Cox, Sr v. Dyke et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION
JIMMY ANTHONY COX, SR.
# 097909440,
Plaintiff,
v.
MIKE VAN DYKE, Robertson County
Sheriff, et al.,
Defendants.
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No. 3:25-cv-00917
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Jimmy Anthony Cox, Sr., a pretrial detainee in the custody of the Robertson County
Sheriff’s Office in Springfield, Tennessee, has filed a pro se Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983, alleging violations of his civil rights. (Doc. No. 1). He also has filed multiple Applications
for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP Application”) (Doc. Nos. 2, 8, 13, 24), two Motions
to Appoint Counsel (Doc. Nos. 3, 15), Request for Removal (Doc. No. 12), “Motion Request for
Federal Agent/Judge” (Doc. No. 14), two Motions for a Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”)
(Doc. Nos. 18, 21), Request to Add Claim/Evidence (Doc. No. 20), Motion to Add New
Names/New Defendants/New Claims (Doc. No. 22), along with other documents (Doc. Nos. 9,
10, 17, 19, 23, 25). The Court must first resolve the matter of the filing fee.
I. FILING FEE
Plaintiff previously informed the Court that he had been unable to obtain the required
certified inmate account statement in support of his IFP Application. The Court granted Plaintiff
an extension of time to do so. (Doc. No. 16).
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Plaintiff now has provided a signed Certificate of Prisoner Institutional/Trust Fund
Account Activity but states that jail officials still refuse to provide him with a “print-out” of his
transactions over the past six months, which is also required by statute. According to Plaintiff,
Major f/n/u Arnold has told Plaintiff there will be “no more print out[s].” (See Doc. Nos. 24 at 3,
24-2 at 1).
Plaintiff has provided written documentation of the date he requested the print-out, to
whom he requested the print-out, and the response of the person to whom Plaintiff requested it.
(See Doc. No. 24-2 at 1). Under these specific circumstances,1 the Court finds that Plaintiff has
made a good faith effort to obtain the required document. He should not be prevented from
pursuing this lawsuit as a pauper simply because jail officials refuse to cooperate. Neither should
his case be delayed for months due to jail officials’ unwillingness to provide the required materials.
Thus, the Court will proceed with a review of Plaintiff’s IFP Application2 as submitted.
Under the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), a prisoner
bringing a civil action may be permitted to file suit without prepaying the filing fee required by 28
U.S.C. § 1914(a). Given Plaintiff’s representations under penalty of perjury (see Doc. No. 24 at 2)
and the signed Certificate of Prisoner Institutional/Trust Fund Account Activity (see id. at 3), the
1 See Laron V. Cole v. Judge D. Gay, No. 3:24-cv-1178 (granting pauper status to the prisoner-
plaintiff even without a certified statement after he provided documentation of his multiple
unsuccessful attempts to obtain a certified statement); Miles v. Dickson Cnty. Sheriff’s Office, No.
3:23-cv-00259, 2023 WL 3168585, at *1 (M.D. Tenn. Apr. 28, 2023) (granting IFP Application
when plaintiff documented multiple unsuccessful attempts to obtain trust fund account statement
from jail officials).
2 Plaintiff has submitted multiple IFP Applications. The Court will review the latest submitted
application. (See Doc. No. 24).
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Court finds that Plaintiff lacks sufficient financial resources from which to pay the full filing fee
in advance. Therefore, his IFP Application (Doc. No. 24) is GRANTED.3
Under § 1915(b), Plaintiff nonetheless remains responsible for paying the full filing fee.
The obligation to pay the fee accrues at the time the case is filed, but the PLRA provides prisoner-
plaintiffs the opportunity to make a “down payment” of a partial filing fee and to pay the remainder
in installments. Accordingly, Plaintiff is hereby assessed the full civil filing fee of $350, to be paid
as follows:
(1) The custodian of Plaintiff’s inmate trust fund account at the institution where he now
resides is DIRECTED to submit to the Clerk of Court, as an initial payment, “20 percent of the
greater of – (a) the average monthly deposits to Plaintiff’s account; or (b) the average monthly
balance in Plaintiff’s account for the 6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the
complaint.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).
(2) After the initial filing fee is fully paid, the trust fund officer must withdraw from
Plaintiff’s account and pay to the Clerk of this Court monthly payments equal to 20% of all
deposits credited to Plaintiff’s account during the preceding month, but only when the amount in
the account exceeds $10. Such payments must continue until the entire filing fee is paid in full. 28
U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).
(3) Each time the trust account officer makes a payment to this court as required by this
Order, he or she must print a copy of the prisoner’s account statement showing all activity in the
account since the last payment made in accordance with this Order and submit it to the Clerk along
with the payment. All submissions to the Court must clearly identify Plaintiff’s name and the case
3 If at any time during this litigation the Court determines that Plaintiff provided inaccurate
information on his IFP Application, the Court may rescind his pauper status and require the
outstanding balance of the filing fee to be paid in one payment immediately.
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number as indicated on the first page of this Order, and must be mailed to: Clerk, United States
District Court, Middle District of Tennessee, 719 Church Street, Nashville, TN 37203.
The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED send a copy of this Order to the administrator of inmate
trust fund accounts at Roberton County State Holding to ensure that the custodian of Plaintiff’s
inmate trust account complies with that portion of 28 U.S.C. § 1915 pertaining to the payment of
the filing fee. If Plaintiff is transferred from his present place of confinement, the custodian of his
inmate trust fund account MUST ensure that a copy of this Order follows Plaintiff to his new place
of confinement for continued compliance.
Plaintiff’s earlier-filed IFP Applications (Doc. Nos. 2, 8, 13) are DENIED AS MOOT.
II. MOTIONS TO APPOINT COUNSEL
Next, Plaintiff has filed two Motions to Appoint Counsel. (Doc. Nos. 3, 15). The Supreme
Court has held that “an indigent’s right to appointed counsel . . . exists only where the litigant may
lose his physical liberty if he loses the litigation.” Lassiter v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18,
25 (1981). Thus, unlike in criminal proceedings, there is no constitutional right to an appointed
counsel in a civil action, such as this action. Willett v. Wells, 469 F. Supp. 748, 751 (E.D. Tenn.
1977), aff’d, 595 F.2d 1227 (6th Cir. 1979); see Williamson v. Autorama, Inc., No. 91-5759, 947
F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1991) (citing Willett favorably). The appointment of counsel for a civil litigant
is a matter within the discretion of the district court and will occur only under exceptional
circumstances. Lavado v. Keohane, 992 F.2d 601, 604-05 (6th Cir. 1993).
In support of his request for the appointment of counsel, Plaintiff states that his financial
circumstances prevent him from being able to hire an attorney. (Doc. No. 3 at 1). This is typical
for most pro se plaintiffs. At this time, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not demonstrated
exceptional circumstances warranting the appointment of counsel. Thus, his Motions to Appoint
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Counsel (Doc. Nos. 3, 15) are DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Plaintiff may renew his
request for counsel later, if appropriate.
In the second Motion to Appoint Counsel, Plaintiff asks for “two 1983 packets of prisoner
complaint forms” and “two inmate trust fund account forms . . . .”, the latter of which refers to a
Certificate of Prisoner Institutional/Trust Fund Account Activity. (Doc. No. 15 at 1). The Clerk is
DIRECTED to mail these forms to Plaintiff. Plaintiff also asks for forms to assist him in pursuing
cases filed in Sullivan and Robertson counties. Such forms must be obtained from those courts as
this Court is a federal court and does not provide forms specific to county courts.
III. TRO MOTIONS
Next, Plaintiff has filed two Motions for a Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”) (Doc.
Nos. 18, 21). In the first TRO motion, he asks the Court to “seize” certain evidence that Plaintiff
believes prove corruption, a “cover up”, and “serial killings.” (Doc. No. 18 at 1). In the second
TRO motion, he asks the Court for “immediate transport to Judge Crenshaw’s court to present
confidential evidence . . . .” (Doc. No. 21 at 1).
A TRO movant must comply with specific procedural requirements. First, “any request for
a TRO” must be made by written motion “separate from the complaint.” M.D. Tenn. L.R. 65.01(a).
Second, because the movant bears the burden of justifying preliminary injunctive relief on the
merits, Kentucky v. U.S. ex rel. Hagel, 759 F.3d 588, 600 (6th Cir. 2014), a TRO motion must be
accompanied by a memorandum of law. M.D. Tenn. L.R. 65.01(b). Third, the motion for a TRO
must be supported, at a minimum, by “an affidavit or a verified complaint.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
65(b)(1)(A); M.D. Tenn. L.R. 65.01(b) (explaining that a motion for a TRO “must be accompanied
by a separately filed affidavit or verified written complaint”). Finally, the moving party must
certify in writing “any efforts made to give notice and why it should not be required.” Fed. R. Civ.
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P. 65(b)(1)(B); see also M.D. Tenn. L.R. 65.01(c) (requiring “strict compliance” with this notice
provision by pro se moving parties).
Here, even if the Court liberally construes Plaintiff’s voluminous filings to comply with
the other procedural requirements, Plaintiff’s TRO motions do not describe any efforts he made to
give notice to Defendants and why it should not be required. Even though Plaintiff is proceeding
pro se, he must follow the notice requirement. See M.D. Tenn. L.R. 65.01(c) (requiring “strict
compliance” with this notice provision by pro se moving parties). Thus, Plaintiff has not placed
specific facts before the Court in a manner allowing it to fairly evaluate the TRO motions on the
merits. The motions therefore are DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
IV. MISCELLANEOUS MOTIONS AND FILINGS
In both his Request for Removal (Doc. No. 12) and “Motion Request for Federal
Agent/Judge” (Doc. No. 14), Plaintiff asks to be removed from “the hole . . . to go in front of Judge
Crenshaw.” (Doc. No. 12 at 1-2). Plaintiff states that he “could have them record/take me to show
them the item from servel [sic] murders and more[.] I’ve got the proff [sic] in evidence that needs
to be seized as well as where victim’s item and family airloom [sic] are at.” (Id. at 2).
Plaintiff’s case will proceed in the usual manner. To the extent Plaintiff’s motions request
emergency relief, the motions do not comply with the rules for seeking a temporary restraining
order and thus cannot be considered as such. Plaintiff’s motions (Doc. Nos. 12 and 14) are
DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
With respect to Doc. Nos. 9 (Supplement), 10 (Letter), 17 (Notice), and 25 (Notice),
Plaintiff is advised that he cannot litigate this action or any action in this Court by way of
supplements, notices, and/or letters to the Court. Even though Plaintiff is proceeding pro se and
the Court will take into consideration his pro se status when evaluating pleadings and pending
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motions, Plaintiff still is required to comply with the rules governing this case. These rules exist
to ensure fairness to all parties. 	If Plaintiff wishes for the Court to consider 	arguments and
evidence, he must raise them by way of timely and properly filed motions such as a motion to
amend the complaint. See Wilson v. United States, No. 3:18-CV-00735, 2021 WL 1088178, at *8
(M.D. Tenn. Mar. 22, 2021) (quoting Gould v. California Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., No. 19-CV-
00015-HSG, 2019 WL 2059660, at *3 (N.D. Cal. May 9, 2019)) (finding petitioner’s supplement
a “nullity” because petitioner did not cite any authority for his ability to unilaterally add new claims
in separate filings; “litigants may not plead their claims ‘in a piecemeal fashion by filing separate
documents that are intended to be read together,’ but must file a single pleading ‘that is complete
within itself.’”)).
Moving on, in Plaintiff’s Request to Add Claim/Evidence (Doc. No. 20) and Motion to
Add New Names/New Defendants/New Claims (Doc. No. 22), Plaintiff indicates his desire to
amend the Complaint. Plaintiff’s motions are GRANTED insofar as the Court GRANTS Plaintiff
a period of 30 days from the date of entry of this Memorandum Opinion and Order to submit an
Amended Complaint, if he so desires, to raise allegations pertaining to the circumstances he
describes in his supplement, notices, motions, and “Final Pleading.”4 (Doc. No. 23). Plaintiff
should take note that Local Rule 15.01(b) requires amended pleadings to state the entirety of the
pleadings with amendments incorporated. In other words, an amended complaint must contain all
claims and defendants the plaintiff wishes to include; the Court will not piece together claims and
defendants from multiple documents to assemble an amended complaint.
4 If Plaintiff wishes the Court to consider his “Final Pleading” (Doc. No. 23) as his Amended
Complaint, Plaintiff need not submit anything further and, upon the conclusion of the 30-day
period, the Court will presume such.
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After the conclusion of that 30-day period, the Court will conduct the required screening
of the Complaint (or Amended Complaint, if filed) as required by PLRA, at which time the Court
will consider whether any portion of the Complaint (or Amended Complaint) fails to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted, is frivolous, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is
immune from such relief. Plaintiff’s allegations will be assumed true for purposes of the required
PLRA screening.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
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WAVERLY D. CRENSHAW, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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