documents for review with counsel; and (d) setting
arbitrary deadlines for signature without legal justification;
2. Defendant is hereby restrained from threatening H.H. with deportation or
any other adverse immigration consequences as a means to coerce his
signature on immigration documents, including but not limited to making
statements that he has “no other options” or “no immigration status” when
such statements are false or misleading;
3. Defendant is hereby restrained from preventing H.H. from accessing
legal counsel of his choice, including but not limited to: (a) excluding
attorneys from meetings concerning H.H.’s immigration status; (b) calling
law enforcement to remove H.H.’s chosen counsel from meetings; (c)
claiming that attorneys are “trespassing” when they appear at H.H.’s
request; or (d) misrepresenting to third parties the nature of an attorney’s
representation of H.H.;
4. Defendant is hereby restrained from physically restraining H.H. or
preventing him from leaving any meeting or location, including but not
limited to: (a) holding doors shut to prevent his exit; (b) telling him he
cannot leave when he requests to do so; (c) using physical force or the threat
of physical force to detain him; or (d) instructing others to prevent his
departure;
5. Defendant is hereby required to permit H.H.’s attorney of choice to be
present at all meetings, proceedings, or discussions concerning H.H.’s
immigration status, legal status, or any documents requiring his signature;
6. Defendant is hereby required to provide H.H. with reasonable time—not
less than 48 hours—to review any legal documents with counsel of his
choice before requesting his signature, unless a court of competent
jurisdiction has set a shorter deadline;
7. Defendant is hereby restrained from removing or threatening to remove
H.H. from his current kinship placement with his sister Lacey, or removing
or threatening to remove his minor siblings R.J. (16), W.H. (15), R.M. (13),
and B.M. (12), from that same placement, where such removal is based on:
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(a) his refusal to sign immigration documents without legal counsel; (b) his
exercise of his constitutional right to counsel; or (c) his pursuit of this legal
action; Defendant shall not threaten such removal or separation as a means
to coerce H.H.’s compliance with their demands regarding immigration
paperwork; and
8. Defendant is hereby required to cease immediately all coercive tactics,
threats, raised voices, and intimidation directed at H.H. regarding his
immigration status or any legal documents.
This Order shall remain in effect for fourteen (14) days from the date of entry,
unless extended by the Court for good cause shown or by consent of the parties.
Pursuant to its wide discretion to do so, the Court waives the security bond
requirement under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c).
(Doc. No. 12 at 1-4).
On December 2, 2025, Defendant Quin filed her Motion (Doc. No. 18), and on December
5, 2025, Plaintiffs filed their Response (Doc. No. 20). On December 8, 2025, Defendant Quin filed
her Reply. (Doc. No. 21).
3. 	The Parties’ Arguments
In her Motion, Defendant Quin makes several arguments for why the Temporary
Restraining Order should be dissolved. Defendant Quin first argues that the Temporary Restraining
Order should be dissolved because “[t]his Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over this case,
and therefore lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to issue or sustain the TRO, because the case has
become moot,” as a result of Plaintiff H.H. turning eighteen years of age and “no longer” being
subject to the Department of Children’s Services’ (“DCS”) “legal care, custody, or control.” (Doc.
No. 18 at 7-8). Second, Defendant Quin argues that the Court “lacks subject-matter jurisdiction
because [Defendant] Quin is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity from this lawsuit.” (Id. at
9).7 Third, Defendant Quin argues that the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over this matter
7 There is some confusion within this Circuit as to whether this state sovereign immunity sounds in personal
or subject-matter jurisdiction. Compare Russell v. Lundergan-Grimes, 784 F.3d 1037, 1046 (6th Cir. 2015)
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under the domestic-relations exception to federal jurisdiction. (Id. at 11-13). Finally, Defendant
Quin argues that the “Court should decline to exercise its jurisdiction under the Younger abstention
doctrine,” because of pending dependency proceedings in Tennessee state court regarding the four
minor children, R.J., W.H., R.M., and B.M. (Id. at 13-14).89
Plaintiffs, unsurprisingly, take issue with all of these arguments. Plaintiffs first argue that
the Temporary Restraining Order in this case is not moot because the Temporary Restraining Order
(“The sovereign immunity guaranteed by [the Eleventh] Amendment deprives federal courts of subject-
matter jurisdiction when a citizen sues his own State unless the State waives its immunity or Congress
abrogates that sovereign immunity”) with Ku v. State of Tennessee, 322 F.3d 431, 435 (6th Cir. 2003)
(determining that “the immunity defense in cases otherwise falling within a federal court’s original
jurisdiction should be treated like the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction”). The Court here follows the
lengthy line of cases in the Sixth Circuit holding that a sovereign immunity defense should be treated like
a personal jurisdiction defense. See e.g., Ku, 322 F.3d at 432, 434 (noting that “it appears that the Supreme
Court is moving in the direction of concluding that, in cases where the district court otherwise has original
jurisdiction over the matter, the Eleventh Amendment immunity defense should be treated in the same way
courts have traditionally treated personal jurisdiction rather than as a matter of subject matter jurisdiction”
and that “the Supreme Court has unequivocally rejected the view that, in cases over which the federal court
otherwise has original jurisdiction, the additional ‘jurisdictional bar’ erected by the Eleventh Amendment
should be treated as a matter of ‘subject matter”); Ruff v. Corr. Med. Servs., No. 07-15443-BC, 2009 WL
1384158, at *1 (E.D. Mich. May 13, 2009) (“In the Sixth Circuit, sovereign immunity is treated like the
defense of lack of personal jurisdiction.”); Doe v. U.S. Dep't of Veteran Affs., No. 08-14958-BC, 2009 WL
2023663, at *2 (E.D. Mich. July 7, 2009) (granting a motion to dismiss based on the grounds of sovereign
immunity under Rule 12(b)(2)); Plain Loc. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. DeWine, 486 F. Supp. 3d 1173, 1187
(S.D. Ohio 2020) (quoting Ku, 322 F.3d at 432). See also Turkiye Halk Bankasi A.S. v. United States, 598
U.S. 264, 282 (2023) (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part) (“Generally, questions about sovereign immunity do
not go to a court's subject-matter jurisdiction (something a court must consider in every case even if the
parties do not). Instead, questions of sovereign immunity usually go to a court's personal jurisdiction over
a particular defendant. And as with other personal-jurisdiction defenses, a sovereign may waive its
immunity and consent to judicial proceedings if it wishes.”).
Thus, although Defendant Quin characterizes her sovereign immunity argument as an attack on this
Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction, the Court construes Defendants’ argument as an attack on personal
jurisdiction.
8 Defendant Quin also argues that Plaintiffs have not made out the requirements for a TRO to issue. Because
the Court ultimately decides the Motion (and dispenses with the underlying action) on jurisdictional
grounds, the Court does not reach this argument.
9 Proof of the ongoing state juvenile proceedings was attached to Defendant Quin’s Motion at Docket No.
18-1, which is comprised of an “Ex Parte Custody Order” regarding Plaintiff H.H., and the four minor
children, R.J., W.H., R.M., and B.M.
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aims at “restraining DCS from removing H.H.’s other four minor siblings[, R.J., W.H., R.M., and
B.M.,] in retaliation for [Plaintiff H.H.’s] exercise of constitutional rights.” (Doc. No. 20 at 9).
Plaintiffs further argue that because “[Defendant Quin’s] threatened removal of the four minor
siblings, [R.J., W.H., R.M., and B.M.]—which escalated after Plaintiffs sued her—is scheduled
for December 8, 2025, the controversy over Plaintiffs’ constitutional claims remains an “[a]ctive,
[o]ngoing [c]ontroversy.” (Id. at 11).10 Plaintiffs also argue that “Plaintiffs’ declaratory judgment
claim [embodied in the relief requested in Count I and Count II] is not moot because the threat of
removal is ongoing” and that because Plaintiffs seek “purely prospective relief,” Defendant Quin
is not entitled to sovereign immunity. (Id. at 13-15). Plaintiffs also argue that the domestic-
relations exception to federal subject-matter jurisdiction does not apply because this action is a
civil rights action challenging allegedly unconstitutional conduct and not an action seeking
“custody, visitation, or modification of the juvenile court’s custody order.” (Id. at 15). Finally,
Plaintiffs argue that Younger abstention does not apply because Plaintiff H.H. would be unable to
adequately protect his constitutional rights in a state juvenile proceeding to which he is no longer
subject because he recently turned eighteen. (Doc. No. 20 at 19-20).11
10 The Court addresses the impact (or lack thereof) on the Court’s mootness analysis of the fact that
December 8, 2025—the date of the scheduled removal of the four minor children—passed prior to the entry
of this memorandum opinion and the accompanying order, in two footnotes below.
11 Plaintiffs also make two other arguments with respect to Defendant Quin’s Motion that the Court will
address below.
First, Plaintiffs argue that there is “no Rule of Civil Procedure on motions to dissolve TROs that are not
ex parte, where the adverse party was given notice of the TRO motion and had a full and fair opportunity
to respond. . . . [as] was the case here.” (Doc. No. 20 at 6-7). Plaintiffs also argue that even if the Court
treated the Temporary Restraining Order as ex parte, Defendant Quin’s Motion fails “because she did not
provide Plaintiffs the two days’ notice” that Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(4) requires of a party moving to dissolve
or modify a TRO. (Doc. No. 20 at 1). These are odd arguments for Plaintiffs to make because there is also
no Federal Rule of Civil Procedure explicitly permitting the Court to enter a TRO that is not ex parte, as
the Court noted in its Memorandum Opinion. (Doc. No. 11 at 2 n.3). The Court nevertheless entered
Plaintiffs’ proposed TRO even though Defendants had been provided notice of the TRO Motion (thereby
rendering it not an ex parte TRO) because (1) “parties and courts have been known to speak as if a motion
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can be one for a TRO within the scope of Rule 65 (and not a preliminary injunction, which is governed by
other provisions of Rule 65) even if it is made with notice to the opposing party,” and (2) the Court issued
its decision on the TRO Motion “before Defendants [had] responded to the Motion and before the
Defendants would necessarily would have had a full opportunity to respond to the Motion.” (Id.).
In any event, the Court will not deny Defendant Quin’s Motion based on any purported procedural
deficiencies, for two reasons: (1) even to the extent Defendant Quin violated Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(4), courts
regularly “overlook non-compliance with procedural rules and consider [motions] on the merits, especially
since it is generally preferable to avoid hyper-technical approaches to litigation,” Trial Laws. Coll. v. Gerry
Spence's Trial Laws. Coll., No. 120-CV-00080-JMC-MLC, 2021 WL 7287674, at *2 (D. Wyo. June 11,
2021); and (2) the arguments that Defendant Quin raises here with respect to mootness and Younger
abstention are exactly the kinds of issues that the Court is obliged to consider sua sponte once it perceives
them and without necessarily waiting for a party to raise them. Fouts v. Warren City Council, 97 F.4th 459,
464 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 376 (2024) (“[W]e may raise the question of mootness sua sponte”
to “assure ourselves of our own jurisdiction to hear a case,”); Hill v. Snyder, 878 F.3d 193, 206 n.3 (6th Cir.
2017) (acknowledging that “federal courts may raise abstention sua sponte”); O'Neill v. Coughlan, 511
F.3d 638, 641 (6th Cir. 2008) (discussing how the U.S. Supreme Court had raised the issue of Younger
abstention sua sponte in Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 396–97 n. 3 (1975), and Ohio Bureau of El. Servs. v.
Hodory, 431 U.S. 471, 479–80 (1977)). In stating the first of these two reasons, the Court does not mean to
imply that the notice requirement in Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(4) is, on its face, merely a technical requirement;
rather the Court observes that in this context, where Plaintiffs have had notice of, and time to respond to,
Defendant Quin’s Motion, any non-compliance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(4)’s notice requirement looks
more technical than substantive and thus does not warrant ignoring the merits of Defendant Quin’s Motion.
Plaintiffs also argue that Defendant Quin’s Motion cannot “satisfy the high bar” to dissolve an injunction.
(Doc. No. 20 at 7). At base, Plaintiffs argue that because “there have been no ‘significant changes in the
law or circumstances’ that ‘threaten to convert a previously proper injunction into an instrument of wrong,’”
Defendant Quin has not met her burden to dissolve or alter the Temporary Restraining Order. (Doc. No.
20 at 8) (quoting Gooch v. Life Invs. Ins. Co. of Am. 672 F.3d 402, 414 (6th Cir. 2012)). This argument can
be dispensed with for three reasons. First, this argument ignores the actual standard on a motion to dissolve
a TRO, which provides that “on a motion to dissolve a TRO, the party that obtained the TRO ‘bears the
burden of justifying the need for continued injunctive relief on a temporary basis.’” Dolan v. Portaro, No.
1:15-CV-01022, 2015 WL 3444351, at *1 (N.D. Ohio May 28, 2015) (quoting North Dakota v. U.S. Army
Corps of Eng'rs, 264 F. Supp. 2d 871, 879 (D.N.D.2003)). See also Lapa v. JP Morgan Chase Bank,
N.A., No. 21-CV-04737 (NSR), 2022 WL 3290677, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 2022) (“On a motion to
dissolve a temporary restraining order, the party that obtained the order bears the burden of justifying
continued injunctive relief”). Second, this argument ignores the thrust of the issue before the Court: whether
the Court has or had jurisdiction to issue the Temporary Restraining Order or to hear the case at all. It
matters not whether there has been a change in law or circumstances if the Court lacked (or now lacks) the
jurisdiction (or if the Court should have declined to exercise jurisdiction) to issue the Temporary
Restraining Order or otherwise hear this action. Third, there actually have been two changes in
circumstances since the Temporary Restraining Order was issued. First, the Court now has had the benefit
of hearing from Defendant Quin, which was not possible at the time the Temporary Restraining Order was
issued, given the time constraints under which the Court was operating at the time. Second, Plaintiff H.H.
has since turned eighteen, while the Temporary Restraining Order was based in large part of the premise
that he had not yet done so (as it turned out, by the time the Temporary Restraining Order was issued,
Plaintiff H.H. actually had hit his eighteenth birthday; it was issued precisely on Plaintiff H.H.’s eighteenth
birthday, a matter of precise timing that the Court unfortunately did not grasp at the time).
Accordingly, these two arguments by Plaintiffs are unavailing and the Court will consider the merits of
Defendant Quin’s Motion.
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Below, the Court will first address Defendant Quin’s mootness arguments, before then
addressing her arguments on Younger abstention. Because the Court ultimately concludes that the
federal claims, Count I and Count II, in this action are dismissed based on Younger abstention and
mootness, respectively, the Court declines to address Defendant Quin’s arguments with respect to
the domestic-relations exception to subject-matter jurisdiction or with respect to 11th amendment
sovereign immunity.12
DISCUSSION
1. 	Mootness
Defendant Quin argues that “[t]his Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over this case,
and therefore lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to issue or sustain the [Temporary Restraining
Order], because the case has become moot” as a result of Plaintiff H.H. turning eighteen years of
age and “no longer” being subject to DCS’s “legal care, custody, or control.” (Doc. No. 18 at 7-
8). Plaintiffs, by contrast, argue that the Temporary Restraining Order in this case is not moot,
because it aims at “restraining DCS from removing [Plaintiff] H.H.’s other four minor siblings in
retaliation for [Plaintiff H.H.’s] exercise of constitutional rights,” (Doc. No. 20 at 9), and that
because “[Defendant Quin’s] threatened removal of the four minor siblings—which escalated after
Plaintiffs sued her—is scheduled for December 8, 2025,” the controversy over Plaintiffs’
constitutional claims remains an active, ongoing controversy. (Id. at 11). Plaintiffs further argue
that “Plaintiffs’ declaratory judgment claim [embodied in the relief requested in Count I and Count
II] is not moot because the threat of removal is ongoing.” (Id. at 13).
12 The Supreme Court has recognized that “a federal court has leeway ‘to choose among threshold grounds
for denying audience to a case on the merits.” Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malaysia Int’l Shipping Corp, 549 U.S.
422, 431 (2007) (recognizing that when dismissing a case, a court may rely on Younger abstention or
personal jurisdiction prior to relying on subject-matter jurisdiction). Accordingly, in the interests of judicial
efficiency, the Court herein will consider Defendant Quin’s mootness arguments and then her arguments
on Younger abstention because they ultimately resolve the Motion (and indeed, the underlying action).
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Implicated by these arguments are really two distinct issues that the Court must address.
The first is whether it lacked (or now lacks) jurisdiction to issue some or all of the Temporary
Restraining Order due to the underlying case or controversy being or becoming moot. And the
second is whether some or all of Plaintiffs’ claims are now moot—and thus subject to dismissal—
due to Plaintiff H.H. turning eighteen
Below, the Court will first provide the legal framework concerning mootness and then
address each of the above issues in turn.
i. 	Mootness Generally
“It has long been settled that a federal court has no authority ‘to give opinions upon moot
questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the
matter in issue in the case before it.’” Church of Scientology of Cal. v. United States, 506 U.S. 9,
12 (1992) (quoting Mills v. Gren, 159 U.S. 651, 653 (1895)). In other words, “[i]f a controversy is
moot, 	the 	court 	lacks 	subject 	matter 	jurisdiction 	over 	the 	action.”
Tallon v. Lloyd & McDaniel, 497 F. Supp. 2d 847, 851 (W.D. Ky. 2007) (citing Church of
Scientology of Cal., 506 U.S. at 12).
“The mootness inquiry must be made at every stage of a case.” McPherson v. Mich. High.
Sch. Athletic Ass’n, Inc., 119 F.3d 453, 458 (6th Cir. 1997). The Sixth Circuit has held that “as a
matter of course, an injunction may dissolve when a case becomes moot and the injunction is no
longer necessary.” Planned Parenthood Sw. Ohio Region v. Dewine, 931 F.3d 530, 540 (6th Cir.
2019). “‘The test for mootness ‘is whether the relief sought would, if granted, make a difference
to the legal interests of the parties . . ..’” McPherson, 119 F.3d at 458 (quoting Crane by Crane v.
Indiana High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 975 F.2d 1315, 1318 (7th Cir. 1992)). Stated differently, where
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a party “can gain no meaningful relief from the continuation of that injunction,” the Court is
obligated to vacate the injunction as moot. Smith v. S.E.C., 129 F.3d 356, 363 (6th Cir. 1997).
ii. 	Is the Temporary Restraining Order Moot?
Here, those portions of the Temporary Restraining Order concerned directly with DCS’s
conduct towards Plaintiff H.H. (Doc. No. 12 at ¶¶ 1-6, 8)13 are moot and will be dissolved on
mootness grounds. On the other hand, those portions of the Temporary Restraining Order
concerned with the custody of the four minor children, R.J., W.H., R.M., and B.M., (Doc. No. 12
at ¶ 7),14 are not moot.
As noted above and for the reasons explained below, those provisions of the Temporary
Restraining Order, (Doc. No. 12 at ¶¶ 1-6, 8), that restrict DCS’s conduct towards Plaintiff H.H.
are moot. As also noted above, Defendant Quin argues that the Court lacks (and lacked) subject-
matter jurisdiction to enter the Temporary Restraining Order because this case has become moot.
Defendant Quin argues that the case has become moot as a result of Plaintiff H.H. turning eighteen
because “[a]ll claims and allegations raised by Plaintiffs against [Defendant] Quin relate to DCS’s
allegedly wrongful behavior toward [Plaintiff H.H.] due to his status as a custodial foster child and
13 The first clause of paragraph 7 of the Temporary Restraining Order also concerns DCS’s conduct towards
Plaintiff H.H. and is also moot for the reasons described above. (Doc. No. 12 at ¶ 7) (enjoining Defendant
Quin “from removing or threatening to remove H.H. from his current kinship placement with his sister
Lacey.”).
14 For context, the Court states those portions of paragraph 7 of the Temporary Restraining Order that it
finds not to be moot:
Defendant [Quin] is hereby restrained from . . . removing or threating to remove [Plaintiff
H.H.’s] minor siblings R.J. (16), W.H. (15), R.M. (13), and B.M. (12), from that same
placement, where such removal is based on: (a) his refusal to sign immigration documents
without legal counsel; (b) his exercise of his constitutional right to counsel; or (c) his
pursuit of this legal action; Defendant shall not threaten such removal or separation as a
means to coerce H.H.’s compliance with their demands regarding immigration paperwork.
(Doc. No. 12 at ¶ 7)
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the alleged wrongful control DCS exerted over him regarding his immigration services.” (Doc No.
18 at 7). Defendant Quin further argues that because Plaintiff H.H. turned eighteen on November
26, 2025, and has left “DCS’s legal care, custody, or control,” “the TRO should not have been
issued because the case was moot at that time, and the restraining order should now be dissolved.”
(Id. at 7-8). Plaintiffs do not address this argument directly, instead choosing to focus their
argument on the ongoing controversy regarding the custody of the four other minor children, R.J.,
W.H., R.M., and B.M., at the Hewitt-Perry home, arguing that “[t]he [Temporary Restraining
Order’s] primary protection—restraining DCS from removing [Plaintiff] H.H.’s other four minor
siblings in retaliation for his exercise of constitutional rights—remains fully operative.” (Doc. No.
20 at 9).
Here, the Court finds that it lacked (and continues to lack) subject-matter jurisdiction to
enter the Temporary Restraining Order with respect to those portions of the Order enjoining
Defendant Quin and her officers, agents, employees and the like from engaging in certain conduct
with respect Plaintiff H.H. because the circumstances underlying the requested Temporary
Restraining Order had become moot by the time it issued.15 The Temporary Restraining Order
issued on November 26, 2025, the day that Plaintiff turned eighteen. Now that Plaintiff H.H. is
eighteen years old and is out of “DCS’s legal care, custody, or control,” (Doc. No. 18 at 7), the
Court (in part because Plaintiffs do not argue otherwise), does not perceive any “meaningful
relief,” Smith, 129 F.3d at 363, that Plaintiffs would derive from the continuation of those portions
of the Temporary Restraining Order enjoining DCS’s conduct towards Plaintiff H.H. Indeed, based
on the briefing on the Motion, it appears that DCS is not in a position to pressure Plaintiff H.H. (at
15 The Court must accept responsibility for metaphorically taking its eye off the ball regarding the date of
Plaintiff H.H.’s birthdate vis-à-vis the date of the issuance of the Temporary Restraining Order, which the
Court had been working on for days in advance of Plaintiff H.H.’s actual birthday.
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least to the extent that it previously could) with respect to his immigration status. Accordingly,
those portions of the Temporary Restraining Order concerned directly with DCS’s conduct
towards Plaintiff H.H., (Doc. No. 12 at ¶¶ 1-6, 8), will be dissolved as moot.
However, the portions of the Temporary Restraining Order concerned with the custody of
the four minor children, R.J., W.H., R.M., and B.M., (Doc. No. 12 at ¶ 7), are not moot. In her
mootness argument, Defendant Quin does not address the ongoing controversy regarding the
custody of the four minor children or whether DCS will remove those children from the Hewitt-
Perry family due to either Plaintiff H.H.’s refusal to sign certain immigration papers or Plaintiff
H.H.’s bringing of the instant lawsuit. Indeed, Defendant Quin’s entire mootness argument rests
solely on the fact that Plaintiff H.H. is no longer subject to DCS’s custody. This may suffice to
show that the Temporary Restraining Order is moot with respect to those portions restraining
DCS’s conduct towards Plaintiff H.H., but it does not suffice to show that the Temporary
Restraining Order is moot with respect to its restrictions on the removal of the four minor children
from the Hewitt-Perry family. And Plaintiffs’ argument here demonstrates at this juncture that
there is indeed an ongoing case or controversy to support maintaining the TRO because of the
planned removal of the four minor siblings that Plaintiffs assert was scheduled for December 8,
2025. (Doc. No. 20 at 11).16 Thus, at least at this juncture, the Temporary Restraining Order’s
16 The Court is aware that as of the time of entry of this memorandum opinion and the accompanying order,
December 8, 2025, the date of the scheduled removal of the four minor children, has passed. Nevertheless,
the Court is satisfied that at least for purposes of the mootness analysis herein, those portions of the TRO
concerned with the custody of the four minor children may still make “‘a difference to the legal interests of
the parties,’” McPherson, 119 F.3d at 458 — namely the legal interests of the Count I Plaintiffs seeking to
maintain their parental due process rights with respect to the four minor children — because of the ongoing
risk of future removal of the four minor children by DCS (as evinced by the planned removal of the minor
children on December 8, 2025). This is especially true because the Court has not been provided any
additional information as to what actually did or did not occur on December 8, 2025, aside from statements
in Plaintiffs’ memorandum of law (Doc. No. 22-1) in support of Plaintiffs’ “Motion to Convert Temporary
Restraining Order Into Preliminary Injunction” (Doc. No. 22), that imply that no removal has yet taken
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provisions concerned with the custody of the four minor children, R.J., W.H., R.M., and B.M.,
(Doc. No. 12 at ¶ 7), are not moot because that relief may still make “‘a difference to the legal
interests of the parties,’” McPherson, 119 F.3d at 458 — namely the legal interests of the Count I
Plaintiffs seeking to maintain their parental due process rights with respect to the four minor
children.
In sum, those portions of the Temporary Restraining Order concerned directly with DCS’s
conduct towards Plaintiff H.H., (Doc. No. 12 at ¶¶ 1-6, 8),17 are moot and will be dissolved on
those grounds, but the portions of the Temporary Restraining Order concerned with the custody of
the four minor children, R.J., W.H., R.M., and B.M., (Doc. No. 12 at ¶ 7)18 are not moot and will
not be dissolved on grounds of mootness.
iii. 	Are Plaintiffs’ Federal Claims Moot?19
place. (Doc. No. 22-1 at 10) (“The removal was scheduled for December 8, 2025, and absent continued
relief from the Court, will likely occur this month.”).
17 As noted above, the first clause of paragraph 7 of the Temporary Restraining Order also concerns DCS’s
conduct towards Plaintiff H.H. and is moot in that respect. (Doc. No. 12 at ¶ 7) (enjoining Defendant Quin
“from removing or threatening to remove H.H. from his current kinship placement with his sister Lacey.”).
18 For context, the Court reiterates those portions of paragraph 7 of the Temporary Restraining Order here
that it finds not to be moot:
Defendant [Quin] is hereby restrained from . . . removing or threating to remove [Plaintiff
H.H.’s] minor siblings R.J. (16), W.H. (15), R.M. (13), and B.M. (12), from that same
placement, where such removal is based on: (a) his refusal to sign immigration documents
without legal counsel; (b) his exercise of his constitutional right to counsel; or (c) his
pursuit of this legal action; Defendant shall not threaten such removal or separation as a
means to coerce H.H.’s compliance with their demands regarding immigration paperwork.
(Doc. No. 12 at ¶ 7).
19 The ultimate issue here is whether there is subject-matter jurisdiction, under Article III of the U.S.
Constitution, over one or both of these claims. The Court is aware that generally this question is answered
via a three-element test for Article III standing and that this test nowhere refers specifically to mootness as
such. But a federal court may lack subject-matter jurisdiction over a case not only because there is no Article
III standing under the three-part test, but alternatively because the case has become moot (given that, as
noted above, mootness is a matter of subject-matter matter jurisdiction). However, “[s]tanding and
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Next, the Court will determine whether Plaintiffs’ federal claims,20 Count I and Count II,
are now moot because Plaintiff H.H. (since the filing of the Complaint) has turned eighteen years
old. As a reminder, the only relief that Plaintiffs seek in connection with Count I and Count II is
temporary injunctive and declaratory relief. Importantly, Plaintiffs characterize their sought-after
declaratory judgment as being “purely prospective relief.” (Doc. No. 20 at 13).21 Here, Plaintiffs’
claims are not moot as to Count I but are moot as to Count II.
As a reminder, via Count I, the Count I Plaintiffs bring a claim for violations of their
parental due process rights with respect to “Plaintiff H.H., as well as [the] minor children R.J.,
W.H., R.M., and B.M.” (Doc. No. 1 at ¶ 82). Although Plaintiff H.H. is no longer a minor—
meaning that parental due process rights as to him are no longer applicable—parental due process
rights with respect to the four minor children, R.J., W.H., R.M., and B.M., are still extant. As
above, Plaintiffs’ argument here demonstrates that there is standing to seek injunctive or
declaratory relief because of the planned removal of the four minor children that Plaintiffs assert
is scheduled for December 8, 2025, and being carried out “in retaliation for [Plaintiff] H.H.’s filing
mootness, albeit related, are distinct doctrines with separate tests to evaluate their existence at different
times of the litigation.” Memphis A. Philip Randolph Inst. v. Hargett, 2 F.4th 548, 559 (6th Cir. 2021). The
parties frame this discussion in terms of “mootness,” and the Court thus analyzes the issue as such, while
noting as an aside that the result here would be the same (and for substantively similar reasons) if the
Court’s analysis were described in terms of the three-element test for standing.
20 The Court will accept Plaintiffs’ characterization and herein will not resolve the conflict in views as to
how to characterize declaratory relief. Compare, e.g., Occupy Nashville v. Haslam, 769 F.3d 434, 440 (6th
Cir. 2014) (categorizing “a declaratory judgment” as “equitable relief”) with Sanders v. Louisville & N.R.
Co., 144 F.2d 485, 486 (6th Cir. 1944) (“actions for declaratory judgment are sui generis[,] and the
procedural remedy is neither legal nor equitable”).
21 The parties forwent briefing the issue of whether Count III or Count IV, which seek monetary relief, are
moot. This turns out to have been prudent because the Court need not and does not address that issue here.
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of this lawsuit.” (Doc. No. 20 at 13).22 And as above, Defendant Quin does not address anywhere
in her mootness argument the ongoing controversy regarding the custody of the four minor
children and whether DCS will remove those children from the Hewitt-Perry family because of
Plaintiff H.H.’s bringing of this lawsuit. Thus, at this juncture, the Court finds that with respect to
Count I, Plaintiffs’ claims are not moot, because the relief sought with respect to Count I (whether
the requested and obtained—but soon-to-expire—temporary injunctive relief or the declaration
that Defendant Quin’s conduct is unconstitutional) would still make “‘a difference to the legal
interests of the parties.’” McPherson, 119 F.3d at 458.
However, the Court finds that Count II is now moot. Via Count II, Plaintiffs bring a claim
for a violation of Plaintiff H.H.’s due process right to fundamental fairness. Plaintiffs characterize
this right as the right of “[m]inors in adjudicative proceedings [to be] afforded the ‘due process
standard’ of ‘fundamental fairness.’” (Doc. No. 1 at ¶ 13) (quoting McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403
U.S. 528, 543 (1971)). At base, the relief Plaintiffs seek with respect to Count II is predicated on
future or ongoing violations of a right which Plaintiff H.H. can no longer invoke: the right to
fundamental fairness afforded to minors in an adjudicatory setting. Count II is moot because
irrespective of whether the Court grants the requested injunctive or declaratory relief sought via
22 As noted in a footnote above, the Court is aware that as of the entry of this memorandum opinion and the
accompanying order, December 8, 2025, the date of the planned removal of the four minor children, has
passed. Nevertheless, the Court is satisfied that at least for purposes of the mootness analysis herein, Count
I is not moot as the relief sought with respect to Count I (whether the requested and obtained— but soon-
to-expire—temporary injunctive relief or the declaration that Defendant Quin’s conduct is unconstitutional)
would still make “‘a difference to the legal interests of the parties,’” McPherson, 119 F.3d at 458, due to
the ongoing risk of future removal of the four minor children by DCS (as evinced by the planned removal
of the minor children on December 8, 2025). This is especially true, as noted above, because the Court has
not been provided any additional information as to what actually did or did not occur on December 8, 2025,
aside from the implication in Plaintiffs’ memorandum of law (Doc. No. 22-1) in support of Plaintiffs’
“Motion to Convert Temporary Restraining Order Into Preliminary Injunction” (Doc. No. 22), that no
removal has yet taken place. (Doc. No. 22-1 at 10) (“The removal was scheduled for December 8, 2025,
and absent continued relief from the Court, will likely occur this month.”).
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Count II, it would not make “‘a difference to the legal interests’” of Plaintiff H.H., McPherson,
119 F.3d at 458, because Plaintiff H.H. cannot plausibly allege any future violations of this right
as to himself since he is no longer a minor. This is especially true as Plaintiffs concede that the
requested relief with respect to Defendant Quin is “purely prospective.” (Doc. No. 20 at 13).
Because Count II is moot, the Court will sua sponte dismiss Count II without prejudice. Micklin
v. Goodell, No. 1:07-CV-237, 2008 WL 58985, at *2 (W.D. Mich. Jan. 3, 2008) (“This court may
also dismiss a complaint sua sponte for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.”).
Because the Court has found that at least a portion of the Temporary Restraining Order as
well as Count I are not moot, the Court will also address (with respect to the non-moot portion)
the Younger abstention argument that Defendant Quin raises in her Motion with respect to Count
I. And the Court then will address Counts III and IV.
2. 	Younger Abstention
Defendant Quin argues that because the four minor children, R.J., W.H., R.M., and B.M.,
are subject to an ongoing juvenile dependency proceeding, Younger abstention applies, and “the
[Temporary Restraining Order] should be dissolved and the Court should abstain from hearing this
case.” (Doc. No. 18 at 13-15; Doc. No. 18-1).23 Below, the Court will briefly review the Younger
abstention doctrine before then analyzing the doctrine’s applicability to the present case and
considering the parties’ arguments on this issue.
In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the Supreme Court “held that absent
extraordinary circumstances federal courts should not enjoin pending state criminal prosecutions.”
New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of City of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 364 (1989) (citing
Younger, 401 U.S. at 43–44). The underlying concern of Younger is the “threat to our federal
23 Proof of the ongoing state juvenile proceedings was attached to Defendant Quin’s Motion at Docket No.
18-1.
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system posed by displacement of state courts by those of the National Government.” Moore v.
Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 423 (1979). Expressing this concern slightly differently, the Sixth Circuit has
stated that “Younger abstention derives from a desire to prevent federal courts from interfering
with the functions of state criminal prosecutions and to preserve equity and comity.” Doe v. Univ.
of Kentucky, 860 F.3d 365, 368 (6th Cir. 2017). Accordingly, when it does apply, “Younger
abstention requires the federal court to defer to the state proceeding.” Coles v. Granville, 448 F.3d
853, 865 (6th Cir. 2006). While Younger was originally contemplated to apply to state-court
criminal proceedings, the Supreme Court over the years has extended the doctrine to the quasi-
criminal and even some strictly civil contexts. For example, in Moore v. Sims, the Court recognized
that the principles of Younger apply not only in the criminal context, but also with equal force
when there is a pending state court civil proceeding “in which important state interests are
involved.” See Moore, 442 U.S. at 423. The Court went on to explain that where the state is a party
to a “temporary removal of a child in a child-abuse context,” the requirement of an important state
interest is met and that therefore Younger abstention may apply. See id. Indeed, the Sixth Circuit
has also noted that Younger abstention is “is generally appropriate in matters of family relations
such as child custody.” Meyers v. Franklin Cnty. Ct. of Common Pleas, 23 F. App’x 201, 204 (6th
Cir. 2001).
Younger abstention is applicable where three requirements are satisfied: “(1) there must be
[related] on-going state judicial proceedings; (2) those proceedings must implicate important state
interests; and (3) there must be an adequate opportunity in the state proceedings to raise
constitutional challenges.” O'Neill v. Coughlan, 511 F.3d 638, 643 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Sun
Refining & Mktg. Co. v. Brennan, 921 F.2d 635, 639 (6th Cir. 1990)). Here, Defendant Quin argues
that all three requirements are satisfied. (Doc. No. 18 at 13-15). By contrast, Plaintiffs dispute the
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fulfilment of the last (but only the last) of the three requirements. (Doc. No. 20 at 20). Neither
party contests that the state-court proceeding here implicates Younger abstention, or that the first
two Younger requirements are met. Thus, the Court will examine only the last Younger
requirement.
i. 	Adequate Opportunity in State Proceedings to Raise Constitutional Challenges
As noted above, the Court must determine whether Plaintiffs have an adequate opportunity
in the state-court proceedings to raise their constitutional challenges. “Abstention is appropriate
unless state law clearly bars the interposition of the constitutional claims.” See Squire v. Coughlan,
469 F.3d 551, 557 (6th Cir. 2006). To that end, the Sixth Circuit has found that the “plaintiff bears
the burden of showing that state law barred the presentation of his or her constitutional claims.” See
id.; Furr-Barry v. Underwood, 59 F. App'x 796, 797–798 (6th Cir. 2003) (affirming district court's
application of Younger, in part because there was no evidence that the plaintiff could not raise
constitutional claims in pending juvenile court proceedings).
Here, Plaintiffs argue merely that because Plaintiff “H.H. is now an adult, he is no longer
a party to the juvenile proceedings” and that therefore “Plaintiffs are unable to obtain their
requested relief in the state juvenile proceeding.” (Doc. No. at 20 at 19-20). Yet this argument will
not do here because it does not actually address whether Tennessee state law “clearly bars the
interposition of the constitutional claims.” Squire, 469 F.3d at 557. In other words, Plaintiffs have
not met their burden to show that “state law barred the presentation of [their] constitutional
claims.” See id. Plaintiffs’ argument here is also unavailing for two reasons. First, as noted above,
Plaintiff H.H.’s constitutional claims in Count II, have already been dismissed from this action as
moot, and so it makes little sense for the Court to decline abstention based on what Plaintiff H.H.
is or is not able to do to assert constitutional claims in the state proceedings. Second, Plaintiffs’
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argument does not actually address whether the Count I Plaintiffs—who (unlike Plaintiff H.H.)
are parties to the (only) surviving constitutional claim after the mootness analysis above—would
be prevented from bringing their parental due process claims in the ongoing juvenile proceeding.
Perhaps sensing this weakness in their arguments, Plaintiffs, relying on Berger v.
Cuyahoga Cnty. Bar Ass’n, 983 F.2d 718 (6th Cir. 1993), argue that “bad faith and harassment by
Defendant Quin and her employees and agents warrant an exception to abstention.” (Doc. No. 20
at 20). But this reliance on Berger is inapt. In Berger, the Sixth Circuit considered whether there
was any bad faith or harassment by the tribunal holding the proceedings at issue. Berger, 983 F.2d
at 724. Berger does not suggest that it is enough for Plaintiffs to assert that because (supposedly)
Defendant Quin acted in bad faith, Younger abstention is inapplicable. Instead, to properly invoke
Berger, Plaintiffs must point to some sort of bad faith by the juvenile court at issue in this case.24
This, Plaintiffs have not done, and accordingly their argument on this point is unavailing.
Accordingly, the Court finds that Younger abstention applies, and the remainder of the
Temporary Restraining Order will be dissolved because the Court is abstaining from the
adjudication of (inter alia) the claim whereunder such part of the Temporary Restraining Order
was granted. However, this is not the end of the analysis, because the Court must next determine,
under the Younger abstention doctrine, whether to dismiss Count I or instead to hold Count I in
abeyance via a stay.
“[W]hen application of Younger abstention is proper and the plaintiff is seeking money
damages and equitable relief[,] the appropriate procedure [generally] is to stay the proceedings
24 The Court is aware of the long-standing (if rarely applied) exception to Younger abstention where there
is a “bad-faith prosecution of an individual.” Tindall v. Wayne Cnty. Friend of Ct., by: £Schewe, 269 F.3d
533, 539 (6th Cir. 2001). However, Plaintiffs here rely on Berger, which (as discussed above) involved
allegations of bad-faith by the tribunal holding the proceedings at issue in that case; thus, Plaintiffs have
not even presented (much less substantiated) an argument to support the Court finding an exception to
Younger abstention based on this bad-faith prosecution exception.
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rather than dismiss the case without prejudice.” Cummings v. Husted, 795 F. Supp. 2d 677, 694
(S.D. Ohio 2011) (citing Brindley v. McCullen, 61 F.3d 507, 509 (6th Cir. 1995)); see also Carroll
v. City of Mount Clemens, 139 F.3d 1072 (6th Cir. 1998). However, where a particular claim seeks
injunctive or declaratory relief (without also seeking monetary relief), dismissal of that claim
without prejudice is proper under Younger. Quatkemeyer v. Kentucky Bd. of Med. Licensure, No.
CIVA 3:09-CV-746-H, 2010 WL 774195, at *3 (W.D. Ky. Feb. 26, 2010) (citing Meyers v.
Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, 23 F. App’x 201, 206 (6th Cir. 2001) (noting that
“dismissal without prejudice of all claims for injunctive and declaratory relief is appropriate” but
that “with respect to the damages claims . . . the appropriate action based on Younger abstention
is a stay.”); see Davis v. Whitmer, No. 1:19-CV-10569, 2019 WL 1326671, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Mar.
25, 2019) (abstaining from considering the plaintiff’s ex post facto challenge to Michigan's sex
offender registry act and dismissing the case, rather than staying the action, where the plaintiff did
not seek money damages); Johnson v. Ohio Bureau of Workers’ Comp., No. 1:13-CV-1199, 2014
WL 296875, at *7 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 27, 2014) (abstaining pursuant to Younger and dismissing the
case, rather than holding the action in abeyance, where the plaintiff did not seek money damages).
Thus, Count I will be dismissed without prejudice and sua sponte, Squire, 469 F.3d at 556–
57 (affirming district court’s sua sponte dismissal of complaint based on Younger abstention),
because the only relief (aside from attorneys’ fees, costs, and post and pre-judgment interest)
Plaintiffs seek in connection with Count I of the Complaint is temporary injunctive relief and
declaratory relief.
Because the Court concludes that Younger abstention here mandates dismissal, the Court
declines to address Defendant Quin’s argument that the Court lacks jurisdiction either under the
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domestic-relations exception to subject-matter jurisdiction or because Defendant Quin is entitled
to 11th Amendment sovereign immunity.
3. 	State Law Claims
With the federal claims in Count I and Count II dismissed sua sponte, only the state law
claims (Count III and Count IV) remain. The Court initially had (or at least appeared to have)
jurisdiction over these state law claims via supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
A district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim if (1) the
claim raises a novel or complex issue of state law, (2) the claim substantially predominates over
the claim or claims over which the district court has original jurisdiction, (3) the district court has
dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction, or (4) in exceptional circumstances,
there are other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c); see also Kinman
v. Burnop, No. 3:18-CV-00809, 2020 WL 707583, at *6 (M.D. Tenn. Feb. 12, 2020).
When no claims over which the court has original jurisdiction remain, courts usually
decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims. See Stevens v.
Gooch, 48 F. Supp. 3d 992, 1007 (E.D. Ky. 2014) (in usual case in which all federal law claims
have been eliminated before trial, balance of factors point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction
over remaining state-law claims); Carpenter v. Lane College, Case No. 2:17-CV-2672, 2019 WL
845275, at *4 (W.D. Tenn. Feb. 6, 2019) (having granted summary judgment on plaintiff’s sole
federal claim, court followed the “usual Sixth Circuit practice” and declined to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s remaining state law claims).
The Supreme Court has noted that “in the usual case in which all federal-law claims are
eliminated before trial, the balance of factors to be considered under the pendent jurisdiction
doctrine—judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity—will point toward declining to
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exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.” Wilkins v. Tennessee Dep’t of
Children’s Servs., No. 3:18-CV-00102, 2018 WL 6413666, at *5 (M.D. Tenn. Dec. 6, 2018)
(quoting Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988)). “In determining whether
to retain jurisdiction over state-law claims, a district court should consider and weigh several
factors, including the ‘values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.’” Gamel v.
City of Cincinnati, 625 F.3d 949, 951 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Carnegie-Mellon, 484 U.S. at 350).
The basis for original jurisdiction in this case is (solely) federal-question jurisdiction, and
the Court is dismissing all of Plaintiffs’ federal claims upon which supplemental jurisdiction over
Plaintiffs’ state-law claims was based. Accordingly, the Court declines to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ state-law claims, and they will be dismissed sua sponte without
prejudice.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for the reasons stated herein, Defendant Quin’s Motion (Doc. No. 18) will be
GRANTED, so that the Temporary Restraining Order (which is short-lived anyway) will be
dissolved.25 Moreover, all of Plaintiffs’ claims in this action will be dismissed based either on
mootness, Younger abstention, or the declination of supplemental jurisdiction, and this action
accordingly will be DISMISSED in its entirety without prejudice. Additionally, because the
Temporary Restraining Order will be dissolved and this action will be dismissed in its entirety,
Plaintiffs’ pending “Motion to Convert Temporary Restraining Order Into Preliminary Injunction”
(Doc. No. 22) will also be DENIED as moot.
25 The Court notes that the Temporary Restraining Order (Doc. No. 12) went into effect at 2:00pm on
November 26, 2025, such that the Temporary Restraining Order would terminate, irrespective of this
memorandum opinion and the accompanying order, at 2:00pm on December 10, 2025. Therefore, at the
time of entry of this memorandum opinion and the accompanying order, the Temporary Restraining Order
is still in effect and will, accordingly, be dissolved, albeit just hours before the time of termination that
otherwise would apply.
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An appropriate accompanying order will be entered.
________________________________
ELI RICHARDSON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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