Holton v. Houston et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF SOUTH DAKOTA
WESTERN DIVISION
LYLE HOLTON,
Plaintiff,
vs.
LT. HOUSTON, Lt. 1 at Pennington
County Jail, in his or her individual
and official capacity; S.C.O. DIRO,
S.C.O. at Pennington County Jail, in
his or her individual and official
capacity; CPT. MUNSCH, Captain at
Pennington County Jail, in his or her
individual and official capacity;
COMMANDER YANTIS, Commander at
Pennington County Jail, in his or her
individual and official capacity; KEV
THOM, Elected Sheriff for Pennington
County, in his individual and official
capacity,
Defendants.
5:22-CV-05059-KES
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED
IN FORMA PAUPERIS AND 1915A
SCREENING
Plaintiff, Lyle Holton, an inmate at the Pennington County Jail at the
time that this lawsuit was filed,1 filed a pro se civil rights lawsuit under 28
U.S.C. § 1983. Docket 1.2 Holton moves for leave to proceed in forma pauperis
1 Holton does not provide facts regarding the reason he was detained at the
Pennington County Jail, nor does he provide his expected release date. See
Docket 1. He is currently incarcerated at the Winner City Jail. Docket 7. The
court will treat him as a pretrial detainee because he was incarcerated at a
county jail when he filed the present action. See Docket 1 at 1.
2 Holton also marked the Bivens action box in his complaint. Docket 1 at 1.
Bivens actions are reserved for when a federal official has violated a plaintiff’s
Constitutional rights. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal
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and has included a prisoner trust account report. Dockets 2, 3. Holton has also
filed a motion for appointment of counsel and a motion for a preliminary
injunction. Dockets 4, 6.
I. 	Motion for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis
Holton reports average monthly deposits of $0.00 and an average
monthly balance of $0.00. Docket 3 at 1. Under the Prison Litigation Reform
Act, a prisoner who “brings a civil action or files an appeal in forma pauperis
. . . shall be required to pay the full amount of a filing fee.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(b)(1). “[W]hen an inmate seeks pauper status, the only issue is whether
the inmate pays the entire fee at the initiation of the proceeding or over a
period of time under an installment plan.” Henderson v. Norris, 129 F.3d 481,
483 (8th Cir. 1997) (quoting McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604 (6th
Cir. 1997)).
The initial partial filing fee that accompanies an installment plan is
calculated according to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), which requires a payment of 20
percent of the greater of
(A) the average monthly deposits to the prisoner’s account; or
(B) the average monthly balance in the prisoner’s account for the 6-
month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint or
notice of appeal.
Based on the information regarding Holton’s prisoner trust account, the court
grants Holton leave to proceed in forma pauperis and waives the initial partial
Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Because defendants are Pennington
County employees and not federal officials, Holton’s Bivens action is dismissed
under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1).
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filing fee. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) (“In no event shall a prisoner be prohibited
from bringing a civil action . . . for the reason that the prisoner has no assets
and no means by which to pay the initial partial filing fee.”).
In order to pay his filing fee, Holton must “make monthly payments of 20
percent of the preceding month’s income credited to the prisoner’s account.” 28
U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). The statute places the burden on the prisoner’s institution
to collect the additional monthly payments and forward them to the court as
follows:
After payment of the initial partial filing fee, the prisoner shall be
required to make monthly payments of 20 percent of the preceding
month’s income credited to the prisoner’s account. The agency
having custody of the prisoner shall forward payments from the
prisoner’s account to the clerk of the court each time the amount in
the account exceeds $10 until the filing fees are paid.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). The installments will be collected pursuant to this
procedure. The Clerk of Court will send a copy of this order to the appropriate
financial official at Holton’s institution. Holton remains responsible for the
entire filing fee, as long as he is a prisoner. See In re Tyler, 110 F.3d 528, 529-
30 (8th Cir. 1997).
I. 	1915A Screening
A. 	Factual Background
The facts alleged in Holton’s complaint are: that on or about March 23,
2022, Holton was removed from his commonfare/Kosher diet at the Pennington
County Jail for “abusing diet.” Docket 1 at 7. Holton, a Muslim inmate, claims
that he reapplied for this diet thirteen times between March and June of 2022
and was denied each time. See id. He claims that he previously filed two
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grievances regarding this issue and that he filed a third grievance at the time
that he wrote this complaint. Id. He also claims that, to his knowledge, only
Muslims at the Pennington County Jail have been completely denied the
commonfare/Kosher religious diet. Id.
Holton alleges that he has had to pick and choose food that did not
violate his religious dietary laws and that this has caused him to lose a
considerable amount of weight. Id. He alleges that he has refused unfit food
since June 26, 2022, and he has been on a “religious hunger strike” since
then. Id. at 7, 10. He also alleges that he is six feet tall and now weighs only
144 pounds. Id. at 7. Holton attaches affidavits from five fellow inmates, who
all state that Holton is a devout Muslim whose health has suffered because of
his dietary restrictions. Docket 1-1 at 1-5.
Holton claims that all defendants have violated his First Amendment and
Fourteenth Amendment rights. Docket 1 at 3-4. He claims that he has
“suffered severe mental agitation” and “actual physical injury” in that he has
lost weight. Id. at 6. He asks this court for a preliminary injunction ordering
the Pennington County Jail to place him back on his commonfare/Kosher diet.
Id. at 10. He also asks for $50,000 “for each physical [and] mental harm” and
$30,000 in punitive damages. Id.
B. 	Legal Background
The court must assume as true all facts well pleaded in the complaint.
Estate of Rosenberg v. Crandell, 56 F.3d 35, 36 (8th Cir. 1995). Pro se and civil
rights complaints must be liberally construed. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,
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94 (2007) (per curiam); Bediako v. Stein Mart, Inc., 354 F.3d 835, 839 (8th Cir.
2004) (citation omitted). Even with this construction, “a pro se complaint must
contain specific facts supporting its conclusions.” Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d
1334, 1337 (8th Cir. 1985) (citation omitted); see also Ellis v. City of
Minneapolis, 518 F. App’x 502, 504 (8th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (citation
omitted).
A complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations . . . [but] requires
more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of
a cause of action will not do[.]” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007) (internal citations omitted). If it does not contain these bare essentials,
dismissal is appropriate. See Beavers v. Lockhart, 755 F.2d 657, 663-64 (8th
Cir. 1985) (citation omitted) (explaining that a district court does not err when
it dismisses a claim based on vague allegations or unsupported
generalizations). Twombly requires that a complaint’s “[f]actual allegations
must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the
assumption that all of the allegations in the complaint are true[.]” Twombly,
550 U.S. at 555 (internal citation omitted); see also Abdullah v. Minnesota, 261
F. App’x 926, 927 (8th Cir. 2008) (noting that a “complaint must contain either
direct or inferential allegations respecting all material elements necessary to
sustain recovery under some viable legal theory” (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at
553-61)).
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the court must screen prisoner complaints
and dismiss them if they “(1) [are] frivolous, malicious, or fail[] to state a claim
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upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seek[] monetary relief from a defendant
who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). The court will now
assess each individual claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
C. 	Legal Analysis
1. 	Official Capacity Claims for Money Damages
Holton brings claims against Houston, Diro, Munsch, Yantis, and Thom
in their official capacities for money damages. Docket 1 at 3-4, 10. Houston,
Diro, Munsch, Yantis, and Thom were employees of the Pennington County Jail
and Pennington County Sheriff’s Office at the time of the incidents in question.
Id. at 3-4. “A suit against a government officer in his official capacity is
functionally equivalent to a suit against the employing governmental entity.”
Veatch v. Bartels Lutheran Home, 627 F.3d 1254, 1257 (8th Cir. 2010). Holton’s
official capacity claims against Houston, Diro, Munsch, Yantis, and Thom are
equivalent to claims against Pennington County.
“[A] local government may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury
inflicted solely by its employees or agents.” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436
U.S. 658, 694 (1978). A municipal government may be sued only “when
execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers
or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy,”
deprives a plaintiff of a federal right. Id.; see also Clay v. Conlee, 815 F.2d
1164, 1170 (8th Cir. 1997) (finding that “the [governmental] entity’s official
‘policy or custom’ must have ‘caused’ the constitutional violation” in order for
that entity to be liable under § 1983).
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To establish governmental liability premised on an unofficial custom
rather than an official policy, a plaintiff must allege facts to support a finding of
“a continuing, widespread, persistent pattern of unconstitutional misconduct
by the governmental entity’s employees” and “deliberate indifference to or tacit
authorization of such conduct by the governmental entity’s policymaking
officials after notice to the officials of that misconduct[.]” Brewington v. Keener,
902 F.3d 796, 801 (8th Cir. 2018) (quoting Corwin v. City of Independence, 829
F.3d 695, 700 (8th Cir. 2016)). A § 1983 complaint does not need to
“specifically plead the existence of an unconstitutional policy or custom to
survive a motion to dismiss.” Crumpley-Patterson v. Trinity Lutheran Hosp., 388
F.3d 588, 591 (8th Cir. 2004) (citing Doe ex rel. Doe v. Sch. Dist., 340 F.3d 605,
614 (8th Cir. 2003)). But the complaint must still include some allegation,
reference, or language that creates an inference that the conduct resulted from
an unconstitutional policy or custom. Id.; see also Doe, 340 F.3d at 614 (“At a
minimum, a complaint must allege facts which would support the existence of
an unconstitutional policy or custom.”).
Here, Holton alleges that “only Muslims have been completely denied
commonfare/Kosher religious diet.” Docket 1 at 7. Although Holton does not
specifically plead the existence of an unconstitutional policy or custom, he
alleges that his rights were violated by “conduct [that] resulted from an
unconstitutional policy or custom” of denying religious diets to Muslim
inmates. See Crumpley-Patterson, 388 F.3d at 591 (citing Doe, 340 F.3d at
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614). Thus, this court must consider whether Holton’s rights were violated by
this allegedly unconstitutional policy or custom.
a. 	First Amendment Claim
Holton alleges that his First Amendment rights have been violated by the
Pennington County Jail’s policy or custom of denying Muslims a religious diet.
See Docket 1 at 6-7. Construing his complaint liberally, Holton brings a First
Amendment free exercise claim against Houston, Diro, Munsch, Yantis, and
Thom in their official capacities for money damages. See id. at 3-4, 6-7.
In order to state a First Amendment free exercise claim, Holton must
allege facts showing that prison officials have substantially burdened the free
exercise of his religion. Patel v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 515 F.3d 807, 813 (8th
Cir. 2008). Substantially burdening the free exercise of religion means that the
regulation
must significantly inhibit or constrain conduct or expression that
manifests 	some 	central 	tenet 	of 	a 	person’s 	individual 	religious
beliefs; 	must 	meaningfully 	curtail 	a 	person’s 	ability 	to 	express
adherence to his or her faith; or must deny a person reasonable
opportunities to engage in those activities that are fundamental to a
[person’s] religion.
Murphy v. Mo. Dep’t of Corr., 372 F.3d 979, 988 (8th Cir. 2004) (cleaned up).
Holton alleges that his ability to follow his religious dietary practices has been
significantly inhibited by the Pennington County Jail’s policy or custom of
denying Muslims a religious diet. See Docket 1 at 7. Thus, Holton’s First
Amendment free exercise claim against Houston, Diro, Munsch, Yantis, and
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Thom in their official capacities for money damages survives § 1915A
screening.
b. 	Fourteenth Amendment Claim
Holton alleges that his Fourteenth Amendment rights have been violated
by the Pennington County Jail’s policy or custom of denying Muslims a
religious diet. See Docket 1 at 7-8. Construing his complaint liberally, Holton
brings a Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim against Houston, Diro,
Munsch, Yantis, and Thom in their official capacities for money damages. See
id. at 3-4, 7-8.
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires the
government to “treat similarly situated people alike,” a protection that applies
to prisoners. Murphy, 372 F.3d at 984 (quoting Rouse v. Benson, 193 F.3d 936,
942 (8th Cir. 1999)). The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained that for
a prisoner to prevail on an equal protection claim, he “must show that he is
treated differently from similarly-situated inmates and that the different
treatment is based upon either a suspect classification or a fundamental right.”
Patel, 515 F.3d at 815 (citations and internal quotation omitted). “Religion is a
suspect classification.” Id. at 816 (citing Weems v. Little Rock Police Dep’t, 453
F.3d 1010, 1016 (8th Cir. 2006)).
Here, Holton alleges that he has been treated differently than similarly
situated inmates of different religions and that this different treatment has
been caused by a policy or custom of the Pennington County Jail. See Docket 1
at 7. Specifically, he alleges that Muslim inmates are not allowed to follow a
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religious diet, but inmates of other religions are still provided religious diets. Id.
Thus, Holton’s Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim against Houston,
Diro, Munsch, Yantis, and Thom in their official capacities for money damages
survives § 1915A screening.
2. 	Official Capacity Claims for Injunctive Relief
Holton brings claims against Houston, Diro, Munsch, Yantis, and Thom
in their official capacities for injunctive relief. Id. at 3-4, 10. In a letter dated
August 6, 2022, Holton informed this court that he has been transferred from
the Pennington County Jail to the Winner City Jail. Docket 7 at 1. The Eighth
Circuit has explained that an “inmate’s claims for injunctive and declaratory
relief to improve prison conditions are moot when he is transferred to another
facility and is no longer subject to those conditions[.]” Davis v. Missouri, 389 F.
App’x 579, 579 (8th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (citing Smith v. Hundley, 190 F.3d
852, 855 (8th Cir. 1999)). Thus, Holton’s claims for injunctive relief to improve
conditions at the Pennington County Jail are moot. Holton’s claims against
Houston, Diro, Munsch, Yantis, and Thom in their official capacities for
injunctive relief are dismissed without prejudice under 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1). Further, Holton’s motion for a preliminary
injunction asking this court to order Pennington County Jail to provide Holton
his religious diet (Docket 6) is denied as moot.
3. 	Individual Capacity Claims
Holton brings claims against Houston, Diro, Munsch, Yantis, and Thom
in their individual capacities. Docket 1 at 3-4. “Because vicarious liability is
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inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-
official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the
Constitution.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009).
Thus, each Government official . . . is only liable for his or her own
misconduct. As we have held, a supervising officer can be liable for
an 	inferior 	officer's 	constitutional 	violation 	only 	if 	he 	directly
participated in the constitutional violation, or if his failure to train
or supervise the offending actor caused the deprivation.
Parrish v. Ball, 594 F.3d 993, 1001 (8th Cir. 2010) (cleaned up). Holton’s
individual capacity claims must allege that each individual defendant either
directly participated in the unconstitutional conduct or caused the conduct to
occur through a failure to train or supervise the offending actor.
Here, Holton makes no allegations regarding each individual defendant’s
direct participation or failure to train or supervise. See Docket 1 at 7. Although
he alleges that he has been denied his religious diet at the Pennington County
Jail, he makes no reference to any jail official who he claims is responsible for
denying him his diet, implementing the allegedly unconstitutional policy or
custom of denying religious diets to Muslim inmates, or failing to train or
supervise an offending actor. See id. Thus, his claims against Houston, Diro,
Munsch, Yantis, and Thom in their individual capacities are dismissed without
prejudice under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1).
II. 	Motion for Appointment of Counsel
Holton moves for appointment of counsel. Docket 4. “A pro se litigant has
no statutory or constitutional right to have counsel appointed in a civil case.”
Stevens v. Redwing, 146 F.3d 538, 546 (8th Cir. 1998). Under 28 U.S.C.
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§ 1915(e)(1), “[t]he court may request an attorney to represent any person
unable to afford counsel.” When determining whether to appoint counsel to a
pro se litigant, the Eighth Circuit considers “the factual complexity of the case,
the ability of the indigent to investigate the facts, the existence of conflicting
testimony, the ability of the indigent to present his claim and the complexity of
the legal issues.” Abdullah v. Gunter, 949 F.2d 1032, 1035 (8th Cir. 1991)
(citation omitted). Here, Holton’s claims do not appear to be factually or legally
complex. Because this court believes that Holton can adequately present his
claims at this time, his motion for appointment of counsel (Docket 4) is denied.
Thus, it is ORDERED:
1. 	That Holton’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (Docket
2) is granted.
2. 	That 	the 	institution 	having 	custody 	of 	Holton 	is 	directed 	that
whenever the amount in Holton’s trust account, exclusive of funds
available to him in his frozen account, exceeds $10.00, monthly
payments that equal 20 percent of the funds credited the preceding
month to Holton’s trust account shall be forwarded to the U.S.
District Court Clerk’s Office under to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), until
the $350 filing fee is paid.
3. 	That 	Holton’s 	First 	Amendment 	free 	exercise 	claims 	against
Houston, Diro, Munsch, Yantis, and Thom in their official capacities
for money damages survive § 1915A screening.
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4. 	That 	Holton’s 	Fourteenth 	Amendment 	equal 	protection 	claims
against Houston, Diro, Munsch, Yantis, and Thom in their official
capacities for money damages survive § 1915A screening.
5. 	That Holton’s remaining claims against Houston, Diro, Munsch,
Yantis, and Thom in their individual and official capacities are
dismissed without prejudice under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and
1915A(b)(1).
6. 	That 	Holton’s 	motion 	for 	appointment 	of 	counsel 	(Docket 	4) 	is
denied.
7. 	That Holton’s motion for a preliminary injunction (Docket 6) is
denied as moot.
8. 	That 	the 	Clerk 	of 	Court 	shall 	send 	blank 	summons 	forms 	and
Marshal Service Forms (Form USM-285) to Holton so that he may
cause the complaint to be served upon defendants Houston, Diro,
Munsch, Yantis, and Thom.
9. 	That Holton shall complete and send the Clerk of Court a separate
summons and USM-285 form for defendants Houston, Diro, Munsch,
Yantis, and Thom. Upon receipt of the completed summons and
USM-285 forms, the Clerk of Court will issue the summons. If the
completed 	summons 	and 	USM-285 	forms 	are 	not 	submitted 	as
directed, the complaint may be dismissed.
10. 	The 	United 	States 	Marshal 	Service 	shall 	serve 	the 	completed
summonses, together with a copy of the complaint (Docket 1) and
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this order, upon defendants Houston, Diro, Munsch, Yantis, and
Thom.
11. 	Defendants Houston, Diro, Munsch, Yantis, and Thom will serve
and file an answer or responsive pleading to the complaint on or
before 	21 	days 	following 	the 	date 	of service 	or 	60 	days if 	the
defendants fall under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(2) or (3).
12. 	Holton will keep the court informed of his current address at all
times. All parties are bound by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
and by the court’s Local Rules while this case is pending.
Dated October 31, 2022.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Karen E. Schreier
KAREN E. SCHREIER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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