Garcia v. Mastercorp Hospitality Services et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE
IDANIS GARCIA, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	No. 3:25-cv-31-KAC-JEM
)
MASTERCORP HOSPITALITY 	)
SERVICES, 	)
)
Defendant. 	)
ORDER AND REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This case is before the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and the Rules of this
Court on Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“Application”) [Doc. 9] and
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint [Doc. 14]. For the reasons more fully stated below, the Court
GRANTS Plaintiff’s Application [Doc. 9]. The Court will therefore allow Plaintiff to file her
Amended Complaint without the prepayment of costs. The Court, however, RECOMMENDS
that the District Judge dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint [Doc. 14].
I. 	DETERMINATION ABOUT THE FILING FEE
Plaintiff has filed an Application [Doc. 9] with the required detailing of her financial
condition. Section 1915 allows a litigant to commence a civil or criminal action in federal court
without paying the administrative costs of the lawsuit. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 27
(1992). The Court’s review of an application to proceed without paying the administrative costs
of the lawsuit is normally based solely on the affidavit of indigence. See Gibson v. R.G. Smith Co.,
915 F.2d 260, 262–63 (6th Cir. 1990) (observing that “the filing of a complaint is conditioned
solely upon a person’s demonstration of poverty in his affidavit and the question of frivolousness
is taken up thereafter”). To proceed without paying the administrative costs, the plaintiff must
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show by affidavit the inability to pay court fees and costs—it is a threshold requirement.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). One need not be absolutely destitute, however, to enjoy the benefit of
proceeding in the manner of a pauper, or in forma pauperis. Adkins v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours &
Co., Inc., 335 U.S. 331, 342 (1948). An affidavit to proceed without paying the administrative
costs is sufficient if it states that the plaintiff cannot, because of poverty, afford to pay for the costs
of litigation and still pay for the necessities of life. Id. at 339.
The Court finds the Application is sufficient to demonstrate that Plaintiff has some income
but many expenses. Considering Plaintiff’s Application, it appears to the Court that her economic
status is such that she cannot afford to pay for the costs of litigation and still pay for the necessities
of life. The Court will allow Plaintiff to proceed in the manner of a pauper. The Court DIRECTS
the Clerk to file the Complaint in this case without payment of costs or fees. The Clerk SHALL
NOT, however, issue process at this time.
II. 	RECOMMENDATION AFTER SCREENING THE COMPLAINT
Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PLRA”),1 the Court is required to screen
complaints. 28 U.S.C. § 1915. To accomplish this end, the Court must evaluate the litigant’s
indigence, 	but 	notwithstanding 	indigence, 	a 	court 	must 	dismiss 	a 	matter 	under
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) “if [it] determines that . . . the action . . . (i) is frivolous or malicious;
(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a
defendant who is immune from such relief.” To survive an initial review, a complaint “must
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
1 	Despite the reference to prisoners, 28 U.S.C. § 1915 requires the Court to screen complaints
filed by non-prisoners seeking in forma pauperis status. McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F. 3d 601,
608 (6th Cir. 1997) (“Unlike prisoner cases, complaints by non-prisoners are not subject to
screening process required by § 1915A. However, the district court must still screen the complaint
under § 1915(e)(2).”), overruled on other grounds, Jones v. Brock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007).
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face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v Twombly,
550 U.S.544, 570 (2007)).
Specifically, under Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a pleading must
provide:
(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s
jurisdiction . . . ;
(2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleading
is entitled to relief; and
(3) a demand for the relief sought, which may include relief in the
alternative or different types of relief.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1)–(3). Otherwise, the complaint is subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6)
for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Courts also
have a continuing duty to ensure that jurisdiction exists to hear the case. Answers in Genesis, Inc.
v. Creation Ministries Int’l, Ltd., 556 F.3d 459, 465 (6th Cir. 2009) (“[F]ederal courts have a duty
to consider their subject matter jurisdiction in regard to every case and may raise the issue sua
sponte.” (citations omitted)). Courts liberally construe pro se pleadings filed in civil rights cases
and hold them to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Haines v.
Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).
Plaintiff 	names 	MasterCorp 	Hospitality 	Services 	(“Defendant 	MasterCorp”) 	as 	a
Defendant [Doc. 14 p. 1]. “During the summer of 2024, [Defendant] Mastercorp conducted a . . .
Quality Assurance[] inspection at Club Wyndham Site 056” [Id. at 2]. Plaintiff claims that she was
“unfairly blamed for deficiencies found in a unit that had already been cleaned” [Id.]. According
to Plaintiff, “This unjustified accusation marked the beginning of increased scrutiny, hostility, and
a pattern of retaliatory behavior directed toward [her]” [Id.].
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Plaintiff states that on August 16, 2024, she met with Luis Delgado (“Mr. Delgado”), a
human resources representative, to report unfair workload increases and retaliation [Id.]. “Instead
of addressing Plaintiff’s concerns, [Mr.] Delgado gave Plaintiff 24 hours to decide whether she
would accept a forced reassignment to the laundry department or remain for ‘30 days left’” [Id.].
According to Plaintiff, “[Mr.] Delgado stated explicitly that if Plaintiff did not accept the
relocation, her pay would be lowered and she would ‘lose her job’” [Id.]. She alleges that she
attempted to contact Mysti, another human resources representative, “but was informed that Mysti
was no longer with [Defendant] MasterCorp” [Id.]. Plaintiff also notified a “trusted manager”
about the “ultimatum and expressed that the decision was unfair” [Id.].
“Between August and September 2024,” Plaintiff claims that “the same pattern of hostility,
pressure, and discriminatory oversight continued” [Id.]. She asserts that she “was repeatedly
subjected to excessive monitoring, unreasonable performance demands, and contradictory
instructions from management” [Id.]. She alleges that “[t]he scrutiny directed at [her] was
significantly greater than that imposed on other supervisors performing the same duties” [Id.].
“Despite Plaintiff’s consistent work quality and experience,” she submits that “management
continued to single her out, assign disproportionate workloads, and intensify the pressure placed
upon her” [Id.]. Plaintiff states that “[t]his ongoing pattern of behavior created a hostile and abusive
work environment that interfered with [her] ability to perform her duties and contributed to
escalating emotional distress” [Id.].
“In late September and into early October 2024,” Plaintiff avers that she “was subjected to
additional hostile and belittling comments from [the] Director of Housekeeping Yolanda Bercey”
(“Ms. Bercey”) [Id.]. Plaintiff claims that “[o]n multiple occasions[, Ms.] Bercey told Plaintiff that
it was ‘not just your jacket[:] it’s you too,’ implying that Plaintiff’s professional appearance and
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leadership role were unacceptable to her” [Id.]. “These targeted remarks made Plaintiff feel singled
out, unwelcome, and intentionally undermined, contributing significantly to the hostile work
environment during the weeks leading up to [her] termination” [Id. at 2–3]. “As [Ms.] Bercey
intensified her aggressive supervision,” Plaintiff states that she “saw [Ms. Bercey] driving around
the property in a black vehicle (SUV), which created extreme anxiety and fear due to the constant
monitoring” [Id. at 3]. Plaintiff claims that “the workload became so excessive that she collapsed
to her knees . . . crying from exhaustion and emotional distress” [Id.]. She alleges that she “was
forced to walk long distances carrying a heavy supply bag filled with chemicals and equipment”
and that when she took “longer to reach the next unit, dispatcher Andrea Hermosillo immediately
demanded explanations and questioned why inspections were taking ‘too long’” [Id.].
“On October 17, 2024, [P]laintiff was called to a mandatory meeting where employees
were told that [Defendant] MasterCorp was at risk of losing [a] contract” [Id. (emphasis omitted)].
Defendant MasterCorp’s employees, including Plaintiff, “were asked to sign a document
acknowledging a potential transfer to another hotel” [Id.]. Plaintiff alleges that she “signed the
document and agreed to stay until December 2024,” but she “did not know that management had
already made an adverse decision regarding her employment” [Id.].
A few days later, on October 20, 2024, Plaintiff represents that “a mandatory meeting was
held . . . where . . . Ms. Bercey acted aggressively and confrontationally” [Id. (emphasis omitted)].
“[Ms.] Bercey stated that ‘someone here is doing something illegal[,]’ and “[h]er behavior created
an atmosphere of fear, intimidation, and humiliation” [Id.]. Following the meeting. “[Ms.] Bercey
instructed another manager to call Plaintiff to her office” [Id.]. According to Plaintiff, “[t]he
manager shouted Plaintiff’s name in front of multiple employees” [Id.]. During the meeting with
Ms. Bercey, and in the presence of Vladimir Gonzalez, a manager, “[Ms.] Bercey stated that
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because Plaintiff did not accept the relocation she ‘had to leave’” [Id.]. Plaintiff states that she
“was confused and felt deceived because she had already signed a written form on October 17,
2024, agreeing to remain with the company until the end of the contract period in December” [Id.].
She claims that Ms. Bercey “insisted that Plaintiff sign a document listing minor alleged
deficiencies in another unit the day before[,]” but “Plaintiff refused to sign the document” [Id.].
Plaintiff left the meeting and “[w]ithin minutes, [she] was removed from the Supervisor Group
chats . . . confirming that the decision to terminate her had already been made and was retaliatory
in nature” [Id.].
Plaintiff alleges violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”),
42 U.S.C. § 2000 et seq. [Id. at 1]. She claims constructive discharge and discrimination [Id. at 4].
She also asks that the Court “evaluate whether the facts presented also support a claim for
[w]rongful [t]ermination under applicable state and federal law” and claims that she “acted in good
faith when reporting the unfair workload, retaliation, and hostile behavior to [h]uman resources”
[Id.]. She seeks emotional distress damages, front pay, back pay, compensatory damages, punitive
damages, injunctive relief, and attorney’s fees [Id. at 4–5].
Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any
individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to h[er] compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). A constructive discharge claim has two
elements: “‘a plaintiff must first [allege] that he was discriminated against by his employer to the
point where a reasonable person in h[er] position would have felt compelled to resign,’ and that
[s]he actually resigned.” Powers v. AutoZoners, LLC, No. 3:23-CV-00609, 2025 WL 2484269,
at *2 (W.D. Ky. Aug. 28, 2025) (quoting Green v. Brennan, 578 U.S. 547, 555 (2016)). The anti-
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retaliation provision states that an employer may not discriminate against an employee “because
[s]he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or
because [s]he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an
investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.” 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-3. With respect
to a hostile work environment claim, “a plaintiff must plead facts to show that: (1) she belonged
to a protected class, (2) she was subject to unwelcome harassment, (3) the harassment was based
on [a protected category], (4) the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the
conditions of employment and create an abusive working environment, and (5) Defendants knew
or 	should 	have 	known 	about 	the 	harassment 	and 	failed 	to 	act.” 	Austin 	v. 	Alexander,
439 F. Supp. 3d 1019, 1024 (M.D. Tenn. 2020) (citation omitted).2
On November 5, 2025, the Court entered an Order noting certain deficiencies in Plaintiff’s
Complaint [Doc. 13]. It stated, “While Plaintiff is not required to allege a prima facie case under
Title VII at this stage, see Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 515 (2002), there are no
allegations about race, color, religion, sex, or national origin” [Id. at 4]. Instead of recommending
dismissal, the undersigned provided Plaintiff an opportunity to amend her Complaint [Id. at 5].
The Amended Complaint does not contain any allegations about race, color, religion, sex,
or national original, or any other protected status [See Doc. 14]. See Blackburn v. Shelby Cnty.,
770 F. Supp. 2d 896, 930 (W.D. Tenn. 2011) (“Title VII was not meant to be, and courts must
ensure that it does not become, a ‘general civility code.’” (quoting Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,
524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998)). Further, while Plaintiff alleges that Defendant retaliated against her,
2 	Courts analyze claims under the Tennesse Human Rights Act “in the same manner as claims
brought under Title VII[.]” Thornhill v. WillScot Mobile Mini Holdings Corp., 764 F. Supp. 3d 670,
679 n.4 (M.D. Tenn. 2025) (quoting Marpaka v. Hefner, 289 S.W.3d 308, 313 (Tenn. Ct. App.
2008)).
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she does not allege that she opposed an unlawful practice or that she made “a charge, testified, or
assisted in any manner in an investigation, proceeding or hearing[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–(3)(a).
Without such allegations, Plaintiff fails to state a claim under Title VII.
C. 	Amendment to the Amended Complaint
The Court has already allowed Plaintiff to file an amended complaint to address the
deficiencies, but she did not cure the deficiencies. The undersigned does not discern any reason to
allow further opportunity to amend.
III. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed in
District Court without Prepaying Fees or Costs [Doc. 9]. But no process shall issue until the District
Judge 	has 	ruled 	upon 	this 	Report 	and 	Recommendation3 	because 	the 	undersigned
RECOMMENDS4 that the Amended Complaint [Doc. 14] be DISMISSED in its entirety.
Respectfully submitted,
________ __________________
Jill E. McCook
United States Magistrate Judge
3 	This matter is to be presented to the District Judge pursuant to this Report and
Recommendation under the authority of Gibson v. R.G. Smith Co., 915 F.2d 260, 263
(6th Cir. 1990), wherein the Court of Appeals states that such matters proceed automatically to a
district judge for examination of the complaint after a magistrate judge has granted the petition to
proceed without prepayment of costs.
4 	Any objections to this Report and Recommendation must be served and filed within
fourteen (14) days after service of a copy of this recommended disposition on the objecting party.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). Such objections must conform to the requirements of Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 72(b). Failure to file objections within the time specified waives the right to appeal
the District Court’s order. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 153–54 (1985). “[T]he district court need
not provide de novo review where objections [to the Report and Recommendation] are ‘[f]rivolous,
conclusive or general.’” Mira v. Marshall, 806 F.2d 636, 637 (6th Cir. 1986) (quoting Nettles v.
Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404, 410 n.8 (5th Cir. 1982)). Only specific objections are reserved for
appellate review. Smith v. Detroit Fed. of Tchrs., 829 F.2d 1370, 1373 (6th Cir. 1987).
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