Paige v. Funk

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION
JAMES PAIGE, #277716,
Plaintiff,
v.
GLENN R. FUNK,
Defendant.
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NO. 3:25-cv-01316
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
On November 13, 2025, James Paige, a state inmate incarcerated at the Lois M. DeBerry
Special Needs Facility (DSNF) in Nashville, filed a pro se complaint under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and
1983 (Doc. No. 1), an application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) (Doc. No. 2), a
Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Doc. No. 3) with supporting affidavit (Doc. No. 4), and a
Motion for Appointment of Counsel (Doc. No. 5).
The case is before the Court for ruling on Plaintiff’s IFP application and motions, and for
initial review of the Complaint under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A.
I. PAUPER STATUS
Subject to certain statutory requirements, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1)–(2), (g), a prisoner
bringing a civil action may be permitted to proceed as a pauper, without prepaying the $405 filing
fee. Because Plaintiff’s IFP application complies with the applicable statutory requirements and
demonstrates that he lacks the funds to pay the entire filing fee, that application (Doc. No. 2) is
GRANTED.
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Nevertheless, prisoners bringing civil lawsuits are “required to pay the full amount of a
filing fee.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). Where the prisoner proceeds IFP, the fee is $350 instead of
$405, see id. § 1914(a)–(b) & Dist. Ct. Misc. Fee Schedule, provision 14 (eff. Dec. 1, 2023), and
may be paid in installments over time via an assessment against his inmate trust account. Id.
§ 1915(b)(1)–(2).
Accordingly, Plaintiff is ASSESSED a $350 filing fee. The fee will be collected in
installments as described below.
The warden of the facility in which Plaintiff is currently housed, as custodian of his trust
account, is DIRECTED to submit to the Clerk of Court, as an initial payment, the greater of: (a)
20% of the average monthly deposits to Plaintiff’s credit at the jail; or (b) 20% of the average
monthly balance to Plaintiff’s credit for the six-month period immediately preceding the filing of
the Complaint. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). Thereafter, the custodian shall submit 20% of Plaintiff’s
preceding monthly income (or income credited to Plaintiff for the preceding month), but only when
the balance in his account exceeds $10. Id. § 1915(b)(2). Payments shall continue until the $350
filing fee has been paid in full to the Clerk of Court. Id. § 1915(b)(3).
The Clerk of Court MUST send a copy of this Order to the warden of the facility in which
Plaintiff is currently housed to ensure compliance with that portion of 28 U.S.C. § 1915 pertaining
to the payment of the filing fee. If Plaintiff is transferred from his present place of confinement,
the custodian must ensure that a copy of this Order follows Plaintiff to his new place of
confinement, for continued compliance with the Order. All payments made pursuant to this Order
must be submitted to the Clerk of Court for the United States District Court for the Middle District
of Tennessee, 719 Church Street, Nashville, TN 37203.
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II. INITIAL REVIEW
A. Legal Standard
In cases filed by prisoners, the Court must conduct an initial screening and dismiss the
Complaint (or any portion thereof) if it is facially frivolous or malicious, if it fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune
from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). Review under the same criteria is also
authorized under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) when the prisoner proceeds IFP.
To determine whether the Complaint states a claim upon which relief may be granted, the
Court reviews for whether it alleges sufficient facts “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face,” such that it would survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6). Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). A viable claim is stated under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if the Complaint plausibly
alleges (1) a deprivation of a constitutional or other federal right, and (2) that the deprivation was
caused by a “state actor.” Carl v. Muskegon Cnty., 763 F.3d 592, 595 (6th Cir. 2014).
At this stage, “the Court assumes the truth of ‘well-pleaded factual allegations’ and
‘reasonable inference[s]’ therefrom,” Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am. v. Vullo, 602 U.S. 175, 181 (2024)
(quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79), but is “not required to accept legal conclusions or unwarranted
factual inferences as true.” Inner City Contracting, LLC v. Charter Twp. of Northville, Michigan,
87 F.4th 743, 749 (6th Cir. 2023) (citation omitted). The Court must afford the pro se Complaint
a liberal construction, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007), while viewing it in the light
most favorable to Plaintiff. Inner City, supra.
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B. Factual Allegations
Plaintiff sues Davidson County District Attorney General Glenn R. Funk for malicious,
selective prosecution. (Doc. No. 1 at 2). He alleges that Funk improperly sought his indictment
and conviction on four counts of rape when the misconduct of which he was accused, forcible
sodomy, “did not fit the elements of the crime [of] rape.” (Id. at 2–4). Plaintiff claims that the
evidence of rape was insufficient, and that his alleged victim communicated to police that she did
not want to press charges. (Id. at 2–5). He asserts that Defendant, lacking grounds for pursuing
rape charges against him, only did so “because he’s an educated black man who was involved in
a solicitated affair with a[n] opiate addicted white woman.” (Id. at 4). As relief, Plaintiff seeks an
order enjoining Defendant Funk to dismiss his indictment and release him from prison; an order
for state and federal law enforcement to launch an investigation into Defendant’s office; the
dismissal of his pending appeal from his rape convictions; monetary damages; and an order for the
Tennessee Department of Correction to relocate him from his current residential unit at DSNF to
a different unit. (Id. at 11–12).
C. Analysis
The Complaint seeks Plaintiff’s immediate release from incarceration and an award of
monetary damages based on his allegedly unjust indictment, prosecution, and conviction. As
explained below, he is not entitled to pursue such relief in this Section 1983 action.
Explicit challenges to the validity of an inmate’s confinement, as distinguished from the
“circumstances” or conditions of confinement, are not properly lodged under Section 1983 but are
within the sole province of habeas corpus. Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 750 (2004).
Plaintiff’s request for release and dismissal of the charges against him, based on the alleged
maliciousness with which Defendant Funk pursued his indictment and conviction “of an offense
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that he did not commit” (Doc. No. 1 at 9), constitutes an explicit challenge to the validity of his
confinement that cannot be pursued through a Section 1983 complaint, but only through a habeas
petition.
A prisoner may challenge the validity of his confinement by claiming unlawful prosecution
and seeking damages under Section 1983. Id. at 751. But that claim cannot be pursued until the
prisoner succeeds in having his conviction or sentence “reversed on direct appeal, expunged by
executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or
called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” Heck v. Humphrey,
512 U.S. 477, 486–87 (1994); see Sykes v. Anderson, 625 F.3d 294, 309 (6th Cir. 2010) (applying
Heck’s favorable termination rule in § 1983 action for malicious prosecution). The Complaint
before the Court seeks an award of damages against Defendant Funk “due to [his] callous
indifferen[ce] to the plaintiff[’s] rights,” which caused Plaintiff to be imprisoned and “ruined by
defaulted credit cards, student loans, and home mortgage.” (Doc. No. 1 at 11). But Plaintiff has
not yet succeeded in winning reversal of his convictions as required by Heck. Indeed, he
acknowledges that he is currently pursuing such relief in state court, on direct appeal.1 (See id.
(asking the Court to “terminate [his] direct appeal” as void in light of Defendant’s misconduct)).
1 The Court takes judicial notice of the record of proceedings in the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals,
https://pch.tncourts.gov/CaseDetails.aspx?id=90349&Party=True (last visited Nov. 20, 2025), which
confirms that the matter of State of Tennessee v. James Andrew Paige (appealing the judgment of the
Davidson County Criminal Court in Case No. 2018-B-1017) is pending review after briefing was completed
on October 27, 2025. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 201(b), the Court may take notice of such
adjudicative facts from the record of state criminal proceedings. See United States v. Ferguson, 681 F.3d
826, 834 (6th Cir. 2012). The Court may also take judicial notice of its own docket, see Overton v.
Tennessee, 590 F. Supp. 3d 1087, 1089 n.1 (M.D. Tenn. 2022) (citation omitted), which reflects that
Plaintiff’s recent filing of a habeas case was dismissed by Judge Trauger on July 28, 2025, so that state
appellate and post-conviction remedies concerning Case No. 2018-B-1017 could be exhausted. Paige v.
Holloway, No. 3:25-cv-00326, Doc. No. 12 at 2 (M.D. Tenn. July 28, 2025).
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The Complaint thus fails to state a currently viable claim to relief under Section 1983 and must be
dismissed.
Even if Plaintiff could at this time properly pursue his malicious-prosecution lawsuit, the
Court could not award him the other relief he seeks, i.e., injunctive orders for law enforcement to
investigate Defendant’s office (Doc. No. 1 at 11) and for the Tennessee Department of Correction
to arrange his transfer to a DSNF residential unit that he “feels . . . is an appropriate unit for him”
(id. at 12). As to the requested order to investigate, “the federal district courts lack the power to
compel a federal criminal investigation at the request of a citizen plaintiff.” Rouse v. Donahue,
No. 	1:20-CV-320, 	2020 	WL 	2059718, 	at 	*2 	(S.D. 	Ohio 	Apr. 	29, 	2020), 	report 	and
recommendation adopted, 2020 WL 4361396 (S.D. Ohio July 30, 2020) (citing, e.g., Leisure v.
FBI of Columbus, Ohio, 2 F. App’x 488, 490 (6th Cir. 2001) (decision to initiate a criminal
investigation rests with Federal Bureau of Investigations, and writs of mandamus are not available
to compel an investigation)); see also Bullock v. Sheela, No. 1:14-CV-00092-DAD-EPG-PC, 2017
WL 4707998, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 20, 2017), report and recommendation adopted, 2018 WL
646132 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2018) (“Federal courts cannot instigate criminal investigations and
prosecutions, and cannot compel a [federal, state, or local] prosecutorial authority to do so.”)
(citing cases). As to the requested order to transfer, federal courts must exercise restraint from
intruding into matters of state prison administration “as a matter of federalism and comity . . .
except in the most compelling situations.” Glover v. Johnson, 855 F.2d 277, 287 (6th Cir. 1988).
No such compelling situation is apparent from Plaintiff’s allegation that a transfer “from unit 3, to
unit 5-B” is justified because he was attacked by another unit 3 inmate on December 4, 2024. (Doc.
No. 1 at 12).
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In sum, the Complaint fails to claim any plausible right to relief and must therefore be
dismissed.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, this action is DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and (iii) and 1915A(b), for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted. The dismissal is WITHOUT PREJUDICE to (1) Plaintiff’s ability to refile a malicious
prosecution lawsuit if and when he succeeds in winning relief from his state convictions, and (2)
Plaintiff’s ability to file a separate lawsuit challenging the conditions of his confinement.
In light of the dismissal, Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Doc. No. 3) and
Motion for Appointment of Counsel (Doc. No. 5) are DENIED as moot.
The Court CERTIFIES that any appeal from this dismissal would not be taken in good
faith. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3).
This is the final order in this action. The Clerk SHALL enter judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P.
58(b)(1).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
____________________________________
WAVERLY D. CRENSHAW, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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