Sockness v. Coyle et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
AT GREENEVILLE
DYLAN LEE SOCKNESS, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	NO. 2:25-CV-137
)
JEREMIAH OWEN COYLE, JR., et al. 	)
)
Defendant. 	)
ORDER AND REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff filed a pro se Complaint [Doc. 2] and accompanying Motion [Doc. 1] asking to
proceed in forma pauperis. The Motion is before the United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 636, and the standing orders of this Court. Plaintiff has also now filed a Motion for
Appointment of Counsel [Doc. 4] and a Motion to Serve by U.S. Marshals [Doc. 11], which will
also be addressed below.
I. 	IN FORMA PAUPERIS APPLICATION
The purpose of 28 U.S.C. § 1915 is to ensure that indigent litigants have meaningful access
to the courts. Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 342, 69 S. Ct. 85 (1948);
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989). The statute allows a litigant to commence or
otherwise defend themselves in a civil action without paying the administrative costs applicable to
the lawsuit. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 27, 112 S. Ct. 1728 (1992).
The court’s review of an in forma pauperis application is normally based solely on the
affidavit of indigence. See Gibson v. R.G. Smith Co., 915 F.2d 260, 262-63 (6th Cir. 1990). To
proceed in forma pauperis, an applicant must show, by affidavit, the inability to pay court fees and
costs. 28 U.S.C. §1915(a). At the same time, one need not be destitute to enjoy the benefit of
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proceeding in forma pauperis. Adkins, 335 U.S. at 342, 69 S. Ct. at 90. An affidavit to proceed in
forma pauperis is sufficient if it demonstrates that the requesting party cannot afford to pay for the
costs of litigation and still pay for the necessities of life due to being impoverished. Id. at 339, 69
S. Ct. at 89. The decision to grant or deny such an application lies within the sound discretion of
the court. Phipps v. King, 866 F.2d 824, 825 (6th Cir. 1988).
In the present case, the court has considered Defendant’s Application to Proceed Without
Prepayment of Fees and his economic status in deciding whether to grant leave to proceed in forma
pauperis. The application sets forth grounds for so proceeding; thus, the Application to Proceed
Without Prepayment of Fees [Doc. 1] is GRANTED. Because Plaintiff is an inmate, he is
ASSESSED the civil filing fee of $350.00. The custodian of Plaintiff’s inmate trust account is
DIRECTED to submit to the Clerk, U.S. District Court, 220 West Depot Street, Greeneville, TN
37743, twenty percent (20%) of Plaintiff’s preceding month’s income (or income credited to
Plaintiff’s trust account for the preceding month), but only when such monthly income exceeds
ten dollars ($10.00), until this filing fee has been fully paid, as authorized under 28 U.S.C. §
1914(a). 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).
The Clerk is DIRECTED to file the Complaint without prepayment of costs or fees.
Gibson, 915 F.2d at 262-63; see also Harris v. Johnson, 784 F.2d 222 (6th Cir. 1986). The Clerk
shall not issue process, however, at this time.
When a person is proceeding in forma pauperis, applicable law directs the district court to
dismiss the case at any time if it is frivolous or fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and (ii); see also Neitzke, 490 U.S. 319, which requires the
court to screen the complaint. In screening a complaint, the court is to consider the facts alleged
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by the plaintiff in conjunction with applicable law. This court will now conduct the required
screening of Plaintiff’s complaint in the case at hand.
II. 	FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
Plaintiff filed a Complaint [Doc. 2] on August 27, 2025, wherein he alleges that he entered
into a final settlement agreement with Jeremiah Owen Coyle, Jr. and Mr. Coyle’s sister, Annmarie
Coyle, in which they agreed to deed to Plaintiff property they owned at 19401 Sunnyside Road, in
Philadelphia, Tennessee. Additionally, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants agreed to pay him $900.00
per month for two years beginning on August 3, 2025. Plaintiff appears to take the position that as
of August 17, 2025, he has not received the deed or any payments. Id. Plaintiff alleges that he sent
Defendants a postcard from the Monroe County Jail before the initial payment was due, but
because he is now incarcerated in Waushara County Jail in Wisconsin, he has asked his brother to
follow up with Defendants regarding the payments. Id. According to the complaint, Defendants
have failed to respond to these efforts to contact them. Plaintiff is asking this Court to enforce the
settlement agreement because it originated in Sweetwater, Tennessee, and he was living there
when it was signed and notarized. Plaintiff also requests that any legal fees due in this matter be
paid by the Defendants. Id.
Plaintiff subsequently filed the Settlement Agreement (“Agreement”) [Doc. 7] referred to
in the Complaint. The Agreement appears to convey the above-mentioned property and call for a
total sum of $21,600.00 to be paid by Defendants to Plaintiff in monthly increments of $900.00
beginning on August 3, 2025. The Agreement’s stated purpose was to settle “various disputes
[that] have arisen between [the Parties].” [Doc. 7, p. 1]. The Agreement also lists the address of
both Plaintiff and Defendants as 554 Hawkins Road, Sweetwater, Tennessee. It was signed by
Plaintiff and both Defendants and notarized on July 17, 2025. [Doc. 7].
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As noted above, Plaintiff has also filed a Motion to Appoint Counsel [Doc. 4] and a Motion
to Serve by U.S. Marshals [Doc. 11]. He requests that the Court appoint him counsel because he
is indigent and is not familiar with the law and asks that the United States Marshals Service serve
Defendants because of his indigency.
III. 	LEGAL ANALYSIS
a. 	Leniency afforded to pro se litigants
In undertaking the present review, the Court liberally construes Plaintiff’s claims because
he is proceeding pro se. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200, 167 L. Ed. 2d
1081 (2007). Even under this lenient standard, a claim will be dismissed if it is frivolous, meaning
it lacks “‘an arguable basis either in law or fact.’” Brand v. Motley, 526 F.3d 921, 923 (6th Cir.
2008) (quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325). For a complaint to survive the §1915 screening process,
it “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim for relief that is plausible
on its face.” Zelesnik v. GE Healthcare, No. 1:18-CV-2443, 2018 WL 5808749, at *1 (N.D. Ohio
Nov. 6, 2018) (quoting Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 471 (6th Cir. 2010)). This being the case, the
Court will not “conjure allegations on a litigant’s behalf” to help a pro se litigant survive the §1915
screening process. Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 714 (6th Cir. 2004). This limitation helps
courts avoid “‘transform[ing] . . . from their legitimate advisory role to the improper role of an
advocate seeking out the strongest arguments and most successful strategies. . . .’” Profitt v. Divine
Sol., No. 3:10-CV-311-S, 2010 WL 2203310, at *1 (W.D. Ky. May 27, 2010) (quoting Beaudett
v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985)).
b. 	The Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the claims at issue
When screening a complaint, the Court must first determine if it has jurisdiction over the
claims that a plaintiff is asserting because federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. The
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Court has a duty to evaluate subject matter jurisdiction and is to sua sponte raise the issue. Wells
Fargo Delaware Trust, Co., N.A. v. Lee, No. 13–2708, 2014 WL 28837 at *2 (W.D. Tenn. Jan. 2,
2014). Federal courts have jurisdiction in two types of civil cases: those arising under the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States, and those where the amount in controversy
exceeds $75,000.00 and the parties have the required diversity of citizenship. Compare 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331 with 28 U.S.C. § 1332; see also Mars v. Hanberry, 752 F.2d 254, 255-56 (6th Cir. 1985)
(dismissing a pro se complaint where it “stated no basis on which the district court could assert
subject matter jurisdiction”). To establish that the federal courts have jurisdiction over a matter, a
party is required to “allege sufficient facts to overcome the presumption against federal subject
matter jurisdiction.” Kondaur Capital Corporation v. Finley, No. 20-cv-02423-JTF-tmp, 2020 WL
7234519 at *2 (W.D. Tenn. Sept. 10, 2020) (internal quotations removed) (citing Farmer v. Fisher,
386 F. App'x 554, 557 (6th Cir. 2010)). The Sixth Circuit has instructed that where a dispute was
originally litigated in, and dismissed from, federal court “[a] district court retains jurisdiction to
enforce a settlement agreement if it either (1) has language in the dismissal order indicating its
retention of jurisdiction, or (2) incorporates the terms of the settlement agreement into the
dismissal order.” Hehl v. City of Avon Lake, 90 F. App'x 797, 801 (6th Cir. 2004). However, this
matter was not originally litigated in federal court. For that reason, enforcement of the settlement
agreement is for the state courts, unless there is an independent basis for federal jurisdiction. See
Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Insurance Co., 511 U.S. 375, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994).
Here, Plaintiff has not provided an independent basis that would provide the Court
jurisdiction to hear his claims. In first considering whether Plaintiff has demonstrated that there is
federal question jurisdiction, the Court notes that the focus of Plaintiff’s claim is a breach of
contract, i.e., Defendants’ purported failure to make payments called for by the parties’
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Agreement. Breach of contract claims are governed by state contract law. Kokkonen, 511 U.S at
382. Further, the claims underlying the Agreement do not implicate the Constitution, laws, or
treaties of the United States.
The Court next must consider whether Plaintiff has demonstrated that diversity jurisdiction
exists, and Plaintiff has the burden to establish that it does. Kondaur Capital, 2020 WL 7234519,
at *2. To demonstrate that diversity jurisdiction exists, a party must show that there is both
diversity of citizenship between the parties and an amount in controversy exceeding $75,000.00.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Plaintiff has not set forth sufficient information in his complaint to
demonstrate that this dispute meets the amount in controversy requirement. At the heart of
Plaintiff’s Complaint is enforcement of an Agreement where real property was to be transferred to
Plaintiff, and he was to be paid $21,600 in addition. While it would not be surprising for the value
of the property when combined with the $21,600 owed to Plaintiff to exceed $75,000, Plaintiff
does not assign a value to the real property in any of his pleadings, meaning that he has failed to
demonstrate that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. See Jones v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am.,
746 F. Supp. 2d 850, 852 (W.D. Ky. 2010) (observing that where the amount in controversy in
unclear, the burden rests on plaintiff to offer proof that the amount in controversy exceeds
$75,000).
Even more importantly, according to the parties’ Agreement, both Plaintiff and Defendants
have permanent addresses in Tennessee, and the real property referenced in the Agreement is in
Tennessee. While Plaintiff is currently incarcerated in an out-of-state facility, that does not affect
his citizenship for purposes of a diversity determination. “Most cases have uniformly held that
incarceration does not change a prisoner's domicile for purposes of the diversity statute.” Tucker
v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 1:13-cv-1260, 2014 WL 1224362, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 24, 2014) (citing
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Polakoff v. Henderson, 370 F. Supp. 690, 693 (N.D. Ga. 1973) (noting that “[a] prisoner does not
acquire a new domicile in the place of [his] incarceration, but retains the domicile he had prior to
incarceration”); Jones v. Hadican, 552 F.2d 249, 250 (8th Cir. 1977) (per curiam) (same)). There
is a rebuttable presumption that a prisoner's domicile is his domicile prior to incarceration. Johnson
v. Corr. Corp. of Am., No. 00-4439, 2001 WL 1298982, at *2 (6th Cir. Aug. 8, 2001); see Smith
v. Cummings, 445 F.3d 1254, 1260 (10th Cir. 2006) (noting that it is generally presumed that a
prisoner remains “a citizen of the state of which he was a citizen before his incarceration, even if
he is subsequently incarcerated in another state” (citing Sullivan v. Freeman, 994 F.2d 334, 337
(7th Cir. 1991))). Accordingly, Defendant has failed to demonstrate that the parties have the
required diversity of citizenship to permit the Court to exercise diversity jurisdiction. As such, the
Court finds it appropriate to recommend that Plaintiff’s claims be dismissed without prejudice,
and that his request for service by the U.S. Marshals be denied as moot.
In making that recommendation, the Court acknowledges that a pro se plaintiff is generally
to be provided with an opportunity to amend his or her complaint before the court determines
whether dismissal is appropriate. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); Brown v. Matauszak, 415 F. App’x
608, 615 (6th Cir. 2011). Still, to be entitled to an opportunity to amend the plaintiff must have
demonstrated that he or she is likely to be able to set forth a colorable claim if given the opportunity
to amend. Id. In the case at hand, Plaintiff cannot do so because he is unable to establish that the
federal courts have jurisdiction over his claims. Given that there is no federal question jurisdiction,
and that permitting amendment cannot change the fact that there is not the diversity of citizenship
between the parties which is necessary to permit the Court to exercise diversity jurisdiction,
allowing plaintiff an opportunity to amend would be futile.
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Turning now to Plaintiff’s request for the appointment of counsel [Doc. 4], the Court first
notes that appointment of counsel in a civil proceeding is not a constitutional right, but a privilege
justified only in exceptional circumstances. Lavado v. Keohane, 992 F. 2d 601, 605‒06 (6th Cir.
1993). When determining whether to exercise its discretion to appoint counsel for an indigent
plaintiff, one of the Court’s primary considerations is whether a plaintiff's claims are frivolous or
have an extremely slim chance of success. Lavado, 992 F.2d at 605-06; see also Brubaker v.
Barrett, 801 F. Supp. 2d 743, 763 (E.D. Tenn. 2011). Given that federal courts do not have
jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims, his claims cannot succeed in this forum, and applicable law
dictates that his Motion for Appointment of Counsel [Doc. 4] must be DENIED.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s
Complaint [Doc. 3] be DISMISSED without prejudice and that his Motion to Serve by U.S.
Marshals [Doc. 11] be DENIED as moot. This matter is to be presented to the District Judge
pursuant to this Report and Recommendation under the authority of Gibson v. R.G. Smith Co., 195
F.2d at 263, wherein the Court states that such matters proceed automatically to a district judge for
examination of the complaint after a magistrate judge has granted the petition to proceed in forma
pauperis.1
Respectfully submitted,
/s/Cynthia Richardson Wyrick
United States Magistrate Judge
1 Objections to this Report and Recommendation must be filed within 14 days after service of this recommended
disposition on the objecting party. 28 U.S.C. 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). Such objections must conform to the
requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). Failure to file objections within the time specified waives the right to appeal
the District Court’s order. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985). The district court need not provide de novo review
where objections to this report and recommendation are frivolous, conclusive or general. Mira v. Marshall, 806 F.2d
636 (6th Cir. 1986). Only specific objections are reserved for appellate review. Smith v. Detroit Federation of
Teachers, 829 F.2d 1370 (6th Cir. 1987).
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