USA v. Delgado-Lopez

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v.
JEFFREY OMAR DELGADO-LÓPEZ,
Defendant.
Criminal No. 25-283 (FAB)
OPINION 	AND 	ORDER
BESOSA, Senior District Judge.
Before 	the 	Court 	is 	defendant 	Jeffrey 	Omar 	Delgado-López
(“Delgado”)’s 	motion 	to 	suppress 	evidence 	found 	in 	a 	vehicle
pursuant to a search warrant. 	(Docket No. 20.) 	The United States
opposed the motion. 	(Docket No. 26.) 	For the following reasons,
the Court DENIES defendant Delgado’s motion to suppress and DENIES
his request for a Franks hearing. 	(Docket No. 20.)
I. 	Relevant Background
On 	June 	1, 	2025, 	Delgado 	traveled 	to 	Isla 	Verde, 	Carolina
from 	Caguas, 	Puerto 	Rico 	in 	his 	brother’s 	vehicle, 	a 	Ford 	F-150
truck 	(“F-150”). 	.Id. 	at 	p. 	2. 	Between 	4:00 	and 	5:00 	a.m., 	a
Carolina 	Municipal 	Police 	Agent 	(the 	“agent”) 	was 	patrolling 	the
area 	when 	he 	noticed 	a 	black 	F-150 	parked 	illegally 	“in 	an 	area
couples frequent to have sex.” 	Id. at p. 3; Docket No. 26 at p. 3.
While 	the 	agent 	was 	issuing 	a 	ticket, 	he 	verified 	if 	anyone 	was
inside the vehicle and observed a firearm in plain view. 	(Docket
Case 3:25-cr-00283-FAB Document 33 Filed 03/12/26 Page 1 of 10

Criminal No. 25-283 (FAB) 	2
No. 26 at p. 3.) 	When Delgado and three other individuals returned
to the F-150, the agent asked for identification. 	(Docket No. 20
at 	p. 	3.) 	According 	to 	Delgado, 	they 	were 	patted 	down 	and
questioned for more than an hour. 	(Docket No. 20 at p. 3.)
Delgado 	informed 	the 	agent 	that 	he 	was 	not 	the 	owner 	of 	the
F-150 	and 	that 	he 	did 	not 	have 	the 	keys 	to 	it. 	Id. 	at 	p. 	4.
Delgado stated that the F-150 belonged to his brother but that he
was the driver. 	(Docket No. 26 at p. 7.) 	The agent asked Delgado
if he had firearms license, and he answered that he did not. 	Id.
The agent gave the four individuals citations to go to the precinct
on June 3rd. 	Id.; Docket No. 20 at p. 4. 	Delgado states the agent
then informed him that he was going to take the F-150 for further
investigation. 	(Docket No. 20 at p. 4.)
Some time later (it is unclear exactly when), the agent spoke
with 	the 	state 	prosecutor 	and 	proceeded 	to 	request 	a 	search
warrant. 	(Docket No. 26 at p. 8.) 	The search warrant was issued,
and the F-150 was searched. 	(Docket No. 20 at p. 5.) 	Inside the
F-150, the municipal agents found:
• 	two 9mm magazines, one with 15 rounds of ammunition and
one with 27 rounds,
• 	a Glock pistol model 19 modified to fire automatically,
• 	three cellphones,
• 	two traffic tickets in Delgado’s name, and
Case 3:25-cr-00283-FAB Document 33 Filed 03/12/26 Page 2 of 10

Criminal No. 25-283 (FAB) 	3
• 	either a medical prescription or a vial of prescription
medicine 	(also 	unclear) 	in 	Delgado’s 	name. 	(Docket
No. 26 at p. 8; Docket No. 20 at pp. 5-6.)
On 	June 	25, 	2025, 	Delgado 	was 	indicted 	on 	two 	counts:
(1) felon in possession of firearms and ammunition in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 	922(g)(1); 	and 	(2) 	possession 	of 	a 	machinegun 	in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(o). 	(Docket No. 1.) 	On February 12,
2026, Delgado requested that the Court suppress the evidence seized
from 	the 	F-150 	or 	alternatively, 	hold 	a 	Franks 	hearing. 	(Docket
No. 20.) 	The government responded. 	(Docket No. 26.)
II. 	Discussion
Delgado 	argues 	(1) 	that 	the 	stop 	and 	pat-down 	search 	was
improper 	because 	there 	was 	no 	reasonable 	suspicion 	to 	stop 	him,
(2) 	that 	the 	F-150 	was 	seized 	and 	searched 	in 	violation 	of 	the
Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, and (3) that the search
warrant 	affidavit 	omitted 	material 	facts, 	which, 	if 	provided 	to
the magistrate judge, would result in finding no probable cause to
the 	search 	the 	F-150. 	(Docket 	No. 	20.) 	Because 	Delgado 	argues
there 	were 	material 	omissions 	in 	the 	search 	warrant’s 	affidavit,
he 	also 	requests 	a 	Franks 	hearing 	to 	determine 	the 	warrant’s
validity. 	The government counters that Delgado (1) fails to show
that 	the 	pat-down 	search 	was 	improper 	because 	he 	was 	not 	subject
Case 3:25-cr-00283-FAB Document 33 Filed 03/12/26 Page 3 of 10

Criminal No. 25-283 (FAB) 	4
to 	a 	Terry1 	stop, 	(2) 	has 	not 	established 	standing 	to 	challenge
the 	search 	of 	the 	F-150 	because 	he 	has 	no 	reasonable 	expectation
of privacy in the vehicle; and (3) has not established a sufficient
showing 	that 	there 	was 	a 	material 	omission 	in 	the 	search 	warrant
because 	Delgado 	has 	only 	provided 	self-serving 	statements.
(Docket No. 26.)
A. 	Terry Stop
Delgado first argues that he was unlawfully stopped and
patted down in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 	(Docket No. 20
at 	pp. 	8-9.) 	The 	government 	argues 	that 	the 	officers 	did 	not
perform a Terry stop. 	Terry stops are “brief investigatory stops
of 	persons 	or 	vehicles 	that 	fall 	short 	of 	a 	traditional 	arrest.”
United States v. Tiru-Plaza, 766 F.3d 111, 115 (1st Cir. 2014). 	A
Terry stop occurs “whenever a police officer accosts an individual
and restrains his freedom to walk away.” 	Terry, 392 U.S. at 16.
The Court declines to address if there was a Terry stop
because 	neither 	party 	seeks 	to 	admit 	or 	exclude 	any 	evidence
obtained 	as 	a 	result 	of 	the 	alleged 	stop. 	See 	United 	States 	v.
Biaou, 	2026 	WL 	221768, 	at 	*8 	n.9 	(D.D.C. 	Jan. 	28, 	2026) 	(citing
United States v. Kahre, 737 F.3d 554, 565 (9th Cir. 2013) (“Because
the government does not intend to introduce evidence obtained from
1 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
Case 3:25-cr-00283-FAB Document 33 Filed 03/12/26 Page 4 of 10

Criminal No. 25-283 (FAB) 	5
[defendant’s] 	cell 	phone 	or 	the 	suspected 	contraband, 	the 	Court
declines 	to 	address 	those 	claims 	here.”). 	Whether 	a 	Terry 	stop
occurred 	and 	whether 	any 	of 	Delgado’s 	constitutional 	rights 	were
violated 	are 	moot 	points 	for 	the 	purposes 	of 	his 	motion 	to
suppress.
B. 	Standing to Challenge Vehicle Search and Seizure
Before 	addressing 	the 	merits 	of 	Delgado’s 	arguments
about the search and seizure of the F-150, the Court must address
whether Delgado has standing to challenge the search and seizure.
The Court finds that he does not.
The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of people to
be secure in their houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures.” 	U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 	Fourth Amendment
protection may only be claimed when a defendant has shown that he
or she has an expectation of privacy. 	United States v. Symovenich,
688 F.3d 12, 19 (1st Cir. 2012).
“In 	the 	context 	of 	a 	vehicle 	search, 	a 	defendant 	must
show a property or a possessory interest in the automobile in order
to establish a reasonable expectation of privacy.” 	United States
v. 	Almeida, 	748 	F.3d 	41, 	47 	(1st 	Cir. 	2014) 	(internal 	quotations
and 	citations 	omitted). 	“[A] 	person 	who 	borrows 	a 	vehicle 	with
the 	owner’s 	permission 	may 	have 	a 	reasonable 	expectation 	of
privacy.” 	Id. 	To 	determine 	if 	a 	defendant 	has 	a 	reasonable
Case 3:25-cr-00283-FAB Document 33 Filed 03/12/26 Page 5 of 10

Criminal No. 25-283 (FAB) 	6
expectation of privacy in a vehicle, the Court looks at a variety
of factors, such as:
ownership, possession, and/or control; historical use of
the 	property 	searched 	or 	the 	thing 	seized; 	ability 	to
regulate 	access; 	the 	totality 	of 	the 	surrounding
circumstances; 	the 	existence 	or 	nonexistence 	of 	a
subjective 	anticipation 	of 	privacy; 	and 	the 	objective
reasonableness of such an expectancy under the facts of
a given case. 	We look, in short, to whether or not the
individual 	thought 	of 	the 	place 	(or 	the 	article) 	as 	a
private one, and treated it as such.
Id. 	(citing 	United 	States 	v. 	Aguirre, 	839 	F.2d 	854, 	856-57 	(1st
Cir. 1988)).
In 	Almeida, 	defendant 	challenged 	the 	lower 	court’s
decision 	to 	admit 	evidence 	obtained 	from 	a 	vehicle 	search. 	Id.
at 46-47. 	The 	First 	Circuit 	Court 	of 	Appeals 	determined 	that
defendant failed to establish that he had a reasonable expectation
of privacy on the vehicle because “he only had a casual possession
of 	the 	vehicle.” 	Id. 	at 	47. 	The 	Court 	in 	Almeida 	noted 	that
defendant 	did 	not 	own 	the 	vehicle 	and 	had 	no 	pattern 	of 	repeated
use 	or 	control 	of 	the 	vehicle 	“that 	would 	allow 	us 	to 	conclude
that 	his 	possession 	. 	. 	. 	was 	anything 	more 	than 	informal 	and
temporary.” 	Id. at 48.
Similarly, 	here 	Delgado 	has 	not 	established 	he 	has 	a
reasonable 	expectation 	of 	privacy 	in 	the 	F-150. 	He 	does 	not 	own
the 	vehicle; 	he 	has 	not 	provided 	a 	sworn 	statement 	from 	his
brother, the owner of the vehicle, that Delgado had permission to
Case 3:25-cr-00283-FAB Document 33 Filed 03/12/26 Page 6 of 10

Criminal No. 25-283 (FAB) 	7
use 	the 	vehicle, 	and 	has 	not 	shown 	a 	pattern 	of 	repeated 	use 	of
the 	vehicle. 	Accordingly, 	he 	has 	not 	shown 	that 	his 	possession
was anything more than informal and temporary and consequently, he
lacks 	standing 	to 	challenge 	the 	admission 	of 	the 	evidence 	seized
from the F-150 pursuant to the Fourth Amendment.
C. 	Franks Hearing
Because 	Delgado 	does 	not 	have 	standing 	to 	suppress 	the
evidence seized from the F-150, the inquiry could stop here. 	See
United 	States 	v. 	Torres, 	188 	F.Supp.2d 	155, 	158 	(D.P.R. 	2002)
(Gregory-García, J.) (finding that a defendant lacked standing to
request 	a 	Franks 	hearing 	because 	he 	failed 	to 	prove 	a 	reasonable
expectation 	of 	privacy 	in 	the 	place 	that 	was 	searched). 	In 	any
event, Delgado has not made the required offer of proof necessary
to 	trigger 	a 	Franks 	hearing. 	An 	affidavit 	“supporting 	a 	search
warrant 	is 	presumptively 	valid.” 	United 	States 	v. 	Gifford, 	727
F.3d 	92, 	98 	(1st 	Cir. 	2013). 	A 	defendant 	is 	able 	“to 	rebut 	this
presumption and challenge the veracity” of the warrant application
at a pretrial hearing, typically referred to as a “Franks” hearing.
United 	States 	v. 	McLellan, 	792 	F.3d 	200, 	208 	(1st 	Cir. 	2015);
Franks 	v. 	Delaware, 	438 	U.S. 	154 	(1978). 	A 	defendant 	does 	not
have 	an 	automatic 	right 	to 	a 	Franks 	hearing 	and 	is 	only 	entitled
to 	an 	evidentiary 	Franks 	hearing 	when 	he 	or 	she 	makes 	a
“substantial preliminary showing that a false statement, knowingly
Case 3:25-cr-00283-FAB Document 33 Filed 03/12/26 Page 7 of 10

Criminal No. 25-283 (FAB) 	8
and 	intentionally, 	or 	with 	reckless 	disregard 	for 	the 	truth, 	was
included 	by 	the 	affiant 	in 	the 	warrant 	affidavit, 	and 	if 	the
allegedly false statement is necessary to the finding of probable
cause.” 	Franks, 438 U.S. at 155–56. 	Material omissions can also
serve as grounds for a Franks hearing, but only when the omissions
are 	“designed 	to 	mislead, 	or 	[...] 	made 	in 	reckless 	disregard 	of
whether [it] would mislead, the magistrate in his appraisal of the
affidavit.” 	United 	States 	v. 	Barbosa, 	896 	F.3d 	60, 	68 	(1st 	Cir.
2018).
To 	make 	a 	“substantial 	preliminary 	showing”, 	a
defendant’s 	claim 	must 	go 	beyond 	vague 	or 	conclusory 	statements
and 	must 	“be 	supported 	by 	more 	than 	a 	mere 	desire 	to 	cross-
examine.” 	United 	States 	v. 	Andújar-Ortiz, 	575 	F. 	Supp. 	2d 	373,
377 	(D.P.R. 	Sept. 	2, 	2008) 	(García-Gregory, 	J.). 	There 	must 	be
“an 	offer 	of 	proof”, 	such 	as 	“affidavits 	or 	sworn 	or 	otherwise
reliable 	statements 	of 	witnesses.” 	Id.; 	Franks, 	438 	U.S. 	at 	171
(“Affidavits 	or 	sworn 	or 	otherwise 	reliable 	statements 	of
witnesses 	should 	be 	furnished, 	or 	their 	absence 	satisfactorily
explained.”). 	Self-serving 	statements 	alone 	are 	insufficient 	to
serve as an offer of proof. 	Id. (citations omitted).
Here, 	Delgado 	has 	not 	made 	a 	substantial 	preliminary
showing to trigger a Franks hearing. 	Delgado only submits his own
affidavit, 	which 	merely 	attests 	that 	he 	has 	read 	“the 	Motion 	to
Case 3:25-cr-00283-FAB Document 33 Filed 03/12/26 Page 8 of 10

Criminal No. 25-283 (FAB) 	9
Suppress 	Evidence 	and 	for 	Frank’s 	Hearing, 	including 	the 	factual
statement 	in 	the 	motion.” 	(Docket 	No. 	20-1.) 	A 	statement 	that
Delgado read the motion is not even an allegation that the agent’s
affidavit 	contains 	a 	material 	omission. 	And, 	even 	if 	the 	Court
considers the facts in the referenced motion, Delgado did not make
a substantial preliminary showing of a material omission. 	He does
not 	include 	statements 	from 	the 	other 	witnesses, 	nor 	does 	he
include 	a 	copy 	of 	the 	affidavit 	submitted 	by 	law 	enforcement,
without which it is difficult if not impossible to assess whether
a material omission was made. 	The failure to include any offer of
proof 	is 	fatal 	to 	Delgado’s 	request 	for 	a 	Franks 	hearing. 	See
United States v. Figueroa-Figueroa, 2025 WL 3079162, at *4 (Nov. 4,
2025) 	(López-Soler, 	M.J.), 	adopted, 	2026 	WL 	94603 	(Jan. 	9, 	2026)
(Delgado-Colón, 	J.) 	(denying 	request 	for 	Franks 	hearing 	because
defendant 	did 	not 	provide 	an 	offer 	of 	proof 	or 	the 	challenged
affidavit, only conclusory allegations). 	Accordingly, the Courts
DENIES his request.
III. Conclusion
For 	the 	reasons 	discussed 	above, 	the 	Court 	DENIES 	defendant
Delgado’s 	motion 	to 	suppress 	and 	DENIES 	his 	request 	for 	a 	Franks
hearing. 	(Docket No. 20.)
Case 3:25-cr-00283-FAB Document 33 Filed 03/12/26 Page 9 of 10

Criminal No. 25-283 (FAB) 	10
IT IS SO ORDERED.
San Juan, Puerto Rico, March 12, 2026.
s/ Francisco A. Besosa
FRANCISCO A. BESOSA
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Case 3:25-cr-00283-FAB Document 33 Filed 03/12/26 Page 10 of 10