Parker v. Commissioner of Social Security, Andrew Saul

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NORTHEASTERN DIVISION
AMANDA DAWN PARKER,
Plaintiff,
v.
FRANK BISIGNANO1, Commissioner of
Social Security
Defendant.
Case No. 2:21-cv-00021
Judge Waverly D. Crenshaw, Jr.
Magistrate Judge Luke A. Evans
To: 	The Honorable Waverly D. Crenshaw, Jr., District Judge
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Currently before the Court is Plaintiff Amanda Parker’s initial and amended motions for
attorney’s fees under § 206(b)(1) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)—offset by
previously awarded fees granted under the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C.
§ 2412(d)—totaling 	$31,040.00. 	(Doc. 	Nos. 30, 	32.) 	In 	his 	response, 	the 	Defendant,
Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“SSA”), filed responses to each motion for
attorney’s fees explaining that he “neither supports nor opposes counsel’s request for attorney’s
fees in the amount of $31,040.00, under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b).” (Doc. Nos. 31, 33.) Briefing is
complete and the motions are ripe for consideration.
1 	Frank Bisignano was sworn in as Commissioner of Social Security on May 7, 2025. Press
Release, Soc. Sec. Nat’l Press Off., Fin. Servs. Indus. Leader Frank Bisignano to be the 18th
Comm’r of Soc. Sec. (May 7, 2025), https://www.ssa.gov/news/en/press/releases/2025-05-
07.html [https://perma.cc/VSC6-YCLM] (last visited Sep. 24, 2025). Under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 25(d), Bisignano is automatically substituted as the defendant in this action. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 25(d).
Case 2:21-cv-00021 Document 35 Filed 03/13/26 Page 1 of 5 PageID #: <pageID>

2
For the reasons that follow, the Magistrate Judge will recommend that Plaintiff’s amended
motion for attorney’s fees (Doc. No. 32) be Granted and that her initial motion for attorney’s fees
(Doc. No. 30) be Denied as Moot.
I. 	Relevant Background
On May 24, 2021, Plaintiff initiated an action in this district for review of Defendant’s
decision denying Plaintiff’s application for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) and Disability
Insurance Benefits (“DIB”). (Doc. No. 1.) On September 13, 2021, Plaintiff moved for judgment
on the administrative record and asked this Court to reverse the Defendant’s final decision and
remand the matter to the SSA for further proceedings. (Doc. Nos. 19, 20.) In response, Defendant
filed a motion to remand the case to the SSA for further evaluation (Doc. No. 22.) Plaintiff did not
oppose the motion and, on April 22, 2022, the Court subsequently issued an order reversing
Defendant’s decision, remanding the matter to SSA, and dismissing Plaintiff’s action. (Doc.
No. 25.)
On July 15, 2022, Plaintiff filed an unopposed motion for $7,200.00 in attorney’s fees
under the EAJA as the prevailing party. (Doc. No. 27.) Defendant did not object and joined in
asking the Court to award Plaintiff the entire requested amount of $7,200.00. (Doc. No. 28.) The
Court granted the unopposed motion on August 9, 2022. (Doc. No. 29.)
On 	remand, 	the SSA 	Appeals 	Council 	further 	remanded 	Plaintiff’s 	claims 	to 	an
administrative law judge (“ALJ”) for further proceedings, after which Plaintiff ultimately
prevailed. (Doc. No. 30.) Ultimately, SSA calculated that Plaintiff was entitled to $132,390.00 in
total past due benefits (Doc. No. 32-1) and that Plaintiff’s dependent was entitled past due benefits
totaling $64,212.25 (Doc. No. 32-2). Consistent with the contingent fee representation agreement
between Plaintiff and counsel, counsel seeks to recover attorney’s fees totaling $31,040.00. (Doc.
No. 32.)
Case 2:21-cv-00021 Document 35 Filed 03/13/26 Page 2 of 5 PageID #: <pageID>

3
II. 	Legal Standard
The EAJA directs that a court “shall award to a prevailing party other than the United States
fees and other expenses” in civil actions including “proceedings for judicial review of agency
action, brought by or against the United States . . . unless the court finds that the position of the
United States was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust.” 28
U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). The court has “broad discretion” to determine whether fees should be
awarded under the statute. Miller v. Berryhill, 393 F. Supp. 3d 738, 742 (M.D. Tenn. 2019) (citing
DeLong v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 748 F.3d 723, 725 (6th Cir. 2014).
“Whenever a court renders a judgment favorable to a claimant [in an action before the
Commissioner of Social Security] . . . who was represented before the court by an attorney, the
court may determine and allow as part of its judgment a reasonable fee for such representation,
not in excess of 25% of the total of the past-due benefits to which the claimant is entitled by
reason of such judgment[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A). This statutory fee cap represents
Congress’s balancing of the competing goals of protecting financially vulnerable benefits
claimants from paying excessive attorney’s fees in disability benefits actions and encouraging
attorneys to provide effective representation to individuals pursuing such claims. Rodriquez v.
Bowen, 865 F.2d 739, 744 (6th Cir. 1989). The Supreme Court has concluded that the “reasonable
fee” provision may include contingency fee agreements and directs lower courts to “review [ ]
such arrangements as an independent check, to assure that they yield reasonable results in
particular cases.” Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 807 (2002). Counsel seeking the award
bears the burden of demonstrating the reasonableness of the amount requested. Id.
In the Sixth Circuit, there is a rebuttable presumption that fee agreements that comply with
§ 406(b)’s 25% cap are reasonable. Lasley v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 771 F.3d 308, 309 (6th Cir.
2014). That presumption is “subject, however, to a ‘floor’: ‘a hypothetical hourly rate that is less
Case 2:21-cv-00021 Document 35 Filed 03/13/26 Page 3 of 5 PageID #: <pageID>

4
than twice the standard rate is per se reasonable, and a hypothetical hourly rate that is equal to or
greater than twice the standard rate may well be reasonable.’” Kaye v. Saul, No. 3:16-CV-002878,
2020 WL 3964205, at *3 (M.D. Tenn. July 10, 2020) (quoting Lasley, 771 F.3d at 309). If a
requested rate exceeds the presumptive “floor,” the court must determine if the rate is nonetheless
reasonable by considering factors “such as the character of the representation, the results achieved,
the amount of time spent on the case, whether the attorney was responsible for any delay, and the
attorney’s normal hourly billing rate for noncontingent fee cases,” among others. Id. The Sixth
Circuit directs that deductions from a 25-percent award should “generally fall into two categories:
1) those occasioned by improper conduct or ineffectiveness of counsel; and 2) situations in which
counsel would otherwise enjoy a windfall because of either an inordinately large benefit award or
from minimal effort expended.” Rodriquez, 865 F.2d at 746.
III. 	Analysis
Here, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s request is presumed reasonable because it is based on
a contingency fee agreement and does not exceed 25%-cap ($31,040.00 in requested fees is
approximately 15.8% of total past due award of $196,602.25 for Plaintiff and her dependent).
Lasley, 771 F.3d at 309. Although this presumption is rebuttable, Defendant plainly states that he
“neither supports nor opposes [Plaintiff’s] counsel’s request for attorney’s fees in the amount of
$31,040.00[.]” (Doc. No. 33 at 1.)
Defendant does correctly note that, where attorney’s fees are awarded under EAJA and
§ 406(b) as seen here, “the attorney must refund the smaller fee awarded . . . .” (Id. at 2.) But, the
parties are in agreement that the $7,200.00 in fees awarded under EAJA should be refunded to
Plaintiff as the smaller of the two amounts. (Id.); (Doc. No. 32-3.)
Under the circumstances, the Court finds that the requested attorney’s fees are reasonable
and absent Defendant’s objection or any other reason to depart from the provisions set forth by
Case 2:21-cv-00021 Document 35 Filed 03/13/26 Page 4 of 5 PageID #: <pageID>

5
§ 406(b), the Court finds that Plaintiff’s amended motion for attorney’s fees should be granted. As
a result, Plaintiff’s initial motion predating the information regarding Plaintiff’s dependent’s past
due benefits (Doc. No. 30) should be denied as moot.
IV. 	Recommendation
For the foregoing reasons, the Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s amended
motion for attorney’s fees (Doc. No. 32) be GRANTED and that Plaintiff’s initial motion for
attorney’s fees (Doc. No. 30) be DENIED AS MOOT.
Any party has fourteen days after being served with this Report and Recommendation to
file specific written objections. Failure to file specific objections within fourteen days of receipt
of this Report and Recommendation can constitute a waiver of appeal of the matters decided.
Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 155 (1985); Cowherd v. Million, 380 F.3d 909, 912 (6th Cir. 2004).
A party who opposes any objections that are filed may file a response within fourteen days after
being served with the objections. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2).
Entered this 13th day of March, 2026.
____________________________________
LUKE A. EVANS
United States Magistrate Judge
Case 2:21-cv-00021 Document 35 Filed 03/13/26 Page 5 of 5 PageID #: <pageID>