Doe et al v. Piraino et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION
JANE DOE, a minor, by her parents and
next friends JOHN DOE and JUDY DOE,
JOHN DOE, in his individual capacity,
and JUDY DOE, in her individual
capacity,
Plaintiffs,
v.
ROBERT PIRAINO, MUSIC CITY
FENCING CLUB, INC., and UNITED
STATES FENCING ASSOCIATION,
Defendants.
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Case No. 3:22-cv-00560
Judge Aleta A. Trauger
MEMORANDUM
Before the court is the motion for partial summary judgment, styled as a “Motion for
Summary Judgment as to Plaintiffs’ Claims for Violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a), 18 U.S.C. §
1594(a), and 18 U.S.C. § 1589(a)” (Doc. No. 139), filed by defendant Music City Fencing Club,
Inc. (“Music City Fencing” or the “moving defendant”). For the reasons set forth herein, the motion
will be granted in part and denied in part.
I. 	FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiffs Jane Doe, a minor at the time this lawsuit was filed, and her parents John Doe,
and Judy Doe (“the parents”), initiated this action on July 27, 2022 against Music City Fencing,
Robert Piraino, and the United States Fencing Association. (Doc. No. 1.) The Second Amended
Complaint (“SAC”), now the operative pleading, alleges that Robert Piraino engaged in sexually
inappropriate conduct with Jane Doe between 2019 and 2021 in Nashville, Tennessee, while he
was Jane Doe’s fencing coach and the owner, principal, and head coach of Music City Fencing.
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(Doc. No. 115 ¶¶ 5, 89–134.) On November 16, 2022, Piraino pleaded guilty to multiple counts
relating to the sexual abuse of Jane Doe and another child, including (1) two counts of especially
aggravated exploitation of a minor and (2) one count of sexual exploitation of a minor via
electronic means. (Id. ¶ 133.) He was sentenced to 25 years in prison without parole. (Id.)
The plaintiffs allege in the SAC that Piraino was the “sole owner, officer, and director of
Music City Fencing. He was responsible for the management of the company and made all
decisions relating to finances, personnel, leases, equipment acquisitions, and policies and
procedures governing the company’s day-to-day operations[.]” (Id. ¶ 41.) Jane Doe began taking
fencing lessons at Music City Fencing in July 2017, when she was 11 years old. (Id. ¶ 90.) Piraino
began sexually grooming and exploiting Jane Doe in 2019, when she was 13, and this abuse
continued until “sometime in early 2021,” when she would have been fifteen years old. (Id. ¶¶ 93–
122.) According to the SAC, the abuse consisted primarily of Piraino’s making “demands” on Jane
Doe, including that she send him videos of herself masturbating or “engaging in ‘dirty talk’” and
photos of herself in “sexually suggestive positions.” (Id. ¶¶ 103–07.) When she complied with his
demands, he rewarded her with gifts. (Id. ¶ 112.) When she did not, he would “punish” her,
including by “mak[ing] [her] perform exercises to aggravate her shoulder,” knowing that she was
already experiencing pain in that shoulder during fencing activities and knowing that forcing her
to do perform exercises with that shoulder “caused her excruciating pain.” (Id. ¶ 114.) The
plaintiffs also allege that Piraino distributed naked photos of Jane Doe online and made articles of
her clothing available for sale online to other pedophiles. (Id. ¶¶ 128, 131.)
Although Music City Fencing does not include any facts outside the SAC in its Statement
of Undisputed Material Facts in support of its motion, it asserts in the body of its supporting
Memorandum that it is undisputed that Piraino never kissed Jane Doe, never had sexual intercourse
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with her, and never touched her genitals. (Jane Doe Dep. 159, Doc. No. 150-7.)1 While Jane Doe
initially testified that Piraino had touched her breast, she later clarified that he touched her right
breast over her chest protector during a fencing lesson, when he was trying to “fix [her] posture,”
so, in actuality, he “touched [her] on the chest protector over the breast area.” (Id. at 159–60.)
Based on these and other factual allegations, the SAC sets forth claims against Music City
Fencing, as relevant here, for purportedly “participat[ing] in a venture with Piraino,” from which
it knowingly benefited, all while knowing that Piraino was engaged in conduct that violated federal
sex trafficking laws, including 15 U.S.C. §§ 1591(a) (which prohibits the sex trafficking of
minors), 1594(a) (which criminalizes the attempt to violate § 1591 and other provisions), and
1589(a) (which criminalizes forced labor), for which the plaintiffs assert claims against both
Piraino and Music City Fencing under 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a). (Id. ¶ 204–12, 217–24 (Counts 6 and
7).) The SAC also asserts that Music City Fencing is vicariously liable for Piraino’s violations of
18 U.S.C. §§ 1591(a), 1594(a), and 1589(a). (Id. ¶¶ 214, 225.)
Music City Fencing (but not Piraino) seeks summary judgment on the federal sex
trafficking and forced labor claims, arguing that (1) the undisputed facts show that it did not
participate in a “venture” with Piraino, for purposes of all of the § 1595(a) claims, and (2) Piraino
did not engage in sex trafficking as to Jane Doe, as defined in § 1591(a), because he never engaged
in a “sex act” with her, as a result of which Music City Fencing cannot be liable for sex trafficking
under any theory. (Doc. No. 141.)
The plaintiffs respond that this court has already held that the plaintiffs adequately alleged
that Music City Fencing was engaged in a venture with Piraino and, further, that Jane Doe does
1 The deposition transcript in the record contains no original pagination. The court therefore
cites the CM/ECF-assigned pagination only.
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not have to prove that Piraino actually engaged in a sex act with Jane Doe—she need only prove
that he “intended to engage in a commercial sex act with her.” (Doc. No. 159 at 4.) In its Reply,
Music City Fencing relies on this court’s opinion in Ramsbottom v. Ashton, No. 3:21-cv-00272,
2024 WL 4993391, at *16 (M.D. Tenn. Dec. 5, 2024), to reiterate its argument that “a single actor
is not a ‘venture’ under the statute.” (Doc. No. 165 at 2.)
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, any party “may move for summary judgment,
identifying each claim or defense . . . on which summary judgment is sought.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). “The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. In
ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor
of the nonmoving party. McLean v. 988011 Ontario Ltd., 224 F.3d 797, 800 (6th Cir. 2000).
“Summary judgment is proper if the evidence, taken in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party, shows that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law.” Hartman v. Great Seneca Fin. Corp., 569 F.3d 606, 611 (6th
Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).
III. 	DISCUSSION
The court already denied Music City Fencing’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the sex
trafficking and forced labor claims against it in 2023. Its present motion for partial summary
judgment on the same issue, which relies entirely on the factual allegations set forth in the SAC,
brings little in the way of new facts to the table, though it attempts to refocus part of its argument
and cites more recent caselaw. As discussed below, the court finds the new arguments to be
partially persuasive, at least with respect to the issue of whether the plaintiffs allege that Piraino
engaged in a commercial sex act with Jane Doe.
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A. 	Statutory Background
Congress initially passed the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (“TVPA”) “[t]o
combat trafficking in persons, especially into the sex trade, slavery, and involuntary servitude, to
reauthorize certain Federal programs to prevent violence against women, and for other purposes.”
Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, PL 106–386 (Division A), Oct. 28,
2000, 114 Stat 1464. The legislation created criminal offenses for sex trafficking and forced labor.
18 U.S.C. §§ 1591(a), 1589(a). Sex trafficking, as relevant here, is defined by the statute to include
the knowing enticement or solicitation of a person under the age of 18 years to “engage in a
commercial sex act.” Id. § 1591(a). Forced labor is defined to include obtaining the labor or
services of a person by means of force or threats of force and by means of serious harm or threats
of serious harm. Id. § 1589(a)(1)–(2).
In 2003, Congress enacted the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act
(“TVPRA”) to provide a civil remedy to victims of violations of the TVPA, now codified at 18
U.S.C. § 1595. The civil remedy statute states in relevant part:
An individual who is a victim of a violation of this chapter may bring a civil action
against the perpetrator (or whoever knowingly benefits, or attempts or conspires to
benefit, financially or by receiving anything of value from participation in a venture
which that person knew or should have known has engaged in an act in violation of
this chapter) in an appropriate district court of the United States and may recover
damages and reasonable attorneys fees.
18 U.S.C. § 1595(a) (effective April 11, 2018 to January 4, 2023).2 Thus, under the TVPRA, a
victim of sex trafficking or forced labor under the TVPA may bring (a) a direct civil claim against
the perpetrator of her trafficking and (b) a “beneficiary” civil claim against “whoever knowingly
2 Congress has amended the statute several times since its initial passage in 2003, including
minor amendments in 2023 that are not material to the plaintiffs’ claims. The court cites herein the
version of § 1595 in effect before the 2023 amendments.
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benefits, financially or by receiving anything of value from participation in a venture which that
person knew or should have known has engaged in an act in violation of [the TVPA].” 18 U.S.C.
§ 1595(a). To prove a claim for beneficiary liability under the TVPRA, a plaintiff must show that
the defendant “ (1) ‘knowingly benefit[ted] financially or by receiving anything of value’ (2) from
participation in a venture (3) that [it] ‘knew or should have known has engaged in’ sex trafficking
under § 1591.” Ramsbottom, 2024 WL 4993391, at *16 (quoting A.B. v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 455
F. Supp. 3d 171, 188 (E.D. Pa. 2020)); see also Powell v. W. Express, Inc., No. 3:24-cv-1315, 2025
WL 2306949, at *4 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 11, 2025) (Crenshaw, J.) (stating that “venture liability”
requires a showing that “(1) [the defendant] was part of a ‘venture,’(2) [the defendant] knowingly
benefitted from participation in the venture; and (3) [the defendant] knew or should have known
that the venture would violate § 1591(a)(1)” (citing A.M. v. Wyndham Hotels & Resorts, Inc., 728
F. Supp. 3d 787, 797 (S.D. Ohio 2024)).
B. 	Whether Piraino Engaged in a “Sex Act” with Jane Doe
Music City Fencing’s Motion to Dismiss did not focus on—and effectively conceded—
this element for purposes of that motion, so the court did not address it, other than to state in
passing that the plaintiffs had adequately pleaded this element when they alleged that Piraino
“induced Jane Doe to engage in ‘commercial sex acts’ . . . when he gave her money and other
things of value in exchange for her providing him with sexually explicit images.” Doe, 688 F.
Supp. 3d at 649 n.7 (citing Doc. No. 36 ¶¶ 97–99, 113, 198). Music City Fencing now argues that
it is undisputed that Piraino did not actually engage in any “sex act” with Jane Doe, citing the
portions of Jane Doe’s deposition testimony referenced above.
Section 1591(a), in relevant part, makes it a crime for any person to “knowingly” “entice[]”
or “solicit[] by any means a person,” while “knowing . . . that the person has not attained the age
of 18 years and will be caused to engage in a commercial sex act.” 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a). The term
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“commercial sex act” is defined as “any sex act, on account of which anything of value is given to
or received by any person.” Id. § 1591(e)(3). The statute does not define the term “sex act,” so
courts give it its ordinarily understood meaning. For instance, as Judge Crenshaw of this court has
held:
While the statute attempts to define what a “commercial sex act” is, it does not
explain what qualifies as a “sex act.” The plain meaning of sex act can be found in
the dictionary: (1) “a sex act is an act performed with another for sexual
gratification”; and (2) “a sex act is sexual relations, usually involv[ing] the touching
of another’s breast, vagina, penis, or anus.”
Powell, 	2025 	WL 	2306949, 	at 	*6 	(first 	quoting 	Merriam-Webster 	Online 	Dictionary,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/sexact; and then quoting Sex Act, Black’s Law
Dictionary (10th Ed.)); accord, e.g., Acevedo v. eXp Realty, LLC, 713 F. Supp. 3d 740, 770 (C.D.
Cal. 2024) (relying on the “plain and ordinary meaning” of “sex act”); Ardolf v. Weber, 332 F.R.D.
467, 477 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (same).
Courts also generally agree that the statute, as indicated by its use of the terms “entice” and
“solicit,” does not require that a commercial sex act occur; instead, the perpetrator must simply
intend that a commercial sex act will occur. See, e.g., United States v. Gatlin, 90 F.4th 1050, 1061
(11th Cir. 2024) (“[C]riminal liability under § 1591 is not conditioned on the actual occurrence of
any commercial sex act.” (citation omitted)), cert. denied sub nom. Gatlin v. United States, 145 S.
Ct. 10659 (2025); United States v. Hornbuckle, 784 F.3d 549, 553 (9th Cir. 2015) (“Case law
makes clear that ‘commission of a sex act or sexual contact’ is not an element of a conviction under
18 U.S.C. § 1591.”). Rather, as the Ninth Circuit has explained in the context of a § 1591(a) appeal:
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When an act of Congress requires knowledge of a future action, it does not require
knowledge in the sense of certainty as to a future act. What the statute requires is
that the defendant know in the sense of being aware of an established modus
operandi that will in the future cause a person to engage in prostitution.
United States v. Todd, 627 F.3d 329, 334 (9th Cir. 2010).
In this case, Jane Doe testified that Piraino did not touch her sexually, except for touching
her on the chest protector over the “breast area” in the course of a fencing lesson. (Doc. No. 150-
7 at 159–60.) He also touched her inner thighs and buttocks during fencing lessons when he was
“fixing [her] lunge or fixing [her] posture,” always when other people, including at least one of
Jane Doe’s parents, were present. (Id. at 161–62.) Otherwise, Jane Doe testified that Piraino “tried
to get [her] to” masturbate him (give him a “hand job”) during summer training camp “two or three
times,” and he also told her he wanted to have “threesomes” with her and other members of the
fencing club or other coaches. (Doc. No. 150-7 at 151, 154, 155.) Jane Doe did not acquiesce to
these solicitations. She also did not state in her deposition testimony that Piraino’s attempts to get
her to give him a “hand job” during summer camp or to engage in a threesome with him were tied
to gifts or anything of value, and she did not testify that Piraino had in any sense put in place a
“modus operandi that [would] in the future cause [her] to engage in a [sex act].” Todd, 627 F.3d
at 334. More specifically, she does not allege that she was ever alone with Piraino or placed in a
situation where sex acts could occur.
Jane Doe testified specifically that Piraino agreed to help her write a scholarship letter for
USA Fencing in exchange for her sending him a photo of herself in a bikini sometime in the spring
or summer of 2019. (Doc. No. 150-7 at 136, 149–50; see also Doc. No. 155-12, Jane Doe Decl.
¶ 2.) This was the first time she sent him a photo of herself. (Doc. No. 150-7 at 135–36.) She also
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testified that Piraino gave her gifts of clothing, fencing equipment,3 and a prepaid credit card “in
exchange for” her sending him “photos and videos” of herself. (Doc. No. 150-7 at 123–24, 145.)4
Piraino gave her items of clothing because he “wanted to see [her] in them.” (Id. at 125.)
As set forth in the SAC, the plaintiffs allege that Piraino violated § 1591(a) (and § 1594(a),
which criminalizes attempt to violate § 1591(a)) by:
(a) Recruiting, enticing, and soliciting Jane Doe to participate in an arrangement
under which Piraino would provide Jane Doe scholarships, gift cards, clothes,
money, and other things of value for photos and videos of her engaging in sex acts;
(b) Recruiting, enticing, and soliciting Jane Doe to participate in an arrangement
under which Piraino would sell her photos and videos to child predators online . . . .
(SAC ¶ 206 (emphasis added).)5 In other words, both in the SAC and in Jane Doe’s testimony, the
commercial element of Piraino’s interactions with Jane Doe is explicitly tied to her sending photos
and videos of herself in sexually suggestive positions. While sending Piraino a nude or partially
nude photograph or video of herself may qualify as sending him child pornography, it is not a sex
3 Judy Doe denied that Piraino ever purchased fencing gear for Jane Doe. (Judy Doe Dep.,
Doc. No. 150-13 at 110.)
4 Piraino did other reprehensible things, including getting Jane Doe to leave her sweaty
socks in the fencing locker room, after which he would send her videos of himself masturbating
into her socks or “sell [them] on the black market.” (Doc. No. 150-7 at 138,144, 157.) He sent her
videos of himself having sex with other girls. (Id. at 148.) He purportedly “tried to date her” and
told her he wanted to marry her. (Id. at 156.) The plaintiffs do not allege that these actions
constitute “sex acts.”
5 The SAC also alleges that Piraino violated § 1591(a) by “[t]elling Jane Doe that when she
turned 16, she could come to his apartment and have sex with him, . . . with the understanding and
explicit representation that he would compensate her for sex.” (SAC ¶ 206.) Aside from the fact
that Jane Doe did not testify about these statements in her deposition, even when asked whether
there was anything else she wanted to say about her relationship with him (Doc. No. 150-7 at 284–
85), Piraino’s telling Jane Doe that he wanted to have sex with her at some time in the future, after
she turned sixteen, and that he would “compensate” her for it, is too vague and inchoate to establish
an “intent” or attempt to engage in a commercial sex act with her.
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act.6 Touching her in the “breast area” on protective gear worn over her athletic clothing during a
fencing lesson in order to correct her posture also does not qualify as a sex act.
The plaintiffs do not, at this juncture, argue to the contrary. Instead, in response to Music
City Fencing’s motion, they argue that there is evidence in the record that Piraino “intended to
engage in a commercial sex act” with Jane Doe. (Doc. No. 159 at 4.) The evidence they point to
includes statements by Jane Doe that Piraino “tri[ed] to get” her to perform sex acts on him;
statements by Piraino to others that he intended to have sex with Jane Doe; and the fact that these
statements were “made in a context where Piraino was providing things of value” to “coerce Jane
Doe into complying with his demands.” (Id. at 5.)
The evidence the plaintiffs cite includes an excerpt of the transcript from a hearing in the
proceedings against Piraino in the Criminal Court for Davidson County, Tennessee, on the state’s
Motion to Increase/Revoke/Alter Bail. (Doc. No. 167 at 1.) In this excerpt, a detective testified
about an apparently intercepted conversation between Piraino and another pedophile (or someone
posing as a pedophile) in which Piraino claimed that he had a fifteen-year-old student, presumably
referring to Jane Doe, with whom he was “planning to hook up in the locker room.” (Id. at 5.)
Even assuming that Piraino, in fact, was “planning to hook up with Jane Doe,” Jane Doe
did not testify that he tried to induce her to have sexual intercourse with him. She testified only
that Piraino “was trying to get her to” give him a “hand job” during a summer training camp that
took place either the summer after eighth grade or the summer after her freshman year in high
school. (Doc. No. 150-7 at 151, 122.) Soliciting a “hand job” would clearly qualify as soliciting a
sex act, but the details Jane Doe provided regarding that inducement are thin. As set forth above,
6 Indeed, the plaintiffs bring a separate claim against Piraino under 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) for
enticing or coercing Jane Doe to produce photos and videos of herself engaged in sexually explicit
conduct. (SAC ¶ 231.)
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she did not testify that Piraino effected a “modus operandi that [would] in the future cause [her] to
engage in a [sex act],” Todd, 627 F.3d at 334, and she does not allege that she was ever alone with
Piraino or in a situation where sex acts could occur. Under these circumstances, it seems unlikely
that her testimony would persuade a jury Piraino attempted to induce her to engage in a sex act.
But even if it did, Jane Doe did not testify or even imply that Piraino offered or tried to give her
gifts or anything of value in exchange for masturbating him. Instead, as set forth above, the gifts
he gave her were explicitly tied to her sending him photos and videos of herself, which is not a sex
act.
The court therefore finds, upon closer look, that the evidence in the record is insufficient
to permit a rational jury to conclude that Piraino knowingly enticed or solicited Jane Doe, when
she was underage, to engage in a commercial sex act, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a), or
attempted to do so, in violation of § 1594(a). As a result, the plaintiffs cannot prove that Piraino
engaged in sex trafficking in violation of § 1591(a) or 1594(a). Because Piraino did not engage in
sex trafficking as defined by the statute, Music City Fencing cannot be vicariously liable or liable
as a beneficiary under § 1595(a) for participating in a venture that it knew or should have known
had engaged in sex trafficking. Music City Fencing is entitled to summary judgment on Count 6
of the SAC.7
C. 	Whether Music City Fencing Participated in a “Venture”
Under 18 U.S.C. § 1589(a),
(a) Whoever knowingly provides or obtains the labor or services of a person by any
one of, or by any combination of, the following means–
7 Piraino did not join in Music City Fencing’s motion for partial summary judgment on the
sex trafficking claim, but the court’s conclusion clearly implicates the claim against Piraino as
well.
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(1) by means of force, threats of force, physical restraint, or threats of physical
restraint to that person or another person;
(2) by means of serious harm or threats of serious harm to that person or another
person;
(3) by means of the abuse or threatened abuse of law or legal process; or
(4) by means of any scheme, plan, or pattern intended to cause the person to
believe that, if that person did not perform such labor or services, that person
or another person would suffer serious harm or physical restraint,
commits the crime of forced labor. As set forth above, a victim of § 1589(a) may bring a civil
action against the perpetrator “or whoever knowingly benefits, or attempts or conspires to benefit,
financially or by receiving anything of value from participation in a venture which that person
knew or should have known has engaged in an act in violation of this chapter,” which includes
§ 1589. 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a).
Count 7 of the SAC asserts that Piraino violated 18 U.S.C. § 1589(a) “by forcing Jane Doe
to perform physical exercises that aggravated her injured shoulder when she did not agree to
provide sexually explicit photos and videos in exchange for gift cards, clothes, money, and other
things of value” and that Music City Fencing is liable under § 1595(a) because it “participated in
a venture with Piraino” from which it knowingly benefitted, while also knowing that Piraino was
engaging in conduct that violated § 1589(a). (SAC ¶¶ 218, 221–23.)
Setting aside the question of whether Piraino’s conduct as alleged falls within the scope of
the forced labor provision, which is a bit of a stretch,8 Music City Fencing argues that it cannot be
8 Music City Fencing does not challenge the forced labor element of the forced labor claim,
but the court observes that the plaintiffs’ forced labor theory is murky at best. As the plaintiffs
allege it, forcing Jane Doe to perform painful exercises was not intended to induce her to provide
Piraino photos and videos (presumably the “labor” in question, another issue the parties do not
address) but as punishment for not providing photos and videos on demand (in exchange for gifts).
It also does not appear from the facts that the threat of requiring her to perform painful shoulder
exercises (which may or may not qualify as a “threat[] of serious harm” under § 1589(a)) induced
or was intended to induce Jane Doe to provide the photos and videos. Jane Doe’s deposition
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liable because it did not engage in a “venture” with Piraino. Its position is, essentially, that Piraino
acted alone, and that a person “acting alone . . . is not a venture.” (Doc. No. 141 at 9.)
The Sixth Circuit has provided no guidance on this question, and the district courts within
this circuit and elsewhere are “all over the map on the meaning” of the terms used to define
beneficiary liability based on participation in a “venture” under § 1595(a). Doe #1 v. Red Roof
Inns, Inc., 21 F.4th 714, 725 (11th Cir. 2021). But those federal appellate courts that have
considered the issue have held that, in the civil context, the term “venture,” as required for
“participation in a venture,” simply requires “taking part in a common undertaking or enterprise
involving risk and potential profit.” Id. at 726; accord G.G. v. Salesforce.com, Inc., 76 F.4th 544,
554 (7th Cir. 2023) (agreeing with the Eleventh Circuit that “the alleged venture can be a
‘commercial venture[]’ like running or expanding a business”); L.M.H. v. Red Roof Inns, No. 2:24-
CV-1823, 2025 WL 961720, at *13 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 31, 2025) (“[B]oth the Eleventh and Seventh
Circuits have recognized that the relevant ‘venture’ under Section 1595 need not be ‘specifically
a sex trafficking venture’ and can instead be a ‘commercial venture’ like running or expanding a
business that facilitates sex trafficking”).
Here, Piraino and Music City Fencing were engaged in a “venture”: together, they operated
Music City Fencing Club, a venture that involved promoting, teaching, and coaching the sport of
fencing, from which they both presumably benefited by generating a profit. (See SAC ¶¶ 44, 49.)
testimony contains essentially no discussion of the facts that would support her forced labor claim,
aside from Jane Doe’s brief statement that her mother was “concerned as to why [Piraino] was
specifically making [her] do exercises that targeted [her] shoulder, knowing [she] was already in
pain” and that her mother asked Piraino about it (in Jane Doe’s presence) several times. (Doc. No.
150-7 at 111.) Jane Doe herself did not remember “express[ing] any concerns to Mr. Piraino about
her workouts,” but she did note that, once she stopped fencing altogether due to shoulder pain, she
was able to cut off communications with him because he “couldn’t hold power over [her] anymore
while [she] was training since [she] wasn’t training with him anymore.” (Id. at 112, 164–65.)
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Music City Fencing does not argue that an entity cannot be engaged in a “venture” with its
agent/employee, and, in any event, those courts that have addressed the issue have found that it
can. See, e.g., Doe (L.M.) v. 42 Hotel Raleigh, LLC, No. 5:23-CV-235-FL, 2024 WL 4204906, at
*6 (E.D.N.C. Sept. 16, 2024) (recognizing that “a corporation cannot form an enterprise with its
own agents or employees,” for purposes of RICO liability, but holding that “Congress elected to
write RICO and the TVPRA differently” and declining to apply the same standard in the TVPRA
context). Music City Fencing does not argue that an entity cannot be a “person” subject to liability
under the TVPRA, and many courts have found that entities qualify as such persons. See, e.g., Doe
v. JRD P’ship, No. 3:23-cv-00928, 2025 WL 2637668, at *4 n.6 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 12, 2025)
(Richardson, J.) (finding that “legal entities . . . can be liable [as] ‘persons” under Section 1595(a)”
(citing M.A. v. Wyndham Hotels & Resorts, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 3d 959, 964 (S.D. Ohio 2019))).
Moreover, it is well established that a corporation’s existence, even that of a closely held
corporation, “is separate and distinct from that of its owner.” Farmers & Merchants State Bank v.
Direct Scaffold Servs. Co., 170 F. Supp. 3d 1079, 1084 (M.D. Tenn. 2016) (Sharp, J.) (citing Foster
Wheeler Energy Corp. v. Metro. Knox Solid Waste Auth., Inc., 970 F.2d 199, 202 (6th Cir. 1992)
(construing Tennessee law)); see also Flynn v. Greg Anthony Constr. Co., 95 F. App’x 726, 733
(6th Cir. 2003) (“Generally, a corporation is considered an entity separate and distinct from its
owners or shareholders.”). “A corporation may not selectively disregard the corporate veil that
separates its legal identity from that of its owner.” Farmers & Merchants, 170 F. Supp. 3d at 1084;
see also Schenley Distillers Corp. v. United States, 326 U.S. 432, 437 (1946) (“One who has
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created a corporate arrangement, chosen as a means of carrying out his business purposes, does
not have the choice of disregarding the corporate entity in order to avoid [its] obligations.”).9
In other words, while it is true that one individual acting alone is not a “venture,” the
plaintiffs’ beneficiary theory of liability against Music City Fencing is based on the fact that
Piraino and Music City Fencing, together, operated a venture—a proposition that Music City
Fencing actually does not dispute. Further, the court is not persuaded by Judge Crenshaw’s
decision in Powell v. Western Express, Inc., which imported the definition of a “sex trafficking
venture” applied by the Sixth Circuit in United States v. Afyare, 632 F. App’x 272 (6th Cir. 2016),
an unreported criminal case, into a civil case under § 1595(a). In Powell, the court reasoned that,
“[b]ecause § 1595 contains no scienter requirement for ‘venture,’ one is left to assume that
plaintiffs must simply prove the existence of a venture, which the Sixth Circuit defines as two or
more people who engage in sex trafficking together.” Powell, 2025 WL 2306949, at *5 (citing
Afyare, 632 F. App’x at 285). The court held that, because the plaintiff’s supervisor alone was
alleged to have engaged in sex trafficking, the plaintiff failed to plead the existence of a sex
trafficking “venture.” See id. (“No one else agreed to engage in sex-trafficking. Mr. Lynch—acting
alone and motivated by his personal sexual desires—is not a venture within the meaning of §§
1591(a)(2) and 1595(a).”).
9 Generally, courts disregard the corporate form—pierce the “corporate veil”—only “in the
interest of public convenience, fairness and equity.” Flynn, 95 F. App’x at 733. Thus, “when a
corporation exists solely for the purpose of serving as an alter ego for its owners, ‘the courts will
not permit themselves to be blinded or deceived by mere forms or law but, regardless of fictions,
will deal with the substance of the transaction involved as if the corporate agency did not exist and
as the justice of the case may require.’” Id. at 733–34 (quoting Quinn v. Butz, 510 F.2d 743, 758
(D.C. Cir. 1975)). In this situation, individuals may become liable for acts otherwise attributable
to a corporation. But veil-piercing is not raised as an issue here.
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In reaching that holding, Judge Crenshaw recognized that his view was “at odds” with that
of other courts—including the undersigned—that have held that a “‘venture’ can be any
association of people and that only one member of that association must engage in a sex trafficking
act.” Id. (collecting cases). He nonetheless found that these other decisions conflicted with the
Sixth Circuit’s decision in Afyare and that there was no good reason to apply different definitions
in the civil context as opposed to the criminal context. Id.
Judge Crenshaw may well be correct that the Sixth Circuit will ultimately apply its holding
in Afyare to a case arising under the TVPRA. This court, however, remains persuaded by those
opinions, discussed above, finding that the civil context imposes a different and less demanding
standard and that there are good reasons for distinguishing between participation in a “sex-
trafficking venture,” for purposes of criminal liability, and participation in a “venture” that
happened to engage in sex trafficking, for purposes of civil liability. As this court already stated
in addressing the virtually identical argument raised in support of Music City Fencing’s Motion to
Dismiss,
Afyare was a criminal case, and the court in that case defined the term “venture”
for purposes of § 1591(a)(2). Afyare, 632 F. App’x at 286. Criminal liability
requires knowing participation in a sex-trafficking venture. See id. (“We . . . find
that § 1591(a)(2) targets those who participate in sex trafficking.”). Civil liability
under § 1595(a) requires simply knowingly benefiting from participation in any
“venture”—not necessarily a sex-trafficking venture—that the defendant “knew or
should have known” has engaged in an act in violation of the TVPA.
Doe, 688 F. Supp. 3d at 654 (M.D. Tenn. 2023) (citing A.B. v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 455 F. Supp. 3d
171, 188 (E.D. Pa. 2020)); accord Doe #1, 21 F.4th at 724 (declining to incorporate into § 1595
the definition of “participation in a venture” in § 1591); G.G., 76 F.4th at 554 (declining to “import
Section 1591’s definition [of ‘venture’] into Section 1595”).
Music City Fencing’s invocation of this court’s more recent decision in Ramsbottom v.
Ashton is also unavailing. In that case, the claims against all entity defendants had been dismissed
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at the motion to dismiss stage, for various reasons. The sole remaining defendant, an individual,
moved to dismiss the “beneficiary” liability claims against him under § 1595(a) on the basis that
the plaintiffs failed to prove the existence of a venture. In addressing that argument, the court first
recognized that “sections 1591 and 1595 differ from one another in that . . . § 1591 is relegated to
sex-trafficking ventures while § 1595 refers to any kind of venture.” Ramsbottom, 2024 WL
4993391, at *16. The court nonetheless held that, “[b]ecause the plaintiffs have not presented any
facts [showing] that any others knew about or were involved in or facilitated [the defendant’s]
alleged sex trafficking of them, they have not alleged the existence of a ‘venture’ that engaged in
sex trafficking.” Id. That holding does not apply here. Obviously, Music City Fencing remains a
defendant, and, as set forth above, the evidence establishes that it was involved in a business
venture with Piraino. Further, because “knowledge of a corporate officer or agent acting within
the scope of his authority is attributable to the corporation,” Frank v. Dana Corp., 646 F.3d 954,
963 (6th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted), Piraino’s knowledge of his own alleged involvement in
“forced labor” is attributable to Music City Fencing as a matter of law.
In sum, Music City Fencing’s only argument in support of dismissal of the beneficiary
liability forced labor claim against it is that the SAC fails to allege the existence of a venture.10
The court, having already rejected that argument once, rejects it again. The motion for partial
summary judgment for Music City Fencing on Count 7 of the SAC will be denied.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, Music City Fencing’s motion for partial summary
judgment will be granted in part and denied in part. Music City Fencing is entitled to summary
10 Again, the court expresses no opinion as to whether the plaintiffs will be able to prove
that Piraino engaged in forced labor as defined by § 1589(a).
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judgment on Count 6 of the SAC, based on the court’s finding that the plaintiffs have failed to
establish that Piraino engaged in a commercial sex act with Jane Doe, as that term is defined in
§ 1591. That count will be dismissed as to Music City Fencing. Summary judgment will be denied
as to Count 7, as there is at least a question of fact as to whether Music City Fencing and Piraino
were engaged in a venture, for purposes of § 1595(a).
An appropriate Order is filed herewith.
ALETA A. TRAUGER
United States District Judge
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