USA v. Medearis

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF SOUTH DAKOTA
CENTRAL DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
vs.
PATRICK KEVIN MEDEARIS,
Defendant.
3:20-CR-30077-RAL-1
REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION FOR
DISPOSITION OF MOTION
TO SUPPRESS AND REQUEST
FOR FRANKS HEARING
In this prohibited person in possession of a firearm case, Patrick Kevin Medearis
seeks to suppress evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant and statements he made
during a custodial interview. Medearis also requests a Franks hearing. Because law
enforcement obtained (1) the warrant in good-faith and without recklessly misleading
the issuing judge and (2) Medearis’s statements in accordance with Miranda, and the
Fifth Amendment, both the suppression motion and hearing request, pending, should
be denied.
BACKGROUND
In March and April 2020, various individuals provided tribal law enforcement, in
the Rosebud, South Dakota area, with information connecting Medearis and India Ford
(India) with the use and sale of drugs. The informants also identified Medearis as a
possessor of firearms.
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At 2:26 p.m. on April 21, 2020, Kara Ford (Kara) called Rosebud Sioux Tribe Law
Enforcement Services (RSTLES) and reported that Medearis was chasing and shooting
at her vehicle near Mission. Dispatched officers located Kara, along with her sister,
India, on the side of a county road with a flat tire.
Around 4:00 p.m. that day, RSTLES Officers Joshua Antman and Gerald Dillon
and RSTLES Special Agent Benjamin Estes interviewed India at the Tripp County
Sheriff’s Office. India informed the trio that she was in a relationship with Medearis but
had tried to avoid him after an incident outside her house earlier that morning. During
the morning’s encounter, India said Medearis “had an ugly look on his face” and tried
to hit her with his four-wheeler. In response, she fled to her mother’s house, but later
decided to return to Mission.
On her return trip to Mission, a white Hyundai Elantra turned around on a dirt
road near Hidden Timber and chased her. According to India, Medearis waved and
fired a silver pistol multiple times from the passenger side of the Elantra. After
recounting the chase scene that ultimately led her to call RSTLES, India divulged
information about a recent event in Norris. Describing it, India related that Medearis
“flipped out and started waving his gun around” upon finding that someone had
broken into his red Chevrolet Monte Carlo and stolen personal items and drugs,
including marijuana and methamphetamine. India also disclosed that Medearis had
sold drugs from their shared home and had struck her on the head with a pistol,
knocking her down, a few days earlier.
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Following the interview, Antman and Dillon made arrangements for India’s flat
tire to be fixed. Dillon gave his contact information to India, advising her to call or text
him if Medearis showed up.
The next morning, at 8:14 a.m., Kara texted Dillon. She informed him that
Medearis was trying to break into India’s home near Mission. Dillon relayed the
information to Antman and headed toward India’s home to arrest Medearis for
domestic abuse. In a later message, Kara stated that Medearis had left India’s home in
his Monte Carlo.
Dillon changed course, and proceeded to the residence of Medearis’s father,
Robert Medearis, where he knew Medearis stayed when he was on “the outs” with
India. There, Dillon spotted the Monte Carlo parked behind the house, as well as a male
getting into a silver Pontiac Grand Prix. He reported these observations to other officers
and requested assistance.
When Dillon pulled into the driveway, the male, Medearis, exited the Grand Prix
and ran toward the rear of the residence. Dillon followed in his patrol car while
Medearis scurried toward a four-wheeler, but debris in the area punctured Dillon’s tire.
Dillon got out of his car and yelled at Medearis, but Medearis jumped on the four-
wheeler and fled south on U.S. Highway 83.
Other officers arrived and pursued Medearis, who eventually circled through a
field and raced back to the residence. On his return, Medearis dismounted the four-
wheeler, ran to the Grand Prix, and sped off. But because Estes blocked the driveway
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entrance with his vehicle when he arrived, Medearis swerved and plowed through a
wire fence, continuing for roughly 100 yards before coming to a stop in a ditch along
the highway. A bloodied Medearis complied with commands to exit the vehicle before
being handcuffed.
Officers searched the Grand Prix and Medearis’s person, discovering a shotgun,
rifle, 	ammunition, 	two 	knives, 	drug 	paraphernalia, 	and 	32 	grams 	of 	suspected
marijuana. When questioned about the blood on his chin and wound on his chest,
Medearis stated that India stabbed him and that he had been cut by barbed wire. An
ambulance arrived and transported Medearis to the Indian Health Service (IHS)
Hospital in Rosebud. Medical providers subsequently airlifted Medearis to another
hospital in Rapid City where he was treated and released.
As Medearis left the scene, officers secured the home. With the spare tire now on
his vehicle, Dillon rushed off to the police station to get the search warrant documents
he had saved for the India Ford/Patrick Medearis and the Robert Medearis residences.
Dillon had prepared the documents earlier using information gleaned from several
informants over the months before and kept them on hand for a time when they might
be needed. But in his desire to swiftly get a warrant while the scene was still secure,
Dillon did not bolster his supporting affidavit with information from the last two days.
At any rate, printed documents in hand, Dillon headed next door to the
courthouse where a tribal judge reviewed them for roughly 20-25 minutes before
granting the search warrant. Upon obtaining the warrant, officers began their search.
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From the Robert Medearis residence, they seized multiple items including ammunition
and drug paraphernalia. In the India Ford/Patrick Medearis residence, officers located
drug paraphernalia, ammunition, and a sawed-off shotgun.
Just after midnight on April 27, 2020 (five days later), Medearis refused to pull
over for a vehicle stop and led officers on another pursuit, this one involving speeds in
excess of 100 mph. Eventually officers managed to stop Medearis on a gravel road using
a spike strip, at which point Medearis fell out of his Monte Carlo. They observed a
shallow self-inflicted wound on Medearis’s neck, bandaged it, and called for an
ambulance. The ambulance crew examined Medearis’ chest wound and neck laceration,
concluding that the injuries were minor and did not require further treatment.
Now medically cleared, officers took Medearis to the tribal correctional facility.
Afterward, at about 9:40 a.m. the same day (April 27), Antman and Estes interviewed
Medearis at the facility. They audio recorded the interview.
Antman 	and 	Estes 	introduced 	themselves 	and 	gathered 	biographical
information, such as Medearis’s date of birth and Social Security number. Estes then
gave Medearis the Miranda advisement, after which the following exchange took place:
Estes: Do you understand what I read to you?
Medearis: Yeah.
Estes: Do you have any questions?
Medearis: Yeah.
Estes: What questions do you have that I, pertaining to what I just read to
you?
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(11 second pause)
Estes: You don’t have any?
Medearis: Go ahead.
Estes: Okay, the waiver of rights portion, do you want to read it out loud,
and read, read this part?
Medearis: I, I need my glasses.
Estes: Okay, it just, it just says that “I have read this statement of my rights
and I understand what my rights are. At this time, I am willing to answer
questions without a lawyer present.” Do you agree with that? Did you
want to talk to us?
Medearis: Yeah, I do, but-
Estes: Okay, if you do, go ahead and sign it here, it’s up to you.
Medearis: Waiver of rights, hmm.
Antman: And you can still stop the interview whenever you want.
Medearis: Yeah.
Antman: If there’s, if there’s a particular question we’re asking and you
don’t want to answer it, you don’t have to answer if you don’t want to. It
just tells us that you know your rights and you’re agreeing to answer any
questions without a lawyer present.
Medearis: It feels like I’m breathing out of my neck.
Estes: Hmm?
Medearis: It feels like I’m breathing out of my neck, like air. Oh, but –
Estes: If you agree to talk to us, if you do, then, without a lawyer present,
just go ahead and sign it right there.
Medearis: Probably sign it, and if that fucker gets out in the fucking free
world, I’m fucked. I know that. Kick his shit again, it still looks all fucked
up, eh?
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Estes: Did you want to talk to us later on today? You want us to come
back later on today? It’s up to you.
Medearis: Let’s just talk, let’s go.
Estes: Okay, if you agree to talk to us without a lawyer present, just sign it
right there.
Medearis: How about I initial it?
Estes: Okay.
Once Medearis initialed the form, Estes and Antman began questioning him and
continued for a little more than a half hour. They asked him about the events India and
the informants had chronicled and about his involvement with guns and drugs.
Medearis repeatedly denied he possessed a certain pistol. When Medearis requested a
lie detector test, officers ended the interview.
Within three months of the interview, a federal grand jury indicted Medearis for
being a Prohibited Person in Possession of a Firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§
922(g)(1), 	922(g)(3), 	924(a)(2), 	and 	924(d). 	Medearis 	moves 	to 	suppress 	evidence
obtained via the search warrant, as well as statements he made during the interview.1
Medearis also requests a Franks hearing.2 The government opposes the motion and
request.3
1 Docket No. 38.
2 Docket No. 45; see Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978).
3 Docket Nos. 41, 50.
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DISCUSSION
A. The Warrant
1. Franks Hearing
Medearis claims that he is entitled to a Franks hearing because Dillon colored, or
left out, facts in his affidavit that, if included, would have negated probable cause for
the issuance of the search warrant.4 To receive a Franks hearing, Medearis must first
make a “substantial preliminary showing that the warrant’s issuing judge relied on
statements in an affidavit that were false or were omissions made knowingly and
intentionally or with reckless disregard for the truth.”5 Such a showing “requires a
defendant to offer specific allegations along with supporting affidavits or similarly
reliable statements.”6 A mere allegation without proof is not enough to satisfy this
substantial burden.7 Nor are allegations of negligence or innocent mistake sufficient to
require a hearing.8
4 Docket No. 45.
5 United States v. Mayweather, 993 F.3d 1035, 1043 (8th Cir. 2021) (cleaned up); see
also Franks, 438 U.S. at 155-56, 171-72.
6 United States v. Gonzalez, 781 F.3d 422, 430 (8th Cir. 2015).
7 Mayweather, 993 F.3d at 1043.
8 Id.
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Instead, 	deliberate 	falsity 	or reckless disregard 	must 	be 	shown.9 Medearis
contends that “law enforcement intentionally or recklessly misrepresented or omitted
facts surrounding [its] investigation.”10 But there is no evidence of intentionality here,11
leaving only the possibility of reckless disregard.
The test for reckless disregard “is whether, after viewing all the evidence, the
affiant must have entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his statements or had
obvious reasons to doubt the accuracy of the information he reported.”12 A showing of
this kind is “not lightly met.”13 Additionally, the Franks challenger “must ... show that
the alleged false statement or omission was necessary to the finding of probable
cause.”14
The government acknowledges that information was omitted from Dillon’s
affidavit.15 The question then becomes whether Dillon, in omitting various facts from
9 Franks, 438 U.S. at 155-56, 171-72.
10 Docket No. 45 at 2.
11 See Mot. Hr’g Tr. 62 (Nov. 10, 2021) (“Q. And you would never intentionally
mislead a judge, would you? A. I would not.”).
12 United States v. Butler, 594 F.3d 955, 961 (8th Cir. 2010).
13 Id. (quoting United States v. Wajda, 810 F.2d 754, 759 (8th Cir. 1987)).
14 Mayweather, 933 F.3d at 1043 (quoting United States v. Engler, 521 F.3d 965, 969
(8th Cir. 2008)).
15 See Docket No. 50 at 3 (“The government agrees that the affidavit does not
include a complete summary of every interview or law enforcement contact
referenced therein. Rather the affidavit contains information that is relevant to
(continued. . .)
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his affidavit, would have had “serious doubts as to the truth of his statements.” Dillon,
a witness the Court found to be credible, testified that he included those facts in the
affidavit which he considered “pertinent to the investigation” and not any potentially
relevant information in the various interview reports.16
The omissions Medearis objects to include (1) relationships between confidential
informants, (2) substance abuse, health, and legal issues of some informants, (3) how
long one informant resided in the Rosebud area, and (4) certain informants being
unsure or having conflicting information about where Medearis resided.17 It remains
unclear whether Dillon was even aware of many of the ancillary details that Medearis
highlights as omitted. Dillon said that he did not listen to the recordings made of the
interviews; instead, he relied on interview reports when available.18 And in cases
without a report or his own personal involvement, Dillon obtained his information by
talking with the interviewing officer.19
establish probable cause for the search warrant.”).
16 See Mot. Hr’g Tr. 60 (“I included what I thought was pertinent to the
investigation that we were doing that day.”).
17 See Docket No. 45 at 2-3.
18 See Mot. Hr’g Tr. 52 (“Q. … the sources that you relied upon to establish
probable cause, do you recall where you got that information? A. Yes, from
memorandums of interviews.”).
19 See Mot. Hr’g Tr. 57 (“Q. We don’t have an interview memo and you say that
you didn’t listen to the recording, so how did you know about this interview? A.
… we all work together with the drug task force … it’s not uncommon to discuss
(continued. . .)
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While he did not rely on interview recordings for his information, nothing in the
record gives the Court reason to believe that Dillon acted with reckless disregard for the
truth or entertained any “serious doubts as to the truth of his statements.”20 Nor were
the omissions critical to a finding of probable cause or the sort which would give an
officer obvious cause to “doubt the accuracy of the information he reported.”21
Dillon also made a typographical error in his affidavit. Paragraph 6 of the
affidavit describes an event that took place on April 19, 2020, as having occurred on
March 19, 2020.22 Yet, “[a] mere typographical error does not establish a ‘deliberate
falsehood,’ or a ‘reckless disregard for the truth,’ nor does it cast doubt on the affidavit's
showing of probable cause to search the residence.”23 What’s more, because the correct
date was closer in time to the issuance of the search warrant, replacing it serves to
strengthen probable cause, not weaken it.24 After examining the error as well as the
interviews that we conduct.”).
20 Butler, 594 F.3d at 961; Mot. Hr’g Tr. 50-51 (“Q. And you mentioned facts from
several law enforcement reports in your affidavit? A. Yes. Q. That you felt
established probable cause – A. Yes.”).
21Butler, 594 F.3d at 961.
22 See Mot. Hr’g Ex. 7 at 5 (Nov. 10, 2021).
23 Butler, 594 F.3d at 961-62.
24 See United States v. Johnson, 848 F.3d 872, 877 (8th Cir. 2017) (“A warrant
becomes stale if the information supporting the warrant is not sufficiently close
in time to the issuance of the warrant and the subsequent search conducted so
that probable cause can be said to exist as of the time of the search.”) (cleaned
(continued. . .)
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omissions, Medearis fails to meet the high threshold of showing reckless disregard for
the truth to warrant a Franks hearing.25
2. Leon Exception
Medearis also attacks the search warrant on probable cause and over breadth
grounds.26 A court though may “consider the applicability of the good-faith exception
to the exclusionary rule” before “reviewing the existence of probable cause.”27 The court
may likewise assume, without deciding, that the scope of the warrant was too broad
and apply the exception.28
up).
25 See United States v. Engler, 521 F.3d 965, 971 (8th Cir. 2008) (noting that denial of
Franks hearing was appropriate when defendant failed “to establish that law
enforcement officers deliberately or recklessly omitted information in an attempt
to mislead the issuing judicial officer,” “did not provide an explanation for the
absence of such evidence,” and “failed to make a preliminary showing that a
Franks hearing was necessary”).
26 Docket No. 39 at 4-8.
27 United States v. Williams, 976 F.3d 807, 809 (8th Cir. 2020).
28 United States v. Harris, No. 20-CR-98 (SRN/TNL), 2021 WL 3929270, at *4 (D.
Minn. Sept. 2, 2021); see also United States v. Stephen, No. 18-CR-31-CJW, 2018 WL
4839065, at *12 (N.D. Iowa Oct. 4, 2018) (“Leon good-faith exception applies to the
assertion that the warrant was overbroad with the same force and effect as it
does to the assertion that the warrant lacked probable cause), aff’d, 984 F.3d 625
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 2021 WL 4508830 (U.S. Oct. 4, 2021) (No. 21-5163).
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Under the good-faith exception, disputed evidence will not be suppressed if the
executing 	officers’ 	reliance 	on 	a 	search 	warrant 	was 	objectively 	reasonable.29 In
determining objective reasonableness, a court “can look outside the four corners of the
[warrant] affidavit and consider the totality of the circumstances, including what [ ]
officers knew but didn’t include in the affidavit.”30 “[T]he fact that a neutral [judge] has
issued a warrant is the clearest indication that [ ] officers acted in an objectively
reasonable manner, or in objective good faith.”31 “[T]he threshold for establishing [that
the good-faith exception dos not apply] is a high one, and it should be.”32
The exception, however, does not apply when:
1. 	The affidavit or testimony supporting the warrant contained a false statement
made knowingly and internationally or with reckless disregard of its truth,
this misleading the issuing judge;
2. 	The 	issuing 	judge 	“wholly 	abandoned 	his judicial 	role” 	in 	issuing 	the
warrant;
3. 	The affidavit in support of the warrant is “so lacking in indicia of probable
cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable”; and
29 United States v. Houston, 665 F.3d 991, 994 (8th Cir. 2012).
30 United States v. Dickerman, 954 F.3d 1060, 1065 98th Cir. 2020) (quoting United
States v. Farlee, 757 F.3d 810, 819 (8th Cir. 2014)).
31Messerschmidt v. Millender, 565 U.S. 535, 546 (2012) (internal quotation omitted).
32Leon, 468 U.S. at 923.
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4. 	The warrant is “so facially deficient” that no police officer could reasonably
presume the warrant to be valid.33
Here, 	none 	of 	these 	circumstances 	exists. 	Medearis 	presented 	no 	credible
evidence that the tribal judge was mislead by a false statement in the affidavit that
Dillon made knowingly and intentionally or with reckless disregard for the truth. The
March 19, 2020 date was an inadvertent error.34 Indeed, supplanting that date with the
right one (April 19, 2020) enhances rather than dilutes, probable cause.
Nor did Medearis show, or submit evidence to suggest, that the tribal judge
“wholly abandoned his judicial role” when he issued the search warrant. The judge
took his time reading everything35 and did not shirk his judicial responsibilities by
rubber stamping an affidavit and warrant that were deficient and fatally flawed.36
Dillon’s affidavit was not “bare bones” either or so insufficient that he and
executing officers could not reasonably believe they had probable cause to search
33 United States v. Jackson, 784 F.3d 1227, 1231 (8th Cir. 2015) (citing Leon, 468 U.S.
at 923).
34 Mot. Hr’g Tr. 52-53, 61-62.
35 Mot Hr’g Tr. 47-48 (“Q. [H]ow long did he take to read it? A. I was in his
chambers for about 20, 25 minutes.”).
36 	Compare 	Dickerman, 	954 	F.3d 	at 	1068-69 	(“viewing 	the 	totality 	of 	the
circumstances from the officers’ perspective, they had no indication that the [ ] judge
had failed to understand the affidavit or otherwise acted as a rubber stamp) with United
States v. Rodriquez, No. 3:20-CR-30016-RAL, 2020 WL 6111638, at ** 2-3, 9-12 (D.S.D. Oct.
15, 2020) (the issuing judge abandoned his duties and acted as a mere rubber stamp for
tribal police).
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Medearis, India, and the two homes.37 The affidavit, which itself arguably contained
enough information to support a finding of probable cause, included these and other
details:
• 	Law 	enforcement 	received 	information 	that 	Medearis 	and 	India 	sold
methamphetamine within the Rosebud Sioux Tribe.
• 	On March 19, 2020 [sic], tribal officers observed a vehicle leave the India
Ford/Patrick Medearis residence and, after a K-9 alert, discovered three grams
of marijuana and a mirror with methamphetamine residue in the vehicle.
• 	On April 19, 2020, an interviewee advised Estes that Medearis owned three
pistols and a rifle and that if “law enforcement wanted to stop the drugs,” it
should watch Medearis’s house and others.
• 	On April 17, 2020, an interviewee, acknowledged having “heard about” India
and Medearis being “around with a lot of drugs.” The interviewee stated that
India and Medearis lived at Shannon Wright’s old residence (known by
Dillon to be 1616 E. Red Cloud Road) in South Antelope. The interviewee also
“heard” that Medearis had pistol whipped India and that she had several
knots on her head. The interviewee likewise reported that “Medearis had a
pipe with him when he returned to his residence on his four-wheeler” six or
seven days ago and that there was constant traffic in and out of the house at
all hours.
• 	On April 14, 2020, an interviewee told Antman that Medearis and India were
in a relationship and described the various vehicles they drove, including a
silver Grand Prix. The interviewee said that Medearis and Dale Haukaas
“were bringing stuff in,” and that Kara was also involved. Additionally, the
interviewee mentioned that India was “strung out” and that Medearis had
threatened the interviewee with a gun.
• 	Lastly, on April 13, 2020, an interviewee informed Antman that Medearis,
while with India, held up a bag of methamphetamine and shot off a gun
37 Compare Dickerman, 954 F.3d at 1066-67 (given the many details in the affidavit
about the investigation, the officers’ reliance on the warrant was objectively reasonable)
with Rodriquez, 2020 WL 6111638, at ** 1-2, 8-9 (search warrant was so lacking in indicia
of probable cause that the officers’ belief in its validity was objectively unreasonable).
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while accusing someone of stealing his methamphetamine. According to the
interviewee, when India tried to leave in her grey or silver car, Medearis
stabbed her tire, stopped her, and the two left together. Later, the interviewee
said, 	Medearis 	returned 	and 	apologized 	after 	finding 	the 	missing
methamphetamine.38
Beyond what he set forth in his affidavit, Dillon knew the following:
• 	When Medearis and India were “on the outs,” Medearis went and stayed at
his father’s residence.39 Otherwise, the two lived together in South Antelope.
• 	Medearis was a felon who could not possess firearms.40
• 	On April 21, 2020, Medearis chased India and shot a pistol in the air.41
• 	During the April 21 interview at the Tripp County Sheriff’s Office, India
provided information on the incident where Medearis accused someone of
breaking 	into 	his Monte 	Carlo 	and stealing 	his methamphetamine 	and
marijuana.42
• 	India also described the incident where Medearis struck her in the head with
a pistol and stated that “Pat was trying to be a drug lord.”43
• 	And India disclosed that Medearis had a black shotgun in his silver Grand
Prix, that he sold “smaller bags” of methamphetamine from the house, and
38 Mot. Hr’g Ex. 7 at 5-8.
39 See Mot. Hr’g Tr. 50 (“It was known that India and Pat resided in South
Antelope and that Pat was also sometimes at his dad’s when him and India were
on the outs.”); Mot. Hr’g Tr. 71 (“A. It was pretty clear that India lived at the
residence in South Antelope …. And also resided in by Pat and when Pat isn’t
there he also resides at his father’s.”).
40See Mot. Hr’g Exs. 6, 10.
41 See Mot. Hr’g Ex. 4 at 1-2.
42 See Mot. Hr’g Ex. 4 at 2-3.
43 See Mot. Hr’g Ex. 4 at 3.
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that “the last time she saw Pat with meth was last week” but he had been
“out of meth” recently.44
• 	After Medearis’s flight on the four-wheeler and in the silver Grand Prix from
his 	father’s 	residence, 	officers 	discovered 	a 	black 	shotgun, 	a 	rifle,
ammunition, drug paraphernalia, 32 grams of marijuana, and knives on
Medearis’s person and in the Grand Prix.45
With this knowledge, Dillon submitted the search warrant, which the tribal judge
reviewed for roughly 20 minutes.46 In paragraph 5 of his warrant affidavit, Dillon made
clear that “[t]his affidavit is intended to show only that there is sufficient probable cause
for the requested warrant and does not set forth all of my knowledge about this
matter.”47 Despite the paragraph, the judge chose to issue the warrant without asking
further questions.48
44 See Mot. Hr’g Ex. 4 at 3-4.
45 See Mot. Hr’g Ex. 6.
46 See Mot. Hr’g Tr. 49 (“With COVID going on – actually I had to step out of the
chambers for that 20 minutes while he read it. I stood outside his door.”).
47 See Mot. Hr’g Ex. 7 at 4.
48 See Leon, 468 U.S. at 921 (“In the ordinary case, an officer cannot be expected to
question the magistrate’s probable-cause determination ....”); Mot. Hr’g Tr. 56
(“A. I guess if the judge had questions on anything, they typically ask and I
usually 	get 	sent 	back 	to the 	police 	department 	to 	make 	corrections, 	add,
whatever it may be. Q. But you didn’t get any questions? A. No.”).
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Considering what Dillon presented to the tribal judge (in the affidavit) and what
he knew at the time,49 it was reasonable for Dillon, and his fellow officers, to believe
that the warrant the judge issued, and the searches authorized in it, were lawful.50
Finally, the search warrant was not so lacking in particulars or overbroad that no
executing officer could reasonably presume it was invalid. Any defects in the warrant’s
scope were not facially obvious so that a reasonable officer would have known that it
was constitutionally infirm. The warrant described, with specificity, the persons and
places to be searched and the items to be seized. And there was a discernable nexus
between the contraband and the persons and places identified. The good-faith exception
applies and defeats Medearis’s lack of particularity/overbreadth claim.51
B. The Interview
49 See Dickerman, 954 F.3d at 1067 (“we may consider ‘what the officer[s] knew but
did not include in the affidavit’ to decide whether their reliance on the warrant
was objectively reasonable”).
50 See, e.g., United States v. Patterson, 666 Fed. App’x 569, 571-72 (8th Cir. 2016)
(known drug dealer’s frequent visits to a home can establish nexus to search the
home for contraband); United States v. Keele, 589 F.3d 940, 944 (8th Cir. 2009)
(“evidence of drug manufacturing and distribution” recovered from car accident
scene sufficient to justify search of driver’s residence); United States v. Ross, 487
F.3d 1120, 1123 (8th Cir. 2007) (nexus to search individual’s home exists where
that person is closely tied to narcotics trafficking).
51 See United States v. Szczerba, 897 F.3d 929, 936-39 (8th Cir. 2018); see also United
States v. Henderson, 416 F.3d 686, 695 (8th Cir. 2005) (affirming finding that good-faith
exception applied to overly broad warrant); United States v. Saddler, No. 4:19-CR-40109-
01-KES, 2020 WL 6255652, at ** 5-6 (D.S.D. Oct. 23, 2020) (warrant lacking particularly
upheld under good-faith exception), appeal filed, No. 21-1884 (8th Cir. Apr. 21, 2021).
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Continuing his attempts at evidentiary preclusion, Medearis claims that the
statements he made during his interview on April 27, 2020, were obtained in violation
of Miranda52 and involuntary under the Fifth Amendment.53 The Court disagrees.54
1. Miranda Waiver
The waiver of Miranda rights may be given expressly or implied from a course of
conduct.55 The validity of a Miranda waiver depends on whether the waiver was both
“voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather
than intimidation, coercion, or deception,” and “made with a full awareness of both the
nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon
it.”56 Making 	this 	determination 	requires 	a 	court 	to 	consider 	the 	totality 	of 	the
circumstances.57 The government bears the burden of proving any purported waiver by
a preponderance of the evidence.58
52 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
53 Docket No. 39 at 8-11.
54 See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 444 (2000) (“[C]ases in which a
defendant can make a colorable argument that a self-incriminating statement
was ‘compelled’ despite the fact that the law enforcement authorities adhered to
the dictates of Miranda are rare.”).
55 Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 382-83 (2010).
56 Id.
57 Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986).
58 Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 168 (1986).
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The Court notes Medearis’s concerns, which primarily focus on (1) the presence
of drugs in his system (unknown by the interviewing officers but later discovered in a
presumptive drug test),59 (2) the fact that he wore a smock because of worries of mental
instability,60 	and 	(3) 	the 	recent 	neck 	wound 	which 	caused 	him 	a 	measure 	of
discomfort.61 To be sure, these could all help make Medearis more susceptible to acts of
coercion by law enforcement. But “even if a suspect has a somewhat diminished
capacity to resist coercion due to a mental defect, a Miranda waiver will not be
invalidated on that basis if there is no evidence of police coercion.”62
About eight hours before the interview, Medearis had self-inflicted “superficial”
wounds 	to 	his 	own 	neck. 	The 	wounds 	did 	not 	require 	further 	treatment 	or
hospitalization according to the ambulance crew. Then, at 9:40 a.m. in a 10x10 room at
the correctional facility,63 Estes and Antman gathered routine biographical information
from Medearis, who did not have his glasses, and read Medearis his Miranda rights.64
59 See Mot. Hr’g Tr. 115 (“I didn’t know that they gave him the drug test.”).
60 See Mot. Hr’g Tr. 113 (“Q. He was in a suicide smock, wasn’t he? A. Yes.”).
61 Docket No. 39 at 9.
62 United States v. Vinton, 631 F.3d 476, 483 (8th Cir. 2011).
63 See Mot. Hr’g Tr. 94 (“probably 10 by 10.”).
64 See Mot. Hr’g Ex. 21 at 00:00-03:33.
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Medearis orally agreed to speak outside the presence of an attorney after Estes’s
oral recitation of Miranda.65 About a minute later and at the only moment when
Medearis exhibited signs of discomfort from his wound,66 officers offered to leave and
come back later.67 In response, Medearis said, “let’s just talk, let’s go.”68 After making
this statement, Medearis initialed the waiver portion of the advice of rights form69 and
engaged in a back and forth dialogue with the unarmed70 officers for 34 minutes.71
Despite Medearis’s potential vulnerabilities, he appears lucid and in control, on
the audio recording, throughout the interview.72 At no time did officers threaten,
65 See Mot. Hr’g Ex. 21 at 04:20-04:25 (“Did you want to talk to us?” “Yeah, I do,
but-“).
66 See Mot. Hr’g Ex. 21 at 04:48-05:30 (“It feels like I’m breathing out my neck, like
air …” “If you agree to talk to us, if you do, then, without a lawyer present, just
go ahead and sign it right there.” “Probably sign that …”).
67 See Mot. Hr’g Ex. 21 at 05:44-05:52 (“Do you want to talk to us later on today?
You want us to come back later on today? It’s up to you.”).
68 See Mot. Hr’g Ex. 21 at 05:54-05:56.
69 See Mot. Hr’g Ex. 21 at 05:56-06:20 (“Okay, if you agree to talk to us without a
lawyer present, just sign it right there.” “How about I initial it?” “Okay.”); Mot.
Hr’g Ex. 18.
70 See Mot. Hr’g Tr. 95 (“Q. … nobody had a firearm in the interview? A. No.”).
71 See Mot. Hr’g Ex. 21 at 06:20-40:10.
72 See United States v. Gaddy, 532 F.3d 783, 788 (8th Cir. 2008) (finding waiver
valid when a suspect did not sleep and consumed drugs and alcohol the night
before an interview but appeared cooperative and calm to the interviewer);
United States v. LaForge, No. 3:19-CR-30065-RAL, 2019 WL 4410301, at *2-3 (D.S.D.
Sept. 	16, 	2019) 	(finding 	valid 	waiver 	and 	voluntariness 	despite 	claims 	of
(continued. . .)
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intimidate, pressure or lay hands on Medearis or use strong arm tactics (such as
brandishing a firearm) to get him to waive his rights and talk.73 Nor did officers raise
their voices or make promises or statements that might otherwise be construed as
improperly coercive or deceptive.74 Instead, officers told Medearis that he could end the
interview at any time75 and informed him that he was free to answer or not as he saw
fit.76 On this record, Medearis’s decision to waive his Miranda rights was the “product of
free and deliberate choice.”
Medearis also appears to have had the wherewithal to comprehend his rights
and to understand the consequences of waiving them.77 Despite having drugs in his
intoxication).
73 See Vinton, 631 F.3d at 483-84 (finding valid waiver and statements voluntary
absent a showing that defendant “was intimidated, coerced, or threatened by the
police prior to or during his interview”); Mot. Hr’g Tr. 131 (“Q. Did you use any
force on him to get him to waive his Miranda rights or talk to you? A. No….”).
74 See Mot. Hr’g Tr. 132 (“Q. Did you or any of the agents engage in any
misrepresentations in an effort to get him to talk to you or tell you things that
you were looking for? A. No.”).
75 See Mot. Hr’g Ex. 21 at 04:40-04:43 (“You can still stop the interview whenever
you want.”).
76 See Mot. Hr’g Ex. 21 at 04:43-04:53 (“If there’s, if there’s a particular question
we’re asking and you don’t want to answer it, you don’t have to answer if you
don’t want to. It just tells us that you know your rights and you’re agreeing to
answer any questions without a lawyer present.”).
77 See Mot. Hr’g Ex. 21 at 03:30-03:33 (“Do you understand what I read to you?”
“Yeah.”).
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system,78 Medearis was able to freely converse and have an intelligent conversation
with 	officers.79 Medearis 	had 	experience 	with 	the 	criminal 	justice 	system,80 and
preceding 	Estes’ 	oral 	Miranda 	recital, 	Medearis 	responsively 	answered 	questions,
providing his full name, date of birth, and Social Security number. Notably, Medearis
expressed the clarity of mind to deny several wrongdoings,81 and to blame India for the
gun and drug related misconduct.82
78 See United States v. Turner, 157 F.3d 552, 556 (8th Cir. 1998) (finding waiver even
if defendant was intoxicated by PCP); Mot. Hr’g Tr. 100 (“Q. Did you have any
… involvement in the drug test that is related to that report at Exhibit 17? A.
No.”).
79 See United States v. Little Hoop, No. 3:19-CR-30121-RAL, 2020 WL 7310898, at *3-
4 (D.S.D. Dec. 11, 2020) (“The Eighth Circuit has found waivers to be valid even
when the defendants were under the influence so long as the defendants
appeared sober and as though they understood their rights.”); Mot. Hr’g Tr. 98
(“Q. At the time of your interview, did you make any observations of the
Defendant that he was under the influence of alcohol or controlled substances?
A. No.”); Mot. Hr’g Tr. 99 (“Q. Did it seem that he was capable of going through
the interview with you? A. Yes.”).
80 See Docket No. 17 at 4-7; see also Mot. Hr’g Tr. 102 (“I can’t remember exact
year, but it was early in my career. He was indicted for drugs. Q. For a
conspiracy charge, correct? A. Correct.”).
81 See Mot. Hr’g Ex. 21 at 10:13-10:30 (Medearis: “I wasn’t shooting at her. I’ll put
that on my dead baby’s grave, I did not shoot at her. She had that pistol.”); 15:07-
15:10 (Medearis: “I didn’t fucking hold no gun to nobody though, I put that on
my mama’s grave.”); 29:52-29:55 (Estes: “Why did you hit her in the head with a
pistol?” Medearis: “I didn’t hit nobody in the head with a pistol.”).
82 See Mot. Hr’g Ex. 21 at 09:51-10:12 (Estes: “I want to get that pistol back. I want
to get it out of the hands so we don’t have to worry about it.” Medearis: “I don’t
got it, India has all that shit. Ben, I swear to God, give me a Bible, I’ll fucking,
India has that.” Estes: “Well how did she get it? Because you had it earlier.”
(continued. . .)
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Medearis knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his rights when he
both orally agreed to speak with officers, outside the presence of an attorney, and
physically initialed the waiver in the advice of rights form. Having made his statements
in compliance with Miranda, Medearis has no room to complain.
2. Voluntariness
Medearis next claims that his statements were involuntary under the Fifth
Amendment because he had recently woken up, two officers questioned him, he had a
neck wound and did not understand his rights, and the crime had been solved.83
Voluntariness in the Fifth Amendment and Miranda waiver contexts is essentially the
same inquiry.84 As already discussed, Estes and Antman did not coerce Medearis,
overbear his will, or critically impair his capacity for self-determination. Medearis made
his statements voluntarily and in accord with the Fifth Amendment.85
CONCLUSION
Medearis failed to establish that Dillon’s omissions and erroneous date, in the
search warrant affidavit, were knowing and intentional or done with reckless disregard
Medearis: “I didn’t have it.”); 21:00-21:15 (Antman: “So, what about all the traffic
that come into your house, that house? … I’m talking about recently since you
guys moved in.” Medearis: “Those are mostly all her friends that came over.”).
83 Docket No. 39 at 11.
84 Connelly, 479 U.S. at 170; United States v. Havlik, 710 F.3d 818, 822 (8th Cir.
2013).
85 See United States v. LeBrun, 363 F.3d 715, 724-26 (8th Cir. 2004) (en banc).
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for the truth. He is therefore not entitled to a hearing or relief under Franks. And
because Dillon and 	his brethren acted in good-faith reliance on a warrant they
reasonably believed was proper, the evidence seized from the homes and vehicles is not
subject to suppression. Medearis’s statements later on are likewise admissible because
he validly waived his rights and spoke voluntarily to officers.
RECOMMENDATION
Based on the authorities and legal analysis set forth in this report, and the record
now before the Court, it is
RECOMMENDED that Medearis’s motion and supplemental motion to suppress
and request for a Franks hearing86 be denied.
NOTICE
The 	parties 	have 	14 	calendar 	days 	after 	service 	of 	this 	report 	and
recommendation to file their objections to the same.87 Unless an extension of time for
cause is later obtained,88 failure to file timely objections will result in the waiver of the
86 See Docket No. 38, 45.
87See 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1); Fed. R. Crim. P. 59(b).
88See Thompson v. Nix, 897 F.2d 356, 357 (8th Cir. 1990); Nash v. Black, 781 F.2d 665,
667 & n.3 (8th Cir. 1986) (citing Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 155 (1985)).
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right to appeal questions of fact.89 Objections must “identify[] those issues on which
further review is desired[.]”90
Dated this 24th day of November, 2021, at Pierre, South Dakota.
BY THE COURT:
MARK A. MORENO
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
89See Thompson, 897 F.2d at 357; Nash, 781 at 667.
90Arn, 474 U.S. at 155.
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