USA v. Barnes et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 	)
)
Plaintiffs, 	)
)
v. 	) 	No. 3:24-CR-79-KAC-JEM
)
CORNELIUS BARNES, JR., 	)
)
Defendant. 	)
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This case is before the Court for a report and recommendation on Defendant Cornelius
Barnes, Jr.’s Motion to Dismiss Count Six of the Indictment [Doc. 60]. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b).
Count Six charges Defendant with being a felon in possession of a firearm on July 12, 2024, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) [Doc. 13 p. 3]. Defendant challenges a finding that he is
“dangerous” such that his Second Amendment right to possess a firearm for self-defense can be
permanently curtailed [Doc. 60 p. 1]. He also challenges the Sixth Circuit’s “dangerousness”
standard and argues that § 922(g)(1) is facially unconstitutional [Id.].
For the reasons explained below, the undersigned finds Defendant’s criminal history shows
him to be dangerous. And this Court is bound by Williams. The District Judge should therefore
DENY Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Count Six of the Indictment [Doc 60].
I. 	BACKGROUND
Defendant is charged with conspiring to distribute and possessing with intent to distribute
fifty grams or more of methamphetamine (Counts One and Three), conspiring to distribute and
possessing with intent to distribute four hundred (400) grams or more of a substance containing
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fentanyl (Counts Two and Four), possessing a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking
(Count Five), and being a felon in possession of a firearm (Count Six) [Doc. 13].
Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(3)(B)(v), Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss Count Six of the
Indictment, seeking an evidentiary hearing on whether he is “dangerous” such that his Second
Amendment right to possess a firearm for self-defense may be curtailed pursuant to the Sixth
Circuit’s decision in United States v. Williams, 113 F.4th 637 (6th Cir. 2024) [Doc. 60 p. 1].
Defendant also objects to the reasoning and holding in Williams, arguing that it “runs afoul of the
holdings and reasoning” in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022),
and United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024) [Id.]. Finally, Defendant argues that
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is facially unconstitutional in violation of the Second Amendment [Id.].
The Government filed a response in opposition [Doc. 64]. It argues that the Court should
not consider Defendant’s suggestion that Williams was wrongly decided [id. at 6] and should find
that Defendant’s prior convictions show that he is dangerous [id. at 1]. In support, it explains that
on May 7, 2012, Defendant was convicted in Michigan state court of receiving and carrying a
stolen firearm, two counts of carrying or possessing a firearm during the commission of a felony,1
and home invasion in the second degree [Id. (citing Doc. 64-1 pp. 4, 6)]. The Government notes
that as part of the plea negotiations relating to those convictions, two cases, each charging home
invasion in the second degree and one also charging larceny in a building were dismissed
[Id. at 1–2 (citing Doc. 64-1 pp. 2, 8)].
The Government contends that Defendant “continued his dangerous behavior [in 2019]
when he committed an Armed Robbery,” by robbing the occupants of a residence at gunpoint
1 	Under Michigan law, carrying or possessing a firearm during the commission of a felony
is called “felony firearm” [See Doc. 64 p. 1 (citing Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.227b)].
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[Id. at 2 (citing Doc. 64-2)]. During the incident, “[s]hots were fired, resulting in both [Defendant]
and another individual being shot” [Id.]. The Government states that Defendant was charged with
armed robbery, being a felon in possession of firearm, carrying a dangerous weapon with unlawful
intent, carrying or possessing a firearm during the commission of a felony, and being a habitual
offender (fourth offense) [id. (citing Defendant’s Pretrial Services Report)], but “pled guilty to
being a Felon in Possession of a Firearm . . . and a notice of enhanced punishment for subsequent
felony following conviction of three or more felonies” in 2022 [id. (citing Doc. 64-1 p. 10)].
The Government asks the Court to deny Defendant’s motion because he fails to carry his
burden of demonstrating he is not dangerous and his prior convictions show him to be a danger
[Id. at 3]. It contends that Michigan’s second-degree home invasion offense “falls within the
dimensions of generic burglary” and is “an inherently dangerous crime because burglary ‘creates
the possibility of a violent confrontation between the offender and an occupant, caretaker, or some
other 	person 	who 	comes 	to 	investigate’” 	[Id. 	at 	5 	(quoting 	Malone 	v. 	United 	States,
791 F. App’x 543, 546 (6th Cir. 2019) (citations omitted))]. It further notes that the Sixth Circuit
held burglary “‘pose[s] a significant threat of danger’ and thus ‘justif[ies] a finding of danger’”
[Id. (quoting Williams, 113 F.4th at 662–63)].
The Government further contends that the circumstances surrounding Defendant’s 2022
conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm show he is dangerous [Id.]. It highlights that
the 2022 conviction “was not the result of the defendant merely possessing a firearm, but rather
stemmed from Defendant’s active participation in a violent armed robbery,” during which
Defendant “entered another individual’s home, held multiple victims at gunpoint, and stole their
belongings” [Id. (citing Doc. 64-2)]. The incident “ultimately escalated into a shootout, during
which [Defendant] and another individual were shot” [Id. (citing Doc. 64-2)]. The Government
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argues that “[t]his brazen and violent conduct highlights the serious threat [Defendant] poses to
the safety of others and underscores his willingness to engage in dangerous behavior” [Id. at 5–6].
Finally, the Government asserts that more recent conduct shows Defendant is dangerous
[Id. at 6]. It states that Defendant “distributed large quantities of fentanyl and methamphetamine
throughout the Knoxville area, both of which are widely recognized as highly dangerous
substances” [Id.]. It further notes that Defendant “was also in possession of two firearms, one of
which was reported stolen” and that “[t]he combination of illicit drugs and firearms presents an
unmistakable and serious threat to public safety,” and is undoubtedly a “dangerous combination”
[Id. (quoting Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 240 (1993))].2
The parties appeared before the undersigned for a motion hearing on July 11, 2025.
Assistant United States Attorney (“AUSA”) Caroline Poore was present on behalf of the
Government. Attorney Robert Kurtz represented Defendant, who was also present.
At the hearing, Defendant stated that he sought to preserve for appellate review his
objection to Williams as unconstitutional.3 Defendant then argued that the criminal history the
2 	The Government also argued that the Court should deny Defendant’s request for an
evidentiary hearing. For the reasons explained in United States v. Michaels, No. 3:24-CR-102,
Doc. 34 (E.D. Tenn. May 22, 2025), the undersigned disagrees that a hearing is not warranted.
3 	Defendant also objected to the documents the Government attached to its response
[Docs. 64-1 to 64-3] as unreliable and argued in the hearing that the Government is relying on
documents that would not qualify as what is commonly referred to as “Shepard” documents.
Shepard documents encompass “charging documents” or “comparable judicial sources” that are
used to determine “whether a defendant’s prior offenses were ‘committed on occasions different
from one another’ as that phrase is used in the ACCA[.]” United States v. King, 853 F.3d 267, 269,
276 (6th Cir. 2017) (citations omitted). He stated that the Government’s attachments, which
include police reports and incident reports, are unsworn documents and should not be relied on by
the Court. The undersigned disagrees that the Court cannot consider the Government’s attachments
in this context. First, the Government primarily relies on the judgments and uses the police and
incident reports as a supplement. Second, in Williams, the court recognized that “[c]ourts may
consider any evidence of past convictions in the record, as well as other judicially noticeable
information . . . when assessing a defendant’s dangerousness.” Williams, 113 F.4th at 660. In other
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Government relies on to establish dangerousness is too outdated and remote in time to support a
finding of dangerousness. Specifically, Defendant contended that his conviction from May 2012,
which arose from an arrest that occurred on January 15, 2012, thirteen and a half years ago, was
not sufficient to make a dangerousness determination. Defendant also noted that his conviction in
2022 was for conduct that occurred in 2019, more than six years ago.
The Government responded that under Williams, if a defendant falls into one of the
categories comprising an inherent threat of danger based on a prior conviction, it is difficult for
the defendant to prove he is not dangerous. It noted that Defendant was convicted of second-degree
home invasion in Michigan in 2012, which is an offense similar to generic burglary. The
Government stated that generic burglary falls into the second category of inherently dangerous
convictions as recognized by Williams. The Government argued that based on that alone,
Defendant could be considered dangerous by the Court.
The Government also asserted that the Court can consider information beyond the
convictions. It asserted that Defendant’s prior felon-in-possession case from 2019 demonstrates
his ongoing dangerousness, as it was only seven years after the home invasion in 2012. The
Government further argued that unlike the typical felon- in-possession charge, the circumstances
of Defendant’s 2022 conviction involved a home invasion that led to a shootout in which
Defendant and another individual were shot. The Government stated that while the conviction
itself may seem minor, the conduct underlying the charge was dangerous.
Finally, the Government noted that Defendant’s behavior underlying the current charges
before the Court involved drug trafficking, with a high volume of drugs and two loaded firearms
words, it did not require a court to consider only Shepard documents. Finally, the burden rests with
Defendant to show he is not a danger, not the Government.
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(one stolen) found in a search of Defendant’s residence. The Government concluded that the
totality of Defendant’s individual characteristics, his prior convictions, including his felon-in-
possession conviction and its underlying facts, as well of the facts of the case before the Court,
show Defendant is dangerous and that his motion to dismiss the count should be denied.
The matter is now ripe for adjudication.
II. 	ANALYSIS
In United States v. Williams, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held “that
§ 922(g)(1) is constitutional on its face and as applied to dangerous people.” 113 F.4th at 662–63.
With respect to as-applied challenges, it explained that “for centuries,” a disarmed felon “could
demonstrate that their particular possession of a weapon posed no danger to peace.” Id. at 657.
“The relevant principle from our tradition of firearms regulation is that, when the legislature
disarms on a class-wide basis, individuals must have a reasonable opportunity to prove that they
don’t fit the class-wide generalization.” Id. at 661.
The Court of Appeals explained that a defendant shoulders the burden to show that he is
not dangerous. Williams, 113 F.4th at 657 (“[I]n an as-applied challenge to § 922(g)(1), the burden
rests on [the defendant] to show he’s not dangerous.”). When a court determines whether a
defendant is dangerous, it “must focus on each individual’s specific characteristics” and must
“consider[] the individual’s entire criminal record—not just the predicate offense” to the
§ 922(g)(1) charge. Id. at 657, 659–60 (“The dangerousness determination will be fact-specific,
depending on the unique circumstances of the individual defendant.”). “Courts may consider any
evidence of past convictions in the record, as well as other judicially noticeable information—such
as prior convictions—when assessing a defendant’s dangerousness.” Id. at 660.
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The Court of Appeals further explained that “certain categories of past convictions are
highly probative of dangerousness, while others are less so.” Id. at 658. It set forth three categories
of crimes and noted that a court need not “find ‘categorical’ matches to show a defendant is
dangerous.” Id. at 660 (citation omitted).
The first category “is crimes against the person.” Id. at 658 (citation omitted). “This
historical category was filled with dangerous and violent crimes like murder, rape, assault, and
robbery.” Id. (citation omitted). The Court of Appeals said that “[o]ffenses in this category speak
directly to whether an individual is dangerous.” Id. “[T]here is little debate that violent crimes are
at least strong evidence that an individual is dangerous, if not totally dispositive on the question.”
Id. A defendant’s burden to show otherwise is “extremely heavy.” Id.; see also United States v.
Vaughn, No. 23-5790, 2024 WL 4615853, at *2 (6th Cir. Oct. 30, 2024) (“Certain convictions,
like aggravated robbery . . . are highly probative and, alone, would almost certainly be sufficient
to conclude that the defendant presented a danger to the public such that they could be
constitutionally disarmed.”).
The second category includes crimes that “put someone’s safety at risk, and thus, justify a
finding of danger.” Williams, 113 F.4th at 659. It includes crimes such as drug trafficking and
burglary. Id. “These crimes do not always involve an immediate and direct threat of violence
against a particular person.” Id. “[W]hile not strictly crimes against the person, [these crimes] may
nonetheless pose a significant threat of danger.” Id.
The final category includes “crimes like mail fraud or making false statements.”
Id. (citations omitted). “Often, such crimes cause no physical harm to another person or the
community.” Id. While this category “is the most challenging to address,” the Court of Appeals
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“trust[ed that] district courts will have no trouble concluding that many of these crimes don’t make
a person dangerous.” Id.
Here, Defendant’s history shows he is dangerous. In May 2012, Defendant was convicted
of receiving and concealing a stolen firearm, possessing a firearm while trying to commit a felony,
and home invasion in the second degree [Doc. 64-1 p. 6]. These convictions fall squarely within
the second Williams category. Williams, 113 F. 4th at 659; see also United States v. Craft, No. 24-
1624, 2025 WL 2888040, at *2 (6th Cir. Oct. 10, 2025) (finding the defendant’s “conviction for
second-degree home invasion [in Michigan] makes it ‘very difficult’ for [the defendant] to ‘show[]
he is not dangerous’” (quoting Williams, 113 F.4th at 663) (alteration in original)).
But there is more. In October 2019, Defendant was charged with armed robbery, being a
felon in possession of a firearm, and felony firearm [Doc. 64-2 p. 30]. Defendant pled guilty to
being a felon in possession of a firearm and a notice of enhanced punishment for a subsequent
felony following conviction of three or more felonies [Doc. 64-1 p. 10]. The Sixth Circuit in
Williams “included Williams’ prior conviction for felon-in-possession of a firearm as the kind of
felony that demonstrates dangerousness. The Sixth Circuit thus sees felon-in-possession, which is
not a crime against a person, as falling in the second category of crimes which . . . carries with it
the possibility that violence or harm to others might occur during its commission.” United States
v. Jennings, 754 F. Supp. 3d 763, 769 (E.D. Mich. 2024).
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has also explained that Williams allows a court
to “consider how an offense was committed.” United States v. Morton, 123 F.4th 492, 500
(6th Cir. 2024) (citing Williams, 113 F.4th at 663 (rejecting a “categorical approach”)). Looking
at the underlying conduct of the 2019 offense, the undersigned finds it further demonstrates
dangerousness. Defendant was participating in an armed robbery, during which he entered a
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victim’s home, held many individuals at gunpoint, and took their belongings [Doc. 64-2 p. 3]. The
offense resulted in a shootout, during which Defendant and another individual were shot [Id.].
Defendant argued at the hearing that the age of these convictions lessens their weight and
that the Court should not consider them when deciding whether Defendant is dangerous. But the
Court of Appeals in Williams did not address how the age of a prior conviction should impact a
district court’s determination of “dangerousness” in an as-applied challenge. The Court of Appeals
did, however, instruct the district courts to “evaluate a defendant’s entire criminal record.”
Id. at 663. The undersigned therefore considers the entirety of Defendant’s criminal history in its
analysis. United States v. Bell, 755 F. Supp. 3d 992, 999 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 28, 2024) (“[A]lthough
[defendant’s] crimes are old, the repeated nature of his drug trafficking offenses indicates
dangerousness.”); see also United States v. Martin, No. 24-3750, 2025 WL 1913185, at *6
(6th Cir. July 11, 2025) (holding that because a defendant committed a burglary in 2012 he was
“among the class of ‘dangerous’ individuals whom the government may disarm consistent the
Second Amendment”); United States v. Lyle, No. 23-cr-20098, 2024 WL 4819572, at *7–9
(E.D. Mich. Nov. 18, 2024) (finding a defendant dangerous where his prior drug trafficking
convictions 	occurred 	in 	2012 	and 	2016); 	United 	States 	v. 	Smith, 	No. 	1:23-cr-83,
2024 WL 4453270, at *3 (E.D. Tenn. Oct. 9, 2024) (“[T]he Court cannot look past Defendant’s
multiple prior convictions for serious crimes [in 2009 and 2016], even if his recent efforts to
reverse course prove admirable.”). But see Bell, 755 F. Supp. 3d at 1000 (finding a single concealed
weapon conviction from thirty years ago when defendant was eighteen years old is of “weak”
probative value). Accord United States v. Pickett, 757 F. Supp. 3d 813, 818 (M.D. Tenn. Nov. 21,
2024) (determining that the defendant’s lengthy intervening time in prison and the repeated nature
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of his drug trafficking offenses diminished the impact of his argument that his convictions were
over ten years old).
Even if the undersigned gives Defendant’s prior convictions less weight because of their
age, the undersigned may also consider the actions underlying the charges currently pending.
United States v. Fordham, No. 24-1491, 2025 WL 318229, at *5 (6th Cir. Jan. 28, 2025)
(“In determining [the defendant’s] dangerousness, then, we look the offense conduct . . . as well
as [his] previous convictions . . . .”). Specifically, it is alleged that on July 12, 2024, officers with
the Knoxville Police Department’s Organized Crime Unit and detectives with the Knox County
Sheriff Office’s Narcotics Unit executed a search warrant at the address of 5101 Asheville
Highway, Apartment 1, Knoxville, Tennessee [Doc. 1 p. 1]. At the apartment, officers recovered:
approximately 750 grams of a substance that field tested positive for methamphetamine,
approximately 474 grams of a substance that field tested positive for fentanyl, two loaded
handguns (one of which was previously reported stolen), $5,047 in United States currency, six
cellular telephones, and various items used to manufacture and distribute narcotics, including
plastic baggies, a kilogram press, electronic scales, and cutting agents commonly used to dilute
narcotics [Id. at 1–2]. As the search warrant was being executed, two occupants later identified as
Michael Alexander Mahone and Cornelius Barnes, Jr., attempted to flee out of a window at the
rear of the apartment [Id. at 2]. Defendants were arrested inside of the apartment unit, but not
before Defendant Barnes discarded a red backpack outside the back window [Id.]. Law
enforcement searched the bag and recovered a vacuum sealed bag of a substance believed to be
fentanyl, two large bags of a substance believed to be methamphetamine, a loaded Taurus model
G2s 9mm handgun, a loaded Taurus model G3 9mm handgun, and two electronic scales [Id.].
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Defendant is alleged to have distributed large quantities of methamphetamine and fentanyl,
which are considered highly dangerous substances. See United States v. Hines, No. 3:22-cr-157,
2024 WL 4252569, at *5 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 12, 2024) (noting that “the fentanyl trafficking offense
was named in Williams as a type of offense likely to lead to a finding of dangerousness” (citing
Williams, 	113 	F.4th 	at 	659)); 	see 	also 	United 	States 	v. 	Washington, 	No. 	3:22-CR-72,
2022 WL 17168604, at *3 (E.D. Tenn. Nov. 22, 2022) (observing that “[a]s little as two milligrams
of fentanyl can be lethal” and that “[m]ethamphetamine trafficking also presents a substantial risk
to human life” (citations omitted)). The Court in Williams noted that that “[d]rug trafficking is a
serious offense that, in itself, poses a danger to the community” Williams, 113 F.4th at 659 (quoting
United States v. Stone, 608 F.3d 939, 947 n.6 (6th Cir. 2010)), and “often leads to violence,”
id.(citing Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1002 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment)). Furthermore, courts have recognized that “[i]t is not a stretch to
conclude that one who must arm himself due to the very danger of the crime in which he is involved
is, by virtue of that fact, also dangerous.” United States v. Risner, 129 F.4th 361, 369
(6th Cir. 2025).
Aside from arguing points related to the age of his criminal history, Defendant offered no
evidence to show he is not dangerous, and the burden lies with him. Accordingly, and for the
reasons discussed herein, the undersigned concludes Defendant fails to show he is not dangerous.
As such, § 922(g)(1) is not unconstitutional as applied to him. Additionally, the Court is bound by
the Sixth Circuit precedent on facial constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). See United States
v. Greely, No. 23-1978, 2025 WL 1797223, at *5 (6th Cir. June 30, 2025) (“There have been no
developments in the case law to indicate that we must depart from Williams.”). Accord Salmi v.
Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 774 F.2d 685, 689 (6th Cir. 1985) (“A panel of [the Sixth Circuit]
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cannot overrule the decision of another panel. The prior decision remains controlling authority
unless an inconsistent decision of the United States Supreme Court requires modification of the
decision or this Court sitting en banc overrules the prior decision.” (citation omitted)).
III. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons explained herein, the undersigned respectfully RECOMMENDS4 that the
District Judge DENY Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Count Six of the Indictment [Doc 60].
Respectfully submitted,
_____ _____________________
Jill E. McCook
United States Magistrate Judge
4 	Any objections to this report and recommendation must be served and filed within fourteen
(14) days after service of a copy of this recommended disposition on the objecting party.
Fed. R. Crim. P. 59(b)(2) (as amended). Failure to file objections within the time specified waives
the right to review by the District Court. Fed. R. Crim. P. 59(b)(2); see United States v. Branch,
537 F.3d 582, 587 (6th. Cir. 2008); see also Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 155 (1985) (providing
that failure to file objections in compliance with the required time period waives the right to appeal
the District Court’s order). The District Court need not provide de novo review where objections
to this report and recommendation are frivolous, conclusive, or general. Mira v. Marshall,
806 F.2d 636, 637 (6th Cir. 1986). Only specific objections are reserved for appellate review. Smith
v. Detroit Fed. of Tchrs, 829 F.2d 1370, 1373 (6th Cir. 1987).
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