Vasser v. DMB Amesbury Springfield, LLC et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE
TRAVETTE TARA VASSER 	)
) 	Case No. 3:24-cv-00527
v. 	) 	Chief Judge Campbell
) 	Magistrate Judge Holmes
DMB AMESBURY SPRINGFIELD, LLC et al. 	)
To: 	The Honorable William L. Campbell, Jr., Chief United States District Judge
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This pro se civil case has been referred to the Magistrate Judge for pretrial proceedings
under 28 U.S.C. §§ 636(b)(1)(A) and (B), Rule 72 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the
Local Rules of Court. (Docket Nos. 7, 94.)
Pending before the Court is Defendants DMB Amesbury Springfield LLC, CGJ Springfield
LLC and Springfield Asset Management LLC’s joint motion for summary judgment against
Plaintiff Travette Tara Vasser (Docket No. 81), to which Plaintiff responded in opposition (Docket
No. 93) and Defendants replied in support (Docket No. 95). For the reasons discussed below, the
undersigned respectfully recommends that Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Docket
No. 81) be GRANTED.
I. 	FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1
This tort action arises from personal injuries allegedly suffered by Plaintiff following an
accident at her apartment complex, Springfield Apartments, in Murfreesboro, Tennessee. Plaintiff
contends that she left her apartment in the evening on February 10, 2023, walked out into a dark
outdoor hallway, slipped on a “dark coffee-like substance” on an uneven floor, tripped on a piece
1 Any statements of fact made in this section about the underlying dispute are contextual
only. Statements of facts considered for purposes of the instant motion for summary judgment are
detailed below.
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of metal protruding from the top of a stairwell, and tumbled down the stairwell, all of which caused
her “life threatening” injuries. (Docket No. 1 at ¶ 8.) She alleges that complaints were made to the
managers, owners, and employees of the apartment complex regarding “malfunctioning lighting,
conditions of the uneven floor, negligent construction, damaged and protruding, rusted, aging
metal pipe, slippery floor, footprints of spilled substances that had stayed too long on the floor”
and refers specifically to emails sent to the property manager and assistant property manager
during 2021 and 2022. (Id. at ¶¶ a–g, 11.)
On April 29, 2024, Plaintiff initiated this lawsuit against Defendants, which she contends
were “in charge of managing” the apartment complex, by filing an unverified complaint. (Id. at ¶¶
5–7.) She alleges that the three Defendants are equally responsible for her injuries and asserts
claims against them for negligence (id. at ¶ 14), negligent failure to supervise employees and
inspect premises (id. at ¶ 15), negligent failure to warn (id. at ¶ 16), some kind of general
negligence relating to the condition of the property (id. at ¶ 17), negligent infliction of emotional
distress (id. at ¶ 18), and “common law dangerous conditions” (id. at ¶ 19). She seeks “actual
damages” and “punitive damages.” (Id. at ¶¶ 21-22).2
Defendants answered Plaintiff’s complaint and largely denied her allegations. (Docket
Nos. 20–22.) Defendants each own an interest in Springfield Apartments, but the complex is
managed by a professional property management company, Mission Rock Residential LLC.
(Docket No. 83 at ¶¶ 3-4, 9.)
Plaintiff was initially represented by counsel, but the Court granted her counsel’s motion
to withdraw on November 14, 2024. (Docket No. 40.) Plaintiff is now representing herself pro se.
2 The District Judge dismissed Plaintiff’s claim for attorney’s fees Docket No. 32), so the
Court will not address this request
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II. 	MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND RESPONSE
Defendants seek summary judgment in their favor under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. (Docket No. 81.) They support their motion with a memorandum of law (Docket
No. 82); a statement of undisputed material facts (Docket No. 83); declarations from Angela
English, Ashlee Cabeal, John Gilmore, and Peter Lukacs (Docket Nos. 81-1 to 81-5); and excerpts
from the depositions of Plaintiff and David P. Johnson (Docket Nos. 81-6 to 81-26).3
In their motion, Defendants argue that the undisputed facts do not support Plaintiff’s claims
that Defendants were negligent and therefore are responsible for her injuries. (Docket No. 82 at 8–
23.) Accordingly, they ask for summary judgment to be granted in their favor on all of Plaintiff’s
claims.
First, for Plaintiff’s claims for negligence regarding the supervision of employees or
inspection of the premises, Defendants assert that they did not hire or employ any of the
management or maintenance employees at the apartment complex. Next, for Plaintiff’s claims for
negligence regarding the condition of the property, Defendants argue that they had no constructive
knowledge of the conditions that allegedly caused Plaintiff’s fall and that Plaintiff’s testimony
regarding these conditions was inconsistent. Next, for Plaintiff’s claim for negligent infliction of
emotional distress, Defendants contend that they did not engage in conduct below the standard of
care that caused Plaintiff’s accident. Finally, for Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages, Defendants
assert that there is no evidence to show that they acted intentionally, fraudulently, maliciously, or
recklessly.
3 Plaintiff later filed court reporter certificates for the depositions of Plaintiff and David P.
Johnson. (Docket Nos. 92, 92-1, 92-2.)
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After Defendants filed their motion for summary judgment, the Court issued an order
setting a briefing schedule and emphasizing to Plaintiff the significance of a motion made under
Rule 56(a). (Docket No. 84.) In particular, the Court cautioned Plaintiff that she was required to
respond to Defendants’ statement of undisputed facts in accordance with Local Rule 56.01(c) and
advised Plaintiff that “failure to file a timely response to the motion could result in the dismissal
of this action.” (Id. at 2.) The Court set a deadline of November 21, 2025 for Plaintiff to file her
response. (Id. at 1.)
On November 24, 2025, three days after the deadline, Plaintiff filed a response (Docket
No. 93)4 and the following attachments: (1) a document containing excerpts of building codes with
some narrative information added, which Plaintiff describes as being from “Expert Witness David
Johnson,” though it does not contain Mr. Johnson’s name or signature (Docket No. 93-1); (2) email
correspondence between Plaintiff and Defendants’ counsel regarding Plaintiff reviewing her
deposition transcript (Docket Nos. 93-2, 93-4)5; email correspondence between Plaintiff and a
court reporter regarding exhibits to Plaintiff’s deposition (Docket Nos. 93-3, 93-6)6; and email
correspondence 	from 	Plaintiff 	to 	“esquireresolutions.com” 	regarding 	Plaintiff’s 	deposition
(Docket No. 93-5).
4 Plaintiff described her response as a “Response to Document 84, Order for Motion
pending for Summary Judgment.” (Docket No. 93 at 1.) As detailed above, in the order at Docket
Entry No. 84, the Court provided Plaintiff with notice that Defendants filed a motion for summary
judgment and gave Plaintiff additional time to file a response in opposition the motion. The Court
construes Plaintiff’s response at Docket Entry No. 93 to be her response to Defendants’ motion for
summary judgment.
5 Plaintiff attached identical copies of the same exhibit. (Docket Nos. 93-2, 93-4.)
6 Plaintiff attached two documents that contain the same email correspondence but in a
different format. (Docket Nos. 93-3, 93-6.) Further, one document contains additional email
correspondence (Docket No. 93-3) that is not included the second document (Docket No. 93-4).
Nevertheless, the substance of the email correspondence is identical.
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Plaintiff’s response focuses mostly on what she believes are issues with various filings
made by Defendants and with various orders of this Court. She contends that this Court’s orders,
including an order from Magistrate Judge J. Gregory Wehrman7, were “unfairly written, judged,
and . . . granted” in Defendants’ favor. (Docket No. 93 at ¶ 1.) Accordingly, she asks Chief Judge
Campbell to “void and sanction” Judge Wehrman and Defendants, and she requests that all emails,
documents, files, and deposition testimony be “disallowed” with respect to the pending motion for
summary judgment. (Id. at ¶¶ 1, 7.) With respect to the substance of the summary judgment motion,
Plaintiff “disputes each and all facts” in Defendants’ statement of undisputed facts because the
statement does not comply with the “rules of the Court” and because “Defendant has been illegally
limited to 5 pages to respond.” (Id. at ¶ 11.) Plaintiff also takes issue with several of the
declarations submitted by Defendants because she was not able to depose the declarant, does not
know who the declarant is, or believes the declarant was not employed by Defendants until last
year. (Id. at ¶ 13.)
Defendants filed a reply in which they argue that Plaintiff’s response was untimely because
it was filed beyond the November 21, 2025 deadline set by the Court; that the response contains
unverified and conclusory allegations; and that Plaintiff failed to properly respond to the facts set
forth in Defendants’ statement of undisputed facts and therefore those facts have been admitted.
(Docket No. 95)
III. 	STANDARD OF REVIEW
A motion for summary judgment is reviewed under the standard that summary judgment
is appropriate if “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). See also Celotex Corp.
7 Judge Wehrman was sitting by special designation during the undersigned’s absence.
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v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986). A genuine issue of material fact is a fact which, if proven
at trial, could lead a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the non-moving party. Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
The party bringing the summary judgment motion has the initial burden of identifying
portions of the record that demonstrate the absence of a genuine dispute over material facts.
Pittman v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., 901 F.3d 619, 627–28 (6th Cir. 2018). If the summary
judgment movant meets that burden, then, in response, the non-moving party must set forth
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. at 628.
A party asserting that a fact cannot be or genuinely is disputed – i.e., a party seeking
summary judgment and a party opposing summary judgment, respectively – must support the
assertion by citing to materials in the record, including, but not limited to, depositions, documents,
affidavits, or declarations. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A). On a motion for summary judgment, a party
may object that the supporting materials specified by her opponent “cannot be presented in a form
that would be admissible in evidence.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2). Upon such an objection, the
proponent of the supporting material must show that the material is admissible as presented or
explain how it could be presented in a form that would be admissible. Thomas v. Haslam, 303 F.
Supp. 3d 585, 624 (M.D. Tenn. 2018).
In considering whether summary judgment is appropriate, the Court must “look beyond
the pleadings and assess the proof to determine whether there is a genuine need for trial.” Sowards
v. Loudon Cnty., 203 F.3d 426, 431 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 875 (2000). The Court must
view the evidence and all inferences drawn from underlying facts in the light most favorable to the
party opposing the motion. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., Ltd., 475 U.S.
574, 587 (1986); Gribcheck v. Runyon, 245 F.3d 547, 550 (6th Cir. 2001).
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IV. 	ANALYSIS
1. 	Local Rule 56.01 and Defendants’ Initial Burden Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure
Under the Local Rules, “any motion for summary judgment . . . must be accompanied by
a separate, concise statement of the material facts as to which the moving party contends there is
no genuine issue for trial.” Local R. 56.01(b). Each of these facts “must be set forth in a separate,
numbered paragraph,” “must be supported by specific citation to the record,” and “the word
‘response’ must be inserted and a blank space provided that is reasonably calculated to allow the
non-moving party sufficient space to respond to the assertion that the fact is undisputed.” Id.
Any party opposing a motion for summary judgment must respond specifically to each
asserted fact by either “(1) [a]greeing that the fact is undisputed; (2) [a]greeing that the fact is
undisputed for the purpose of ruling on the motion for summary judgment only; or (3)
[d]emonstrating that the fact is disputed.” Local R. 56.01(c). For each fact that is disputed, there
must a “specific citation to the record.” Id. Parties who represent themselves pro se are not excused
from this requirement. See id. The Local Rules contemplate the resulting ramifications if a party
does not respond to the statement of material facts in a timely manner: “If a timely response to a
moving party’s statement of material facts . . . is not filed within the time periods provided by these
rules, the asserted facts shall be deemed undisputed for purposes of summary judgment.” Local
R. 56.01(f) (emphasis added).
Here, Defendants filed a statement of undisputed material facts with their motion for
summary judgment in compliance with the Local Rules. (Docket No. 83.) Plaintiff failed to
respond to these assertions as directed in Local Rule 56.01(c). She merely stated that she “disputes
each and all facts” in the statement of undisputed material facts. (Docket No. 93 at ¶ 11.) The Court
provided Plaintiff with an explicit notice that she “must specifically respond to Defendants’
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statement of undisputed facts (Docket No. 83) in accordance with Local Rule 56.01(c)” and
provided detailed instruction on how to do so. (Docket No. 84.) Nevertheless, Plaintiff failed to
comply with this requirement. Accordingly, pursuant to Local Rule 56.01(f), the Court must accept
Defendants’ unaddressed asserted undisputed facts as true.
However, Local Rule 56.01(f) applies only to “facts, not argument, conclusions, or legal
principles.” New Century Found. v. Robertson, 400 F. Supp. 3d. 684, 690 n.1 (M.D. Tenn. 2019).
See also Local R. 56.01(f) (providing that unaddressed “asserted facts shall be deemed undisputed
for purposes of summary judgment” (emphasis added)). Even though Plaintiff did not explicitly
respond to Defendants’ statement of undisputed material facts, the Court still must examine the
evidence Defendants offer in support of their motion for summary judgment to determine if
Defendants have met their initial burden. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp., 447 U.S. at 330;
Carver v. Bunch, 946 F.2d 451, 454–55 (6th Cir. 1991) (“[A] party moving for summary judgment
always bears the burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue as to a material fact . . .
regardless if an adverse party fails to respond.”); Pewitte v. Hiniger, No. 3:17-cv-00822, 2020 WL
2218754, at *9 (M.D. Tenn. May 6, 2020).
2. 	Plaintiff’s Claims for Negligent Hiring, Training, and Supervision
In Tennessee, a negligence claim requires proof of each of the following elements: “(1) a
duty of care owed by the defendant to the plaintiff; (2) conduct by the defendant falling below the
standard of care amounting to a breach of that duty; (3) an injury or loss; (4) cause in fact; and (5)
proximate or legal cause.” Downs ex rel. Downs v. Bush, 263 S.W.3d 812, 819 (Tenn. 2008)
(quoting West v. E. Tennessee Pioneer Oil Co., 172 S.W.3d 545, 550 (Tenn. 2005)).
“A plaintiff in Tennessee may recover for negligent hiring, supervision or retention of an
employee if she establishes, in addition to the elements of a negligence claim, that the employer
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had knowledge of the employee’s unfitness for the job.” Thompson v. Bank of Am., N.A., 773 F.3d
741, 755 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing Doe v. Catholic Bishop for Diocese of Memphis, 306 S.W.3d 712,
717 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2008)). See also Gunter v. Est. of Armstrong, 600 S.W.3d 916, 928 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 2019). As the Sixth Circuit points out, “clearly this requires the plaintiff to identify the
employee and explain what the employee did that negligently injured the plaintiff.” Thompson,
773 F.3d at 755.
In her complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants managed her apartment complex and
were negligent in selecting, hiring, training, and supervising employees regarding the maintenance
of the complex, which led to her accident. (Docket No. 1 at ¶¶ 5–7, 12, 14–15.) However, the
undisputed facts clearly demonstrate that Defendants, all of which are companies that have a
financial interest in the apartment complex, did not have knowledge of the actions of any
employees whose responsibilities included maintaining the complex. Defendants hired a third-
party company, Mission Rock Residential, LLC, which then hired and managed the employees
who maintained the apartment complex. (Docket No. 83 at ¶¶ 16–17.) Defendants were not
involved in the hiring, training, or supervising process. Plaintiff has not pointed to any proof in the
record to contradict this evidence or demonstrate that Defendants employed any individual who
was responsible for maintaining the complex.
Plaintiff’s claim fails as a matter of law for additional reasons. Plaintiff has failed to either
identify which employee or employees negligently harmed her or demonstrate what their negligent
behaviors were and how those behaviors led to her injuries. These are required elements of a
negligent hiring and supervision claim. See Thompson, 773 F.3d at 755 (“Even assuming that these
were the employees Thompson alleges were negligently supervised, she does not point us to any
specific negligent behavior on their part.”); Rice v. PetSmart LLC, 649 F. Supp. 3d 673, 679 (M.D.
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Tenn. 2023) (“However, just as in [Thompson], Rice fails to identify any employee who
negligently harmed her. She alleges that PetSmart had seven employees located at the front of the
store, but she does not identify any individual employee that was unfit for the job or otherwise
posed a risk. PetSmart is entitled to summary judgment on this claim.”). Plaintiff references
Meaghan Taylor and Angela J. English in her complaint and alleges that they received information
about allegedly dangerous conditions, but Plaintiff offers no proof of any specific negligent acts
on their parts. For these reasons, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s
claims for negligent selection, hiring, training, or supervising.
3. 	Plaintiff’s Claims for Negligence Related to the Condition of the Property and Failure
to Warn
Plaintiff brings a premises liability claim against Defendants that requires her to satisfy the
elements of a negligence claim, “and in addition, prove either that ‘the condition was caused or
created by the owner, operator, or his agent,’ or ‘if the condition was created by someone [else],
that the owner or operator had actual or constructive notice that the condition existed prior to the
accident.’” Parker v. Holiday Hosp. Franchising, Inc., 446 S.W.3d 341, 350 (Tenn. 2014) (quoting
Blair v. West Town Mall, 130 S.W.3d 761, 764 (Tenn. 2004)). “Constructive notice” is defined as
“information or knowledge of a fact imputed by law to a person (although he may not actually
have it) because he could have discovered the fact by proper diligence, and his situation was such
as to cast upon him the duty of inquiring into it.” Hawks v. City of Westmoreland, 960 S.W.2d 10,
15 (Tenn. 1997) (quoting Kirby v. Macon Cnty., 892 S.W.2d 403, 409 (Tenn. 1994)). Constructive
notice may be established by showing that a dangerous or defective condition existed for such a
length of time that a property owner, in the exercise of reasonable care, should have become aware
of it. Blair, 130 S.W.3d at 764; Simmons v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 713 S.W.2d 640, 641 (Tenn.
1986). Constructive notice may also be established by showing that the dangerous condition
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resulted from “a pattern of conduct, a recurring incident, or a general or continuing condition.”
Blair, 130 S.W.3d at 765.
Defendants contend that there is no admissible evidence to show that they breached their
duty of care regarding any of the allegedly hazardous conditions that Plaintiff believes led to her
fall. The Court finds that the undisputed facts establish that Defendants received neither actual nor
constructive notice of the allegedly hazardous conditions, which Plaintiff described as a dimly lit
hallway, uneven flooring, “dark coffee-like substance” on the ground, and “black metal piece”
protruding from a damaged guardrail.
With respect to actual notice, there is no evidence that Defendants received direct
complaints about the hazardous conditions that Plaintiff alleges led to her fall. (Docket No. 83 at
¶ 31, 39, 53.) With respect to constructive notice, Plaintiff has not presented any evidence that
Defendants could have and should have discovered the allegedly hazardous conditions. (Docket
No. 83 at ¶¶ 30–32, 44, 52–53.) Plaintiff asserts in her unverified complaint that emails were sent
– presumably by her, though it is not clear – to two employees of Mission Rock Residential, LLC
in 2021 and 2022 regarding the condition of the area outside of her apartment. (Docket No. 1 at ¶¶
a–g.) Those emails concerned “broken glass and pills,” a “nasty breezeway,” a sandwich package
stuck to concrete, dirt blown onto Plaintiff’s rug, dog feces, “damages items,” and “multiple safety
issues.” (Id.) However, Plaintiff has not provided proof that the hazardous conditions referenced
in these emails or the hazardous conditions that allegedly caused her to fall either existed for a
long enough time that Defendants should have become aware of them, or resulted from any
recurring or general conditions. See Blair, 130 S.W.3d at 764–65. Accordingly, the Court
concludes that Plaintiff has failed to “make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an
essential element” of her premises liability claim because she has not shown that Defendants had
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actual or constructive notice that the condition existed prior to the accident. Pineda v. Hamilton
County, Ohio, 977 F.3d 483, 491 (6th Cir. 2020).
In addition, Plaintiff’s claim for negligence related to the condition of the apartment
complex fails as a matter of law for other reasons. “[F]or an owner or occupier to be found
negligent, there must be some evidence that there was a dangerous or defective condition on the
premises.” Nee v. Big Creek Partners, 106 S.W.3d 650, 653 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002). “A jury cannot
conclude that an owner or occupier failed to exercise reasonable care to prevent injury to persons
on their property if there is no evidence of a dangerous or defective condition.” Id. at 654. “If no
dangerous or defective condition exists, an owner or occupier cannot be held liable for failing to
take action in order to remedy the supposed condition.” Id. Again, Plaintiff has provided no
evidence to create a disputed issue of material fact. She has not provided proof that there was,
indeed, a problem with the hallway lighting, flooring, or guardrails prior to the incident. If
anything, the proof demonstrates that there were no problems with these conditions: there were no
complaints received or work orders entered regarding the hallway lighting (Docket No. 83 at ¶ 32,
33, 38); the flooring was never physically altered during the time that Plaintiff lived in the
apartment and no complaints were received regarding the flooring (id. at ¶¶ 29–31); Plaintiff was
not aware of how long the “dark coffee-like substance” on the ground was present or how it got
on the ground (id. at ¶¶ 41–42); Plaintiff’s expert David Johnson testified that he did not find any
problem with the guardrails (id. at ¶ 51); and the bracket attached at the base of the guardrails was
not in the intended path of someone using the stairs (id. at ¶ 55). Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed
to sufficiently demonstrate that a dangerous or defective condition existed at the apartment
complex prior to the incident.
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Finally, because Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that Defendants were negligent with
respect to the condition of the property, Plaintiff’s claim for failure to warn of a dangerous
condition fails as a matter of law. “Liability in premises liability cases stems from superior
knowledge of the condition of the premises.” Ogle v. Winn–Dixie Greenville, Inc., 919 S.W.2d 45,
46 (Tenn. 1995) (citing McCormick v. Waters, 594 S.W.2d 385, 387 (Tenn. 1980)). Defendants
did not have the requisite knowledge of the condition of the premises, so they cannot be held liable
for that condition, including for failing to warn of that condition. For these reasons, Defendants
are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claims for negligence related to the condition of
the property.
4. 	Plaintiff’s Claim for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress
The elements of a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress include the elements
of a general negligence claim, though the plaintiff must also prove that the defendant’s negligence
caused the plaintiff serious or severe emotional injury. Hunt v. S. Baptist Convention, 777 F. Supp.
3d 776, 833 (M.D. Tenn. 2025) (citing Doe 1 v. Woodland Presbyterian, 661 S.W.3d 87, 109
(Tenn. Ct. App. 2022)). To demonstrate “serious or severe emotional injury,” the plaintiff must
demonstrate that a “reasonable person, normally constituted, would be unable to adequately cope
with the mental stress engendered by the circumstances of the case.” Slowik v. Lambert, 529 F.
Supp. 3d 756, 767 (E.D. Tenn. 2021) (internal citation omitted).
The Court has already determined that the record does not contain evidence that Defendants
acted with negligence in connection with Plaintiff’s fall. Further, Plaintiff has failed to point to
evidence of mental and emotional injuries as a result of her fall which would disable a reasonable,
normally constituted person from adequately coping with the alleged mental stress. For these
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reasons, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claim for negligent infliction
of emotional distress.
5. 	Plaintiff’s Request for Punitive Damages
Punitive damages are a remedy rather than a cause of action. StarLink Logistics, Inc. v.
ACC, LLC, 653 F. Supp. 3d 462, 471 n.8 (M.D. Tenn. 2023); Jimenez v. Vanderbilt Landscaping,
LLC, No. 3-11-0276, 2011 WL 3027190, at *1 n.2 (M.D. Tenn. July 25, 2011). Punitive damages
are “appropriate only in the most egregious cases and, consequently, a verdict imposing such
damages must 	be supported 	by clear and 	convincing 	evidence that the defendant acted
intentionally, fraudulently, maliciously or recklessly.” Goff v. Elmo Greer & Sons Const., Inc.,
297 S.W.3d 175, 186 (Tenn. 2009).
The Court has already determined that all of the claims asserted by Plaintiff fail as a matter
of law. Because Defendants are not liable to Plaintiff, Plaintiff is not entitled to a remedy, including
a remedy of punitive damages. For these reasons, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment
on Plaintiff’s request for punitive damages.
V. 	RECOMMENDATION
Based on the foregoing, it is respectfully RECOMMENDED that Defendants DMB
Amesbury Springfield LLC, CGJ Springfield LLC and Springfield Asset Management LLC’s joint
motion for summary judgment (Docket No. 81) be GRANTED and that this action be
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail a copy of this Report and Recommendation to Plaintiff
and to send an additional copy by email to the following email addresses: ttvasser@icloud.com,
ttvasser@hotmail.com, vassertt@gmail.com.
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ANY OBJECTIONS to this Report and Recommendation must be filed within fourteen
(14) days of service of this Report and Recommendation and must state with particularity the
specific portions of this Report and Recommendation to which objection is made. See Rule
72(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Local Rule 72.02(a). Failure to file written
objections within the specified time can be deemed a waiver of the right to appeal the District
Court’s order regarding the Report and Recommendation. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985);
United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981). Any response to the objections must be
filed within fourteen (14) days after service of objections. See Rule 72(b)(2) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure and Local Rule 72.02(b).
Respectfully submitted,
________________________________
BARBARA D. HOLMES
United States Magistrate Judge
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