USA v. Valdes-Ramirez et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v.
[2] JORGE SIBERÓN-FLUSA,
Defendant.
CRIMINAL NO. 24-279 (RAM)
OPINION AND ORDER
RAÚL M. ARIAS-MARXUACH, United States District Judge.
Pending 	before 	the 	Court 	is 	Defendant 	Jorge 	Siberón-Flusa’s
(“Mr. 	Siberón-Flusa” 	or 	“Defendant”) 	Motion 	to 	Suppress 	and 	the
Government’s 	Opposition 	thereto. 	(Docket 	Nos. 	90 	and 	92). 	Having
held 	a 	suppression 	hearing 	on 	November 	26, 	2025 	and 	December 	8,
2025, 	and 	having 	reviewed 	the 	parties’ 	arguments 	and 	evidence,1
the Court hereby GRANTS IN PART Defendant’s Motion to Suppress.
I. 	PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Following 	a 	federal 	criminal 	investigation 	and 	a 	Criminal
Complaint,2 on August 22, 2024, a Grand Jury issued a three-count
Indictment 	charging 	Mr. 	Siberón-Flusa 	with 	conspiracy 	to 	possess
1 The Court also considered Defendant’s Reply to the Government’s Opposition
and the parties’ post-hearing supplemental briefs. (Docket Nos. 99, 122, and
125).
2 Docket No. 1.
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Criminal No. 24-279 (RAM) 	2
with intent to distribute a controlled substance, in violation of
21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1)&(b)(1)(A)(ii) and 846 (Count 1); aiding and
abetting 	possession 	with 	intent 	to 	distribute 	a 	controlled
substance, 	in 	violation 	of 	21 	U.S.C. 	§§ 	841(a)(1)&(b)(1)(A)(ii)
(Count 	2); 	and 	possession 	of 	a 	firearm 	in 	furtherance 	of 	a 	drug
trafficking 	crime, 	in 	violation 	of 	18 	U.S.C. 	§§ 	924(c)(1)(A)(i)
and 	2 	(Count 	3). 	(Docket 	No. 	23). 	Specifically, 	the 	Indictment
charged 	Defendant 	with 	knowingly 	possessing 	with 	intent 	to
distribute 	400 	grams 	or 	more 	of 	fentanyl 	and 	with 	knowingly
possessing a Glock pistol, G19, 9mm, bearing serial number BHKD576,
loaded with ammunition in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime.
Id. at 1.
On September 15, 2025, Defendant filed the pending Motion to
Suppress. (Docket No. 90). Mr. Siberón-Flusa alleges that on August
1, 	2024, 	he 	visited 	co-Defendant 	Eliezer 	Valdés-Ramírez’s 	(“Mr.
Valdés-Ramírez” 	or 	“co-Defendant”) 	residence 	at 	148 	Calle
Igualdad, 	Caguas, 	Puerto 	Rico, 	and 	that 	he 	signed 	and 	received 	a
parcel on behalf of co-Defendant. Id. at 2. According to Defendant,
he 	placed 	the 	parcel 	in 	his 	vehicle 	and 	began 	to 	transport 	it 	to
another location at the request of Mr. Valdés-Ramírez. Id. Shortly
thereafter, United States Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”)
agents stopped his vehicle and arrested him. Id. at 3. Mr. Siberón-
Flusa 	alleges 	that 	DEA 	agents 	proceeded 	to 	ask 	unwarned,
unconstitutional 	questions 	and 	conduct 	a 	warrantless, 	illegal
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Criminal No. 24-279 (RAM) 	3
search 	of 	his 	vehicle. 	Id. 	at 	8-17. 	Defendant 	claims 	that 	he 	was
removed 	from 	his 	vehicle 	by 	several 	armed 	DEA 	agents, 	restrained
by 	two 	DEA 	agents 	toward 	the 	back 	of 	the 	vehicle, 	and 	asked
aggressively 	about 	the 	whereabouts 	of 	a 	weapon. 	Id. 	at 	2-3. 	He
admits 	that 	he 	told 	the 	agents 	that 	there 	was 	a 	weapon 	under 	the
front 	driver’s 	seat 	of 	the 	car. 	Id. 	at 	2-3. 	He 	also 	alleges 	that
he was restrained in such a fashion that he could not reach inside
the 	vehicle 	or 	access 	any 	weapon. 	Id. 	at 	3. 	As 	a 	result 	of 	Mr.
Siberón-Flusa’s 	statement 	and 	the 	agent’s 	search 	of 	the 	vehicle,
the 	DEA 	seized 	the 	following: 	a 	package 	containing 	approximately
10,000 fentanyl-laced pills stamped “M-30”;3 a stolen Glock pistol,
G19, 9mm, bearing serial number BHKD576, with a thirty-three (33)
round 	extended 	9-millimeter 	Glock 	magazine 	containing 	thirty-one
(31) 	rounds 	of 	9-millimeter 	ammunition 	inserted 	into 	the 	pistol
with an empty chamber; a twenty-four (24) round 9-millimeter Glock
magazine 	containing 	twenty-three 	(23) 	rounds 	of 	9-millimeter
ammunition; 	and 	a 	fifteen 	(15) 	round 	9-millimeter 	Glock 	magazine
containing fifteen (15) rounds of 9-millimeter ammunition. (Docket
No. 92 at 3). Finally, Mr. Siberón-Flusa asserts that the unwarned
statements 	he 	made 	during 	an 	interview 	in 	an 	unmarked 	car 	and 	a
visit 	to 	the 	hospital 	were 	obtained 	illegally, 	and 	that 	any
subsequent 	statements 	and 	the 	seizure 	and 	extraction 	of 	his
3 Prior to the controlled delivery of the parcel, Drug Enforcement Agency (“DEA”)
and United States Postal Service (“USPS”) agents removed the fentanyl pills and
replaced them with decoys (“fake drugs”). (Docket No. 113 at 41).
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Criminal No. 24-279 (RAM) 	4
cellphone 	should 	be 	suppressed 	as 	“fruit 	of 	the 	poisonous 	tree.”
(Docket No. 90 at 18).
The 	Government 	filed 	an 	Opposition 	questioning 	Defendant’s
Fourth 	Amendment 	standing 	and 	arguing 	that 	the 	seizure 	of 	the
parcel 	was 	covered 	by 	a 	tracking 	warrant, 	that 	the 	agents 	had
probable 	cause 	to 	stop 	the 	vehicle, 	and 	that 	the 	public 	safety
exception, automobile exception, and plain view doctrines applied.
(Docket 	No. 	92). 	The 	Government 	asserts 	that 	Defendant 	had 	no
legitimate 	expectation 	of 	privacy 	in 	the 	package 	he 	transported
because 	it 	was 	subject 	to 	a 	tracking 	warrant. 	Id. 	at 	8. 	The
Government 	also 	alleges 	that 	the 	presence 	of 	the 	parcel 	known 	to
contain fentanyl-laced pills gave the DEA agents probable cause to
believe 	Defendant 	was 	committing 	a 	drug 	trafficking 	offense 	and,
therefore, 	to 	stop 	the 	vehicle. 	Id. 	at 	8-10. 	Additionally, 	the
Government 	posits 	that 	the 	automobile 	exception 	applies 	because
Defendant’s 	car 	was 	readily 	mobile 	and 	probable 	cause 	existed 	to
search the vehicle. Id. at 10. The Government further submits that
the public safety exception applies because the narrowly tailored
questions 	about 	the 	presence 	of 	a 	weapon 	were 	geared 	towards
ensuring 	the 	agent’s 	safety 	and 	the 	safety 	of 	the 	public. 	As 	to
the plain view doctrine, the Government maintains that it applies
because 	the 	parcel, 	located 	on 	the 	front 	passenger 	seat, 	and 	two
magazines, 	located 	in 	the 	driver’s 	side 	door, 	were 	in 	plain 	view
of the DEA agents. Id. at 11. Finally, the Government posits that
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Criminal No. 24-279 (RAM) 	5
Defendant’s unwarned statements in the police vehicle do not taint
his 	post-Miranda 	statements, 	that 	his 	statements 	at 	the 	hospital
were voluntary, and that he authorized the search of his cellphone.
Id. at 14.
On 	November 	26, 	2025 	and 	December 	8, 	2025, 	the 	Court 	held 	a
suppression 	hearing. 	(Docket 	Nos. 	113 	and 	119). 	At 	the 	hearing,
Defendant 	and 	the 	Government 	jointly 	presented 	the 	arresting
officers’ body camera footage. Defendant presented his partner’s,
Ms. 	Nayshaliz 	Mulero-Bezares 	(“Ms. 	Mulero-Bezares”), 	testimony
about her ownership of the vehicle and Mr. Siberón-Flusa’s use of
it. The Government presented the testimonies of DEA Special Agent
Christopher 	Johnson 	(“SA 	Johnson”), 	DEA 	Special 	Agent 	René
Gutiérrez 	(“SA 	Gutiérrez”), 	DEA 	Task 	Force 	Officer 	Israel 	Román-
Rodríguez, 	(“TFO 	Román-Rodríguez”), 	and 	DEA 	Task 	Force 	Officer
Abimael 	Zayas 	(“TFO 	Zayas”) 	as 	to 	the 	circumstances 	relating 	to
Defendant’s arrest, his questioning, and the search of the vehicle.
During the hearing, the parties stipulated the following facts:
1. The 	parcel 	that 	was 	seized 	was 	delivered 	to 	and 	received
by 	Defendant 	at 	148 	Calle 	Igualdad, 	Caguas, 	Puerto 	Rico,
as testified to by SA Johnson;
2. After 	Defendant 	received 	the 	parcel, 	he 	got 	in 	a 	vehicle
with 	the 	parcel, 	drove 	off 	in 	that 	vehicle 	and 	was
subsequently arrested in it with the parcel;
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Criminal No. 24-279 (RAM) 	6
3. When Defendant received the parcel, it did not have drugs
inside because the drugs had already been removed from the
parcel, as testified to by SA Johnson. (Docket No. 113 at
84).
II. 	FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Considering the parties’ stipulations, the testimony and the
evidence 	presented 	at 	the 	November 	26, 	2025 	and 	December 	8, 	2025
suppression 	hearing, 	the 	Court 	makes 	the 	following 	relevant
findings of fact:
1. On July 31, 2024, Magistrate Judge Héctor Ramos-Vega issued
federal search warrant 24-704(M) authorizing the search of
USPS parcel EI 993 508 764 US.
2. DEA 	agents 	discovered 	approximately 	10,000 	fentanyl-laced
pills stamped “M-30” after executing the warrant.
3. On 	August 	1, 	2024, 	Magistrate 	Judge 	Héctor 	Ramos-Vega
issued 	an 	anticipatory 	search 	warrant 	for 	148 	Calle
Igualdad, 	Caguas, 	Puerto 	Rico, 	and 	a 	tracking 	warrant 	for
the parcel.
4. DEA 	and 	USPS 	agents 	replaced 	the 	10,000 	fentanyl-laced
pills 	in 	the 	parcel 	with 	decoys 	and 	placed 	a 	tracking
device inside the parcel.
5. On August 1, 2024, the parcel was delivered to and received
by 	Defendant 	at 	148 	Calle 	Igualdad, 	Caguas, 	Puerto 	Rico,
as testified to by SA Johnson.
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Criminal No. 24-279 (RAM) 	7
6. Mr. 	Siberón-Flusa 	and 	the 	black 	Nissan 	Sentra 	were 	not 	a
part 	of 	the 	criminal 	investigation 	in 	this 	case 	before
August 1, 2024.
7. When Defendant received the parcel, it did not have drugs
inside; the drugs had already been removed from the parcel,
as testified to by SA Johnson.
8. After 	Defendant 	received 	the 	parcel, 	he 	got 	in 	a 	black
Nissan 	Sentra 	with 	the 	parcel 	and 	drove 	off 	in 	that
vehicle.
9. Ms. Mulero-Bezares owns the black Nissan Sentra.
10. 	Ms. 	Mulero-Bezares 	shared 	the 	car 	with 	Mr. 	Siberón-
Flusa, and he had free use of it during the day while his
own car was inoperable.
11. 	The DEA agents did not have a warrant to search the black
Nissan Sentra.
12. 	Shortly 	after 	Defendant 	drove 	off 	in 	the 	black 	Nissan
Sentra, DEA vehicles intercepted it.
13. 	DEA 	agents 	exited 	their 	vehicles, 	opened 	the 	driver’s
side door, removed Defendant from the vehicle, and arrested
him.
14. 	At 	the 	time 	the 	vehicle 	was 	intercepted, 	there 	were
approximately armed eight agents involved in the operation.
15. 	The parcel was located on the front passenger side seat
of the vehicle.
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Criminal No. 24-279 (RAM) 	8
16. 	Two 	DEA 	agents 	restrained 	Mr. 	Siberón-Flusa 	with 	his
arms 	behind 	his 	back, 	placed 	handcuffs 	on 	him, 	and 	held
him 	near 	the 	trunk 	of 	the 	vehicle 	while 	other 	agents
“cleared” it.4
17. 	The vehicle was secured in place and inaccessible to Mr.
Siberón-Flusa.
18. 	While Defendant was restrained by two agents towards the
trunk 	of 	the 	vehicle, 	SA 	Gutiérrez 	asked 	Defendant 	if 	he
had 	a 	firearm 	to 	which 	Mr. 	Siberón-Flusa 	answered 	in 	the
affirmative.
19. 	SA Gutiérrez followed up by asking where the gun was, to
which Mr. Siberón-Flusa responded by saying that there was
a gun under the driver seat.
20. 	Mr. 	Siberón-Flusa 	had 	not 	been 	given 	Miranda 	warnings
prior to these questions.
21. 	The DEA agents had no previous suspicion that there were
firearms in the car, and they did not have a warrant for a
firearm.
4 According to SA Johnson’s testimony, clearing the vehicle involves removing
all personnel that are inside the vehicle. (Docket 113 at 35). Specifically,
clearing the “entire vehicle, front seats, back seats, trunk even, and make
sure that there’s nobody that can do us or any civilians harm, make sure there's
no weapons [. . .] [a]nything that can hurt us or the civilian population we
want to make sure that it's not a threat to anybody.” Id. at 35-36.
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Criminal No. 24-279 (RAM) 	9
22. 	It was only by Mr. Siberón-Flusa’s affirmation as to the
fact that there was a weapon in the car that the DEA agents
searched under the driver seat.
23. 	Special 	Agent 	Daniel 	Galvas 	removed 	a 	stolen 	Glock
pistol, 	G19, 	9mm, 	bearing 	serial 	number 	BHKD576 	with 	a
thirty-three 	(33) 	round 	extended 	9-millimeter 	Glock
magazine containing thirty-one (31) rounds of 9-millimeter
ammunition 	inserted 	into 	the 	pistol 	with 	an 	empty 	chamber
from under the driver seat.
24. 	DEA 	agents 	also 	recovered 	a 	twenty-four 	(24) 	round 	9-
millimeter 	Glock 	magazine 	containing 	twenty-three 	(23)
rounds of 9-millimeter ammunition and a fifteen (15) round
9-millimeter Glock magazine containing fifteen (15) rounds
of 	9-millimeter 	ammunition 	from 	the 	front 	driver’s 	side
door of the vehicle.
25. 	DEA agents seized a cellphone from Defendant’s person at
the time of the arrest.
26. 	Around 12:15 p.m. on August 1, 2024, Defendant was moved
to 	an 	unmarked 	vehicle 	at 	which point 	TFO 	Román-Rodríguez
asked him where he was going with the parcel, to which Mr.
Siberón-Flusa responded that he was told to take it to Mr.
Valdés-Ramírez’s grandmother’s house.
27. 	TFO Román-Rodríguez then asked if Defendant could point
out the location of the house on a map and he did so.
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Criminal No. 24-279 (RAM) 	10
28. 	Mr. 	Siberón-Flusa 	was 	not 	given 	Miranda 	warnings 	prior
to TFO Román-Rodríguez’s questions.
29. 	While 	in 	the 	unmarked 	vehicle, 	Defendant 	then 	said, 	“I
don’t even know why I took that box.”
30. 	Around 12:40 p.m. on August 1, 2024, inside the unmarked
vehicle, 	TFO 	Román-Rodríguez 	gave 	Mr. 	Siberón-Flusa
Miranda warnings and Defendant waived them.
31. 	DEA 	Special 	Agent 	Felix 	Flores 	(“SA 	Flores”) 	was 	also
present when Defendant waived his Miranda rights.
32. 	At 	12:58 	p.m., 	Defendant 	signed 	a 	consent 	for 	his
cellphone to be searched and provided the password for it.
33. 	After signing both the Miranda waiver and consent to the
phone 	search, 	Mr. 	Siberón-Flusa 	had 	a 	10–25-minute
interview with SA Román-Rodríguez.
34. 	SAs 	Flores, 	Zayas 	and 	Román 	transported 	Mr. 	Siberón-
Flusa to the DEA offices in Guaynabo.
35. 	At 	5:15 	p.m., 	TFO 	Zayas 	gave 	Mr. 	Siberón-Flusa 	Miranda
warnings 	in 	the 	DEA 	offices 	and, 	again, 	Defendant 	waived
them.
36. 	TFO Zayas conducted an interview with Defendant after he
signed the Miranda waiver.
37. 	Around 8 p.m., Defendant was in his cell and said he was
not feeling well.
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Criminal No. 24-279 (RAM) 	11
38. 	Due 	to 	Defendant’s 	heart 	condition, 	TFO 	Zayas 	and 	SA
Flores 	took 	Defendant 	to 	the 	Cardiovascular 	Hospital 	in
San Juan.
39. 	While in a private room at the hospital, Defendant told
TFO Zayas and SA Flores that he remembered that Mr. Valdés-
Ramírez bought a pickup truck and a BMW SUV from “El Negro,”
the Turabo Heights big shot, using 10,000 pills.
40. 	Mr. 	Siberón-Flusa 	was 	cleared 	by 	the 	doctors 	and 	taken
to detention in Carolina.
III. LEGAL STANDARD
The 	Fourth 	Amendment 	protects 	“[t]he 	right 	of 	the 	people 	to
be 	secure 	in 	their 	persons, 	houses, 	papers, 	and 	effects, 	against
unreasonable 	searches 	and 	seizures.” 	U.S. 	Const. 	amend. 	IV. 	In
light 	of 	this 	Constitutional 	prohibition 	against 	unreasonable
searches 	and 	seizures, 	“a 	search 	of 	an 	arrestee’s 	vehicle 	[is]
unreasonable 	unless 	police 	obtain 	a 	warrant 	or 	show 	that 	[an]
exception 	to 	the 	warrant 	requirement 	applies.” 	Arizona 	v. 	Gant,
556 U.S. 332, 351 (2009). Moreover, the Supreme Court has explained
that 	“searches 	conducted 	outside 	the 	judicial 	process, 	without
prior 	approval 	by 	judge 	or 	magistrate, 	are 	per 	se 	unreasonable
under 	the 	Fourth 	Amendment—subject 	only 	to 	a 	few 	specifically
established 	and 	well-delineated 	exceptions.” 	Katz 	v. 	United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (emphasis added).
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Criminal No. 24-279 (RAM) 	12
In the case at bar, Defendant challenges the legality of the
warrantless search of the vehicle he was driving. “On a motion to
suppress evidence seized on the basis of a warrantless search, the
presumption favors the defendant, and it is the government’s burden
to 	demonstrate 	the 	legitimacy 	of 	the 	search.” 	United 	States 	v.
Delgado-Perez, 	867 	F.3d 	244, 	250 	(1st 	Cir. 	2017) 	(quoting 	United
States v. Winston, 444 F.3d 115, 123–24 (1st Cir. 2006)).
IV. 	STANDING
As 	a 	threshold 	matter, 	the 	Government 	contests 	whether
Defendant 	has 	standing 	to 	raise 	a 	Fourth 	Amendment 	claim. 	“The
proponent 	of 	a 	motion 	to 	suppress 	has 	the 	burden 	of 	establishing
that 	his 	own 	Fourth 	Amendment 	rights 	were 	violated 	by 	the
challenged 	search 	or 	seizure.” 	Rakas 	v. 	Illinois, 	439 	U.S. 	128,
132, 	n. 	1 	(1978). 	To 	meet 	this 	burden, 	the 	defendant 	“must 	show
that 	he 	had 	a 	reasonable 	expectation 	of 	privacy 	in 	the 	area
searched 	and 	in 	relation 	to 	the 	items 	seized.” 	United 	States 	v.
Aguirre, 839 F.2d 854, 856 (1st Cir. 1988). In Aguirre, the First
Circuit established a two-tier test for reasonable expectation of
privacy. 	First, 	courts 	must 	determine 	“whether 	or 	not 	the
individual thought of the place (or the article) as a private one,
and 	treated 	it 	as 	such.” 	Id. 	at 	857. 	The 	following 	factors 	are
relevant to this inquiry: “ownership, possession, and/or control;
historical 	use 	of 	the 	property 	searched, 	or 	the 	thing 	seized;
ability 	to 	regulate 	access; 	the 	totality 	of 	the 	surrounding
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Criminal No. 24-279 (RAM) 	13
circumstances; 	the 	existence 	or 	nonexistence 	of 	a 	subjective
anticipation of privacy; and the objective reasonableness of such
an expectancy under the facts of a given case.” Id. at 856–57. If
the defendant satisfies this first step, courts must “then look to
whether or not the individual’s expectation of confidentiality was
justifiable under the attendant circumstances.” Id. at 857. “While
property 	ownership 	is 	clearly 	a 	factor 	to 	be 	considered 	in
determining 	whether 	an 	individual’s 	Fourth 	Amendment 	rights 	have
been violated, ownership alone is not dispositive.” United States
v. 	Garcia-Robledo, 	488 	F. 	Supp. 	2d 	50, 	63 	(D.P.R. 	2007) 	(citing
United 	States 	v. 	Salvucci, 	448 	U.S. 	83, 	91 	(1980); 	Rawlings 	v.
Kentucky, 	448 	U.S. 	98, 	105 	(1980)). 	Courts 	should 	also 	consider
“any 	precautions 	taken 	to 	exclude 	others 	or 	otherwise 	maintain 	a
privacy 	interest.” 	Garcia-Robledo, 	488 	F. 	Supp. 	2d. 	at 	63.
(citations omitted).
The Government argues that, because Mr. Siberón-Flusa is not
the 	owner 	of 	the 	vehicle 	searched, 	he 	did 	not 	have 	a 	reasonable
expectation 	of 	privacy 	in 	it 	and, 	consequently, 	does 	not 	have
standing to challenge its search. (Docket Nos. 113 at 13). At the
suppression hearing, Ms. Mulero-Bezares testified that she is the
owner of the black Nissan Sentra. However, she further noted that
Defendant 	lived 	with 	her 	and 	habitually 	used 	the 	black 	Nissan
Sentra. Id. She testified that while Defendant owned a vehicle, it
was inoperable at the time of the relevant events. Id. at 7.
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Criminal No. 24-279 (RAM) 	14
Considering 	this 	testimony, 	during 	the 	hearing 	the 	Court
found 	that 	Mr. 	Siberón-Flusa 	established 	standing 	in 	challenging
the search of the black Nissan Sentra. Id. at 25. The Court ruled
that Defendant has standing because Ms. Mulero-Bezares shared the
vehicle 	with 	him 	and 	he 	had 	free 	use 	of 	it 	during 	the 	day 	while
his own car was inoperable. Id.
V. 	DISCUSSION
First, 	the 	Court 	underlines 	the 	fact 	that 	the 	DEA 	agents 	in
this case knew that the parcel contained 10,000 pills of fentanyl,
or 	rather 	the 	decoy 	drugs 	they 	had 	replaced 	them 	with, 	when 	they
executed 	the 	controlled 	delivery 	and 	Mr. 	Siberón-Flusa 	received
it. (Docket No. 113 at 41). In Illinois v. Andres, the Supreme Court
held 	that 	“[n]o 	protected 	privacy 	interest 	remains 	in 	contraband
in a container once government officers lawfully have opened that
container 	and 	identified 	its 	contents 	as 	illegal.” 	463 	U.S. 	756,
771 (1983). Here, the controlled delivery package had been opened
pursuant 	to 	a 	valid 	search 	warrant, 	and 	the 	“simple 	act 	of
resealing 	the 	container 	to 	enable 	the 	police 	to 	make
a controlled delivery does 	not 	operate 	to 	revive 	or 	restore 	the
lawfully invaded privacy rights.” Id. at 771-772 (finding “once a
container has been found to a certainty to contain illicit drugs,
the 	contraband 	becomes 	like 	objects 	physically 	within 	the 	plain
view 	of 	the 	police, 	and 	the 	claim 	to 	privacy 	is 	lost”); 	see 	also
United 	States 	v. 	Ruiz-Ruiz, 	No. 	CR 	22-232 	(RAM), 	2025 	WL 	1378659
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Criminal No. 24-279 (RAM) 	15
(D.P.R. 	May 	13, 	2025). While 	the 	controlled 	substances 	were
removed 	from 	the 	package 	before 	the 	container 	was 	resealed, 	such
a removal does not affect this assessment. If there are large gaps
in surveillance, it is possible a container could be put to other
uses, but the “likelihood that this will happen depends on all the
facts 	and 	circumstances, 	including 	the 	nature 	and 	uses 	of 	the
container, the length of the break in surveillance, and the setting
in 	which 	the 	events 	occur.” Id. at 	772. 	Here, 	approximately 	30
seconds elapsed between the controlled delivery of the parcel and
the 	moment 	the 	DEA 	agents 	saw 	Defendant 	board 	the 	black 	Nissan
Sentra with the parcel in hand. (Docket No. 113 at 31); see Andres,
463 U.S. at 773 (holding “absent a substantial likelihood that the
contents have been changed, there is no legitimate expectation of
privacy 	in 	the 	contents 	of 	a 	container 	previously 	opened 	under
lawful 	authority”). 	Accordingly, 	the 	DEA 	agents 	could 	not
reasonably 	conclude 	that 	the 	contents 	of 	the 	package 	had 	been
changed. Hence, Defendant had no legitimate expectation of privacy
in the contents of the parcel.
Under 	the 	“plain 	view 	doctrine,” 	a 	warrantless 	seizure 	is
lawful 	if 	the 	following 	three 	elements 	are 	met: 	“(i) 	the 	police
officer who effects the seizure lawfully reaches the vantage point
from 	which 	he 	sees 	an 	object 	in 	plain 	view; 	(ii) 	probable 	cause
exists 	to 	support 	his 	seizure 	of 	that 	object; 	and 	(iii) 	he 	has 	a
right 	of 	access 	to 	the 	object 	itself.” 	United 	States 	v. 	Sanchez,
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Criminal No. 24-279 (RAM) 	16
612 F.3d 1, 4-5 (1 st Cir. 2010) (citing United States v. Allen, 573
F.3d 42, 51 (1st Cir. 2009); United States v. Antrim, 389 F.3d 276,
283 	(1st 	Cir. 	2004)). 	When 	“a 	seizure 	of 	items 	in 	plain 	view 	is
supported 	by 	probable 	cause, 	an 	inquiring 	court 	will 	not 	look
behind that justification.” Sanchez, 612 F.3d at 6.
Here, 	DEA 	agents 	lawfully 	stationed 	on 	the 	street 	saw 	Mr.
Siberón-Flusa board the black Nissan Sentra in plain view with the
parcel 	known 	to 	contain 	contraband 	in 	hand. 	Therefore, 	they 	had
probable 	cause 	to 	believe 	Defendant 	was 	committing 	a 	crime.
Specifically, a drug trafficking offense. Consequently, DEA agents
had 	limited 	authority 	to 	stop 	the 	vehicle, 	arrest 	Defendant, 	and
seize the parcel.
Therefore, 	the 	questions 	before 	the 	Court 	are: 	(1) 	whether
the 	DEA 	agents 	lawfully 	questioned 	Defendant 	without 	issuing
Miranda 	warnings; 	(2) 	whether 	DEA 	agents 	lawfully 	searched 	the
vehicle 	and 	seized 	property 	without 	a 	warrant; 	and 	(3) 	whether
Defendant’s post-Miranda warning statements and the search of his
cellphone are “fruit of the poisonous tree.”
The Government submits that questioning Mr. Siberón-Flusa as
to the whereabouts of a weapon was lawful under the public safety
exception 	because 	the 	narrowly 	tailored 	questions 	about 	the
presence 	of 	a 	weapon 	were 	geared 	towards 	ensuring 	the 	agent’s
safety and the safety of the public. The Government also maintains
that 	the 	seizure 	of 	two 	gun 	magazines, 	located 	in 	the 	front
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Criminal No. 24-279 (RAM) 	17
driver’s side door, was legitimate because they were in plain view
of the DEA agents. (Docket No. 92 at 11). Moreover, the Government
contends 	that 	the 	search 	of 	the 	vehicle 	was 	justified 	under 	the
automobile 	exception 	because 	Defendant’s 	car 	was 	readily 	mobile
and 	probable 	cause 	existed 	to 	search 	the 	vehicle. 	Id. 	at 	10.
Finally, the Government avers that Defendant’s unwarned statements
in 	the 	police 	vehicle 	do 	not 	taint 	his 	post-Miranda 	statements,
that 	his 	statements 	at 	the 	hospital 	were 	voluntary, 	and 	that 	he
authorized the search of his cellphone. Id. at 14. The Court shall
address 	the 	credibility 	of 	testifying 	witnesses 	and 	the
applicability 	of 	the 	Government’s 	purported 	warrant 	and 	Miranda
warning exceptions below.
A. THE PUBLIC SAFETY EXCEPTION
The 	Fifth 	Amendment 	provides 	that 	“[n]o 	person 	... 	shall 	be
compelled 	in 	any 	criminal 	case 	to 	be 	a 	witness 	against 	himself.”
U.S. Const. amend. V. Consequently, before conducting a “custodial
interrogation” of a suspect, law enforcement officers must provide
Miranda warnings to the suspect as a procedural safeguard for his
or 	her 	Fifth 	Amendment 	rights. 	See 	Miranda 	v. 	Arizona, 	384 	U.S.
436, 	444 	(1966). 	Hence, 	“the 	need 	for 	a 	Miranda 	warning 	turns 	on
whether a suspect is in custody.” United States v. Swan, 842 F.3d
28, 31 (1st Cir. 2016) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
Courts 	typically 	apply 	a 	two-part 	test 	to 	determine 	if 	a
person 	is 	in 	custody 	for 	Miranda 	purposes. 	First, 	“the 	court
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Criminal No. 24-279 (RAM) 	18
examines 	the 	circumstances 	surrounding 	the 	questioning,” 	and
second, “sees whether those circumstances would cause a reasonable
person 	to 	have 	understood 	his 	situation 	to 	be 	comparable 	to 	a
formal arrest.” United States v. Guerrier, 669 F.3d 1, 6 (1 st Cir.
2011) 	(citations 	omitted). 	This 	analysis 	is 	guided 	by 	various
factors, 	including 	but 	not 	limited 	to 	“where 	the 	questioning
occurred, the number of officers, the degree of physical restraint,
and the duration and character of the interrogation.” Id. (quoting
United 	States 	v. 	Teemer, 	394 	F.2d 	59, 	66 	(1 st 	Cir. 	2005)).
Accordingly, individuals who are taken into custody and subject to
questioning 	by 	law 	enforcement 	must 	be 	given 	a 	warning 	about 	the
right 	to 	an 	attorney, 	among 	other 	rights. 	Id. 	at 	479. 	A 	suspect
may waive the Miranda rights and consent to an interrogation, but
the waiver must be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. See Edwards
v. 	Arizona, 	451 	U.S. 	477, 	484 	(1981). 	The 	district 	court 	“must
start 	with 	a 	presumption 	that 	the 	suspect 	did 	not 	waive 	his
rights,” and the government bears the burden of proving waiver by
a preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Carpentino, 948
F.3d 10, 26 (1 st Cir. 2020).
The Government does not contest that SA Gutiérrez’s unwarned
questions about the whereabouts of a weapon constitute a custodial
interrogation. As such, and given the degree of physical restraint
of Defendant and the approximately eight armed DEA agents present,
the 	Court 	finds 	that 	SA 	Gutiérrez’s 	questions 	constitute 	a
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Criminal No. 24-279 (RAM) 	19
custodial interrogation. The next question is whether an exception
to Miranda applies.
The 	Government 	posits 	that 	Mr. 	Siberón-Flusa’s 	answers 	fall
within 	the 	public 	safety 	exception. 	(Docket 	No. 	92 	at 	12). 	The
Government 	maintains 	that, 	given 	the 	risks 	associated 	with
firearms 	and 	narcotics 	trafficking 	and 	given 	that 	there 	were
neighbors 	nearby 	at 	the 	time 	of 	arrest, 	a 	limited 	unwarned
questioning 	aimed 	at 	ensuring 	officer 	safety 	and 	securing
contraband 	is 	admissible. 	Id. 	To 	support 	this 	proposition, 	they
cite 	the 	Supreme 	Court’s 	decision 	in 	New 	York 	v. 	Quarles 	which
found 	that 	a defendant’s 	initial 	statement 	indicating 	the
whereabouts of a gun was admissible despite the officer’s failure
to 	read 	the 	defendant 	his 	Miranda 	rights 	before 	attempting 	to
locate 	the 	weapon. 	467 	U.S. 	649 	(1984). 	The 	Supreme 	Court 	ruled
this 	way 	in 	view 	of 	the 	existence 	of 	a 	“public 	safety” 	exception
to the requirement that Miranda warnings be given before a suspect
may be questioned. Id.
In 	Quarles, 	the 	defendant 	was 	apprehended 	in 	a 	supermarket.
Id. 	at 	652. 	Upon 	frisking 	the 	defendant, 	the 	arresting 	officer
realized 	he 	had 	an 	empty 	gun 	shoulder 	holster. 	Id. 	The 	arresting
officer 	asked 	the 	defendant 	about 	the 	whereabout 	of 	the 	gun, 	and
he 	signaled 	that 	it 	was 	by 	some 	empty 	cartons. 	Id. 	There, 	the
police 	officers 	had 	“the 	immediate 	necessity 	of 	ascertaining 	the
whereabouts 	of 	a 	gun 	which 	they 	had 	every 	reason 	to 	believe 	the
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Criminal No. 24-279 (RAM) 	20
suspect 	had 	just 	removed 	from 	his 	empty 	holster 	and 	discarded 	in
the supermarket.” Id. At 657. This posed a threat to public safety
because 	if 	“the 	gun 	was 	concealed 	somewhere 	in 	the 	supermarket,
with 	its 	actual 	whereabouts 	unknown 	[. 	. 	.] 	an 	accomplice 	might
make use of it, a customer or employee might later come upon it.”
Id. Hence, “that the need for answers to questions in a situation
posing 	a 	threat 	to 	the 	public 	safety 	outweighs 	the 	need 	for 	the
prophylactic 	rule 	protecting 	the 	Fifth 	Amendment’s 	privilege
against self-incrimination.” Id. at 657.
Based 	on 	the 	evidence 	presented 	at 	the 	suppression 	hearing,
the facts in New York v. Quarles are clearly distinguishable from
this 	case 	and 	such 	distinction 	makes 	the 	public 	safety 	exception
inoperable here. Per the DEA agents’ testimony and the body camera
footage, 	Mr. 	Siberón-Flusa 	was 	already 	restrained 	near 	the 	trunk
of the vehicle, with his hands behind his back, when SA Gutiérrez
asked 	him 	about 	the 	whereabouts 	of 	a 	weapon. 	In 	fact, 	upon
arresting Defendant, the DEA agents had no indicia that there was
a 	weapon 	in 	the 	vehicle.5 	(Docket 	No. 	113 	at 	100). 	Moreover,
approximately eight DEA agents surrounded the vehicle and verified
that no other people were inside it. Although the Government points
to the presence of neighbors nearby, no evidence was presented to
5 For this reason, this case is also distinguishable from U.S. vs. Shea, which
the 	Government 	cites, 	where 	the 	First 	Circuit 	upheld 	an 	agent’s 	unwarned
question about the whereabouts of a gun after the defendant’s attempted armed
bank robbery. 150 F.3d 44 (1st Cir. 1998).
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Criminal No. 24-279 (RAM) 	21
establish that these neighbors or Mr. Siberón-Flusa could possibly
access 	the 	car 	or 	any 	weapon 	therein. 	Therefore, 	the 	Government
did 	not 	evince 	an 	immediate 	necessity 	of 	ascertaining 	the
whereabouts 	of 	a 	gun 	or 	demonstrate 	that 	agents 	had 	reason 	to
believe 	Defendant 	possessed 	a 	gun. 	Thus, 	the 	public 	safety
exception is inapposite here.
B. THE AUTOMOBILE EXCEPTION OR SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST
The 	Government 	maintains 	that 	the 	search 	whereby 	DEA 	agents
found 	the 	Glock 	pistol 	under 	the 	driver 	seat 	is 	lawful 	under 	the
automobile 	exception 	to 	warrantless 	searches 	of 	vehicles.
Defendant 	argues 	that 	the 	search-incident-to-arrest 	doctrine 	is
applicable 	and 	that 	the 	search 	in 	this 	case 	fails 	under 	the
exception set forth in Gant. 556 U.S. at 347.
On 	the 	one 	hand, 	the 	automobile 	exception 	provides 	an
exception to the search and seizure warrant requirement, providing
that 	“[i]f 	there 	is 	probable 	cause 	to 	believe 	a 	vehicle 	contains
evidence of criminal activity,” agents can search without a warrant
“any area of the vehicle in which the evidence may be found.” Gant,
556 U.S. at 347 (2009) (discussing United States v. Ross, 456 U.S.
798, 820–821(1982). In Carroll v. United States, the Supreme Court
found 	that, 	given 	the 	nature 	of 	an 	automobile 	in 	transit, 	an
immediate intrusion is necessary if police officers are to secure
the illicit substances. 267 U.S. 132 (1925); see also United States
v. Polanco, 634 F.3d 39 (1 st Cir. 2011).
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Criminal No. 24-279 (RAM) 	22
On 	the 	other 	hand, 	in 	Gant, 	the 	Supreme 	Court 	recognized 	that 	a
vehicle could fall into the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine and
not the automobile exception in some cases. Polanco, 634 F. 3d at
42 	(citing 	Gant, 	267 	U.S. 	at 	343). 	Specifically, 	it 	found 	that
vehicle 	search 	may 	fall 	within 	the 	search-incident-to-arrest
doctrine 	in 	two 	situations: 	“when 	the 	arrestee 	is 	unsecured 	and
within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time
of 	the 	search 	(the 	officer-safety 	justification), 	or 	when 	it 	is
reasonable 	to 	believe 	evidence 	relevant 	to 	the 	crime 	of 	arrest
might 	be 	found 	in 	the 	vehicle 	(the 	evidence-preservation
justification).” Id. (quotations omitted). “The auto exception is
distinct 	from 	the 	evidence-preservation 	component 	of 	Gant’s
search-incident-to-arrest 	analysis” 	because 	“the 	auto 	exception
extends beyond the crime of arrest” while Gant does not extend to
evidence 	of 	other 	offenses. 	Polanco, 	634 	F. 	3d 	at 	42. 	Also, 	“the
auto exception requires probable cause” while Gant “only requires
a ‘reasonable basis.’” Id. It is important to note that in Carroll,
Ross, and Polanco, the contraband that law enforcement had probable
cause to believe was in the vehicle was not in plain view.
In 	the 	case 	at 	bar, 	the 	DEA 	agents 	had 	probable 	cause 	to
believe 	that 	Mr. 	Siberón-Flusa 	was 	committing 	a 	drug 	trafficking
offense because he boarded the black Nissan Sentra holding a parcel
known 	to 	contain 	approximately 	10,000 	fentanyl 	pills. 	Thus, 	they
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Criminal No. 24-279 (RAM) 	23
had 	probable 	cause 	to 	stop 	the 	vehicle 	which 	contained 	such
contraband.
However, prior to Mr. Siberón-Flusa accepting the parcel and
boarding 	the 	black 	Nissan 	Sentra 	with 	it, 	he 	was 	not 	subject 	to
the 	criminal 	investigation 	that 	led 	to 	the 	controlled 	delivery;
nor did the DEA agents have any knowledge of him. (Docket No. 113
at 	62-63). 	Moreover, 	once 	the 	DEA 	agents 	intercepted 	the 	vehicle
and 	arrested 	Defendant, 	they 	found 	the 	parcel 	on 	the 	front
passenger seat, in plain view. (Docket No. 113 at 36-37).
While the automobile exception can extend beyond the crime of
arrest, 	it 	requires 	probable 	cause. 	The 	Government 	presented 	no
evidence 	to 	establish 	that 	the 	DEA 	agents 	had 	probable 	cause 	to
believe Mr. Siberón-Flusa had any contraband apart from the readily
identified 	parcel 	or 	that 	they 	had 	probable 	cause 	to 	believe 	he
was 	committing 	any 	other 	crime. 	In 	fact, 	SA 	Gutiérrez 	admitted
that before Defendant told him there was a weapon in the car, they
had 	no 	other 	indicia 	there 	was 	a 	weapon 	in 	the 	vehicle. 	(Docket
113 at 100). Therefore, the automobile exception does not operate
here. The Court now examines the facts of this case under Gant and
the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine.
Under Gant, a warrantless search of a vehicle falls under the
search-incident-to-arrest doctrine “when the arrestee is unsecured
and 	within 	reaching 	distance 	of 	the 	passenger 	compartment 	at 	the
time of the search” or “when it is reasonable to believe evidence
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Criminal No. 24-279 (RAM) 	24
relevant 	to 	the 	crime 	of 	arrest 	might 	be 	found 	in 	the 	vehicle.”
Polanco, 634 F. 3d at 42 (citing Gant, 267 U.S. at 343). That is,
the 	search-incident-to-arrest 	doctrine 	exists 	to 	ensure 	officer
safety 	and 	to 	preserve 	evidence. 	Consequently, 	law 	enforcement
officers 	“may 	search 	a 	vehicle 	incident 	to 	a 	recent 	occupant’s
arrest 	only 	if 	the 	arrestee 	is 	within 	reaching 	distance 	of 	the
passenger compartment at the time of the search or it is reasonable
to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest.”
Gant, 556 U.S. at 351.
Here, 	the 	search 	of 	the 	vehicle 	was 	conducted 	after 	Mr.
Siberón-Flusa 	was 	removed 	from 	the 	vehicle, 	while 	he 	was 	being
held by two DEA agents with his hands behind his back towards the
trunk 	of 	the 	vehicle, 	while 	the 	vehicle 	was 	surrounded 	by
approximately eight DEA agents, and while the parcel sat atop the
front 	passenger 	seat 	of 	the 	car. 	In 	other 	words, 	he 	was 	secured,
he 	was 	not 	within 	reaching 	distance 	of 	the 	passenger 	compartment
at 	the 	time 	of 	arrest, 	and 	the 	evidence 	relevant 	to 	the 	crime 	of
arrest 	was 	in 	plain 	view 	of 	the 	DEA 	officers 	without 	them
conducting 	a 	search 	of 	the 	vehicle. 	Consequently, 	the 	search-
incident-to-arrest 	exception 	established 	in 	Gant 	is 	also
inapplicable 	in 	this 	case. 	Therefore, 	the 	Glock 	pistol 	was
unlawfully seized.
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Criminal No. 24-279 (RAM) 	25
C. THE PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE
The 	Government 	alleges 	that 	the 	two 	gun 	magazines 	recovered
from the driver side door of the vehicle were in plain view of the
DEA 	agents, 	and 	that 	their 	seizure 	was 	lawful. 	As 	we 	have
established, 	under 	the 	“plain 	view 	doctrine,” 	a 	warrantless
seizure 	is 	lawful 	if 	the 	following 	three 	elements 	are 	met: 	“(i)
the 	police 	officer 	who 	effects 	the 	seizure 	lawfully 	reaches 	the
vantage 	point 	from 	which 	he 	sees 	an 	object 	in 	plain 	view; 	(ii)
probable 	cause 	exists 	to 	support 	his 	seizure 	of 	that 	object; 	and
(iii) he has a right of access to the object itself.” Sanchez, 612
F.3d 	at 	4-5 	(citing 	Allen, 	573 	F.3d 	at 	51; 	Antrim, 	389 	F.3d 	at
283).
In this case, the DEA agents had sufficient probable cause to
intercept the vehicle and arrest Defendant. To do so, they opened
the 	driver 	side 	door 	and 	removed 	Mr. 	Siberón-Flusa 	from 	the
vehicle. As per the body camera footage, once the DEA agents opened
the 	driver 	side 	door, 	they 	could 	observe 	the 	contents 	of 	the
compartment 	in 	the 	driver 	side 	door 	from 	their 	vantage 	point.
Given the nature of the objects and given that the front driver’s
side 	door 	was 	open, 	the 	DEA 	agents 	had 	a 	right 	to 	access 	and
probable cause to seize the two gun magazines. Therefore, the two
gun magazines were lawfully seized.
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Criminal No. 24-279 (RAM) 	26
D. UNWARNED STATEMENTS, VOLUNTARY STATEMENTS AND CONSENT TO
SEARCH
i. 	Unwarned Statements
Around 	12:15 	p.m. 	on 	August 	1, 	2024, 	Defendant 	was 	moved 	to
an 	unmarked 	vehicle 	at 	which 	point 	TFO 	Román-Rodríguez 	asked 	him
where 	he 	was 	going 	with 	the 	parcel, 	to 	which 	Mr. 	Siberón-Flusa
responded 	that 	he 	was 	told 	to 	take 	it 	to 	Mr. 	Valdés-Ramírez’s
grandmother’s 	house. 	(Docket 	No. 	119 	at 	13-15). 	TFO 	Román-
Rodríguez then asked if Defendant could point out the location of
the house on a map and he did so. Id. As per SA Román’s testimony,
he 	spoke 	to 	Defendant 	for 	around 	forty 	minutes 	and 	then 	issued
Miranda warnings to Mr. Siberón-Flusa at 12:40 p.m. Id. Defendant
signed a waiver of his Miranda rights at that time. Id.
Mr. 	Siberón-Flusa 	argues 	that 	all 	unwarned 	statements 	made
prior to the 12:40 p.m. waiver should be suppressed; the Government
offers 	no 	exception 	to 	Miranda 	that 	could 	possibly 	cover 	them.
Individuals who are taken into custody and subject to questioning
by 	law 	enforcement 	must 	be 	given 	a 	warning 	about 	the 	right 	to 	an
attorney, among other rights. Miranda, 394 U.S. at 479. Absent an
exception 	to 	Miranda, 	unwarned 	statements 	are 	obtained 	in
violation of the Fifth Amendment and are, as such, inadmissible.
ii. 	Voluntary Statements
Around 	8 	p.m. 	on 	August 	1, 	2024, 	Defendant 	was 	in 	his 	cell
and said that he was not feeling well. (Docket No. 119 at 21-24).
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Criminal No. 24-279 (RAM) 	27
Due 	to 	Defendant’s 	heart 	condition, 	TFO 	Zayas 	and 	SA 	Flores 	took
Defendant to the Cardiovascular Hospital in San Juan. Id. While in
a 	private 	room 	at 	the 	hospital, 	Defendant 	told 	TFO 	Zayas 	and 	SA
Flores that he remembered that Mr. Valdés-Ramírez bought a pickup
truck and a BMW SUV from “El Negro,” the Turabo Heights big shot,
using 	10,000 	pills. 	Id. 	Mr. 	Siberón-Flusa 	was 	cleared 	by 	the
doctors and taken to detention in Carolina. Id.
The 	Fifth 	Amendment 	requires 	suppression 	only 	of 	statements
obtained 	through 	custodial 	interrogation. 	Miranda, 	384 	U.S. 	at
444. 	The 	Supreme 	Court 	has 	found 	that 	Miranda 	safeguards 	apply
only when a suspect in custody is subjected to “express questioning
or 	its 	functional 	equivalent.” 	Rhode 	Island 	v. 	Innis, 	446 	U.S.
291, 	300–01 	(1980). 	This 	includes 	“any 	words 	or 	actions 	on 	the
part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest
and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to
elicit 	an 	incriminating 	response 	from 	the 	suspect.” 	Id. 	at 	301.
Hence, “[v]olunteered statements of any kind are not barred by the
Fifth 	Amendment.” 	Id. 	at 	300. 	“[T]he 	finder 	of 	fact 	must 	examine
the 	surrounding 	circumstances, 	and 	the 	entire 	course 	of 	police
conduct with respect to the suspect in evaluating the voluntariness
of 	his 	statements.” 	Oregon 	v. 	Elstad, 	470 	U.S. 	298, 	(1985).
However, 	“[t]he 	fact 	that 	a 	suspect 	chooses 	to 	speak 	after 	being
informed of his rights is, of course, highly probative.” Id.
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Criminal No. 24-279 (RAM) 	28
In 	this 	case, 	Defendant 	does 	not 	allege 	any 	coercive 	or
improper tactics utilized by the DEA agents to elicit a statement.
Defendant 	had 	been 	read 	his 	Miranda 	rights 	twice, 	at 	12:40 	p.m.
and 	at 	8 	p.m., 	prior 	to 	the 	statements 	at 	the 	hospital, 	and 	he
expressed 	the 	statements 	voluntarily, 	without 	prompting 	from 	the
DEA 	agents. 	Therefore, 	the 	statements 	Mr. 	Siberón-Flusa 	made 	at
the hospital are not precluded by Miranda.
E. POST-MIRANDA STATEMENTS AND THE APPLICATION OF THE
EXCLUSIONARY RULE
Around 	12:40 	p.m. 	on 	August 	1, 	2024, 	inside 	the 	unmarked
vehicle, 	TFO 	Román-Rodríguez 	gave 	Mr. 	Siberón-Flusa 	Miranda
warnings 	and 	Defendant 	waived 	them. 	(Docket 	No. 	119 	at 	15). 	SA
Flores was also present when Defendant waived his Miranda rights.
Id. at 16. After signing the Miranda waiver, Mr. Siberón-Flusa had
a 	10–25-minute 	interview 	with 	SA 	Román. 	Id. 	at 	18. 	SAs 	Flores,
Zayas, and Román transported Mr. Siberón-Flusa to the DEA offices
in Guaynabo. Id. at 19. At 5:15 p.m., TFO Zayas gave Mr. Siberón-
Flusa 	Miranda 	warnings 	in 	the 	DEA 	offices 	and, 	again, 	Defendant
waived 	them. 	Id. 	at 	69. 	TFO 	Zayas 	conducted 	an 	interview 	with
Defendant after he signed the Miranda waiver. Id.
A 	suspect 	may 	waive 	the 	Miranda 	rights 	and 	consent 	to 	an
interrogation, 	but 	the 	waiver 	must 	be 	voluntary, 	knowing, 	and
intelligent. See Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484. The district court “must
start 	with 	a 	presumption 	that 	the 	suspect 	did 	not 	waive 	his
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Criminal No. 24-279 (RAM) 	29
rights,” and the government bears the burden of proving waiver by
a preponderance of the evidence. Carpentino, 948 F.3d at 26.
Defendant 	does 	not 	contest 	that 	his 	waiver 	was 	knowing,
voluntary, 	and 	intelligent. 	Instead, 	Defendant 	argues 	that 	his
post-Miranda 	statements 	should 	be 	suppressed 	as 	“fruit 	of 	the
poisonous tree.”
The 	Court 	must 	“determine 	whether 	the 	fruits 	of 	that 	Fourth
Amendment violation ought to be suppressed.” United States v. Mata-
Pena, 	233 	F. 	Supp. 	3d 	281, 	293 	(D.P.R. 	2017). 	“The 	exclusionary
rule 	has 	traditionally 	barred 	from 	trial 	physical, 	tangible
materials 	obtained 	either 	during 	or 	as 	a 	direct 	result 	of 	an
unlawful 	invasion.” 	Wong 	Sun 	v. 	United 	States, 	371 	U.S. 	471, 	485
(1963). However, the “exclusion of evidence does not automatically
follow from the fact that a Fourth Amendment violation occurred.”
Davis 	v. 	United 	States, 	564 	U.S. 	229, 	244 	(2011) 	(citations
omitted). 	Rather, 	the 	exclusionary 	rule 	applies 	only 	where 	its
purpose, 	namely 	to 	“deter 	future 	Fourth 	Amendment 	violations[,]”
is “effectively advanced.” Id. at 236-237, 244.
To trigger the exclusionary rule, the police conduct at issue
must 	be 	sufficiently 	deliberate, 	reckless, 	grossly 	negligent, 	or
consist 	of 	a 	recurring 	or 	systemic 	negligence, 	so 	that 	the
deterrence 	achieved 	by 	suppressing 	evidence 	is 	worth 	the 	price
paid 	by 	the 	justice 	system. 	Herring 	v. 	United 	States, 	555 	U.S.
135, 	144 	(2009). 	On 	the 	contrary, 	“when 	the 	police 	act 	with 	an
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Criminal No. 24-279 (RAM) 	30
objectively 	reasonable 	good-faith 	belief 	that 	their 	conduct 	is
lawful, 	or 	when 	their 	conduct 	involves 	only 	simple, 	isolated
negligence, the deterrence rationale loses much of its force, and
exclusion cannot pay its way[.]” Davis, 564 U.S. at 238 (quotations
and citations omitted).
As 	to 	the 	questioning 	prior 	to 	the 	Miranda 	waiver 	at 	12:40
p.m. 	on 	August 	1, 	2024 	and 	the 	unwarranted 	search 	of 	the 	black
Nissan Sentra, the record does not reflect that the DEA agents had
an 	objectively 	reasonable, 	good-faith 	belief 	that 	their 	conduct
was lawful. The agents who testified were aware that they did not
have a warrant to search Defendant’s vehicle and they concede that
they did not have probable cause to believe there was a weapon in
the vehicle. Further, the Government provides no justification for
the unwarned interview that occurred in the unmarked vehicle prior
to 	12:40 	p.m. 	In 	the 	absence 	of 	evidence 	or 	testimony 	to 	support
their 	contention 	that 	the 	unwarned 	statements 	and 	warrantless
evidence 	seized 	were 	acquired 	lawfully, 	the 	Court 	concludes 	that
they must be suppressed.
However, 	as 	to 	Defendant’s 	statements 	after 	the 	12:40 	p.m.
and 5:15 p.m. waivers, the Court finds no evidence that they were
tainted 	by 	his 	pre-Miranda 	statements. 	The 	First 	Circuit 	has
established 	that 	“[a]bsent 	evidence 	of 	a 	deliberate 	strategy 	to
circumvent Miranda, [. . .]post-warning statements are admissible
if 	knowingly 	and 	voluntarily 	made.” 	United 	States 	v. 	Faust, 	853
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Criminal No. 24-279 (RAM) 	31
F.3d 	58 	(2017). 	Defendant 	does 	not 	plead 	a 	concerted 	DEA 	agent
effort 	to 	circumvent 	Miranda, 	nor 	does 	he 	challenge 	the 	validity
of 	his 	Miranda 	rights 	waivers. 	Moreover, 	the 	record 	does 	not
support 	either 	contention. 	Defendant 	also 	challenges 	the 	search
and seizure of his cellphone. However, at 12:58 p.m. on August 1,
2024, Defendant signed a consent for his cellphone to be searched
and provided the password for it. (Docket No. 119 at 15). Defendant
does not contest the validity of his consent nor does he plead if
and how it was tainted by DEA agents’ prior unlawful search of his
vehicle and their unwarned questions. In light of these facts, the
Court finds no basis to exclude it. Therefore, all of Mr. Siberón-
Flusa’s 	statements 	after 	his 	Miranda 	waivers 	were 	lawfully
obtained. 	The 	search 	and 	seizure 	of 	his 	cellphone 	was 	similarly
lawful.
VI. 	CONCLUSION
In accordance with the above, the Court hereby GRANTS IN PART
Defendant’s Motion to Suppress at Docket No. 90. Furthermore, the
Court 	SUPPRESSES 	the 	following 	statements 	and 	physical 	evidence
that the police acquired on August 1, 2024: Defendant’s statements
about the whereabouts of a gun made during his arrest; Defendant’s
statements while he sat in an unmarked vehicle before being given
Miranda 	warnings 	at 	12:40 	p.m.; 	and 	a 	stolen 	Glock 	pistol, 	G19,
9mm, bearing serial number BHKD576, with a thirty-three (33) round
extended 	9-millimeter 	Glock 	magazine 	containing 	thirty-one 	(31)
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Criminal No. 24-279 (RAM) 	32
rounds of 9-millimeter ammunition inserted into the pistol with an
empty 	chamber 	recovered 	from 	under 	the 	driver 	seat 	of 	the 	black
Nissan Sentra.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
In San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 12 th day of February 2025.
S/RAÚL M. ARIAS-MARXUACH_________
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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