Garrett v. Social Security Administration

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION
KATRINA MARIE GARRETT,
Plaintiff,
v.
SOCIAL SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION,
Defendant.
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NO. 3:22-cv-00356
JUDGE RICHARDSON
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Pending before the Court1 is the March 8, 2023 report and recommendation (Doc. No. 31,
“R&R”) of the Magistrate Judge, which recommends that the Court grant in part the “Notice of
Motion for Attorney’s Fees Pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412” (Doc.
No. 26, “Motion”) filed by Plaintiff, Katrina Marie Garrett (“Plaintiff”).2 Defendant, Social
Security Administration (“Defendant”), filed Objections (Doc. No. 32, “Objections”)3 to the R&R.
For the reasons stated herein, the Court adopts the R&R in full.
Below, the Court first reviews the relevant procedural and factual background. The Court
next provides an examination of the substance of the R&R, then reviews the legal standard for a
district court judge’s review of the report and recommendation of a magistrate judge. The Court
1 Herein, “the Court” refers to the undersigned District Judge, as opposed to the Magistrate Judge who
authored the R&R.
2 The Motion was referred to the Magistrate Judge on February 10, 2023, for a report and recommendation.
(Doc. No. 29).
3 Herein, a given use of the term “Objections” may refer to the document (Doc. No. 32) itself, to the
purported objections contained therein (i.e., the “objections” to the R&R contained within the
“Objections”), or both.
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then analyzes Defendant’s Objections to the R&R and reviews (as necessary) any portions of the
Magistrate Judge’s R&R to which Defendant made a proper objection.
BACKGROUND
Absent any objection to the background section (regarding the procedural history and
underlying circumstances of this case as well as the circumstances underlying the instant Motion)
set forth by the Magistrate Judge in the R&R, the Court adopts the background section in its
entirety and repeats it below:
Plaintiff, Katrina Marie Garrett, filed this action pursuant to 42 U. S. C. § 405(g) to
obtain judicial review of the final decision of the Social Security Administration
denying her application for disability insurance benefits on May 17, 2022. Docket
No. 1. The Defendant filed its Answer and the Social Security Administrative
[R]ecord [(“Administrative Record”)] on September 12, 2022. Docket Nos. 12, 13.
The Court entered a scheduling order for briefing on the Complaint [on] September
13, 2022. Docket No. 14. The Plaintiff filed her Motion for Judgment on the record
and supporting documents on October 7, 2022. Docket No. 18. On November 2,
2022, Social Security filed an unopposed motion to remand. Docket No. 23. On
November 7, 2022, the Court entered an order remanding this matter back to the
Commission for further action. Docket No. 25. Thereafter the motion for fees was
filed on February 1, 2023. Docket No. 26. Plaintiff seeks an award of fees under
the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), in the total amount of $12,669.44.
Docket No. 26-1.
(Doc. No. 31 at 1-2). Defendant filed a “Partial Objection to Plaintiff’s Application for Attorney
Fees Pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act” (Doc. No. 28, “Response”) in response to
Plaintiff’s Motion, and Plaintiff filed a “Reply to Defendant’s Partial Objection” (Doc. No. 30,
“Reply”) in further support of Plaintiff’s Motion.
THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S R&R
The R&R recommends that Plaintiff’s Motion be granted in part. (Doc. No. 31 at 1).
Specifically, and as discussed more fully below, the R&R recommends that the Court grant
Plaintiff’s Motion, but that “Plaintiff’s request should be reduced by $280.00[,] resulting in an
award amount [of] $12,389.44.” (Doc. No. 31 at 5).
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The R&R recommends this award amount based on two calculations. First, the R&R notes
that “Plaintiff agreed to reduce 2.8 hours of paralegal time of preparation of the record” (out of 7.8
total hours of paralegal time) in Plaintiff’s Reply, and that the R&R “accept[ed] this reduction to
the fee request and modif[ied] it accordingly” in calculating the total award amount it recommends.
(Doc. No. 31 at 3). Therefore, the R&R recommends that Plaintiff be awarded $500.00 for 5 hours
of paralegal time.4 (See Doc. No. 31 at 3, 5).
Second, the R&R concludes that “Plaintiff’s request for 51.1 hours of attorney work at the
uncontested 	rated 	of 	$232.67 	per 	hour 	is 	reasonable,” 	“[b]ased 	upon 	the 	size 	of 	the
[Administrative] [R]ecord in this case, the procedural history of the case[,] and counsel’s limited
involvement in the case prior to required briefing in this matter.” (Doc. No. 31 at 4). Accordingly,
the R&R rejects Defendant’s assertion that “the requested hours [of attorney work]” should be
reduced because they are (according to Defendant) “excessively outside what . . . courts have
typically found the average number of hours expend[ed] on Social Security cases to be,” and
therefore recommends that Plaintiff be awarded the full $11,889.44 for attorney time.5 (Doc. No.
31 at 4-5). However, the R&R does not recommend that the Court award Plaintiff the additional
fees “associated with preparing and filing the reply brief in this case” that Plaintiff requests in its
Reply. (Doc. No. 31 at 4-5 (citing Doc. No. 30)).
4 As the R&R notes, “Defendant does not contest the requested hourly rate[]” of $100 per hour of paralegal
time. (Doc. No. 31 at 2 (citing Doc. No. 28)).
5 Plaintiff requests the rate of $232.67 per hour of attorney time to account for inflation and “an increase in
the cost of living” in the time since March 1996, (Doc. No. 26-1 at 1-2), when the EAJA was amended to
provide that “attorney fees shall not be awarded in excess of $125 per hour unless the court determines that
an increase in the cost of living . . . justifies a higher fee.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A)(ii). As the R&R notes,
“Defendant does not contest th[is] requested hourly rate[.]” (Doc. No. 31 at 2 (citing Doc. No. 28)).
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LEGAL STANDARD FOR THE REVIEW OF REPORTS & RECOMMENDATIONS
Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2)(D) provides that the district court “may refer a motion for
attorney’s fees to a magistrate judge under Rule 72(b) as if it were a dispositive pretrial matter.”
When a magistrate judge issues a report and recommendation regarding a dispositive pretrial
matter, the district court judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report
or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which a proper objection is made. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 72(b)(3); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).6 The district judge may accept, reject, or modify the
recommended disposition, review further evidence, or return the matter to the magistrate judge
with instructions. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
6 Significantly, and perhaps surprisingly, the statute does not actually direct the district judge to expressly
rule on the objections themselves (i.e., expressly sustain or reject the objector’s specific criticism(s) of what
the magistrate judge did). Instead of requiring the district judge to determine the validity of the objections
to what the magistrate judge did, the statute requires the district judge to make a determination—de novo,
which inherently means ultimately without reference to whether what the magistrate judge did was
objectionable—as to the portion(s) of the report and recommendation to which objection was made.
Moreover, since the review of the objected-to portions of the report and recommendation is de novo, any
critiquing of what the magistrate judge did ultimately would be dicta (albeit relevant and probative dicta to
the extent that such critiquing explains the analysis underlying the district judge’s determination of the
objected-to portions of the R&R). Additionally, district judges in this Circuit not infrequently either decline
to rule on (or, to the same effect, deny as moot) particular objections on the specific ground that so doing
is unnecessary to rule on the objected-to portion of the report and recommendation. E.g., Collins v. Bright,
No. 2:13-CV-02987-JPM-CGC, 2021 WL 5205622, at *3 (W.D. Tenn. Nov. 9, 2021) (“[T]his objection
does not affect or alter the conclusions of the Magistrate Judge and is overruled as moot.”); Lashuay v.
Fornwalt, No. 1:15-CV-1109, 2017 WL 4160947, at *1 (W.D. Mich. Sept. 20, 2017) (“This Court need not
resolve all of the objections,” because only some of them needed to be addressed in order to resolve the
motion that was the subject of the report and recommendation); Weatherspoon v. Williams, No. 2:14-CV-
108, 2016 WL 6070994, at *1 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 17, 2016) (“Plaintiff’s objections are irrelevant and will
be denied.”); Bowers v. Burnett, No. 1:08-CV-469, 2011 WL 1047343, at *2 n.1 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 18,
2011) (noting that “[t]he Court need not resolve” an objection to the extent that the objector’s position on
the R&R has other fatal deficiencies); Powell v. Alcoa High Sch., No. 3:10-CV-212, 2010 WL 2598260, at
*2 (E.D. Tenn. June 24, 2010) (“[B]ecause this objection is irrelevant to [the magistrate judge’s]
recommendations, it is hereby overruled.”); Cline v. Kelly, No. 09CV859, 2010 WL 1006529, at *1 n.1
(N.D. Ohio Mar. 16, 2010) (“The Court acknowledges [the petitioner’s] objection, but need not resolve it
because that specific fact is not relevant to the resolution of any of the grounds for relief set forth in [the]
Petition” that the magistrate judge had recommended be denied). For these reasons, when conducting the
required de novo review herein, the Court does not dwell much specifically on what the Magistrate Judge
did or did not do and whether what the Magistrate Judge did or did not do was appropriate.
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A district judge is not required to review, under a de novo or any other standard, those
aspects of a report and recommendation to which no proper objection is made. Ashraf v. Adventist
Health Sys./Sunbelt, Inc., 322 F. Supp. 3d 879, 881 (W.D. Tenn. 2018); Benson v. Walden Sec.,
No. 3:18-CV-0010, 2018 WL 6322332, at *3 (M.D. Tenn. Dec. 4, 2018) (citing Thomas v. Arn,
474 U.S. 140, 150 (1985)).
ANALYSIS OF DEFENDANT’S OBJECTIONS
As noted above, Defendant has filed Objections (Doc. No. 32) to the R&R, whereby
Defendant objects (in written, specific, and otherwise proper fashion) to the portions of the R&R
that recommend an “award [of] $11,889.44 in attorney’s fees under the EAJA, compensating all
51.1 hours of attorney work.” (Doc. No. 32 at 1-2). In particular, Defendant objects to the portions
of the R&R that find “that the 32.4 hours spent by Plaintiff’s counsel reviewing the case, taking
notes, organizing facts, and drafting the facts and procedural section were [] reasonable.”7 (Doc.
No. 32 at 2). Defendant argues (as it did in its Response to Plaintiff’s Motion) that, instead, a total
of “around 30 attorney hours, plus 5 paralegal hours, are reasonable in this case,” and asks the
Court to reject the R&R and “reduce the requested attorney fees to $7,480.10.” (Doc. No. 32 at 9,
11). Having conducted a de novo review of the portions of the R&R to which Defendant objects,
the Court finds that Plaintiff’s requested attorney hours are reasonable. Accordingly, the Court
adopts and approves the R&R in its entirety.
7 In Defendant’s Objections, Defendant at times refers to Plaintiff’s “brief” or “opening brief,” (Doc. No.
32 at 3), which the Court understands to mean Plaintiff’s “Memorandum of Law in Support of a Motion for
Judgment on the Administrative Record” (Doc. No. 19). Defendant likewise refers to “the facts,” the
“procedural section,” and the “statement of facts” contained within that “brief,” (Doc. No. 32 at 2), which
the Court understands to correspond to the material on pages 1-10 of that “brief.” The R&R incorporates
this terminology, (Doc. No. 31 at 3), so for the sake of consistency, the Court herein preserves the use of
those terms in quoted material.
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In Plaintiff’s Motion, Plaintiff seeks an award of $11,889.44 for 51.1 attorney hours. (Doc.
No. 26-1 at 2). Attached to Plaintiff’s Motion are several exhibits that Plaintiff offers to support
this request, including—in relevant part—an exhibit that lists “the time spent by all who worked
on this case in chronological sequence” and an exhibit that “lists the attorneys and their time.”
(Doc. No. 26-1 at 2; Doc. No. 26-3; Doc No. 26-4). As Defendant highlights in its Response to
Plaintiff’s Motion, these exhibits show that “[t]he attorney who drafted the brief in this
case . . . spent 46.7 hours over the course of six days drafting a brief,” which included “spen[ding]
32.4 hours billed as reviewing the [Administrative Record], taking notes, organizing facts, and
finishing the same.”8 (Doc. No. 28 at 3 (citing Doc. No. 26-3 at 3)). Specifically, Plaintiff’s
“[c]ounsel billed 9.3 hours on 9/29/22, 8.7 hours on 9/30/22, and 8.3 hours on 10/03/22, on ‘review
of [Administrative Record], take notes and organize facts,’” as well as “6.1 hours on 10/4/22 to
‘[f]inish review of [Administrative Record], drafting procedural section and facts.’” (Doc. No. 32
at 3 (quoting Doc. No. 26-3 at 3); see also Doc. No. 26-4 at 2).
According to Defendant, these time entries, which reflect Plaintiff’s counsel “taking the
equivalent of three full eight-hour workdays spent merely reviewing the [Administrative]
[R]ecord,” were not “reasonably expended.” (Doc. No. 28 at 2-3). Although Defendant describes
the Administrative Record as “admittedly lengthy” and notes that it “is about 2[,]800 pages, which
is fairly long,” Defendant argues that “the hours expended simply for reviewing the file are out of
line with what would normally be expected” in analogous cases. (Doc. No. 28 at 3). In support of
this argument, Defendant notes that “[b]ecause the EAJA permits an award of only ‘reasonable’
attorney hours, courts may ‘prune’ unnecessary hours accordingly,” (Doc. No. 28 at 2 (quoting
8 As Defendant notes in its Objections, “[t]he attorney who is listed on the bill” attached to Plaintiff’s
Motion “is not Plaintiff’s counsel of record, but presumably another attorney with the firm” representing
Plaintiff, Olinsky Law Group. (Doc. No. 32 at 3 n.2). Consistent with the parties’ briefing and the R&R,
the Court herein refers to the attorneys at Olinsky Law Group as “Plaintiff’s counsel.”
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Kaeck v. Kijakazi, No. 3:22-CV-00180, 2022 WL 4350261, at *4 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 19, 2022))),
and further notes that “[i]t is Plaintiff’s burden to prove the reasonableness of the time spent[.]”
(Doc. No. 28 at 4 (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983))).
Defendant is correct that (i) the Court may reduce fees for unreasonable time, including in
instances where the time spent is excessive, redundant, or inadequately documented, Hensley, 461
U.S. at 433-34, and (ii) Plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the fees requested under the EAJA
are, in fact, reasonable. Id. at 437. The Court, however, does not accept Defendant’s assertion that
Plaintiff has failed to meet its burden here.
As the undersigned has discussed previously, “[i]n determining whether the number of
hours expended on a case is reasonable, ‘the standard is whether a reasonable attorney would have
believed the work to be reasonably expended in pursuit of success at the point in time when the
work was performed.’” Reed v. Young Ho Kim, No. 3:18-CV-00819, 2020 WL 4530936, at *3
(M.D. Tenn. Aug. 6, 2020) (Richardson, J.) (quoting Wooldridge v. Marlene Industries Corp., 898
F.2d 1169, 1177 (6th Cir. 1990)), aff’d sub nom. Reed v. Kim, No. 20-6013, 2021 WL 4047030
(6th Cir. July 2, 2021). “The documentation offered in support of the hours charged must be of
sufficient detail to enable a court to determine with a high degree of certainty that such hours were
actually and reasonably expended in the prosecution of such litigation.” Id. (quoting Bench
Billboard Co. v. City of Toledo, 759 F. Supp. 2d 905, 913 (N.D. Ohio 2010), aff’d in part, rev’d
in part, 499 F. App’x 538 (6th Cir. 2012)). Here, the Court finds that Plaintiff has met this burden
for three reasons.
First, “[t]he EAJA does not limit the amount of attorney’s hours and only requires the
attorney to submit all hours in an itemized statement.” Kaeck, 2022 WL 4350261, at *4 (quoting
Brusch v. Colvin, No. 15-13972, 2017 WL 1279228, at *2 (E.D. Mich. April 6, 2017)). The Court
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finds—and Defendant does not appear to contest—that Plaintiff’s submission of five pages of
itemized, detailed time entries for attorney hours (see Doc. Nos. 26-3, 26-4) fulfills this
requirement. Cf. Kaeck, 2022 WL 4350261, at *4 (“Regarding the Commissioner’s contention that
the 	fee 	billing 	entries 	are 	insufficiently 	specific 	to 	allow 	her 	to 	address 	their
reasonableness, . . . [t]he court finds the records to be sufficiently itemized. It is clear that counsel
reviewed the Administrative Record while drafting the Statement of the Case on July 9 and 10[.]”).
Second, upon review of Plaintiff’s billing statements and the case record, the Court finds
that Plaintiff (that is, Plaintiff’s counsel) has complied with the Supreme Court’s instruction to
“make a good faith effort to exclude from a fee request hours that are excessive, redundant, or
otherwise unnecessary, just as a lawyer in private practice ethically is obligated to exclude such
hours from his fee submission.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434. For example, Plaintiff does not request
a fee award for time spent working on filings such as status reports and motions for leave to file
excess pages, (see Doc. No. 26-4 at 2-3 (listing “0” under the “[h]ours” column for time entries
related to those filings)), which the Court is inclined to treat as a good-faith effort on the part of
Plaintiff’s counsel to ensure that “[h]ours that are not properly billed to one’s client also are
not . . . billed to one’s adversary pursuant to statutory authority.”9 Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434
(internal quotation omitted).
Third, 	the 	Court 	finds 	that 	the 	“32.4 	hours 	[billed] 	for 	reviewing 	the 	certified
[A]dministrative [R]ecord, taking notes, organizing facts, and drafting the procedural section and
facts between September 29, 2022 and October 4, 2022,” (Doc. No. 32 at 3), i.e., the billing entries
on which “Defendant’s primary disagreement with the reasonableness of time billed is based,”
9 To be clear, the Court does not mean to suggest that it is categorically improper for an attorney to bill a
client for time spent drafting a status report or motion for leave to file excess pages. Rather, the Court uses
these examples from Plaintiff’s Motion to illustrate what the Court views as good-faith discretion in billing
on the part of Plaintiff’s counsel.
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(Doc. No. 32 at 3; see also Doc. No. 28 at 3), represent hours that “a reasonable attorney would
have believed . . . to be reasonably expended in pursuit of success at the point in time when the
work was performed.” Reed, 2020 WL 4530936, at *3 (internal quotation omitted). Indeed, even
though “the fee request in this case exceeds the typical range of hours for work on a Social Security
case as documented by the Defendant,” (Doc. No. 31 at 4), there are various factors that
collectively suggest that Plaintiff’s counsel reasonably believed that the time spent reviewing the
Administrative Record was reasonably necessary to pursue Plaintiff’s case, including: the size of
the Administrative Record (2,836 pages in total); Plaintiff’s assertion that “counsel here did not
have any familiarity with the case,” (Doc. No. 30 at 2), prior to drafting the “required briefing in
this matter,”10 (Doc. No. 31 at 4); and the fact that within two days of Plaintiff’s counsel finishing
the review of the Administrative Record, Plaintiff filed an (unopposed) motion (Doc. No. 16)
requesting “an additional five pages due to the length of the [A]dministrative [R]ecord and the
nature of the issues presented.” (Doc. No. 16 at 1).11 Cf. Imwalle v. Reliance Med. Prods., Inc.,
10 In Defendant’s Objections, Defendant asserts that Plaintiff’s requested attorney hours for reviewing the
Administrative Record are unreasonable in part because “Plaintiff’s counsel’s firm was familiar with a
significant portion of the record as the firm represented Plaintiff before the Appeals Council and in a prior
federal court case.” (Doc. No. 32 at 2, 4). Although Defendant does not raise this point explicitly in its
Response to Plaintiff’s Motion, Plaintiff addresses this topic in its Reply, explaining that “[w]hile Olinsky
Law Group was involved in this case at the Appeals Council after the first [Administrative Law Judge’s
(‘ALJ’)] decision was issued, and did represent [Plaintiff] in federal court prior to the remand in this case,
the firm was not involved in administrative level proceedings following the first remand.” (Doc. No. 30 at
1). Plaintiff further explains that “[t]he record was never reviewed in the first federal court case, which was
remanded without briefing” and argues that “unlike the attorney in Kaeck” (where the court reduced
attorney hours because, among other reasons, “counsel should basically have been familiar with [the
administrative record],” 2022 WL 4350261, at *5), “[Plaintiff’s] counsel here did not have any familiarity
with the case.” (Doc. No. 30 at 1-2). Like the Magistrate Judge, the Court finds that this explanation
supports the finding that Plaintiff’s requested attorney hours are reasonable.
11 Defendant argues that “[t]o the extent Plaintiff’s counsel took notes on the entirety of the 2,800-page
certified [Administrative Record], this time was not reasonably expended and would not be reasonably
billed to a client, as it appears to have played little, if any, role in Plaintiff’s brief” because Plaintiff’s
“opening brief included only a paragraph-long ‘statement of facts’ that declined to provide any summary
of the medical evidence due to page limitations and the ‘nature of the arguments.’” (Doc. No. 32 at 3-4
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515 F.3d 531, 553 (6th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he party seeking fees has ‘the burden of providing for the
court’s perusal a particularized billing record.’ Once the prevailing party provides such a record,
however, ‘conclusory allegations that the award was excessive and that . . . counsel employed poor
billing judgment . . . do not suffice to establish that there was error . . . .’” (quoting Perotti v.
Seiter, 935 F.2d 761, 764 (6th Cir.1991))). The Court thus finds that Plaintiff has met its burden
of proving that the fees requested are reasonable, and the Court therefore approves and adopts the
R&R in full.12
(citing Doc. No. 19 at 3 n.1)). However, the Court notes that the “Statement of the Case” section of
Plaintiff’s brief is approximately ten (10) pages, (see Doc. No. 19 at 1-10), and that—contrary to
Defendant’s suggestion—the first footnote appended to Plaintiff’s brief states that “Plaintiff has
summarized only the medical opinion evidence here and will reference specific medical facts infra as
necessary.” (Doc. No. 19 at 3 n.1). In any event, “the standard is whether a reasonable attorney would have
believed the work to be reasonably expended in pursuit of success at the point in time when the work was
performed,” Reed, 2020 WL 4530936, at *3 (emphasis added) (internal quotation omitted), which the Court
finds is satisfied here for the reasons described above.
12 As a final observation, the Court notes “Defendant’s concern more broadly, in relation to the many other
similar cases that come before the courts of this district,” that the R&R’s recommendation (and the Court’s
decision to adopt and approve the R&R) could “lead to a rapid escalation in fees paid by the taxpayers in
similar Social Security cases” by adopting what Defendant describes as “Plaintiff’s logic [that] any case of
comparable length would also contain a de facto reasonable length of record review time to which [c]ounsel
is entitled.” (Doc. No. 32 at 6). However, the Court does not construe Plaintiff’s filings or the R&R as
advocating for such a “de facto” rule, (see Doc. No. 30 at 1-2 (describing the procedural history of the case
in relation to Plaintiff’s counsel’s “involve[ment]” and “familiarity”); Doc. No. 31 at 4 (noting “the
procedural history of the case and counsel’s limited involvement in the case prior to [the] required briefing
in this matter”)), nor would the Court accept such a “de facto” rule in light of the case-specific inquiry that
governs attorney’s fees awards in the Sixth Circuit. See Glass v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 822 F.2d
19, 20 (6th Cir. 1987) (“The relevant question, however, is not what is required in most social security
cases, but what did this case require.”). Moreover, the Court also recognizes that the converse of
Defendant’s concern may well be true—i.e., that Defendant’s arguments could be construed as seeking a
hard cut-off at “about 30 hours,” (Doc. No. 32 at 11), beyond which a court ought not to award attorney’s
fees, regardless of whether counsel demonstrates that the additional hours were “reasonably expended in
the prosecution” of Plaintiff’s case. Reed, 2020 WL 4530936, at *3. The Court would likewise reject such
an argument (if that were in fact the argument that Defendant is making), because—as stated above—“[t]he
relevant question [] is not what is required in most social security cases, but what did this case require.”
Glass, 822 F.2d at 20.
The Court certainly appreciates Defendant’s concerns about (and efforts to preserve) taxpayer
funds and does not begrudge Defendant its arguments made in this case. But ultimately the Court rejects
those arguments.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons described herein, the R&R (Doc. No. 31) is adopted and approved in its
entirety. Accordingly, the Motion (Doc. No. 26) is GRANTED IN PART, and Plaintiff is awarded
attorney’s fees in the amount of $12,389.44, payable to Plaintiff and subject to offset to satisfy any
preexisting debt Plaintiff owes to the United States.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
____________________________________
ELI RICHARDSON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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